Is Bild having second thoughts about Juncker?

If Angela Merkel had privately hoped to quietly ditch Jean-Claude Juncker after the European election, it all started to go wrong when Axel Springer, the media group that owns Bild, Germany's and Europe's biggest selling paper, added its substantial weight to the pro-Juncker/pro-spitzenkandidaten campaign. This severely restricted Merkel's room for manoeuvre.

While Bild's editorial line has not changed explicitly, today's coverage of the issue is notably less enthusiastic. The paper's Brussels correspondent Dirk Hoeren asks "Will the Juncker deal be a dirty one?", with his piece claiming that France and Italy have made their support for Juncker conditional on a relaxation of EU budgetary rules (unlike Cameron who has taken a principled stance).

In a separate op-ed entitled “Merkel’s dilemma”, Bild’s deputy editor in chief Béla Anda argues:

“that the Southern Europeans will make their vote for Juncker dependent on an agreement on their debt policies shows the shabby extent the haggling over the EU’s chief post has reached.”

“If Merkel supports the election of a euro-softener to the post of Commission President, she will have backed the wrong horse.”

“Jean-Claude Juncker should be warned and be made aware that he must not be a chief at the mercy of Southern Europe.”

If you believe in tight observance of budget rules, as most Germans do, the last thing you want is to have a Commission President, appointed on a 'pan-European democratic mandate', who supports relaxing German-inspired rules on budgetary stability and the introduction of eurobonds.

While Juncker might need French and Italian support, ultimately he is the EPP candidate and Merkel is likely to bring her influence to bear. But imagine if 'centre-left' parties with a more avowedly Socialist spitzenkandidat were to win in future. How would Germany respond then, particularly the 'centre-right'? Would it be a case of yes to pan-European democracy, but only if the 'right' candidate wins? It seems like some people are starting to wake up to this prospect.

A closer look at Juncker's "popular mandate" - is he really the People's President?

Forget Cameron. Forget the personal merits or otherwise of Jean-Claude Juncker. The question of who ought to become the next Commission President goes a lot deeper. Supporters of the 'spitzenkandidaten' concept say that it represents genuine 'EU democracy', and that since the national centre-right parties belonging to the European People’s Party (EPP) won the most seats in the European Parliament, Juncker has a “popular mandate” to become the next Commission President, and that therefore, national governments are obliged to nominate him at the European Council summit later this month.

However, Open Europe has compiled some figures which put these claims to democratic legitimacy into sharp context.

Click here to enlarge

Did Juncker really 'win the European elections?

Out of a total electorate of approximately 395 million people, 40.3 million (10.2%) voted for EPP affiliated parties. However, this falls to 38.4m (9.7%) when you take out Sweden and Hungary, where the EPP parties made a point of not endorsing the spitzenkandidaten process and/or Juncker’s candidacy in particular.

A handful people on twitter have predictably vented their frustration at the flaws within the UK's democratic system, trying to somehow show that, in fact, Juncker does have a strong public mandate after all. Arguments include that David Cameron himself was only on the ballot in one constituency and therefore is elected by some 33,000 people. This is of course silly. If we want to play this game, the Tories contest virtually every constituency in the UK and it was blatantly clear that if they emerged as the largest party, Cameron would become the Prime Minister. As we demonstrate below, in the European elections, even those voting for EPP parties did not know they were effectively casting a vote 'for Juncker'. In addition,. turnout in the last UK general election (65.1%) was around a third higher than in the European elections (43.1%). We can go on and on.

He was not even supported by a majority of EPP delegates

When Juncker was chosen as the EPP's official candidate at the group's March congress in Dublin he only received 382 delegates' votes, less than half of the 800 who were eligible to vote. 245 delegates voted for Michel Barnier instead, and 173 did not vote at all. There is no publicly available list of who the delegates were or how they voted.

Only around a third of voters knew Juncker was even in the race

In reality, far less than 9.7% can be said to have genuinely voted 'for Juncker' given that the majority (outside of his native Luxembourg) did not know that he was standing - or even who he was.

A poll commissioned by the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformers immediately after the European elections found that unprompted, only 8.2% of respondents were able to name Juncker as one of the lead candidates, and only 8.8% were able to name the EPP or any other EU-level political party. When prompted, only 25.9% of respondents (33.9% of voters) were able to identify Juncker, and only 24.4% of respondents (30.8% of voters) were able to identify the EPP.

The poll also found that less than 30% of respondents (41.3% of voters, 17.3% of non-voters) were aware that their vote in the European elections indirectly supports one of the European political parties’ candidates as the next President of the European Commission. Only 1 in 10 of respondents (10.1%) endorsed this process, suggesting two-thirds of those aware of it did not.

An Emnid poll for Bild am Sonntag published two weeks before the elections found that even in Germany - where politicians and commentators have taken up his case with zeal - only 7% could identify Juncker as the centre-right’s leading candidate (13% among CDU/CSU voters).

This completely demolishes the argument that the majority of those who voted for national centre-right parties were aware they were actively casting a vote either for the EPP or for Juncker.

German media turn on Cameron over Juncker - but what are they arguing for?

We pointed out on Friday that a powerful coalition between media and politicians was forming in Germany in support of Jean-Claude Juncker becoming the next Commission President and the Spitzenkandidaten experiment more generally. More worryingly for Cameron, he has emerged as the pantomime villain of the piece due to his opposition to both.

What's interesting though is that German commentators seem to argue more against Cameron than in favour of Juncker - who, we suspect, most of them realise that the idea of Juncker as the saviour of European democracy isn't entirely intellectually sound. A widely reported pre-election opinion poll for Bild showing that only 7% of Germans actually knew Juncker was a candidate, is no longer cited.  Here is a round-up of some of the key pieces from the past few days:

On Friday, the big news was the endorsement of Juncker by Axel Springer (the parent company of Bild and Welt). In a piece headlined “Juncker has to become President", the group's chairman Mathias Döpfner wrote:

“Are the results of the elections in Europe the sovereign decision of the citizens that politicians ought to implement? Or are they a form of non-binding suggestion that in the backrooms of powers can be interpreted and then gladly twisted into something opposite?”

"The issue is clear: Europeans want Juncker as the EU president. Schulz got the second-best result. A third [candidate], who didn't stand for election, can't be allowed to get the job. Otherwise that would make a farce out of democracy. You may get away with something like that in the DDR or in far-right banana republics. But not in the EU. Otherwise it will abolish itself."

