ECB surprises markets with interest rate cut and purchases of private assets: Round-up of reactions from around Europe

As we predicted might happen, the ECB surprised markets yesterday with the announcement of an interest rate cut and the purchases of private assets.

Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel has a full analysis on his Forbes blog, where he concludes:

“In summation, Draghi surprised the markets with some bullish action. That said, I remain unconvinced that these programmes will do much to boost inflation, growth or even credit supply in the Eurozone. Importantly, the ECB is nearing the end of the actions it can take, and it is very aware of this. The onus has now once again been shifted to governments, with the expectations rising for action. For the first time since 2012, pressure is now really increasing for Eurozone governments to reassess the Eurozone’s institutional structures and take action to pool further sovereignty. Draghi may have come bearing gifts for markets but he came with further warning for governments.”

Needless to say, the fallout from the ECB's announcements has been widespread and varied. Below are some of the best reactions from papers across Europe. As one might expect, the German press was less than impressed with the policies unveiled by Draghi:

Die Welt’s Economics Editor Sebastian Jost describes the announcement as “Draghi’s last roll of the dice”, and claims that the ECB has demonstrated “an unusual passion for experimentation”. He also argues that “the ECB has now done pretty much everything which appears to be economically justifiable. Whoever wants a stable monetary union should hope that it does not go any further.”

Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Economics Editor Ulrich Schäfer describes the ABS as a “highly dubious innovation”, claiming that it resembles many of the financial products that contributed to the initial financial crash “when no-one could ultimately identify who had lent whom how much, and therefore who had assumed what risk.” He concludes that it is “ironic” that the ECB wants to give such products “renewed respectability”.

FAZ’s Economics Editor Holger Steltzner criticises Italy and France for delaying structural reforms in order to get more help from the ECB. He also argues, “Does the purchase of securities, which banks are struggling under the burden of, even come under monetary policy?...How can the ECB eventually return to normal? As soon as it increases interest rates, it will threaten itself with losses.”

Again as many would have predicted, the Mediterranean press took a more sympathetic view of Draghi’s decisions.

An editorial in Spanish daily El País argues that “the ECB hasn’t disappointed…[but] it’s equally necessary that the governments with sound public finances – and notably the German government – intensify investment and temporarily back greater flexibility in the necessary requests for public finances adjustment in the eurozone as a whole.”

The deputy editor of Spanish daily El Mundo, John Müller, makes an interesting point, “The enormous debt – both private and public – that has been amassed, is such a huge burden that it is surprising that no-one is addressing the problem seriously...Yesterday, Draghi only asked for help [from eurozone governments] in the form of fiscal measures and reforms, but not [in the form] of debt restructuring. In short, we don’t know if the monetary sorcerer has correctly identified the reason why we have lost the favour of the gods of growth.”

Columnist Jean-Marc Vittori writes in French business daily Les Echos that “the currency won’t be enough to save Europe”, and argues, “[There’s] no tenable monetary union without budgetary union. In a continent where the temptation to withdraw is growing, this appears to be a challenge. Nonetheless, it’s the condition for the survival of the euro.”

Italian Economics Professor Donato Masciandaro writes in Il Sole 24 Ore, “Draghi couldn’t have been clearer: the later the necessary fiscal and structural policies come, the less effective monetary policy will be…Such a decisive statement should make everyone reflect. The [European] Union is like a bogged-down machine. It has at least four traction wheels – currency, taxation, competition and labour – but only one of them is working. In such a situation, the machine risks going under.”

Italian journalist Danilo Taino writes in Corriere della Sera, “[Italian Prime Minister Matteo] Renzi is a lucky guy, since no [Italian] Prime Minister ever got this sort of help from the ECB. This means, however, that [Renzi] won’t be able to ask for anything else from Draghi. The ECB President has reached the extreme limit – except for a difficult, potential government bond-buying programme. From now on, everything is in the hands of governments.”

One interesting take away, particularly from the articles from around the eurozone periphery, is that there seems to be a renewed push for measures such as further budgetary union and debt-pooling. It looks as though there is a growing acceptance of the limitations of ECB action, and the continued flaws in the Eurozone architecture – something which we have long warned of.

ECB acts as expected, now the waiting game begins

For anyone following twitter yesterday around the ECB’s announcement and press conference it would seem as if we have just had another ‘whatever it takes’ moment (when ECB President Mario Draghi promised to backstop the eurozone).

However, stepping back for a moment and it becomes clear that the ECB acted more or less as expected and some would argue has done the minimum necessary to retain its credibility and not be labelled an ‘all talk’ institution.

Sure, the package of measures looks more impressive when strung together but as we discussed in detail here and here, few if any of them address the crux of the problems in the eurozone which are depressing inflation and growth (delayed impact of internal devaluation, rebalancing of various economies, recapitalisation of banks and the breakdown of the eurozone’s cross border financial system).

All that said, there were a few more subtle and interesting takeaways from Draghi’s press conference.

Unanimous support is impressive but unlikely to apply to further easing
Draghi stressed that the support for this entire package of measures was unanimous. This is quite surprising given the previous Bundesbank opposition and does add weight to the strength of the decision. That said, just because unanimity was agreed here does not mean it can be easily translated into support for much stronger action such as asset purchases. In fact, Draghi’s hesitancy to talk about such a programme in more depth and the ECB’s willingness to push ahead with one suggests a lack of consensus on the issue. Furthermore, the outcry in Germany has already begun and will likely make central bankers think twice about stronger easing action.

Draghi insists the ECB is not “finished”, but its mighty close
Over the past year, Draghi has waxed lyrical about all the tools at his disposal and we have analysed them all in detail – see here. However, with this package of measures he has come close to emptying his toolkit – he admitted as much on the rate side saying that, for all “practical purposes”, the lower bound has been reached.

True, he has pulled out many of the smaller tools and retains the big sledge hammer of asset purchases (Quantitative Easing through buying either private assets or government bonds) but the bar to take such action remains high and gaining support for it remains a huge challenge. Pushing the deposit rate further into negative territory is also unlikely to work as banks will simply begin hoarding hard cash – this of course has some cost in terms of storage and security but it will not be more than a fraction of a percent. Finally Draghi stressed that this package could take some time to have any impact, between three and four quarters (9 – 12 months), suggesting that the ECB is now in wait and see mode as the emphasis falls on governments and the bank stress tests to help push along the economic recovery.

Impact of long term lending operations relies on cross border lending being revived
As the useful chart to the left shows (from Morgan Stanley via FT Alphaville) the amount which banks can borrow is again limited in countries which need it (the periphery) due to their already underdeveloped markets in lending to small and medium sized businesses. The technical structure for the TLTRO (pronounced Tel-tro) does allow for them to borrow more if they lend more but this will take some time. Ultimately, the target seems to be to encourage banks in the core to lend to banks and businesses in the periphery – this fits with the theory of the negative deposit rate which should encourage a search for yield. Rebuilding the cross border system in the eurozone remains a huge task.

