Are Greek banks improving or struggling for liquidity?

Those who followed our analysis of the Greek bond buyback will remember that we warned at length that it could have some adverse effects, one of which would be to hit bank liquidity at a time when Greek banks could least afford it.

In the end Greek banks were pushed to take part by the government but their resistance (despite being reliant on the Greek Central Bank for liquidity and the eurozone for a recapitalisation) was quite telling.

In any case, data is now beginning to emerge which sheds some light on the issue but also provides plenty of questions (as always with Greece data releases are some months behind elsewhere so the latest data available is for January 2013).

Greek bank borrowing from the ECB and the Greek Central Bank (via ELA) has dropped significantly since the bond buyback at the start of December (down €21.3bn since November 2012).

 

Now, normally a sharp drop in borrowing from the ECB and ELA would be a positive thing since it suggests reduced reliance on official funding. However, in this case, we suspect that rather than improving their position, banks are actually struggling to find sufficient assets to post as collateral with the Bank of Greece to gain liquidity.

Other factors do support this argument. The Bank of Greece annual accounts show that the overall collateral pledged for central bank liquidity fell by €11.7bn in the aftermath of the bond buyback, while borrowing from the central banks fell by €7.5bn (data for January is not yet available). Furthermore, with total assets pledged for collateral still totalling €217.1bn or 50% of all bank assets in Greece it is easy to imagine that the banking sector is working under significant collateral constraints.

Are there any other potential explanations?

Well, the first would be that banks repaid their borrowings from the ECB’s Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) in January. This seems very unlikely. The LTROs coincided with a period of extreme turmoil in the Greek banking sector due to the Greek debt restructuring, a period in which Greek banks could not access the ECB. Therefore, it is unlikely that Greek banks borrowed much if anything from the LTRO. Besides, if they did, it seems strange that they would give back a key source of long term funding early.

The second explanation could simply be that confidence has returned somewhat. There is some evidence to support this, not least the return of domestic deposits, which have increased by €12.1bn since November 2012. However, that still leaves a drop in central bank borrowing of €10bn which does not seem to have been filled by other sources of liquidity.

Lastly, the bank recapitalisation is being enacted, which could reduce the Greek bank demands for liquidity, although since it isn’t expected to be completed until end of April it would seem strange if the impact showed up this early on.

Overall then, there seems to be some strong evidence that the Greek bond buyback has hit the liquidity access of Greek banks, albeit not in a catastrophic way. More importantly though it has happened at a time when credit provided to the real economy continues to contract and economic growth remains some way off.

Update 16:30 13/03/13: 
@EfiEfthimiou has flagged up a good point over email. In December 2012 the ECB began accepting Greek government bonds as collateral again, this allowed banks to switch from using the more expensive ELA to standard ECB liquidity. The haircut on collateral may also be lower under standard ECB lending (we can't be certain since ELA terms are secret). This could have allowed the banks to reduce their liquidity needs and the level of collateral posted - another potential explanation then.

Greek bond buyback fallout continues

As we noted in this morning’s press summary, there have been some interesting developments with regards to the Greek banking sector.

Kathimerini reported that, according to unnamed bank officials, the bank recapitalisation may now need to be larger than the scheduled €27.5bn. The reason for this is twofold:

• First, the level of non-performing loans in Greek banks topped 24% of all loans at the end of 2012. This is a staggering amount. Keep in mind the Spanish banking sector, which has been the focus of so much uncertainty, still has non-performing loans equal to around 11% of all loans. Greece once again is in another league here.
• Secondly, as we warned at the time, the bond-buyback had a detrimental effect on the Greek banks. Even if they did not take substantial direct losses on the bonds they submitted, they have lost out in terms of future revenue (the interest from the bonds). This is reported to amount to around €1.5bn this year.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this seems a fairly clear-cut case of the negative trade off which we highlighted at length in the run up to buyback.

Needless to say, it is not make or break and the marginal effect of the buyback is still positive, albeit fairly small in the scheme of the Greek crisis. Fortunately, there is an additional €5bn set aside for such ‘unexpected’ increases in the bank bailout, so the additional cost should not disrupt the bailout programme.

We would note as a final point, that this may not be the end of the story (not just because the non-performing loans are likely to increase further) but also because we are yet to find out what impact the bond buyback had on the Greek banks’ ability to access liquidity (an issue we discussed in detail here). Again it may not be make or break, but we suspect it could be a further negative factor for Greece to deal with - something it hardly needs.