In another comment piece on Saturday titled “Merkel must keep her word”, regular Bild columnist Ernst Elitz - who has often been critical of EU over-reach argued that :

“Before the elections it was clear: The Commission President will be decided by the voters and the EU Parliament. Afterwards some national leaders don’t want to hear about it anymore.”

On Monday, Handelsblatt’s Brussels correspondent Thomas Ludwig argued that:

“Whoever listens to the Brits in the debate about the personnel for Europe’s top posts is allowing the notorious spoil sport to take charge of the game... “It is impudence that the British Prime Minster David Cameron called the vote of the people an ‘unnecessary restriction’ for the political manoeuvring in the personnel poker. What kind of democracy understanding is that!”

Die Welt's Brussels correspondent Florian Eder - another German journalist and commentator who is often sensitive to the need for EU reform - also had a piece on Monday in which he argued that:

"It would in any case be a risky move [for member states to put forward an alternative candidate] which would delight the strengthened anti-Europeans that David Cameron and Francois Hollande want to keep at bay. The sceptics could already by the first vote get that which they could never achieve alone: a hamstrung, institutionally paralysed EU. Is that supposed to make sense?" 

"the European Council is by no means set against Juncker. Many of its members, including social democrats, have come out in support of the Luxembourger. That was how it had been agreed: the election winner would become Commission President. Cameron is voting against this as he blames his defeat at the European elections on the EU, which should show consideration towards him and his party interests... whoever blocks Juncker is duping the voters who believed in a political promise."

German magazine Spiegel went the furthest, with its English-language version publishing an editorial yesterday entitled "Decision Time: Britain must now decide if it will stay in Europe", which argued that:

“The EU cannot allow itself to be blackmailed by the British for another three years and refuse to give the people of Europe what was assured to them before the election - that they could use their vote to determine the next president of the European Commission. If the EU doesn't fulfill that promise, it will lose all credibility and acceptance… Britain is important to be sure. But the choice between a more democratic EU and Britain's continued membership is clear. Europe must choose democracy.”

There are a others who take a more nuanced tone. For example FAZ’s Brussels correspondent, Werner Mussler, points out that:

“The future of democracy in the EU does not depend on whether [the European Commission President] is called Jean-Claude Juncker, Martin Schulz or something else.” 

The European Parliament - a failed experiment in pan-European democracy?

In a new report published this morning we assess the track record of the European parliament and conclude that it has failed as an institution on a number of fronts. Although many individual MEPs work hard and conscientiously for their constituents, the European Parliament as a whole has failed to gain popular democratic legitimacy. Still, given that the EP now has a lot of power to decide law that impacts on people's every day life - from working hours to browsing the web - there's a lot of reason to vote in the European elections.

Here are the key findings:

• Turnout has fallen despite an increase in MEPs’ powers: While the use of ‘co-decision’, under which MEPs have equal status with national ministers in passing EU legislation, has more than doubled during the last two decades – from 27% to 62% – turnout in European elections has fallen from 57% to 43%. Yes, yes, correlation not causation (as the old twitter cliché goes) but point is: if the EP was effective in closing the democratic deficit, we would see exactly the opposite trend. 

• There is no correlation between voter turnout and knowledge of the European Parliament or interest in EU affairs: A common explanation for low turnout in European elections is a lack of public knowledge of EU politics and the EU institutions yet this is not borne out by our research. For example, in Romania 81% and Slovakia 79% of people say they are aware of the European Parliament but only 28% and 20% turned out to vote in 2009.

Likewise, low turnout cannot be explained by a lack of interest - in the Netherlands, 61% say they were interested in European affairs – the highest in the EU – yet the turnout of voters at 36% is one of the lowest.

• The main party groups in the European Parliament agree with each other three quarters of the time: It probably won't come as a surprise to anyone who watched any of the 'debates' between Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Juncker that, despite representing national parties of different political traditions, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Socialist and Democrat (S&D) party families voted the same way 74% of the time in the 2009-14 parliament. Meanwhile, the average majority in co-decision votes in the 2009-14 parliamentary term is over 75% – the highest it has ever been. In effect, this denies the voters the very same choice the EP is meant to boost. 

• In 2012, the European Parliament spent €85 million on fostering a common European political identity through the party groups in the European Parliament and their affiliated pan-European parties and political foundations outside the parliament. This is only part of a budget that has been spiralling out of control - up from €1.4bn in 2008 to around €1.75bn in 2014.
  
  
  

So those are some of the key problems - what about the solutions? While there is no quick easy fix to what is a complex and multi-faceted problem, the single most effective remedy would be to return democratic accountability closer to voters by boosting the role of national parliaments in the EU decision making process and not repeating the mistake of giving more powers to the European Parliament.

This would involve national parliaments being able to group together to block proposed EU laws and amend or repeal existing rules (see here for more details on this). In parallel, the European Parliament should be stripped of its right to increase the EU budget as it is national parliaments that are responsible for raising the revenue. In addition, MEPs should not be able to veto EU trade agreements agreed by national parliaments.

Meanwhile, the €85 million spent on fostering a common European political identity through the party families in the parliament and their affiliated pan-European political parties and foundations should be cut. The 2009 reforms to MEPs’ allowances should be completed by requiring all allowances, such as the general expenditure allowance (worth €51,588 a year) which is vulnerable to misuse, to be conditional on the production of receipts.

Book review - George Soros 'The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?'

Over on his Forbes blog, Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel provides a review of George Soros’ latest book ‘The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?’ off the back of the event we hosted with him last night (the full write up of which can be found here).

The abstract of the book notes:

“The euro crisis was not an inevitable consequence of integration, but a result of avoidable mistakes in politics, economics and finance; the excessive faith in the self-regulating financial markets that Soros calls market fundamentalism inspired flawed institutional structures that call out for reform. Despite the considerable perils of this period, George Soros maintains his faith in the European Union as a model of open society.”

In his interviews Soros focuses on the failings of Europe during the eurozone crisis – specifically looking at the structural flaws in the euro and the role of Germany. Soros posits that the crisis could have been averted, or at least ended earlier, if Germany had taken the lead in the eurozone and allowed for greater solidarity through fiscal union. He also suggests the future of Europe could be marred by on-going political crises and economic stagnation if these flaws are not corrected.

Raoul argues that:

“His comments in general are interesting and for the most part accurate. However, he remained overly optimistic on the prospects for the euro despite these flaws and even called on the UK to join the single currency.”