Another potential question which arises is whether the end of sterilising purchases made under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) will raise any legal issues or challenges in Germany and whether it will impact the judgement of OMT sterilisation.

In the end, the ECB has made its play and will likely now give it time to pan out. It will continue to provide dovish statements and may even talk up asset purchases in the future but it will urge patience in waiting to see if these measures have the desired impact.

ECB to ease policy but impact could be limited

Over on his Forbes blog Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel provides a preview for tomorrow’s ECB meeting at which some action to ease monetary policy is expected.

In specific terms he sees the ECB taking the following action:

1. Cut the main interest rate to 0.15% (from 0.25% now).
2. Cut the deposit rate to -0.1% (from 0% now). This will be an unprecedented move.
3. Announce a new Long Term Repurchase Operation (LTRO) focused on boosting lending to small and medium sized businesses. The term of the LTRO will be between 3 and 5 years, rates will be reduced if banks provide evidence of a pick-up in lending (see below for a useful Nomura graphic on this).

It could also decide to end the sterilisation of the Securities Market Programme purchases, creating a liquidity injection of €164.5bn and loosen collateral rules further. The ECB will likely keep asset purchases (both of private assets and government debt) in reserve but will likely reiterate that such action remains possible as part of a broader dovish statement from Draghi.

Despite some of these moves being unprecedented Raoul forecasts that the impact could be limited. This is for three reasons. First, much of it has been priced in as the moves have long been expected. Second, the impacts of a negative deposit rate and targeted LTRO are far from certain. Finally because it does not address the key problem, as he notes:

As the chart below shows (courtesy of SocGen) the biggest problem facing the eurozone financial system at the moment remains the discrepancy in lending rates to businesses in different economies. The knock-on impact of this is limiting credit in countries where the economy needs it and where it is needed to help drive inflation and growth.

It’s not clear that the rate cut, negative deposit rate or the LTRO will help close this gap. Fundamentally this gap is driven by a few factors which these issues do not address:

• Banks continue to deleverage and overhaul their balance sheets. The ECB’s Asset Quality Review and the bank stress tests are in the process of trying to put banks on a surer footing but until they are all done and dusted this process will weigh on banks actions.
• Cross border lending system in the eurozone remains fractured. Banks and investors on the whole are still not willing to lend and invest heavily in the peripheral economies. This stops the excess liquidity in the stronger countries filtering in the weaker ones. While negative rates will seek to encourage such movement by pushing a search for yield it is unlikely to override concerns over risk and the desire for safe assets.
• As recent ECB bank lending surveys highlight the problem is not just on the supply side but also the demand side. The economic overhaul, reform and rebalancing on many of the eurozone economies (both in the core and periphery) is an on-going process. Not only does this itself limit demand but it highlights that lending must be to new sectors and new drivers of economic growth rather than helping to simply prop up older sectors (here I am thinking for example in Spain of lending to new services rather than to the old real estate and construction sector).

Has the ECB actually moved closer to QE?

There has been a cacophony of comments from ECB members and ECB watchers over the past few days. However, the overriding view since ECB President Mario Draghi’s press conference last week is that the ECB has now moved a step closer to unconventional action such as Quantitative Easing (QE).

This is mostly down to two factors. First the following statement from Draghi’s presser:

“The Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to using also unconventional instruments within its mandate in order to cope effectively with risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation…this statement says that all instruments that fall within the mandate, including QE [Quantitative Easing], are intended to be part of this statement. During the discussion we had today, there was indeed a discussion of QE. It was not neglected in the course of what was actually a very rich and ample discussion.”

Second, the FAZ report over the weekend that the ECB has been modelling the impact of a €1 trillion per year (€80bn per month) QE programme. While it suggested that such a programme would only raise inflation by between 0.2% and 0.8% (not a significant amount given the cost), the simple fact it is being modelled has been enough to give markets hope.

We believe QE or similar measures have become a bit more likely, but mostly because the market now seems to expect action and if the ECB is to maintain its credibility it will need to do more than simply talk.

That said, while there may be ‘unanimous commitment’ to using such measures when needed, it’s still not clear what the criteria are for such action and it is even less clear that all members of the GC agree on when such action would be needed. Draghi was pushed on this on the first question during the Q&A session, however, he never provided a direct answer.

Furthermore, much of the coverage has suggested that QE is in fact closer because the ideological opposition to such a measure at the Governing Council (GC) level has crumbled - although we're not sure that such a clear unified opposition ever really existed.

With this in mind then, it’s worth once again pushing the point that, in fact many of the issues with further easing are practical, political and/or legal rather than ideological at the ECB. We have previously analysed each measure in detail, below is a summary and links to all those posts:

Quantitative Easing (purchasing government debt)
We have detailed the issues extensively here (but also here and here). Draghi has hinted of these practical issues before, highlighting that they need time to design the programme and gather more information. Beyond political opposition in Germany and the legal limits to ECB financing governments, there is a clear problem in that the purchases would need to split according to the ECB capital key, meaning little would flow to the periphery where the deflationary forces are strongest. Add onto this the fact that QE in other countries has not been proven to boost the real economy or even bank lending as well as that it may exacerbate the squeeze on safe assets and it becomes clear that practically and technically this would be a very difficult step for the ECB to take and is not well suited to tackling the problem of low inflation.

Quantitative Easing (purchasing private assets)
See our detailed analysis here. The thrust would be to target purchases of assets which would help promote bank lending – the main one discussed is Asset Backed Securities (ABS), particularly ones made up of loans to the real economy. However, these markets in Europe are small and underdeveloped meaning the level of assets available and suitable for purchase would be minimal. The ECB has suggested it wants this market to grow but it’s tough to force such a move, especially in the short term.

Negative deposit rate
We analysed this option here. Since then the ECB seems to have made progress on the technical implementation of such a move. That said, the impact remains very uncertain. It could further reduce excess liquidity, force money market funds to shutter and force banks to pass costs onto consumers. On the plus side it could help weaken the euro.

A targeted LTRO (similar the Bank of England’s Funding for Lending Scheme)
Discussed, with other measures, here. A fairly simply option to take, however, given that there is already full allotment (unlimited liquidity at low rates) and banks have already repaid a lot of the previous LTROs there is no guarantee there would be any significant take up or that it would filter through to the full economy.

Ending sterilisation of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)
A smaller measure, discussed in this post. While it would stop liquidity being drawn out of the system on a weekly basis, it’s not clear that this liquidity would flow to the real economy.

Further standard measures such as rate cuts and changing collateral rules
We rounded up such options a while ago here. Given that rates are already so low and that the transmission mechanism remains broken, the impact of such moves is likely to be limited to signalling intent rather than hoping for any significant return.

Overall, nearly all of these measures face quite serious practical, technical and/or legal obstacles.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that there is any consensus at the ECB GC level of when each measure is needed or what the triggers for such action are. The obstacles are also probably viewed to be different sizes by each national central bank. All that is to say, while it may have moved slightly closer, don't yet count on QE being much more than a last resort.