The Greek bond buyback: Greek banks are putting up a fight (as we predicted)

As we predicted two weeks ago the Greek bond buyback is turning out to be much trickier than almost everyone else expected, and for exactly the reason we suggested – the Greek banks.

Despite positive declarations throughout last week that the Greek bond buyback would reach its target of €30bn bonds submitted by the Friday deadline, the Greek government has announced that the deadline has now been moved to 12pm Tuesday 11 December.

Throughout the buyback process the Greek banks have made it clear that they want to keep their participation to a minimum and are not keen on the buyback plan generally. The reasons for why have been discussed here and here (potential losses and hit to liquidity). Needless to say, the Greek government has exerted significant political pressure to ensure that the Greek banks do participate fully.

Despite this, Kathimerini reports that the Greek government decided to extend the deal after hedge funds submitted €16bn in bonds (much of which they will make a profit on) while Greek banks submitted around €10bn. This was short of €16bn which the banks were expected to submit, and which they are likely to be pushed into submitting by tomorrow.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this did not go down too well and the press release on the extension contains a (very thinly veiled) threat that those bond holders who do not take part may not end up getting paid back at all. Stelios Papadopoulos, the head of the Public Debt Management Agency, is quoted (in the actual press release) as saying:

“Investors should bear in mind that even if Greece accepts all bonds tendered in the Invitation, it will continue to engage with its official sector creditors in considering further steps to put its debt on a sustainable path. Future measures may not involve an opportunity to exit investments in Designated Securities at the levels offered for this buy back.” 

The buyback still looks likely to be completed, but all of this highlights just how weak Greek banks are - the last thing the Greek economy needs is even weaker domestic banks (and therefore even less lending to the real economy).

Greek banks and the Greek bond buyback

Yesterday we put out a flash analysis looking at the latest Greek deal and the prospect of Greek bond buyback. One of the many issues with the deal (and the buyback in particular) which we raised was that Greek banks will find it difficult to participate without needing extra capital.

However, Greek Finance Mininster Yannis Stournaras also said yesterday (in a timely statement):

The debt buyback "doesn't mean new capital for banks, given that they have recorded these bonds at lower prices than those that will be offered."

His suggestion then, is that the Greek banks have already marked their bonds to market prices on their books, meaning that they can sell them at the low prices involved in the bond buyback without needing new capital. This may make their participation more likely, but there are plenty of other reasons why we still see it as difficult and unpredictable. (We also still question why foreign holders will be involved, particularly previous hold outs and those who are holding to maturity, see our full analysis here).

Firstly, as Kathimerini reported today, the banks themselves are not keen to be involved in the buy back. Many feel that they have already done their part in terms of taking part almost ubiquitously in the first debt restructuring. If they were to take part in the buyback, they could seek adjustments in the terms of the recapitalisation and reform – something which the EU/IMF/ECB troika is unlikely to accept.

Secondly, taking part in such a scheme would need significant approval within the banks and other financial firms. This means board level and possibly wider shareholder approval. As the restructuring earlier this year showed, this takes time, with the process dragging for months. Given the 13 December deadline to have a bond buyback plan in place (i.e. to have a firm idea of who will take part, to make sure it is worthwhile) it is not clear how many bondholders will be in place to participate.

Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, is that the banks need their holdings of bonds (around €22bn) to gain liquidity from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) through the Greek Central Bank (GCB). Looking at the GCB balance sheet, it seems broadly that Greek banks posted €247bn in collateral to gain €123bn in liquidity, an average haircut of 50%. Given that many of these assets will be loans or securities, sovereign debt (even Greek) is unlikely to be judged any more harshly than the average. So, if the banks sold these assets for a 65% write down (as suggested) they could purchase new assets (maybe other sovereign debt) but would be able to buy less of it (as not many other assets priced at a 65% discount) meaning they would not be able to gain as much liquidity under the ELA as with current Greek bonds.

Essentially, this could harm the Greek banks liquidity position which would further constrain their lending ability and possibly prompt further deposit flight – both of which would hurt the fragile Greek economy.

All in all then, this process could still be counterproductive for Greek banks even if they do not book new losses directly and they still could be hesitant to take part voluntarily. However, that is not to say that the political pressure applied behind the scenes will not be enough to force them to voluntarily join. Ultimately, it simply highlights that this policy may deliver a small benefit with some negative side effects but is at best a way of skirting the real issue of whether the eurozone can stomach permanent fiscal transfers to Greece. This will come to the fore again soon.