Viviane Reding: The EU Commissioner for Mars

Yesterday, Viviane Reding, the EU Commissioner for Justice and vice-President of the Commission, gave a speech saying she wanted to increase the EU's powers to intervene in member states where there is a "rule of law" crisis. Citing the "Roma crisis in France in summer 2010; the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; and the Romanian rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012", she said she wants to establish a "far-reaching rule of law mechanism, which would include more detailed monitoring and sanctioning powers for the Commission".

Reding also chose to cite in her speech the arrest of David Miranda at Heathrow airport by UK authorities using anti-terrorism legislation.

Reding's big idea is a treaty change to extend the reach of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights into member states' domestic legal systems and therefore the power of the Commission to intervene. She called for:

"A very ambitious Treaty amendment – which I would personally favour for the next round of Treaty change – would be abolishing Article 51 of our Charter of Fundamental Rights, so as to make all fundamental rights directly applicable in the Member States, including the right to effective judicial review (Article 47 of the Charter). I have raised this idea already in a speech at the FIDE Congress in Tallinn in May 2012. This would open up the possibility for the Commission to bring infringement actions for violations of fundamental rights by Member States even if they are not acting in the implementation of EU law. I admit that this would be a very big federalising step. It took the United States more than 100 years until the first ten amendments started to be applied to the states by the Supreme Court."

Currently, the Charter can only be used to interpret how EU law is implemented in member states - the UK's 'opt-out'/clarification on the Charter was meant to reinforce this point in the Lisbon Treaty negotiations (that clarification hasn't really worked).

Viviane Reding has long been one of the most far-out there EU federalists but this is a fundamental and outright challenge to national governments' authority. This would be a good time for member states to remind Reding, Barroso et al what their mandate is. If member states are ever to rest back control of the EU, this sort of thing should almost become a sackable offence.

As someone put it to us in Brussels recently: every time Reding opens her mouth, Nigel Farage gains another thousand votes.

Who said EU federalists don't get headlines in UK media (but 'associate membership' for Britain is hardly a revolutionary thought)

The Union of European Federalists – an umbrella group of federalist organisations and lobby groups – got a pretty good hit in the UK media on New Year’s eve when the Times (and later other papers) picked up on a forthcoming paper by the group, which is expected to argue that the UK be granted “associate status” in the EU, a few days after Jacques Delors made similar comments.

So EU federalists can make headlines in the eurosceptic UK press after all, although we would hasten to add that an intervention by a few MEPs and retired politicians can’t qualify as a “Brussels plot” – you at least need to have some scheming Commission bureaucrats on-board for that. Apparently, the paper, which will come in the form of a draft “EU Treaty”, will be based on a report by Andrew Duff, the Lib Dem MEP.

According to Duff, the UK would be given “membership based on trade and the single market”, with a UK judge at the ECJ but no Commissioner and no MEPs. The objective is clear: Given that the UK is a perceived as a  “continual impediment” to greater EU integration, associate membership of the EU would be devised “to prevent a British veto of the constitutional evolution needed and desired by its partners”. Curiously, and perhaps testament to the world view of the author, there’s no mention of what would happen to the UK’s voting weight/rights in the Council of Ministers, the forum where national governments are represented. They might want to work that one out before publishing their draft EU treaty.

Either way the idea is for the UK to effectively be given access to the single market but with little say - like Norway but with some twists and without the EEA-wrapping. This is hardly revolutionary stuff and the author, though an interesting guy, isn’t exactly the go-to guy in key national capitals. So don’t expect this to become policy any time soon. To view the UK as an “impediment” - ignoring the moving goal posts created by the eurozone crisis - is also predictably simplistic.

In addition, there are massive obstacles to more EU integration also amongst “EU partners” and European public opinion – from joint and several liabilities in Germany, to Bundesbank-style budget controls in France to banking union in Sweden. But Duff’s contribution is nonetheless welcome as it does remind us of the need to develop a new model for EU integration in light of changing economic, political and economic circumstances – one that is better at reconciling different democratic decisions in member states with EU cooperation. This is a debate that should be in everyone’s interest to have under way.