“In particular there seems to be an inconsistency between his desire for greater centralisation and a firm grounding in democracy and an “open society” (which is transparent and responsive). It seems that behind Soros’ approach is the assumption of a European demos. However, I fundamentally believe that this is simply not the case.”

“While I do not believe the goals Soros outlines are readily achievable at this point in Europe, the one thing that comes through during the book is that this is not a policy proposal but a pitch to try to bring the reader round to his ambitious goals for Europe despite the current problems.”

One part which isn’t discussed on the blog is Soros’ view of the UK’s position in the EU. At our event he described the UK’s current position as “the best of both worlds” and called on it to rediscover its “European identity”. This comes through in the book as well, where he warns against a Brexit and accuses the UK of “blackmailing” the rest of the EU with the threat of an exit.

However, it doesn’t entirely fit with his broader view of the EU and the eurozone, which he believes needs much deeper integration. If that were to happen (and it is to some extent albeit more slowly than Soros would like) it would fundamentally change the UK’s position in the EU and the makeup of the EU itself. He seems to review the UK’s position in a much more static way than he does the EU and euro which he views as largely fluid.

This context also makes his “blackmail” comments a bit strange since part of the UK’s move is in response to the crisis. It also does not fit with his idea of an open society and democracy, given that many in the UK are keen to see a reformed EU and a referendum.

Nevertheless, it’s an interesting book and certainly worth a read if you’re looking for an overview of the current crisis and some historical factors around it as well as thoughts on the future.

EU approval process for GM requires better balance between innovation and democratic accountability

Yesterday saw a debate between the EU's Europe ministers regarding the approval of Pioneer 1507 - a strain of genetically modified maize which has been developed by US firm DuPont to be pest-resistant. This is a fascinating case which sees the clash between EU legal procedures and scientific evidence on one hand, and public opinion and green lobbying on the other.

Unbelievably, DuPont first applied for EU approval back in 2001, but due to the political resistance to GM in the EU, this application was deliberately kicked into the long grass despite six separate positive opinions from the EU's food quango, the European Food Safety Agency. The wider context is a climate of political hostility which has resulted in Europe falling far behind the rest of the world when it comes to biotechnology - aside from Pioneer 1507 only one other GM crop has been approved in the past 15 years. The result is that biotech companies such as BASF and Monsanto have already left the EU and others could follow suit, with the loss of jobs, investment and trading opportunities.

Following a legal challenge by DuPont, the EU's General Court ruled that the EU was breaching its own rules by not taking a decision. Opinion among member states was divided, with five states including the UK minded to vote in favour, four including Germany minded to abstain and the remaining 19 minded to vote against (a formal vote was not actually held). Despite the large number of member states opposing the approval, no qualified majority was reached either way.

Under the EU's comitology process, when the result is indecisive, the Commission can chose to push ahead with its original proposal, and its looks set to do so (in fact during the debate the Council's legal service indicated it would be legally obliged to).

This is undoubtedly a problematic situation. On one hand, it is good that the Commission is heeding the independent scientific recommendation issued by EFSA. As EU Health Commissioner Tonio Borg argued during the debate, member states should not pick and chose when to follow such advice and when to disregard it. On the other hand it is bad from a democratic perspective when the Commission forces through something opposed by a majority of member states and public opinion - the EU was rightly slammed for proposing to ban jugs of olive oil from restaurant tables following a similarly inconclusive vote.

The case therefore illustrates the need for more flexibility in the EU on issues where member states cannot agree and where public sensitivities need to be taken into account. As UK Europe Minister David Lidington argued during the debate:

"I've no wish to force any country that doesn't want to cultivate this variety of maize to do so... in the longer term the answer surely has to be some agreement under which we agree that those member states that want to have GM crops in cultivation are free to do it while those maintain a ban are free to do so as well."

Greater flexibility for member states to ‘go it alone’ in designing appropriate regulatory frameworks for GM was also one of the recommended in the recent Fresh Start report on the EU's impact on UK Life Sciences. This would be a good compromise - that way it would be down to national governments and parliaments to decide whether to allow cultivation of GM crops - and it would be down to national politicians in favour of this to show the requisite leadership to win over public opinion.

Is the scrutiny of EU legislation only the preserve of the EU-critical?

Who cares about EU scrutiny?

The Hansard Society has today published a collection of essays on improving the current scrutiny of EU legislation in the UK Parliament - well worth a read. Open Europe's Christopher Howarth contributed an essay arguing for greater powers for national parliaments arguing "Scrutiny without power is not scrutiny, it is ritual" - along with a series of detailed suggestions (more on those later). Other contributors include Bill Cash MP, Chris Heaton Harris MP, Robert Broadhurst, Gisela Stuart MP and Lord Boswell and the foreword is written by none other than the Europe Minister David Lidington MP.

However, reading those names you might be struck by the absence of those on the more EU integrationist side of the UK EU debate. Surely those on all sides of the political spectrum have an interest in the EU's democratic accountability? Well here is what the Hansard Society's Ruth Fox had to say:

“A majority of the authors – though not all – might be said to occupy the more eurosceptic end of the political spectrum. We invited a wide range of politicians across all the major parties to our seminar in September 2012 but those who accepted came, in the main, from the eurosceptic perspective. Similarly, we invited a number of pro-Europeans to contribute to this pamphlet but, disappointingly, there were few expressions of interest. This underlines the concern that those engaging with the detail of European issues are drawn from too narrow a tranche of parliamentary representatives.”

So there you have it. Why are those who argue for the UK's place in Europe to remain unchanged and/or more integration so reluctant to say anything about increasing the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the goings on of the EU - what do they think they have to lose?

Did the EU instruct Rome to “unplug” Berlusconi?

If true, this is quite extraordinary.

Fabrizio Goria - business and finance correspondent of the Italian online news site Linkiesta - has recently taken a look back at the Italian crisis towards the end 2011. An English version of the article is available on the LSE's Europe blog. With Italian borrowing costs reaching record highs, he writes that European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso instructed the then Interior Minister Roberto Maroni (of Lega Nord) to "unplug" Silvio Berlusconi, who was the Prime Minister at the time.