Expectations and pressure mount for ECB action

This could easily be a standard monthly headline. As before the past four or five ECB meetings, the questions of deflation and further easing are once again weighing on the ECB Governing Council and the markets.

Over the past month the market has come full circle from essentially ruling out any further ECB action to almost expecting some purchases of assets (both accompanied by the respective strengthening and then weakening of the euro exchange rate).

This was topped off today with the latest inflation data which showed that inflation in the eurozone has dropped to its lowest level for five years (annual rate of 0.5%).

A couple of points to note on this data:

• While energy prices are still the largest driver of the contraction, unlike some previous months, core inflation (without energy, food prices or tobacco) has also fallen. This may encourage the view that the decreases are not simply due to short term shifts in commodity prices.
• That said, the core inflation rates remain above where they were in November 2013 when the ECB previously cut rates.
• Other national inflation data has been quite weak – Spain moved into outright deflation in March, while German inflation was running at only 1%.
• As Gavyn Davies noted on twitter, the 0.5% rate falls outside of the ECB’s March projections for inflation this year and up to 2016. This raises questions about whether the inflation rate is still on the upward path forecast. Combine this will the volatility and tendency to strengthen of the euro and the ECB’s projections do not seem to be holding up too well.

The other aspect adding weight to expectations has been dovish comments by ECB members, notably by Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann. Many believe this has “opened the door” to significant action by the ECB. Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel addressed this issue on his Forbes blog on Friday arguing:

“The real issue from a German perspective is not necessarily that the door was ever firmly closed (or open) but that we remain someway from the QE door and to get there would require carefully negotiating some politically and legally explosive obstacles.”

He concludes:

“In the end, I think we find ourselves in a fairly similar position to last month (albeit having gone through a cycle of over scepticism and now over optimism) – further action remains possible but not yet highly likely.”

This meeting will be another one to watch but so far the ECB seems strongly wedded to its new communication and forward guidance policy, which it believes can allow greater control over rates markets, it is not yet clear whether it is willing to abandon this approach or push it over the barrier into full on policy action.

ECB stands firm but looks to wider measures

Over on his new Forbes blog, Open Europe’s Head of Economic Research Raoul Ruparel lays out his take on why the ECB decided to stand firm despite the apparent deflation threat,

“My feeling is that there are two broad reasons. The first being that the flow of data is mostly positive, and the second, more important factor, being that none of its tools are economically, politically or legally suited to tackling the low inflation environment in the eurozone.”

He concludes,

“All in all then, the tools at the ECB’s disposal are far from suited to helping push up inflation in the struggling countries and boosting lending to the real economy to help economic growth. This is not to say the ECB would never use them, but that are better suited to a deeper more acute crisis (such as a break-up threat) than the chronic long term malaise which the eurozone currently finds itself in.”

These are themes we’ve explored plenty of times on this blog so won’t rehash here.

But there were a couple of other interesting points to come out of ECB President Mario Draghi’s press conference though.

The first being his mention of a new dataset which the ECB is looking at, specifically the “the high degree of unutilised capacity” in the eurozone economy. This refers to the ‘output gap’, i.e. the amount by which GDP in the eurozone has fallen below potential GDP. As you might imagine, estimating such a gap is fraught with difficulty and estimates are notoriously revised retrospectively (for example before the crisis few economies were seen performing above potential despite huge financial, real estate and debt bubbles).

Why is this important? Well, it could be the first step towards a more firm GDP target on the part of the ECB. Admittedly, it’s a small step and a full GDP target is unlikely but it could be an interesting shift for the ECB which has traditionally focused more on inflation, money market and private sector survey data (such as the PMIs). As Draghi himself said, it also shows that monetary policy will stay looser for longer, even if the data improves, due to the large gap between actual and potential GDP. It will be interesting to watch how this one develops over the next few meetings and whether the ECB decides to put any more emphasis on this measure.

ECB preview - ECB may take limited action but shy away from serious intervention

As we noted last month, a lot has been pinned on the March ECB meeting, with the release of new data potentially facilitating further easing action.

But on the eve of the meeting, analysts remain split, although the sense is that the pressure for significant action is easing. February’s inflation data came in above expectations, with core inflation (removing the effect of short-term moves in energy and food prices) actually at 1% - still very low but well above expectations. We’ve also seen positive PMIs (indicators of private sector business activity) across the eurozone and in some of the struggling countries, although France remains behind the curve.

With that in mind, it looks as if the ECB will shy away from taking a major decision on Quantitative Easing or a negative deposit rate. These remain drastic actions which the ECB is clearly unsure about, and with good reason. It’s not clear what the side-effects would be of such action or that it would actually feed through to tackling low inflation in the periphery or boosting lending to the real economy (and therefore economic growth).

There are a few other options on the table. Another, more targeted long-term lending operation (LTRO), or purchases of private sector assets, probably packaged bank loans (asset-backed securities). These are possible and more likely than the above, but for reasons discussed before, would also be quite a big step by the ECB.

The most likely options remain a token rate cut (i.e. one without an accompanying cut to the deposit rate), a further extension of the unlimited fixed rate liquidity provision and the end to ECB sterilisation of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) bond purchases. We have outlined before that, at this stage, a rate cut makes little difference as the transmission mechanism is broken, at least to the areas where the impact of the cut would like to be felt. Extension of the liquidity provision is also broadly inferred and was always expected to go on as long as is needed, in line with the forward guidance given.

We’ve yet to discuss the end to sterilisation, so we lay out a few points below.

As a recap, the SMP was a programme launched in 2010 to purchase government bonds on the secondary market and bring down borrowing costs for certain countries (which were hampering the transmission of monetary policy). The sterilisation process sees the liquidity introduced by these purchases absorbed by the ECB, through the issuance of corresponding amounts of one week fixed-term deposits with an interest rate of 0.25%.

ECB SMP sterilisation total amount (€m)

Why take this measure?

• The idea is that ending the sterilisation would free up the €175bn in liquidity currently pledged to the ECB. This will counteract the recent decrease in excess liquidity in the eurozone and should encourage banks to lend this money out rather than simply posting it with the ECB.
• From a political perspective, this is also one of the least controversial actions since it has been endorsed by the Bundesbank and should be fairly easy to get support for at the ECB Governing Council.

Will it have any impact?

• It is unclear, but we are not overly hopeful. As the chart to the right (courtesy of Commerzbank) highlights, the earlier tensions in money market rates have eased. This means the impact will be limited.
• Ultimately, it depends on what banks decide to do with this money. The ECB deposits were a very safe investment with a decent return given the ultra low rates around at the moment. Our feeling is that banks will want to continue to search for equally safe assets rather than take on much more risk for a similar return over a short period. This could actually acerbate the demand for quality short term assets, particularly core ones, in the eurozone.
• Despite some failings in the sterilisation (shown by sharp deviations in the graph) demand has been fairly solid, although whether this is due to demand for safety or a decent return is unclear.
• The fixed-term deposits are also eligible as collateral for the ECB’s lending operations. It’s not clear if they have been used for this purpose, but if they were, this could further limit the impact in terms of boosting liquidity.

