Expectations and pressure mount for ECB action

This could easily be a standard monthly headline. As before the past four or five ECB meetings, the questions of deflation and further easing are once again weighing on the ECB Governing Council and the markets.

Over the past month the market has come full circle from essentially ruling out any further ECB action to almost expecting some purchases of assets (both accompanied by the respective strengthening and then weakening of the euro exchange rate).

This was topped off today with the latest inflation data which showed that inflation in the eurozone has dropped to its lowest level for five years (annual rate of 0.5%).

A couple of points to note on this data:

• While energy prices are still the largest driver of the contraction, unlike some previous months, core inflation (without energy, food prices or tobacco) has also fallen. This may encourage the view that the decreases are not simply due to short term shifts in commodity prices.
• That said, the core inflation rates remain above where they were in November 2013 when the ECB previously cut rates.
• Other national inflation data has been quite weak – Spain moved into outright deflation in March, while German inflation was running at only 1%.
• As Gavyn Davies noted on twitter, the 0.5% rate falls outside of the ECB’s March projections for inflation this year and up to 2016. This raises questions about whether the inflation rate is still on the upward path forecast. Combine this will the volatility and tendency to strengthen of the euro and the ECB’s projections do not seem to be holding up too well.

The other aspect adding weight to expectations has been dovish comments by ECB members, notably by Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann. Many believe this has “opened the door” to significant action by the ECB. Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel addressed this issue on his Forbes blog on Friday arguing:

“The real issue from a German perspective is not necessarily that the door was ever firmly closed (or open) but that we remain someway from the QE door and to get there would require carefully negotiating some politically and legally explosive obstacles.”

He concludes:

“In the end, I think we find ourselves in a fairly similar position to last month (albeit having gone through a cycle of over scepticism and now over optimism) – further action remains possible but not yet highly likely.”

This meeting will be another one to watch but so far the ECB seems strongly wedded to its new communication and forward guidance policy, which it believes can allow greater control over rates markets, it is not yet clear whether it is willing to abandon this approach or push it over the barrier into full on policy action.

Handelsblatt asks, "Where is the inflation?"

That’s today’s front page of German daily Handelsblatt, with the headline asking “Where is the inflation?”

A stark reminder of what remains a key issue in German (and therefore European) politics. We could barely ever imagine such a front page in the UK, particularly when annual inflation is running at only 1.6% (August 2013).

Inside the paper there is a ten page section discussing the issue. Essentially, Handelsblatt is questioning why, when there has been such significant money printing and low interest rates in the eurozone, is there yet to be inflation. This is put in context with a comparison to the hyperinflation of the 1920’s Weimer Republic, another reminder that this episode in the country’s history continues remains firmly embedded in the German psyche.

The discussion itself is obviously hugely technical, but the paper’s explanations for why inflation is (yet) to show up is quite telling about the debate in Germany.

• Central banks only measure consumer prices – the paper essentially suggests that the usual metric of inflation, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), does not fully capture the real inflation rate since it does not include things such as asset prices and house prices.

• The increased money supply is not feeding through to the real economy – the suggestion here is that, although money supply is being increased significantly, it is not feeding through to the real economy because banks are not lending out and because people and companies are saving more. It could also be down to the fact that banks, companies and the government are deleveraging (paying off debts and reducing their size) in order to become more stable in the wake of the crisis. For these reasons, the money created has stayed within the financial system rather than leaking to the wider economy and hitting inflation – at least not yet.

• Still too early to fully judge the impact of the ECB’s policies – this seems to be linked to the argument above but the paper suggests that the low interest rates and other non-standard measures which the ECB has undertaken (such as unlimited long term loans) are yet to have their full impact. The suggestion seems to be that, as the economy recovers, the true impact of the policies will become clear.

• So, what will happen? The paper concludes that these policies are likely to have some impact and that inflation will show up at some point.

Although this is clearly just the view of one paper, the tone and line of argument here is quite telling.

Clearly, there is still concern that inflation will show up and even that it may already have and be going unnoticed. This fits with recent concerns raised by the Bundesbank that low interest rates and loose monetary policy can pump up financial bubbles and set the scene for the next crisis.

This debate is here to stay in Germany and Europe. As the ECB considers further long term lending operations (LTROs), how to deal with actions of other central banks and the large divergence in growth between Germany and some struggling countries, it could come to the fore once again. 