Goria writes:

"In those dark days, with the 10-year Bund-BTP spread close to a historical peak, a unique incident occurred. During an institutional meeting, the then minister of internal affairs Roberto Maroni received a phone call. It was towards the end of October. People attending that meeting, a select group of associates, reported that he turned pale. The call came from José Manuel Barroso [who] was very clear with Maroni: “I don’t want you to take this personally. Neither you nor all other members of the government. But you need to “unplug” Berlusconi.” And in that moment Barroso revealed what the strategy was: a flurry of declarations against the then prime minister. From all fronts, from every European policy maker. The message to be sent was one and one only: Berlusconi is inadequate."

Ten days later, Berlusconi resigned.

It was extensively reported at the time that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and then French President Nicolas Sarkozy (who are obviously much more powerful than Barroso) were putting enormous pressure on Berlusconi to take a hike - and it was always assumed that Berlusconi's departure was at least in part due to European pressure.

However, this would be the most explicit intervention known to date. Now, we haven’t seen this reported anywhere else – and given that it is evidence that the EU fell just short of toppling a democratically elected leader – we'd expect it to be all over Italian and international media.

So we take it with a pinch of salt – but, as always, we’re keen to know what our readers think…

The UK electorate is in the market for something more than the false choice of status quo or exit

When it comes to the question of whether the UK ought to stay in the EU there are two key considerations. Is continued membership the best solution from an economic perspective (trade, regulation etc) and also is it democratically sustainable? (Others will also cite 'influence' and geopolitical clout).

Leaving aside the first consideration for now, the second one has long generated a heated debate, not least in the comment section of our blog, with some regular readers pointing out to us that a majority of the UK public wants to leave the EU. End of story.

In his Europe speech, David Cameron warned that support for the EU was “wafer-thin” – which as we highlighted at the time was a long-term trend (albeit exacerbated by the crisis).

Recent polls have shown an ever larger margin in favour of exit, with a widely cited ComRes poll over the weekend showing that 46% would vote to leave, 24% would vote to stay in, with 30% undecided.

However, there is, of course, an important sub-story here. While this and similar polls have been interpreted by some as a mandate for withdrawal, when a supplementary question about restoring “some EU powers” to the UK is posed, the proportions change quite dramatically with 43% (including 48% of Conservative and 20% of UKIP voters) voting to stay in, 24% voting to leave regardless, and 34% undecided. These figures are consistent with the results of similar questions asked in a number of opinion polls in recent times.

In fact, restricting the choice in the EU debate to only In/Out is rather odd. How often does that happen in other areas of public policy? Would a choice between a 100%, all encompassing welfare state or no welfare state at all, for example, be a fair choice put to the British public? Unlikely, as most of the public wants something in between.

That we consistently see such a large swing in opinion from 'Out' under a straight In/Out scenario to 'In' under renegotiated terms shows that one of the clearest trends in UK public opinion is that the UK public wants to see new EU membership terms first, and only then withdrawal if that fails.

As such, for those who cite the issue of democratic legitimacy as their prime motivation, whilst they most certainly have a point, there is no reason not to at least give Cameron a good shot at his strategy of re-negotiation followed by a referendum.

The democratic question is also frequently cited by those who demand an immediate referendum, including the MPs who voted in favour of the amendment to the Queen’s Speech last week. However, buried in the poll data was an interesting finding that ought to provide some food for thought – 20% of voters (including 52% of Conservative voters) said they had more sympathy with David Cameron while 18% sided with backbench MPs. Meanwhile 48% said they did not have more sympathy for either side.

If there was an overwhelming support for an immediate UK exit - as opposed to substantially reducing the EU's powers in Britain - one would have suspected far greater support for the handful Tory backbenchers who are pushing for an early referendum bill. This isn't to say that there is a major trust issue when it comes to Europe, and that some Tory backbenchers didn't make valid points last week, but merely that the public, again, is basically quite content with the basic idea of the UK negotiating new membership terms followed by a public vote.

At the same time though, politicians and officials who think they can fudge this process or procrastinate over addressing the EU's involvement in too many areas of national life ought to be very careful. The electorate's desire to staying the EU is clearly predicated on substantial reforms taking place.

This is welcome stuff: David Lidington says national parliaments could be given a 'red card' over EU proposals

National Parliaments' should be allowed
to show the EU the red card

This is an idea that's very close to our hearts - and an idea that we have promoted for a very long time.

The first bits of UK Europe Minister David Lidington's interview with German daily Die Welt have just been published on the paper's webpage. We'll have to wait until tomorrow to see the full version. But from what we can see so far, Lidington's interview is likely to reverberate quite a bit across Europe.

He said,

"Perhaps we should lower the threshold for national parliaments to take action against initiatives from Brussels; perhaps we should introduce the principle of a 'red card' so that a given number of national parliaments can block initiatives from the [European] Commission."

Sounds familiar? Well, the 'red card' was first advocated by Open Europe in 2011 in our report 'The case for European Localism'. And again by Lidington's PPS Tobias Ellwood MP in a publication for Open Europe in December 2012, where he argued:

"Any future [EU] Treaty change should include some system of the red card system with the right quota and powers."

A red card is an improvement over a yellow

Open Europe's Director Mats Persson pushed the idea in the Telegraph here in January. Under the Lisbon Treaty, if a third of national parliaments show the Commission the current 'yellow card', the Commission is obliged to reconsider its proposal and explain why it wants to change it, scrap it or push ahead with it. To date, the Commission has withdrawn a proposal in only one case after being shown the 'yellow card' - the so-called 'Monti II' Regulation on the right to strike.

However, this provision has several weaknesses. First, it doesn't oblige the Commission to actually drop the proposal, but only to reconsider it. So it's a far cry from a veto. Secondly, it's only supposed to happen on 'subsidiarity' grounds - and not on 'proportionality'. Thirdly, a third of parliaments are supposed to agree within an eight-week window, meaning that if the Commission tables a proposal in August or September - when most parliaments are in recess - it can basically push ahead with anything.

In other words, it really doesn't do that much to close the EU's infamous democratic deficit. Nor to strengthen the powers of national MPs - an aspect which, as we've argued repeatedly, is absolutely vital if the EU is to regain democratic legitimately.

Therefore, a 'red card' provision giving a certain number of national parliaments acting in unison (the threshold needs to be discussed) an actual veto right, would be an absolutely massive improvement. This is also an area where the UK will have support from Germany and others if it pitches it right.

In the interview, Lidington also pointed out that several times in the past,

"the content of [EU] treaties has been interpreted in a way which was not desired or expected at the time the treaty changes were decided on. Sometimes, the European Commission or the European Parliament try to expand the boundaries of their competences." 