Barroso's Christmas wish list

Christmas is approaching and, in that spirit, José Barroso, the President of the European Commission, has written himself a wish list of presents for the EU member states (and particularly the Eurozone) to hand over. The Christmas wish list, or as Barroso puts it "A Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU" is as follows:

For the next 18 months:

Wish number one: the "rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the two-pack and the Single Supervisory Mechanism" - i.e giving the ECB powers over eurozone (and perhaps other) financial supervision.
Wish number two: a eurozone "rebalancing" budget in addition to the EU budget. - more money.
Wish number three: a "Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument" for the eurozone - mutual contracts to enforce bailouts and deficits.
Wish number four: "external representation of the euro area in international economic and financial organisations and fora." - some more foreign postings.

And thinking ahead for next Christmas (next 18 months to 5 years):

Wish number five: deeper [eurozone] coordination in the field of tax policy issues as well labour markets
Wish number six: an "autonomous" and enhanced eurozone fiscal capacity that will  "rely solely on own resources" - a eurozone tax, budget and treasury- perhaps a financial transaction tax?
Wish number seven: a "power of intervention in the design and implementation of national fiscal policies"
Wish number eight: "The common issuance... of so-called eurobills", requiring a treaty change - but will the German taxpayer want to underwrite (and perhaps lose) money lent to Greece?

For the Christmas after that (for 5 years time):

Wish number nine: "extend the competences of the Court of Justice, i.e. by deleting Art. 126 paragraph 10 TFEU and thus admitting infringement proceedings for Member States or by creating new, special competences" - i.e further power over national economies.
Wish number ten: "a commensurate involvement of the European Parliament in the EU procedures. The European Parliament, and only it, is that Parliament for the EU and hence for the euro."

And this would leave you with Barosso's ultimate wish: "a banking union, a fiscal union, an economic union [and] as a fourth element, appropriate  democratic legitimacy and accountability."

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's response to the proposals was: “It is good that the EU commission is putting forward proposals for a stronger co-operation in the eurozone. But eurobonds, bills or any other form of joint debt liability in Europe are going in the wrong direction."

To many the proposals may seem alarming, but in truth, most of these proposals have been floating around for a long time. The novel aspect was the proposed time frame outlined by the Commission and combining them in a single vision. Notably though, many similar proposals by the Commission have resulted in very little, especially since the eurozone crisis has put an increasing emphasis on the intergovernmental decision-making found in the European Council.

Herman Van Rompuy's own list (expected at the December summit) which will probably be more modest and less eye-catching is likely to be more important simply because it more closely reflects the views of the key decision makers in the process.

The view from Sweden: Barroso is making it more difficult to be pro-EU

This is spot-on.

Sara Skyttedal, vice-president of the Youth wing of the European People’s Party – the pan-EU party Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso belongs to – has a blistering piece  in today's Svenska Dagbladet. She takes Barroso to town over his 'State of the Union' address, in which he called for Europe to become a "federation":

"As Vice-Chairman of [the EPP's] youth wing, YEPP, I can only say that representatives such as Barroso make it more difficult to be pro-EU [EU-vän] “

She continues:

"At a time when crises are raging across Europe and when countries need a helping hand, the eurocrats see an opportunity to demand extensive transfers of power and centralisation in return. Barroso suggests the creation of a banking union and argues that the EU in the end must become a federation. This is a frightening development, since even though Barroso himself says that a superstate isn’t the end goal, it is it hard to interpret his vision in any other way.”

She argues that politicians have ”time and again” ignored the subsidiarity principle. Taking aim at the Swedish political class, Skyttedal says:

“Just as there are many signs that the EU makes it harder for member states to fight the centralisation of powers, Sweden has reinforced this tendency on its own”, arguing that the requirement for EU-membership should be deleted from the Swedish Constitution.