Ultimately, ending SMP sterilisation would be a token compromise measure. Its greatest use is probably as an indicator of an on-going willingness to ease if needed, and of the ability to compromise on the issue from the Bundesbank side. 

Are further falls in inflation putting more pressure on the ECB to act?

Friday saw the release of the flash estimate for annual inflation in the eurozone in January. It dropped further to 0.7% - well below the ECB’s target of 2%.

The initial reaction was that this will increase pressure on the ECB for action at this Thursday’s Governing Council meeting. While that is true on the surface its worth keeping another couple of points in mind.

• As the graph above shows (click to enlarge), much of the recent decline has come from changes in energy and food prices. Core inflation, excluding these two factors, has been relatively stable since October and has been on a gradual decline since spring 2013.
• Now of course, many will point out that energy and food are important components of real world costs and therefore should not be discounted. This is a valid point, but here we are looking for insight into how the ECB takes its decisions. Generally, the ECB will be less concerned over short term moves in energy and food prices and is therefore less likely to take action off the back of this.
• The main part of the decline took place last year and has been happening for some time – this is likely already accounted for in the ECB easing efforts.
• While the inflation data may not push the ECB to act, there are plenty of other concerns. The turmoil in Emerging Markets could push the ECB to provide an additional liquidity buffer against any shocks. While this morning’s PMI manufacturing data was actually very positive for the eurozone, data on lending to the real economy and growth of the money supply is less so.

As we have suggested before, some further easing is looking likely. The real question is when and how? The data suggests to us that the ECB will wait until its March meeting and its updated inflation forecasts to make a judgement – but then again it went a month earlier than expected in November.

As for how, the most likely tools remain some form of targeted LTRO and/or purchases of bank loans but both programmes would require significant work and have numerous shortcomings, as we have already noted.

ECB debate comes full circle back to QE again - but substantial obstacles remain

As with many things in the eurozone crisis, we have now come full circle in the discussion of one part of ECB policy – the prospect of Quantitative Easing (QE).

The debate over ECB QE was had when the crisis was at its peak. The motivating factor then was ensuring the euro stayed together. Now the motivating factor is low inflation/fear of deflation and low growth. The ultimate conclusion back then was that QE is not the right policy for the ECB (compared to the Fed or the BoE) for a number of practical and political reasons.

Despite the current motivation behind the debate being different, we think the key constraints still hold, while other issues over the effectiveness of QE have also come into play. Our previous thoughts are here. Below we restate our points and add some new insights.

Hard to target QE on the necessary sovereign debt: As we stressed in our previous post and note on this, any QE in terms of direct primary market purchases of eurozone sovereign debt would have to be shared out according to each countries share of ECB capital – i.e. Germany and France would see the large majority of purchases. This significantly limits any real benefit in the periphery and could worsen the crunch for safe assets in the eurozone with the price of core eurozone sovereign debt being driven even higher (and the returns going further down). The hope would be that this would spur investment in the periphery countries but given the investment patterns in Europe and the upcoming stress tests, it’s clear that demand for periphery debt remains separate from demand for core debt.

QE is very different to OMT: The exact constraints for OMT remain ill defined, but what we do know is that any purchases will be limited to short term (below 3 year maturity) debt on the secondary market, will be subject to the strict constraints of a bailout programme and the purchases will be sterilised.  What form a QE programme would take is also unclear, however, it is likely to involve significant and widespread purchases which come with no conditions and are not sterilised. 

QE on private assets might have little impact in Europe: Unlike the US and even the UK, the European market for securities is far less developed. Furthermore, the corporate sector relies much more heavily on bank loans for funding than on debt issuance (see graph to the right). If the ECB decided on a QE programme to target different securities, the impact on the real economy would be limited by the structure of these markets. This point is driven home by the graph to the right below, which highlights the broad breakdown of assets in the eurozone - significantly dominated by government debt. The ECB could purchase mortgage backed securities, which is one of the more developed markets. However, a significant chunk remain non-performing (or close) and are opaque in terms of what is included inside them and what their true market price is. In all likelihood any purchasing of private sector assets would mostly be a boost to bank balance sheets, however, unless it is sufficient to completely reverse their deleveraging and kick start lending it would probably do more than push up asset prices.

Political obstacles are significant: The programme would need approval in the ECB’s Governing Council. With a quarter already known to be against last month’s rate cut, opposition to such a significant step could grow. Even if it got through the fallout in terms of divisions within the ECB and the political blowback from within Germany could create serious problems for the eurozone. Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann even said earlier today that the ECB should not take further easing steps in the near future after the rate cut.

The overall impact on the real economy is far from clear: the discussion over this point in the US and UK has been substantial, with no clear winner. While QE did likely help to avert a deeper crisis, particularly in the short term, the fact is that there is no clear link between higher inflation or higher growth and asset purchases of the central banks.

For these reasons, we believe QE will be a very last resort for the ECB. It is practically and politically difficult. That said, it still seems like further easing is very much being considered. See for example the Bloomberg story today about the very real possibility of a negative deposit rate (which has weakened the euro significantly). Such a move would itself of course come with drawbacks and difficulties, but we’ll leave them for another post.

ECB preview – ECB edges towards rate cut as inflation drops

Interest has grown in this month’s ECB meeting, after inflation surprised on the downside last month, falling to 0.7% - far below the ECB’s 2% target.

In all likelihood, the discussion will not be too different from previous monthly meetings, but there are a few points worth flagging up.

A rate cut in November or December?

• The consensus is now moving towards a rate cut this month, or more likely next month. As we pointed out before, this will have little impact given that rates are completely detached from the ECB’s main interest rate and the transmission mechanism remains broken in much of the eurozone. Ultimately, it is a signal that the ECB is keen to keep loose monetary policy. 
• The ECB, though, could well hold back for a few reasons. Firstly, it probably wants to see how the nascent recovery in the eurozone develops. Secondly, it knows this is probably its final rate cut and wants to time it correctly. Thirdly, its medium-term forecast is for inflation to recover (although this is likely to be revised downward in December). 
• FT Alphaville also highlights the interesting point that, given that this will likely signal the end of rate cuts, the response could even be a slight increase in market rates.

A new LTRO in the New Year?

• The shrinking of the ECB balance sheet continues, as eurozone banks are repaying the LTRO loans. Liquidity is dropping rapidly in the eurozone and short-terms rates have edged up somewhat – creating a de facto tightening of ECB policy. This is exacerbated by the continued easing bias by the other global central banks.
• That said, the previous LTROs have served to increase the sovereign-banking loop. They also remain a blunt tool since the amount of liquidity injected relies on demand, while the prospect of this lending being stigmatised under next year’s stress tests could discourage banks from tapping it.