The Europe Minister also stressed that the EU's single market for services is "painfully underdeveloped". echoing similar remarks on the importance of deepening the single market before. However, this time they come after he said that Open Europe's proposals to reignite the EU's services sector and boost EU-wide GDP by up to €294bn were "interesting" and "worth exploring".

More please!

"Why EU mandarins refuse to learn"

Has anything changed since the 15th century?

Die Welt’s Foreign Affairs Editor Clemens Wergin today has a blistering op-ed on the current state of affairs in Europe, entitled “Why EU mandarins refuse to learn”. Here are the key parts:

“The disastrous decisions regarding the future of Europe have been completely without consequences. Despite all the mistakes made the system appears to be incapable of adapting. The tanker remains on the wrong course.”

“It belongs to the biggest disappointments for convinced democrats that up until now, neither on the European level or on that of the nation states, there are no noteworthy efforts to clarify the causes of the euro crisis… The Bundestag has also not covered itself in glory. There has been no cross-examination of Hans Eichel and Gerhard Schröder why they agreed to let Greece join the euro despite the fact that already then there was a strong suspicion that the Greek figures were problematic.”

"Democracy is adaptive and able to correct itself. However this is out of the question in the worst crisis to hit Europe after the war. Here, the euroscepticism of many of the continent’s citizens is justified. They see that in this crisis that this Europe is not created on transparency, enlightenment and accountability. This creates the impression that they are dealing with a conspiracy of the elite, conspiracy against common sense."

“EU elites are afraid of washing their dirty laundry for fear it will portray the European project in a bad light… It is part of the pride and ethos of a democratic polity to clarify failures and to draw consequences.”

“With the exception of the changes to the eurozone’s regulatory framework forced through by the Germans there have been no intentions of rethinking the fundamental assumptions of the EU… One gets the justifiable impression that nothing can divert EU mandarins from their current path and their pre-conceived opinions. The euro has not worked? Ok, let's try an even higher dose of community building… In Brussels they mourn over bad poll numbers and believe that this is only down to national populists who have wrongly explained Europe.” 

"With Portugal, Spain and Greece there was once the quiet hope that good European governance would be diffused via a kind of osmosis process from the EU headquarters in Brussels into the periphery. That has worked only in part. In some respects, the abundant money from the EU’s structural funds has had the opposite effect to that which was intended. They have strengthened clientelistic structures and made people there believe their system somehow works. Ultimately, politicians always had enough money via Brussels assistance to distribute to cronies and voters. As long as money was available, many people profited from this system. Then along came the crisis which showed that it just does not work and carries with it significant competitive disadvantages.” 

"At present, the EU is obviously not an adaptive system. Nothing is solved, no one is held accountable. Responsibility for consequential mistakes is lost somewhere between the many capital cities and the corridors of Brussels. As long as this does not change, one should not be surprised by the bad reputation that this European undertaking enjoys among citizens."

 Taking no prisoners. For German speakers, it's worth reading the entire piece. 

MEPs around Europe defy their parties on EU budget

Earlier today we looked at how UK MEPs voted on the EU budget, pointing out that Lib Dems defied the national party line (earning them a telling-off from Nick Clegg). However, we thought it would also be interesting to round up how other national delegations voted, in particular those of member states whose leaders were most insistent on imposing budgetary discipline on the EU.

Germany: Angela Merkel was instrumental in forcing through the budget cut but both her own CDU MEPs and CSU MEPs voted to "reject it in its current form", siding with their EPP group. Likewise, MEPs from her junior coalition partner, the FDP also voted against the budget. At the national level, all three parties have been steadfast in their insistence on budgetary discipline in the eurozone.

Netherlands: Dutch PM Mark Rutte was another key ally for Cameron in pushing for a cut to the budget. However, his VVD MEPs followed the ALDE leadership in voting against the budget.

Sweden: The Swedish Moderaterna MEPs remained loyal to their Prime Minister and backed the deal but in doing so had to defy the EPP group.

Finland: Despite the Finnish government being one of the strongest supporters of the deal its MEPs from the ALDE and EPP groups managed to split both ways within their groups.

Poland: PM Donald Tusk's Civic Platform party backed him and supported the deal but in the process 'rebelled' from the EPP party line.

Are certain governments regretting having given the EP more powers via the Lisbon Treaty we wonder?

Shocker in Italy: A comedian-cum-politician wins twice as many seats as the 'Brussels candidate'

So we now have a pretty good idea of the election results in Italy. And there are two victims: eurozone stability and Mario Monti.

The winner: comedian-cum-politician Beppe Grillo. 

We knew from earlier today that there would be a hung Senate, meaning massive challenges ahead in forming a functioning government.

But what about the Lower House - Camera dei Deputati? Well, counting is almost completed so these projections of how seats will be allocated (courtesy of Rai) will most likely be very close to the final results. Bersani's centre-left coalition managed to secure a majority. The gap between Bersani's centre-left coalition and Berlusconi's centre-right coalition is around 0.4%, so the huge difference in seats is due to Italy's electoral system (which gives the coalition or party with the most votes an automatic majority of almost 54%). 

But this is the shocker: Beppe Grillo's Five-Star Movement - the party that came out of nowhere and whose leader wants to hold a referendum on both euro membership and the restructuring of the country's debt - looks set to become the largest party in the lower house, and the second-largest one in the Senate. This is exceeding all expectations (though we warned you!).

Grillo is going to win 110 seats, more than double those of  Mario Monti - the outgoing technocrat PM who was the clear favourite in Berlin and Brussels. Monti will only have 46 MPs at his disposal.

The scale of this defeat was pretty obvious at the press conference that Monti gave earlier today, in which he said he was "very satisfied" with the election results but was visibly emotional.

In contrast, a relaxed but triumphant Grillo chucked about "having another hot tea and then going to bed" when interviewed by 'La Cosa' - the Five Star Movement's official radio/TV station.

That so many Italians voted for anti-austerity parties also bodes ill for the ability of the eurozone to press ahead with its cash-for-discipline recipe. We will provide a more detailed analysis once the final results are in. But for now at least, there's no doubt about who's having the last laugh...

N.B.: The breakdown above does not include the 12 MPs elected by Italians residing abroad and the MP elected in the Valle d'Aosta region, who are subject to different rules - a small caveat which does not change the bigger picture.