“Those of us who are active in the EPP…must take a bigger responsibility for the liberal-conservative family in Europe. In these circles we must dare to bring up the problems that exist. Large parts of our respective parties were once active in the Yes-campaigns, both for EU and euro membership, but it’s time to swallow our pride and take up the fight against supranationalism and to show it’s possible to have a realistic attitude to the EU, which doesn't automatically mean arguing in favour of leaving the project altogether."

“The EPP-family is the biggest one in Europe, but includes members that unfortunately work in the opposite direction to the EU that we rather want to see. What we think the EU needs is less supranationalism, less political interference and definitely not a federation.”

Hear hear.

Sweden isn't exactly a European hegemon (those ambitions pretty much died in 1709) but it's an interesting country for the UK and Europe in at least two respects: first, it's actually doing well, both on the fiscal and banking front. Secondly, how the country responds to the drive for further euro integration will be an interesting proxy for how easy it'll be to reconcile a more tightly knit eurozone block with the EU-27. Most importantly, the banking union with the single market.

70-80% of Swedes oppose joining the euro, and that debate is dead (baring random calls from the occasional politician and opinion former who still cling on to that particular dream - it's almost cute), but the country has fundamental choices ahead of it - such as whether or not it joins the the ECB's banking supervision structure - so Europe needs to be discussed. 

Though a majority of Swedes would echo the sentiment contained in Skyttedal's article, there is still a contingent in Sweden, particularly on the centre-right (associated with Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister) that clings on to a vision of an ever-closer integrated EU as a liberal inroads into its dominant domestic social democratic model, and also as a catalyst for Swedish internationalist idealism, i.e. a 'peace project'.

Historically, both of these assumptions contained some truth but firstly, Sweden's social democratic domination has already been broken and secondly, the single currency - clearly - has proven less of a liberal trade project and more an ideological over-reach (think Greece). The eurozone crisis is now causing friction in Europe, rather than the opposite, and it most certainly isn't aiding either Europe in the world or facilitating enlargement (which is a legitimate EU foreign policy tool).

In other words, this traditional Swedish centre-right vision is dated and needs upgrading - which is true for other contingents in the EPP. Skyttedal's article is an important reminder that if we want to save what's good in Europe, Barroso's "federation" vision - which risks a massive popular backlash - is the opposite of what's needed.

The path for true pro-Europeans must lay elsewhere.

Do the Germans and French still believe in Europe?

The front page of today's Die Welt reads "Germans no longer believe in Europe". According to a TNS Emnid poll carried out in July in Germany, France and Poland on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation, support for the EU and the euro has hit an all-time low with 49% of Germans saying they believe they would personally be "better off" without the EU, with only 32% saying that they would be "worse off". By contrast only 34% of French and 28% of Poles said they would be better off without the EU.

The poll also found that 65% of Germans (and 36% of French) believed they would be better off had the euro not been introduced.  

While the gap between French and German public opinion reflected in the above poll is striking, it is not all good news from France as far as the European Commission is concerned. The front page of today's Le Figaro runs with the headline, "The French and Europe: The disenchantment" (although the French word désamour can also be used to describe someone 'falling out of love'). The paper reports on a "shocking" IFOP survey conducted twenty years after the Maastricht Treaty was signed - and the euro was officially created.

According to the poll, if a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty were held today, 64% of French would vote against it. Indeed, one could argue that the French were never hugely enthusiastic about the Maastricht Treaty - only 51% voted 'Yes' in the original referendum. But the finding remains very significant.

Furthermore, a large majority of French also think that the adoption of the euro has had a negative impact on the competitiveness of the French economy (61%), unemployment (63%) and price levels (89%). Interestingly, though, 65% of respondents are opposed to returning to the franc.

Furthermore, the survey also found that 60% of respondents are in favour of "less European integration" of budgetary and economic policies, while 56% consider it "unlikely" that, in the long term, EU member states will give up their sovereignty to establish a "single European state".

Another tough reality check for European Commission President José Manuel Barroso's recent calls for a "federation of nation states" in Europe. As we already noted last week (see here), public opinion across Europe does not really seem to be on the same wavelength...