Euro strength weighs on the ECB’s mind

• The strength of the euro in recent weeks, particularly against the dollar, has been covered widely with an increasing number of investors and politicians calling for action on this front. 
• Although the ECB has stressed that it does not target the exchange rate, it has shown before that it certaintly considers it. Draghi has shown a willingness to ‘talk down the euro’ previously, and is likely to try and do so again. However, turning this into lasting success is tricky and clamour for more concrete signs could increase.
• Failure to address the issue also leaves the currency open to volatility, as markets struggle to interpret the ECB’s vague signals and balance them with more defined ones from other central banks.

What to do with the deposit rate?

• This is another aspect weighing on the ECB’s collective mind. As we pointed out before, a cut to negative territory could have many unintended consequences, and is unlikely to be risked in anything but the worst circumstances. Still, the desire to maintain some ‘corridor’ between the regular rate and the deposit rate could make the ECB think twice about cutting rates at all.

As the above suggests though, we stick by our view that the ECB does have limited tools to help promote economic growth. This meeting is also likely to be another test of its new communication policy and whether it can really have lasting market impact. Ultimately, though, pressure for some concrete action from the ECB is likely to increase as long as inflation remains subdued.

ECB preview - is the ECB already seeing the limits of its new communication policy?

The ECB holds its monthly meeting today in what may be seen as the most positive eurozone economic environment for some time.

Having previously been earmarked as a meeting which could see a further rate cut (a prediction which has evaporated due to more positive economic data) this meeting is now likely to be dominated by ECB President Mario Draghi’s attempts to restate his new communication policy.

July saw the launch of this policy, focused on ‘forward guidance’ (forecasting future interest rates) and the potential publishing of minutes of ECB meetings, in an attempt to add a new tool to the ECB’s monetary policy arsenal. However, in recent weeks there have been indications that the ECB may already be seeing the limits of such an approach.

Forward guidance struggles

• As the chart above shows (via Commerzbank) indicators suggest that future overnight short term interest rates are expected to increase, while the borrowing costs for short term bunds and other core eurozone countries have also been creeping up. Expectations of an ECB interest rate increase have also been brought forward significantly, whilst the euro has also been strengthening recently.
• Much of this is off the back of recent good data from the eurozone, of course a positive, but given that the data is far from comprehensive and problems still abound for the eurozone its clear the ECB is not yet ready to change course.
• Of course, given that it is early days for this policy and that the rate moves have been small it is impossible to draw a definitive judgement just yet, but there are signs of limits to the policy.

ECB Total Balance sheet (€m)

• The ECB is also seeing its monetary policy being effectively tightened as the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) loans are repaid, with its balance sheet shrinking (chart above) to its smallest size since the start of 2012, and no signs of banks increasing lending to the real economy to compensate. Again, a positive indicator but not quite what the ECB might have wanted with the introduction of a new tool indicating loose monetary policy for some time.
• External conditions have also not been helping. The Bank of England is facing a similar issue, for similar reasons, while the US Fed has announced the prospect of slowing down its Quantitative Easing programme – the much maligned ‘tapering’. This has unsettled markets and threatens to reduce liquidity globally – so far much of the pain has been felt in emerging markets, but it could yet spill over into peripheral Europe, hitting demand for government and corporate debt and pushing up borrowing costs.

Backing away from minutes

The other part of this new communication strategy was a move towards publishing minutes of ECB Governing Council meetings, with many ECB members issuing support. However, there are indications that this may also come up against problems (as might have been expected).

The concern has always been that divergent views within the ECB (read, from the Bundesbank) would make ECB minutes more trouble than they’re worth. Over the past few weeks we have seen the Bundesbank use its monthly bulletin to warn that rates could still increase and attempt temper the commitment under ‘forward guidance’, while its President, Jens Weidmann, has also warned of the potential "pressure" on decision makers if minutes were published. Additionally, comments from Austrian Central Bank Governor Ewald Nowotny suggested that the ECB might be backing away from the plans (such interventions are rarely made without some approval from the ECB hierarchy as we saw when minutes were proposed):

“My personal view is that of the founding fathers of the ECB…They were very cautious to secure the independence of the ECB by not giving minutes on the individual votes of the members of the Governing Council.”

All these factors then, have worked to expose some of the frailties of the ECB’s guidance policy, not least that it remains much more vague and unfocused than those employed at the US Fed and the BoE. The ECB (with some good reason) is hesitant to get into specifics over the timeline and conditions for keeping rates low – this will clearly hamper the usefulness of this policy tool (and brings us back to questions about how many tools the ECB really has at its disposal).

In fact, there is already talk of using another LTRO to bolster this policy and help stop any upward movement in rates, although given the limited impact of the initial LTROs (beyond avoiding a bank funding crisis) this may not help much.

All that said, the ECB is unlikely to drop its new communication approach in the near future, leaving Draghi the unenviable task of continuously restating the ECB’s commitment to this policy – expect this to begin in earnest at today's meeting.

A shift towards greater transparency at the ECB?

As we reported in today’s press summary, there has been an interesting development in the push for greater transparency at the ECB.

In a joint interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung and Le Figaro, Benoît Cœuré (BC) and Jörg Asmussen (JA), ECB Executive Board Members, both supported the longstanding call for the ECB to publish the minutes of the meetings of its Governing Council, saying:

BC: “Transparency is important for the effectiveness of monetary policy and for trust in the central bank. There was a time when the ECB was ahead of the curve in its communications and transparency as first central bank with regular press conferences by its president. Now the ECB is the only large central bank that does not publish its minutes of meetings. There is a demand in society for transparency and accountability. Therefore, I personally think that the ECB should start publishing its meeting minutes soon.”

JA: “The minutes should include who voted for what, and the reasoning behind that vote. Publishing the minutes will sharpen the European mandate, because the ECB will then have to explain why its decisions are in line with the European mandate.”

BC: “The other side of the coin is, as Jörg has said, that the Governing Council has a European mandate. The governors of the national central banks come here in a personal capacity – they do not represent their institutions or their countries – and should be accountable for what they do.”

This is something which many (including ourselves) have supported for some time (see here for a House of Lords report from 2003 which provides an interesting discussion of the issue), particularly during the crisis where the opacity of the ECB (on issues such as bond purchases, legal documents and potential policies) has at times caused confusion and uncertainty. It has also hampered the accountability of the ECB and its members despite the bank playing a central role in the crisis resolution.