The pretence of transnational politics and why national parliaments still rule

The home of European Democracy?

The most resolute defenders of the European parliament often argue that it is the home of ‘transnational democracy’ where MEPs look after the interests of European citizens. However, in Monday's debate on the EU budget deal – struck by national leaders – reactions of the leaders of the Parliament’s four largest political groups which we cited on our blog showed just how far from reality this assertion is.

The leaders of the EPP, Socialists and Democrats, Liberals and Greens all attacked the compromise, and demanded renegotiation. They all claimed to speak on behalf of their factions but in reality these tend to be hugely fragmented along national lines, a handful of ‘true believers’ aside. For example, the views of Dutch, Swedish, Danish, British and German MEPs – whose national leaders backed cutting the budget – were barely reflected. Moreover, in the UK and Holland in particular, the need for restraint in the EU budget was an issue of cross party consensus, and not of ideological contention.

Consequently we were treated to the bizarre spectacle of Labour MEPs sitting behind S&D group chairman Hannes Swoboda as he lambasted the budget cut which Labour leader Ed Miliband had demanded. The same applies to Moderaterna MEPs listening to EPP group chairman Joseph Daul and VVD and Lib Dem MEPs listening to the BBC-favourite Guy Verhofstadt ("he's always available"). Meanwhile, Martin Callanan of the ECR group, composed mainly of MEPs from the Conservative party and Poland’s Law and Justice party, broadly welcomed the deal.

However, in a inverse version of the above phenomenon, a debate in the Polish parliament yesterday morning, the Law and Justice representative argued that the budget deal was bad for Poland, in particular the failure to obtain more funds for rural subsidies and to obtain parity in direct payments with the EU15 countries, citing the speech by Jospeh Daul in support of his argument – the same Daul accused by Callanan of “throwing a teenage tantrum”. Meanwhile, referring to the fiscal treaty, the same Law and Justice MP claimed it would "murder solidarity in Europe", a view ostensibly more suited to the socialist and far left than conservative groups.

Particularly when it comes down to the core issues in a democracy  - such as taxation and spending - it's still all about national politics, and securing the best possible deal for domestic constituents and trying to inflict damage on their domestic political opponents. A genuinely transnational politics in the EU is nowhere near to becoming a reality.

Out of touch or totally in tune? Monti wants an in/out referendum in the UK

In an interview on Italian TV on his new book, 'Democracy in Europe', co-authored together with French MEP Sylvie Goulard, Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti was asked by the host whether Europe has "a British problem".

Monti replied:

"Britain rather considers it a 'Europe problem' [Monti laughs, but no-one else in the studio seems to get the sarcasm]. Yes, there is a British problem… [but] I’m one of those who says that Britain has to be kept in the European Union."

Monti went on to say,

"It is good for Britain to stay in the EU and it is good for the EU that Britain stays in. The euro is a different thing. I’m not sure that, at the moment, it would be good for Britain to have the euro and for the eurozone to have Britain in. But there are aspects of European life that go beyond the euro. The single market, foreign policy, defence policy (one day)…The British can, however, be rather frustrating when they seek, as a condition to stay aboard this big European ship, specific exemptions, specific derogations that would ultimately be equivalent to opening holes in the ship and making it harder to navigate, not to say sink." 

"Now, there are some in Europe who would, after all, feel relieved if Britain were not in. I think some French belong to this category. I am convinced that a compromise with the British has to be sought and, above all, it is necessary that, one day – and I spoke about this with David Cameron last week – the British ask their electorate not, ‘Do you agree with this further change that other [EU] countries want to make’, but ask the fundamental question, ‘Do you want [your country] to remain in the EU?’ I’m sure that, at that point, faced with such an important set of choices - banking interests, financial interests, industrial interests - they [British voters] would immediately say, ‘Yes, please’."

So Monti has waded into the British referendum debate, effectively calling for an in/out choice. It is perhaps a  bit ironic that an unelected head of an unelected technocratic government chose to comment so explicitly on how other democratic countries ought to involve voters in key decisions. We'll leave it up to you to decide whether Monti is completely out of the touch with the UK debate or totally on top of it when he calls for a future British referendum on the EU to be a question of "all or nothing"....

Eurozone votes for eurozone laws: one way to solve the European Parliament’s “West Lothian question”

In the UK, Scottish MPs can vote on English matters (such as the English NHS and education etc.) where, because they are devolved to the Edinburgh parliament, English MPs have no say on specific Scottish matters. This has been labelled the “West Lothian Question”. Solving it is has been a perennial subject for debate, going way back to debates on Irish home rule in the 19th century right through to Scottish devolution. As yet it remains unanswered.

With a multi-tier Europe becoming more of a reality every day, in wake of further Eurozone integration, the EU is now facing its own West Lothian question. If some countries don’t take part in say, more fiscal integration or if some countries – such as the UK – wish to devolve some EU powers back to the national level, how would the EU’s voting system take that into account?

European Parliament President Martin Schulz said yesterday for instance in an interview with Die Welt, that:

"it can't be the case that individual member states pull out of the common [policy] areas, but believe that they can continue to co-decide on legislation. That's the case for negotiations in the Council, but also in the Commission and for us in the Parliament. The withdrawal of Great Britain raises the second big question apart from the euro question: how do we deal with this now from a legislative perspective? With Schengen, it was already the case that London doesn’t take part but was allowed to co-decide on legislation. We must make this systematic. When Cameron starts picking what he prefers from current Treaty law, we must consider which consequences this has for us as an institution. Whoever doesn't take part in certain policies, should no longer take part in the legislative process. When you withdraw, you need to withdraw completely.”

And he is also quoted by DPA as saying:

“The euro is the currency of the union. The parliament of the union is the European Parliament. Thus the parliament of the euro is the European Parliament. We have 27 EU member states and two, namely Denmark and the UK, said we won’t go along with the euro. All other states are required to introduce the euro sooner or later. Therefore we need a ‘27 minus’ approach on EP decisions on Eurozone-specific issues”.

Schultz has asked the West Lothian question
- but does he have the answer?

Schultz seems to be arguing for the eurozone votes for Eurozone laws. He makes a good point, but how would this work? Well, Britain has some experience of assessing the relative merits of limiting MPs to voting on different laws. In essence the problems that have been thrown up are these:


Problem in UK: How do you ascertain what is a ‘eurozone’ law is when something might effect both parts? 19th Century British PM William Gladstone, for instance, concluded that: "it passed the wit of man to frame any distinct, thorough-going, universal severance between the one class of subject and the other."