Deliberations begin as hearings draw to a close in Karlsruhe

The hearing at the German Constitutional Court into claims against the ECB's crisis policies is now over. Day one saw verbal jousting between the two men to the left (Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann and ECB Executive Board Member Jörg Asmussen) which we covered on our live blog. Day two of the hearing was a bit more cagey and less political but possibly more revealing in terms of the Court's thinking.

Constitutional Court Judge Peter Müller kicked off by reiterating the strict rules of the game:

“it is clearly defined in which china shop the elephant of monetary policy is not allowed – monetary state financing.” 

Clemens Fuest, Research Director at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, shrugged his shoulders and replied:

“If OMT is ECB’s commitment to buy state bonds to a non-defined extent, than I wouldn’t know how to prevent the contact with the china shop”  

Being slightly more direct (as might be expected), Head of the Ifo Institute Hans-Werner Sinn said that the ECB engages in “regional fiscal policy” and that the Central Bank’s OMT programme is basically “a free insurance for investors when a state goes bankrupt”.

It's clear the Court remains concerned that the ECB could overstep its mandate. President of the Court Andreas Vosskuhle suggested that the current conditions attached to the OMT, the ECB’s bond-buying programme, are on a “very abstract level” but if correctly applied “could be a good middle way…of distinguishing between monetary and fiscal policy”.

A rather diplomatic construction but conditionality is a key issue here, as we’ve pointed out. The fundamental problem is that since there is no legal documentation and the OMT has never been tapped, it is very challenging for the court to judge how strictly the conditions will be applied. They could make a value judgement over whether they trust the ESM and eurozone politicians to fully implement the conditions but this could well be beyond the scope of the legal judgements the Court is allowed to make.

As Süddeutsche Zeitung's Markus Zydra points out, there is significant ambiguity around one of Asmussen's key points - that the OMT is practically limited since it can only purchase short term bonds. This is especially true given ECB President Mario Draghi's (and other's) previous remarks that there are no ex-ante limits to the OMT. Chief economists of DZ Bank Stefan Bielmeier put it nicely saying, “there is a dual rhetoric of the ECB…[they] tell everybody what they want to hear” - exactly as we noted here.

A running theme of the coverage following day two has been the signfiicant time given to those arguing against the ECB. ECB proponents reportedly told Handelsblatt “we feel like at an away game”, given the level of opposition support. The paper even goes so far as to question the neutrality of the court's referees given the line-up of known ECB critics it had called to provide evidence at the hearing (e.g. Hans-Werner Sinn, Kai Konrad, Harald Uhlig, Franz-Christoph Zeitler, Clemens Fuest).

How the Court will rule remains to be seen. It's clear they have some serious concerns about the policies but are struggling given the hypothetical nature of the case - the OMT remains undefined and unused, so any claims against it rely on second-guessing its implementation. Ultimately, it could be a question of whether they take the ECB at its word or not. Approval of policies but with some extra constraints remains the most likely outcome.

A final ruling is due for September although many involved expect a delay until after the German Federal Elections on 22 September. In the meantime, there are already those calling for a re-match in Luxembourg.

German Constitutional Court live blog: One of the most important cases in the Court's history?

The German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe

The German Constitutional Court’s (GCC) hearings into the legality of the ECB’s actions to combat the eurozone crisis – and specifically the OMT bond buying programme – kicked off this morning. (See here for the background). In a front page leader, FAZ describes the case as one of the “most important” in the court’s history.

Public opinion in Germany is mixed, with a Forsa poll for Handelsblatt finding that 48% of Germans hope that the Court will put a stop to the OMT, while 31% believe that the complaint against the ECB is unjustified. As we noted in our flash anaylsis on the topic yesterday, the GCC can't actually stop the ECB. At worst, it could remove Germany from the ECB's bond buying programme and probably, therefore, from the eurozone itself. (A poorly phrased poll question, then, but a very telling result nonetheless).

With Schäuble, the German Finance Minister, and the ECB's positions already well known (that OMT is within the Central bank's mandate), we can safely say that the highlight of the day will come  from the opposing side, in testimony of Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann. In terms of their specific grievances, it will be the first time we will hear a detailed, public explanation of where the Bundesbank stands on this issue, while the tone of Weidmann's comments will also be interesting. Will there be any more Faust references we wonder?

Check our twitter feed for live updates from Karlsruhe throughout the day. We will also continue to update this blog as things develop.

17:45

Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann has now had his say - and again his points were very much as expected (his full statement is here but only in German for now).