But all that has been true for some time, so why might the ECB be changing its tune now? The most likely reason seems to be a switch in the communication policy of the ECB, which began last month with the change to ‘forward guidance’ (forecasting future interest rate policy). Although, this did little to change the substance of ECB policy (frankly everyone knew rates would be low for some time) it is a clear shift in tactics and rhetoric. Publishing minutes fits well with this new approach for a few reasons:

• It allows the ECB to provide further detail about its decisions and what the key motivating factors were.
• It highlights the discussions of various options which the ECB may be considering to combat the crisis, this could help telegraph future action and impact market sentiment without the need for an actual decision to be taken.
• It will demonstrate the weighting of support within the council for certain policy options, again providing further detail on likelihood of future actions but also the strength of feeling on various policies (i.e. a clearer picture of the dovish or hawkish nature of the council).
• Can be used to communicate concerns to the market and other policymakers which may not have warranted inclusion in the monthly press conference of the ECB President Mario Draghi. Furthermore, if published with a delay, can allow for reflection on the impact of different policies.
• Essentially, it provides a further tool in the arsenal of the ECB to help communicate with markets and achieve policy goals. As we have noted, the ECB has recently looked increasingly policy constrained and so any additional tool would likely be welcome.

All that said, the impact of this tool should not be overplayed. It is ultimately a small aspect of overall ECB policy, its main benefit is that it can provide further nuance to some of the blunter instruments (interest rates etc.). From an outside perspective it could provide a much needed insight into the decision making process – although this will ultimately depend on the credibility of the minutes (will they really reflect the true nature of the discussion) and when they are released.

On top of this, FAZ is reporting this afternoon that the ECB and national central banks will publish more details on the notoriously secretive Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), although the article seems to suggest they may only release the framework or rules of ELA rather than details on its practical use and application. Still this would be a welcome, if small, step towards transparency.

Some steps towards greater transparency then, however, the underlying motivation seems more likely to be to give the ECB another tool in its new communication strategy rather than increasing accountability as an end in itself. Either way greater insight into the opaque institution playing a key role in the crisis should always be welcomed.

Doves dominate as central banks show the way ahead in Europe

While the US has its Independence Day, Europe looks to be having its Forward guidance day.

Bad puns aside, it’s actually been quite an interesting day in the world of central banking in Europe.

First we had the new Bank of England Governor Mark Carney surprising the markets somewhat suggesting that the increase in rates which had seemingly been priced in was premature. Essentially, providing forward guidance that the BoE would keep monetary policy loose.

More interesting for us though, was that the ECB took a similar despite not much being expected to come out of today’s meeting. Below are the key points from ECB President Mario Draghi’s press conference:

• “The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” This is essentially forward guidance (forecasting what policy will be in the future). It’s not full because there is no clear date set but still it is a big change from Draghi’s previous line of “we never pre-commit” (this has also been the line of the ECB generally since its inception). He also added at the end, “all in all we said our exit [from loose monetary policy] is very distant”.

• Draghi also stressed that the decision on this form of ‘forward guidance’ was unanimous (numerous times in the Q&A). Again surprising since the Bundesbank has previously warned against the problems of loose monetary policy, so one might expect Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann to be wary of committing to it for an extended period.

• When quizzed about whether the ECB was now simply reacting to the US Fed’s talk of tightening its monetary policy (the much maligned ‘taper’ which has sparked market volatility) Draghi insisted that the ECB takes its actions independently of those of any of the central bank. Behind the rhetoric though it seems fairly clear that the Fed’s policy has had an impact on European and global markets and the ECB felt the need to compensate for that. Draghi also said it was simply a “coincidence” that the BoE took a similar policy approach on the same day.

• As for the rest of the press conference, it was much as expected (more of the same). Draghi continued to stress the need for structural reform and for the creation of a clear banking union with a working resolution mechanism to recapitalise banks in the event that ECB find capital shortfalls when it does its asset quality review (stress test) next year. Draghi also distanced the ECB once again from action to boost lending to small and medium sized enterprises.

It seems all this caught markets somewhat unawares with stock markets rallying and both the pound and the euro weakening in response.

This suggests that central bankers may have a trick or two still up their sleeve, although the response is likely to be short lived. Ultimately, this is not a sea-change in the policy of the ECB, the fundamental challenges facing Europe remain.

ECB gears up for German Constitutional Court scrutiny

This is set to be an important week for the ECB and therefore the eurozone.

As we noted in a flash analysis this morning, the German Constitutional Court (GCC) will hold a hearing on the 11 and 12 June focusing on whether the ECB’s policies have infringed either its own or the Bundesbank’s mandate, and if these have created fiscal risks without democratic approval.

The focus of the case will be the OMT, the ECB’s flagship bond buying programme, the announcement of which is widely seen to have played an important role in easing the eurozone crisis.

Why is the case important?

1. Highlights the tensions at the heart at the eurozone: the case is a microcosm of the wider debate as to whether Germany is willing and able (in terms of legal constraints) to do what is seen as necessary to save the eurozone. It also puts pay to the idea that once the German government has a fresh mandate following September’s election, there will be a swift move towards more eurozone integration – these legal questions will remain and will continue to crop up.
2. Pits the ECB against the Bundesbank: linked to the point above but this is also a very awkward division within the eurozone architecture, as personified by the confrontation of the ECB's Jörg Asmussen on one hand and Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann on the other. The Bundesbank will likely have to keep implementing ECB policies despite it now being well known that it fundamentally disagrees with them. 
3. Further constraints on crisis policies: in the end, the GCC will likely rule in favour of the ECB. However, as with previous rulings, it could set out red lines and restrictions to protect the German Constitution – this could throw a new element of risk into the crisis.
4. Increased transparency on ECB actions: this is something which we, and others, have been calling for for some time. One benefit of the case is that it has increased scrutiny on the OMT with the ECB now admitting it may be forced to published the legal documents which will layout the practical functioning of the OMT. This could generally be beneficial, although if markets do not like what they hear then it could actually contribute to market jitters.

With this final point in mind, there was an interesting story in FAZ over the weekend, which suggested that the OMT is not in fact as “unlimited” as had first been thought. Indeed, FAZ claimed that it is limited to €524bn, since the ECB will only be allowed to purchase debt with maturity between one and three years.

This constraint was always known, as we noted when the programme was announced. The cap essentially arises because this is the total amount of debt from Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal (i.e. those countries most likely to access OMT). The cap doesn’t seem to be hard and fast then, since countries could simply issue more short term debt. However, this does come with its own risks (another point we raised at the time), and the ECB has suggested it would look to prevent such an approach, although it hasn't said how.

Handelsblatt goes even further, suggesting that there is an internal rule which limits the ownership of bonds by the ECB to 50% of the given market, suggesting this means the cap is even lower at €260bn.

But even if the cap isn't quite what it’s cracked up to be, it’s very interesting that the ECB itself is selling it to the GCC as a limit. Clearly, there is some concern about the outcome on its part.

Despite a definitive ruling not expected until the end of the summer at the earliest, and more likely after the September elections, there could well be plenty of interesting revelations and disputes aired over the next few days, which we will of course be covering in detail.

More of the same expected from the ECB despite eurozone economic malaise

The ECB holds its monthly meeting tomorrow. Below we look at the main topics of discussion, with the ECB weighing some important decisions.