Not a problem in EU: In the UK these problems remain due to the imprecise nature of UK governance. However, in the EU all legislation is based on treaty articles and EU competences, so deciding who votes on what should be far easier, though if the line between the banking union and the single market, for example, gets blurred this could suddenly become problematic.

Problem in the UK: English votes for English laws in the UK raised the prospect of a UK government unable to govern England because, it may not in fact command a majority of English MPs (only an ‘overall’ majority) creating constitutional chaos (think posts such as the Home Secretary).

Not a problem in EU: In an EU context allowing differing governments to get on with their business would probably suit the UK just fine, as would limiting MEPs’ power over UK affairs (though we acknowledge the risk of eurozone caucusing etc).

In principle, there’s no reason why variable geometry in the EU voting system can not be made to work – in fact, it could be an important component of a reformed EU, in areas such as the CAP, JHA and social and employment laws, as per the model we’ve outlined below. When these are up for discussion a UK MEP would simply not vote.

Politically, it would need to be managed very carefully. Some euro-outs, such as Sweden, will probably oppose such a differentiated approach. But it would be fair democratically and, as Europe moves towards a multi-tier model, perhaps something the EU will eventually get used to.


Will eurozone votes for eurozone laws catch on in a multi tier EU?

EU and the Nobel peace prize: the once-celebrated actor who just got a life-time achievement award?

It’s common practice in Hollywood to give a life-time achievement award to a once-celebrated actor whose career is in decline. Although he or she hasn't really done a good movie in years, the award acts like a bit of encouragement and/or belated recognition. The exercise is partly driven by appreciation but also has a condescending feel to it, with the implicit suggestion being that your best days are behind you.

When we heard the unexpected news today that the EU won the 2012 Nobel Peace prize, we couldn't help but to draw this analogy. You can almost picture the actor (the 'EU' in this case) – dragging themselves up onto the stage to collect their award despite having since gone through several broken marriages, a series of stays in rehab, and a ton of plastic surgery. It’s all for show – but we can’t help but feel it’s a bit sad at the same time.

As ever with the Nobel Peace Prize, this year’s decision will divide opinion – to put it mildly. British eurosceptics’ blood pressure has already been raised several notches. And equally we don’t want to ruin the orgy of self-congratulation currently underway in Brussels. While Europe’s epic moments have belonged to national politicians and not to Eurocrats, these guys haven’t had something to celebrate since the Irish were forced to vote ‘Yes’ in the second Lisbon referendum; they (sort of) need a bit of a break.

But what’s clear is the EU isn't exactly hot at the moment. Trust in the EU in the Mediterranean – the countries to which the zone of peace and stability spread in the 1980s and who have traditionally been the strongest supporters of the project - has dropped from 55% to 25% in a decade, in the wake of euro-induced pain. Several countries are in recession. Angela Merkel got a pretty rough reaction in Greece earlier this week. Far from uniting countries and fostering “solidarity”, the Eurozone crisis risks driving a wedge at the heart of the European project, between north and south in particular.

But at the same time, to be fair, despite Angela Merkel trying to bundle the two together (a mistake), the EU isn't only the euro. The Nobel committee is right that 'the EU' as a trading block has contributed to stability and peace in Europe, first following WWII and then carrying on throughout the transition of Mediterranean ex-dictatorships and post-Communist countries. The idea of stability through trade is fundamentally a good one, and enlargement is the EU’s only proper foreign policy tool. But the awarding committee, of course, hugely simplifies the issue. The EU is only one of several factors which played in maintaining peace and stability in Europe after WWII; the role of NATO cannot be overlooked in this context.

The saddest (some would describe it as the most ironic) part about the EU’s lifetime achievement award is that through ideological over-reach, political vanity and economically illiteracy, i.e. the Eurozone at 17, much of what Europe has collectively achieved with respect to trade, peace and stability, risks being undermined. The committee should have added this lesson to its motivation: trying to stamp out economic and democratic realities through political and ideological ambition alone never ends well.

PS: Organisations have of course won the prize before – the UN, the inter-governmental panel on climate change, Amnesty international etc – but the debate is currently raging as to who, exactly, will accept the prize. This links to a second question. Who, exactly, did the Norwegians award the Nobel Peace Prize to? Jose Manuel Barroso? Herman Van Rompuy? Angela Merkel – whose taxpayers are currently paying for the party? The European Parliament - many of whose MEPs are under the impression that they are seen as the legitimate democratic voice for European citizens? The head of that fine entity known as the European Social and Economic Affairs Committee (if you've never heard of it, not to worry)? Or the millions of Europeans who travel and trade across borders rather than shooting at each other (and vote for politicians who want them to do just that)? Who, exactly?

If the latter, the Open Europe team is honoured to have received the Nobel Peace Prize – and the roughly €0.0027 each that the prize money comes to. (Nobel prize award of €1,354,045 ÷ 502,489,143 inhabitants = per citizen via @RuadhanIT).

What keeps the folks in Brussels and Berlin awake at night?

Possibly this graph - from our new report on the internal devaluation needed in the PIIGS for the euro to remain intact.

Source: Eurobarometer

It shows how trust in the EU amongst voters in the PIIGS has on average fallen from 55%  in 2001 to 25% in 2012, in the wake of EU-mandated cuts. On average, 66% of voters in these countries now mistrust the EU (up from 26% in 2001). And Spain still has half of its internal devaluation ahead of it (not to mention Greece). This won't be easy.

The view from Sweden: Barroso is making it more difficult to be pro-EU

This is spot-on.

Sara Skyttedal, vice-president of the Youth wing of the European People’s Party – the pan-EU party Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso belongs to – has a blistering piece  in today's Svenska Dagbladet. She takes Barroso to town over his 'State of the Union' address, in which he called for Europe to become a "federation":

"As Vice-Chairman of [the EPP's] youth wing, YEPP, I can only say that representatives such as Barroso make it more difficult to be pro-EU [EU-vän] “

She continues:

"At a time when crises are raging across Europe and when countries need a helping hand, the eurocrats see an opportunity to demand extensive transfers of power and centralisation in return. Barroso suggests the creation of a banking union and argues that the EU in the end must become a federation. This is a frightening development, since even though Barroso himself says that a superstate isn’t the end goal, it is it hard to interpret his vision in any other way.”

