Slovenia dodges bailout as it swallows cost of bank overhaul alone

The Slovenian Central Bank this morning released the long anticipated results of the stress test of Slovenian banks. The full results can be found here, while the press release is available here and a reader-friendly Q&A here.

The release did not begin well, with the English feed of the conference proving slow and laggy – similarly to the tests themselves, whose results have been delayed a couple of times. Beyond that, though, things went much as expected, with the tests showing a €4.8bn hole which needs to be filled, around the expectations of €4bn to €5bn. Below, we lay out our key thoughts:

The macroeconomic scenarios include some optimistic export numbers. As we have said before for Slovenia, and others, relying on exports alone to prop up GDP can be a risky game.

The tests are based on data from the end of 2012. This is a problem with these tests in general, but has been exacerbated by delays in the case of Slovenia. The data are one year out of date – a year where the Slovenian economy has struggled, and non-performing loans held by banks have increased steadily.

The €4.8bn figure is taken from the adverse scenario, and it's not exactly clear why this is done when the figures shown under the base scenario are normally used in these tests. This could be seen as an attempt to be 'extra conservative', or a sign that the base case is a bit outdated in terms of projections or data.

 

€3bn of the money will come from the government and be injected into the three largest state-owned banks (NLB, NKBM and Abanka). €2bn will be in the form of cash, with the rest in the form of government securities. A further €441m will come from a 100% write-down of subordinated debt.

The largest banks will also transfer €1.7bn in non-performing loans to the country’s bad bank – exactly what price this will be at remains unclear. It is also unclear if the bad bank will require further state support. Overall, this is a huge amount of support for the largest banks in the sector. The remaining small banks will be forced to raise around €1.1bn through private sources before June 2014. If they fail, then the government may step in once again (although this will certainly involve further bail-ins).

As a result of this bank recapitalisation, Slovenia's government debt will rise to 75.6% of GDP. Not massive by standards of the eurozone crisis, but high enough that we could see upward pressure on borrowing costs, especially given the poor growth outlook for the economy. It also means that both the public and private sector in Slovenia is heavily indebted. This risks weighing on the economy, and could potentially create a downward spiral as domestic demand, investment and government spending falls.

One of the more astonishing figures (to us) is that the stress tests cost €21 million (around 0.06% of GDP) to conduct, due to fees for the consulting firms such as Oliver Wyman, Roland Berger, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte.

So far, then, Slovenia has managed to avoid the need for external aid, despite a significant overhaul of its banking sector. However, the economy remains in a fragile state, and any shocks to the system over the next six months, as the overhaul takes place, could push the economy into a wider and deeper crisis.

An EU bank bailout facility?

Bloomberg reports on a potential proposal by the European Commission to alter the EU’s ‘Balance of Payments’ (BoP) facility to allow it to aid banks which may need to be recapitalised in the aftermath of next year’s ECB Asset Quality Review and the EU's bank stress tests.

As a reminder, the BoP facility was originally created to aid countries with currency crises that may impact the rest of the EU or the fundamental stability of the state. It has since been adjusted to apply to only non-euro members and seen its scope widened slightly with its budget increased to €50bn due to the financial crisis. It is guaranteed by the EU budget and therefore ultimately by the member states - with the UK underwriting around 14-15%.

What is the rationale behind this move?

• Next year’s stress tests are hopefully going to be the most stringent and comprehensive so far, yet there are fears that, without clear aid to help banks found to be in trouble, supervisors may shy away from revealing any deep problems.
• This is backed somewhat by the ECB’s insistence that the stress tests will not be able to be effective unless there are clear backstops for banks in place.
• The eurozone does have some form of backstop in the shape of the ESM which can provide aid to banks (via states) but also has a direct bank recap tool.

Can it be done?

• The most likely approach would be to use Article 352 (the flexibility clause) to adjust the regulation establishing the facility.
• However, the facility also has a treaty base, Article 143, which specifies lending to states. For this reason, it seems unlikely that a direct recapitalisation tool could be added but a credit line which is lent to states to solely aid banks could potentially be. This could come with less or more specific financial sector conditions than other loans (for example see ESM and Spanish bank bailout).
• This would require unanimous approval in the Council. So far, Germany and the UK have expressed scepticism based on the fear that a backstop would reduce the pressure on banks (and their governments) to reform and clean up ahead of the tests.

Could it be significant?

• Yes. If it were approved it would create a collective fund to salvage banks should a member state be unable to deal with the problem alone. If the UK were to approve the move it could open up the door for future pay-outs of funds to aid other countries' banks – decisions taken under qualified majority voting. 
• Furthermore, it also seems to be driven by events in the eurozone. Firstly, it seems an attempt to extend this centralised banking union model (to break the so-called sovereign-bank loop) to the entire EU - even though the other countries have already rejected this to a large extent. If they really wanted to join the banking union, which some might, there will be chances for them to engage directly.
• The creation of the fund would raise some serious questions. Will this backstop exist without strong influence over the amount of risk taken in or the relative size of banking sectors to governments across the EU? If so, surely that creates a moral hazard problem. If not, it would necessitate far greater powers over member states' financial sectors. 
• Lastly, it highlights the level of concern around the health of many of the EU's banks. This was furthered by the EBA's recent assessment that the largest EU banks are some €70bn short of where they need to be to meet the new Basel III rules.