Could the ECB cut its main interest rate again?

• Possibly. It is certainly considering it. As with last month, growth and inflation have remained subdued, providing further incentive and scope for the ECB to cut rates.
• There has not been a significant downturn on either front however, meaning many do not expect further action.

The ECB is considering a negative deposit rate
Most reports suggest the ECB Governing Council is split on this issue. At the least this means it is unlikely to push ahead with it. We also believe the problems and complications outweigh the benefits. There has been much written about this but below we summarise the key points.

Logic: banks are now charged for holding large excess reserves (deposits) with the ECB, this will hopefully encourage them to make loans on the interbank market and make more loans to the real economy rather than holding the money at the ECB.

In favour:

• Banks and investors look for higher returns and begin lending cross borders again. This aids financial integration and could help tackle other issues such as the large Target 2 imbalances.
• Increases the amount of times money is circulated through the economy (the velocity of money) as lenders try to avoid getting stuck with excess cash. This could in theory help boost inflation and growth.

Against:

• Contrary to prevailing logic it could actually cause a drop in liquidity. As excess reserves become more expensive banks begin repaying loans they have taken from the ECB. All the while they are deleveraging (may even speed it up), causing less money to flow to the real economy.
• Rates could actually rise for a number of reasons. Larger number of weaker banks forced onto the interbank market. Banks may simply look to pass on increased costs to consumers.
• If banks do not pass on costs or deal with them, then profits will be hit – in many cases they are already worryingly low.
• Could increase the flood of money to safe assets, particularly from the core eurozone countries. The return on these would become even more negative, increasing their costliness and driving divergence with the rest of the eurozone.
• The large money market fund industry, which plays an important role for liquidity in bond markets, could struggle to stay afloat since it relies on small positive returns on safe short terms assets (see above points).
• The euro is likely to weaken, this combined with the other effects could cause a large outflow of cash to other parts of the world, exacerbating problems.

What about all the talk of boosting lending to small businesses?
This focuses around the creation of a new market for securitised loans to small businesses. The logic being: banks make these loans, package them together into securities and then sell them on to other banks and investors. There is a clear demand for quality assets which provide a decent return meaning there could be demand for such securities.

However, the ECB has backed away from grand plans on this issue. As we pointed out previously it was always very hesitant about purchasing such securities itself, with the Bundesbank in particular opposed to such action.

More of the same seems likely
With things ticking over the ECB is likely to hold off on any further drastic action at its meeting tomorrow. It will continue to emphasise that monetary policy will remain loose for some time (the concept of forward guidance which it began to adopt last month to some extent). It may also put more flesh on the bones of schemes to work with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to boost lending to small businesses. Some easing of the collateral rules as we predicted last month is also a definite possibility.

As we’ve said before, the ECB continues to look constrained. It does of course have a few more tools, however, they are in many cases quite extreme and have potential side effects. These are best suited to very extreme scenarios (euro break-up) rather than the wider malaise and long term endemic crisis which the eurozone now faces, particularly given that often (as we are now seeing with banking union) any ECB action sparks complacency and inaction on the part of politicians.

Splits in Germany (and beyond) over banking union?

It’s been a week of 'splits' over Europe and it looks like another one may be emerging – although this time in Germany.

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had an article in the FT arguing:

"While today’s EU treaties provide adequate foundation for the new supervisor and for a single resolution mechanism, they do not suffice to anchor beyond doubt a new and strong central resolution authority.

We should not make promises we cannot keep. The overly optimistic predictions about a single supervisor starting work as early as January 2013 cost the EU credibility.

A two-step approach could start with a resolution mechanism based on a network of national authorities as soon as the new supervisor is operational, the resolution directive has been adopted and the Basel III capital requirements are in place.

A banking union of sorts can thus be had without revising the treaties, including a single supervisor; harmonised rules on capital requirements, resolution and deposit guarantees; a resolution mechanism based on effective co-ordination between national authorities; and effective fiscal backstops, also including the European Stability Mechanism as last resort."

Essentially, pointing out that a full centralised banking union is some time away, post EU treaty change. This potentially has implications for the UK, as much of Schäuble's solution, with the exception of the common eurozone supervision, would apply to all 27 members - the question for non-eurozone countries, including the UK, is how they will be affected by the 'second stage' of his solution. On the other hand, treaty change, as we've noted before would potentially enable the UK to put forward its own amendments.

However, German ECB Executive Board Member Jörg Asmussen espoused a different view in comments to the German press this afternoon:

"It is the aim [of the banking union] to make the Eurozone more robust against banking crises with an orderly, cross-border resolution of systemically relevant banks without leaving the burden on the taxpayer or the central bank."

"We think this is best ensured by a common resolution regime, a joint resolution fund that is financed by banks' contributions and a common resolution scheme…The entire tool kit should be available along with the Single Supervisory Mechanism."

So, much stronger on the need for a clear centralised authority as soon as possible, preferably when the ECB takes on its supervisory role at the start of next year. This also seems to imply then that such a move could be done without changing the EU treaties.

To be honest this is not an entirely new position, it is something other members of the ECB have previously called for. Nevertheless, it represents a fairly significant split between two leading political voices in Germany over what is now the key policy for reforming the eurozone.

It's also worth noting that at a press conference earlier today the Spanish and Portuguese leaders both put forward a similar argument to that of Asmussen on the need for an immediate 'full' banking union. Meanwhile, Eurogroup Head Jeroen Dijsselbloem said that the issue of treaty change could be dealt with "later on" but admitted that "understandable questions" were being asked on this front.

We, as with all those following the crisis, wait with bated breath for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to declare which side she comes down on. So far she has managed to dodge taking any big eurozone decisions ahead September's election in Germany, but with key discussion on banking union coming up next month its not clear whether she can continue to do so on this one.

A marginal impact of the ECB rate cut?

As expected the ECB announced it has cut its main interest rate by 0.25% to 0.5%. As we noted at length, this is likely to have little impact on the real economy. The real question remains whether it will announce any additional non-standard measures to help boost lending in the economy – see here for our discussion of the many constraints on such action.

Slightly more interestingly the ECB cut its marginal lending facility rate by 0.5% to 1% (this is the overnight lending facility which the ECB provides, but is often used as a last resort since borrowing on the markets should be cheaper except in an emergency). This may have just been procedural to keep the corridor between the main rate and this rate at a standard size. The graph below (in €m) highlights that borrowing under marginal lending facility is at near record lows:

This could mean one of two things. Either:

• No-one has much use for the marginal facility given the unlimited liquidity provided under normal ECB operations and the much more placid market sentiment seen at the moment.
• Alternatively, it could be that the rate has been too punitive to make its use worthwhile at this point in time, even if banks are struggling for liquidity. The lack of overnight repo market lending suggests this may be the case to some extent, although clearly banks have significant liquidity so may just be doing a better job of managing their needs.