She argues that politicians have ”time and again” ignored the subsidiarity principle. Taking aim at the Swedish political class, Skyttedal says:

“Just as there are many signs that the EU makes it harder for member states to fight the centralisation of powers, Sweden has reinforced this tendency on its own”, arguing that the requirement for EU-membership should be deleted from the Swedish Constitution.

“Those of us who are active in the EPP…must take a bigger responsibility for the liberal-conservative family in Europe. In these circles we must dare to bring up the problems that exist. Large parts of our respective parties were once active in the Yes-campaigns, both for EU and euro membership, but it’s time to swallow our pride and take up the fight against supranationalism and to show it’s possible to have a realistic attitude to the EU, which doesn't automatically mean arguing in favour of leaving the project altogether."

“The EPP-family is the biggest one in Europe, but includes members that unfortunately work in the opposite direction to the EU that we rather want to see. What we think the EU needs is less supranationalism, less political interference and definitely not a federation.”

Hear hear.

Sweden isn't exactly a European hegemon (those ambitions pretty much died in 1709) but it's an interesting country for the UK and Europe in at least two respects: first, it's actually doing well, both on the fiscal and banking front. Secondly, how the country responds to the drive for further euro integration will be an interesting proxy for how easy it'll be to reconcile a more tightly knit eurozone block with the EU-27. Most importantly, the banking union with the single market.

70-80% of Swedes oppose joining the euro, and that debate is dead (baring random calls from the occasional politician and opinion former who still cling on to that particular dream - it's almost cute), but the country has fundamental choices ahead of it - such as whether or not it joins the the ECB's banking supervision structure - so Europe needs to be discussed. 

Though a majority of Swedes would echo the sentiment contained in Skyttedal's article, there is still a contingent in Sweden, particularly on the centre-right (associated with Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister) that clings on to a vision of an ever-closer integrated EU as a liberal inroads into its dominant domestic social democratic model, and also as a catalyst for Swedish internationalist idealism, i.e. a 'peace project'.

Historically, both of these assumptions contained some truth but firstly, Sweden's social democratic domination has already been broken and secondly, the single currency - clearly - has proven less of a liberal trade project and more an ideological over-reach (think Greece). The eurozone crisis is now causing friction in Europe, rather than the opposite, and it most certainly isn't aiding either Europe in the world or facilitating enlargement (which is a legitimate EU foreign policy tool).

In other words, this traditional Swedish centre-right vision is dated and needs upgrading - which is true for other contingents in the EPP. Skyttedal's article is an important reminder that if we want to save what's good in Europe, Barroso's "federation" vision - which risks a massive popular backlash - is the opposite of what's needed.

The path for true pro-Europeans must lay elsewhere.

Westerwelle's Future of Europe report - worth getting excited over?

The so-called ‘Future of Europe’ reflexion group of eleven European foreign ministers, set up by Germany's Guido Westerwelle, to discuss and propose ideas on organisational and structural change in the EU held its closing meeting on Monday. Yesterday it released its final report and conclusions, the broad thrust of which is that, to emerge from the crisis, Europe needs more economic and political integration.

In terms of the economic and fiscal side, the majority of the proposals in the document have already been agreed or proposed, such as the “reinforced economic governance framework” – i.e. the fiscal treaty and a single supervisory mechanism for eurozone banks. Even the possibility of making the ESM into a fully-fledged European Monetary Fund has already been voiced. Furthermore, these proposals will only apply to eurozone members and any non-euro members who participate voluntarily.

It is therefore the political/institutional side that is the most interesting and here are the key points that we’ve picked out:

• More powers for Baroness Ashton and the EU’s External Action Service;
• More majority decisions in the Common Security and Defence Policy sphere including joint representation in international organizations where possible, and in the longer-term a European defence policy which for some members could eventually involve a European army;
• Strengthening the Commission should be strengthened so it can fully and effectively fulfil its role as the engine of the Community method;
• Moving to a super-qualified majority for future EU Treaty revisions (with the exception of enlargement) which would be binding for those Member States that have ratified them;
• A more “streamlined and efficient system” of EU governance which could include a directly elected Commission President, a European Parliament with the powers to initiate legislation and a second chamber for the member states.

Most of these proposals have been around the block once before but some journalists have gotten very excited about this, with the Guardian splashing the story on its front page. Running with a "Britain is isolated" theme it also noted that:

"The likelihood is that the 11-country consensus will swell into a majority among the EU's 27. Britain also stands apart from this. The 11 include Germany and France, the big ones, plus Italy, Spain and Poland – after Britain the biggest EU countries.”

Well, not quite.

Sure, some of these proposals are conspicuous, and certainly they pose a challenge for Britain. However, many of them have almost no chance of going ahead, certainly not in the immediate future. Firstly, the report represents less of a consensus amongst the relevent states and more of a brainstorming session with lots of dissenting views. As the note itself states:

“The report reflects our personal thoughts. We wish to underline that not all participating Ministers agree with all proposals that have been put forward in the course of our discussions, and that the Member States’ individual treaty obligations and rights within the various policy areas have to be taken into account.”

As stated above, there is significant momentum for more integration in economic, fiscal and banking affairs, but its hugely unlikely to spill over into foreign policy which exists in a parallel political sphere. This is simply a way to re-state the long-standing German desire for a Europeanised foreign policy (the practical difficulties of which have been made clear many times, most recently over Libya).

Super-QMV for treaty change won't happen either - not least since Berlin itself would block it if push comes to shove, as would Paris - unless they would be willing to risk - for example - QMV on the European Parliament's second seat in Strasbourg. 

Banking union, and calls for EU treaty negotiations to be opened by 2014 - as called for by Barroso in his 'state of the union' speech last week - is where the story is at.

The context for this whole initiative is effectively German domestic politics. While no one can question Guido Westerwelle’s European credentials, he is arguably one of the most side-lined Foreign Ministers in the whole EU, and the Future of Europe group is a way for him to show he's still a player.  For Merkel this serves as a useful exercise at a time when the German government is über-sensitive to accusations that it is not sufficiently ‘pro-European’ - but without actually having to do anything. 

Finally, it is worth contrasting the lofty idealism of such - and similar - proposals with the cold, harsh realities of public opinion. As we reported on Monday, support for the EU and the euro has hit an all-time low in Germany, in France a majority of those surveyed said that given the opportunity now, they would vote against ratifying the Maastricht treaty, while the EU debate in the Netherlands is also become more complex.