If it is the first point (as we suspect) then it is unlikely to make much difference since no-one is using the facility anyway (similar to the main refinancing rate and the limited impact of its cut). @LorcanRK also notes that the marginal lending rate can provide a reference for Emergency Liquidty Assistance which is still used heavily in certain countries, notably Cyprus and Greece. Reducing this rate provides some relief for them.

In any case, all of this is unlikely to have much impact, the tone of the ECB press conference and any further specifics announced will be far more important.

ECB increasingly likely to cut rates but running short of tools to help the eurozone economy

The ECB looks set to cut its main interest rate by 0.25% to 0.5% on Thursday (while keeping the deposit rate at 0% due to concerns about distortionary effects of negative rates).

Why is the ECB considering cutting rates?

• The obvious answer is that the crisis is clearly dragging on and the eurozone economy is struggling. But, that has been true for some time, so why now?
• Economic activity has been particularly bad (see right hand graph below), while forecasts have been continuously downgraded.
• In particular, annual inflation has dropped well below the ECB’s target of 2%, while unemployment has continued to rise (left hand graph below, click to enlarge).

Will it have any impact?

• Not really. On the margin it will help reduce costs for those banks which borrow heavily from the ECB and consumers with variable rate loans and mortgages – but the impact will be very limited.

• The usual mechanism through which a rate cut is transmitted to the market is broken. See for example the overnight lending in the eurozone. It remains at a very low levels. That said, rates are also at record lows. Why is this? Well, most likely because only the strongest banks are borrowing on these markets. For this reason the cut will not filter through to where it’s most needed since lending rates are already completely detached from it and focus more on the risks of the banks involved.

• As has been well documented, rates in the south and the north are also significantly different, particularly in terms of lending to businesses. Clearly, these have also diverged from the current ECB rates which are already incredibly low. Cutting further is unlikely to impact this.

What other tools does the ECB have?

Communication: ECB indicates willingness to keep monetary policy loose and step in to aid markets if needed. This has been used effectively by the Fed.
Probability: High, especially in coordination with rate cut.
Effectiveness: Minimal boost since it is already being pursued to some extent, more to reassure markets.

Easing collateral rules: ECB widens the range of assets which it accepts as collateral in exchange for its loans. May also decrease the 'haircut' applied to the value of the loans (thereby increasing their worth as collateral). This is likely to be targeted on SME loans and securities made up of SME loans.
Probability: High, if not this month then in June, particularly if economic data continues to be poor. Effectiveness: Limited, could help bank funding but unlikely to boost SME lending significantly. More risk taken onto ECB balance sheet, likely to widen divisions with Bundesbank. Has been done previously and had little impact.

Outright purchases of SME loans and securities: ECB purchases securities of bundled SME loans, similar to the purchases it made under the Covered Bond Purchase Programme and the Securities Markets Programme.
Probability: Very low. Draghi has previously suggested he sees it more as the job of institutions such as the EIB to help SMEs. Furthermore, the level of SME ABS is limited since they rely heavily on bank loans for funding (another reason why the ECB believes a rate cut could help, at least in theory).
Effectiveness: Limited, especially given that the market for such products is not huge. It would also increase the risk taken directly onto the ECB balance sheet (more so than easing collateral) and would provoke an outcry in Germany for overstepping the acceptable level of central bank intervention. Furthermore, such direct purchases are much harder to unwind than loan related policies which expire naturally, selling off these assets will be tough.

A version of the UK 'Funding for Lending' scheme: not really an option for the ECB at this time, contrary to popular belief. The various national regulations and structures aside it is practically impossible since the ECB already applies full allotment (unlimited lending).
Probability: Very low.
Effectiveness: Potentially counterproductive as the ECB would need to end its programme of full allotment in order to then make liquidity dependent on the amount of loans made by banks.

These are to name but a few options being reviewed currently. Other options such as working with the European Investment Bank to promote SME lending would need political assistance, while options such as 'Quantative Easing' aren't viable for the ECB, as we discussed here.

So for all the talk of the rate cut, it will likely have a very minimal impact. The ECB could look to combine it with other policies but the painful reality is that, when it comes to boost lending to the real economy, the ECB has very few options. Constraints from the Bundesbank and concerns over the progression to banking union mean the ECB will likely continue to put the onus on governments to make reforms to boos the economy.

Conflict of interest (rates): clamour for ECB rate cut grows but Germany remains wary

The last few days have seen a shifting of consensus in the ECB rate cuts debate.

Recent economic data in the eurozone has been particularly bad, with private sector activity slowing more than expected. However, potentially more importantly, this effect has been seen in Germany and some of the stronger northern countries as well.

In response to this data most banks and analysts shifted their expectations and now forecast an ECB rate cut in May or June.

The thinking goes that, a slowing economy in these countries (and therefore lower inflation) will give the ECB more scope to cut rates without fear of it having disproportionate effects on the stronger economies. After all, the ECB is meant to find a balance that suits all countries (although it rarely does, hence the flaw of one-size-fits-all monetary policy).

As always on central banking issues though, Germany remains the key player.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has now waded in to debate about possible ECB action. Speaking at the conference organised by Sparkassen association this morning, Merkel said:

"The ECB is obviously in a difficult position. For Germany it would actually have to raise rates slightly at the moment, but for other countries it would have to do even more for more liquidity to be made available and especially for liquidity to reach corporate financing."

"If we want to get back to a bearable interest rate level, then we have to get over this internal division of the euro zone."

In a country where central bank independence is worshiped, politicians usually stay well clear of commentating on monetary policy, so Merkel's comments are quite extraordinary. Perhaps they were prompted by increasing noise coming out of the French government over what it sees as the need for the ECB to take a more activist approach, despite a genetlemen's agreement between the two governments not to discuss ECB policy in public.

German ECB board member Joerg Asmussen also weighed in yesterday saying:

"Monetary policy is not an all-purpose weapon for any kind of economic illness…Due to impaired monetary policy transmission, the pass-through of rate cuts to the periphery would be limited, and this is where they are most needed.

At the same time, rate cuts would further relax already unprecedentedly easy financing conditions in the core. This is not per se a problem – but interest rates that are too low for too long can eventually lead to distortions. In particular:

• to a misallocation of resources, which ultimately leads to lower potential growth,
• to excessive capital inflows into a number of emerging economies with exchange rate effects and credit risks,
• and to reduced incentives for governments, banks, and corporates to adjust."

For numerous reasons, it seems that a rate cut should not be taken for granted after all. Asmussen is  right that given the broken transmission mechanism and market fragmentation, any cut will have limited effect on the economies where it's meant to provide a boost. But more importantly, there is still a view in Germany that lower rates could have a harmful effect particularly by pumping up an asset and property bubble – similar to those seen when newly low ECB rates were introduced in the south during the euro's creation.

That said, the wave of voices calling for some ECB action is growing, particularly given the wider debate on austerity. It will be tricky to balance this with the demands of the northern countries.

Once again the ECB finds itself stuck as the main player in an increasingly political debate.