• Warned that ECB OMT blurs the line between monetary and fiscal policy - this makes it more difficult to achieve price stability and spreads solvency risks amongst eurozone countries, but does so without any parliamentary or democratic approval.
• Pushed for a narrow interpretation of a central bank's primary mandate, with a complete focus on price stability.
• Suggested that the OMT does represent potential losses for taxpayers, arguing that if the ECB took on significant amounts of risky debt, it may face large a loss which it cannot absorb and may require aid from member states.
• Argued that even secondary market purchases can overturn the force of market discipline and undermine fiscal autonomy.
• Issued a warning over the interpretation of the real-risk premiums for bonds, which he suggested was very subjective and dependent on future policies.
• Accepted that the inflation outlook in the eurozone fits with price stability at the moment, but still expressed serious concern about comprising the ECB’s focus on this.

It seems to us that, of the two sides, Weidmann had the tougher case to make. Ultimately, as much of the above shows, he is forced to consider hypothetical scenarios and potential worst cases. These are undoubtedly risks that should be highlighted, but it does leave one feeling that his argument is slightly less clear cut than Asmussen’s.

Having heard the key testimony of both sides, we still expect the court to side with the ECB, but with some caveats (although how strict they will be is very much up in the air). Of course, this could still develop more tomorrow. 

16:20

Asmussen has now concluded his testimony and subsequent Q&A, and the ECB has also helpfully put a transcript on their website. Here are the key points he made:

• the OMT will have the ability to sell bonds as well as buy them, and it will not take them off the market permanently, unlike its forerunner the SMP (in fact Asmussen repeatedly highlighted the differences between the two);
• the OMT is pari passu (equal to) other creditors,
• the OMT seeks only to reduce unwarranted interest rate spikes and is not aimed at harmonising financing conditions of member states,
• the ECB would react if a country were to try to game the system by converting all its bond issues to a short maturity (of up to three years), but that in any case markets themselves would "see through and deny" such attempts,
• the only risks associated with the programme stem from countries operating "un-sound" policies, but that those states that fail to comply with the OMT's conditionality could be faced with the prospect of having to leave the eurozone.

The comments were more or less as expected. However, there are a couple of interesting points. First, the fact that the bonds purchased under the OMT will be judged at market value suggests that, if they are purchased and then decline in value, the ECB could be facing losses on its balance sheet. A tricky technical and political issue. Second, the point about 'un-sound' policies leaves us feeling slightly uneasy. Its clear that even with an ESM bailout programme, implementation may not be up-to-scratch. Meanwhile, it also highlights the clear link that would be established between ECB policies and the fiscal (and other) policy of national governments. This surely raises questions about the ECB's independence.

Asmussen also admitted that the policy did have de-facto practical limits given that it will only purchase short term debt, as reported over the weekend.

15:10

Handeslblatt reports that Philip Rösler, the German Minister for Trade and Vice Chancellor is coming under increasing pressure from his own FDP party to take a stand against the ECB, following the Handelsblatt/Forsa poll showing that almost 50% of Germans hope that Karlsruhe will stop the ECB’s OMT programme (despite this actual course of action not being possible, see blog intro above on this).

Frank Schäffler, the financial expert of the FDP parliamentary group, told Handelsblatt Online that "Working towards a market-economy is widespread among the followers of the FDP. Liberals know that prosperity cannot be printed from the ECB.”

The irony of clinging on to central bank independence, while using political pressure to change the course of the ECB is not lost on us - nor on Rösler it seems, who said: “We must not allow this course toward stability to be broken up through the the attempt to exert influence on the European Central Bank.”

13:55

These comments from ECB Executive Board member Yves Mersch seem to confirm our feelings that the ECB is trying to have it both ways over its refusal to publish the OMT documentation (see 13:30):

Mersch: "controlled uncertainty on the OMT is necessary"
— zerohedge (@zerohedge) June 11, 2013

13:40

Germany's new anti-euro party Alternative für Deutschland has just put out a press release citing Professor Joachim Starbatty - one of the original plaintiffs in the case and now one of AfD's top candidates in September's elections - warning that under the OMT, German taxpayers will be responsible for liabilities that are "no longer the responsibility of any government or parliament". The party is clearly hoping the publicity around the hearings will boost its poll ratings.

13:30

Asmussen is clearly channelling Draghi in his comments below. The ECB's continuing refusal to simply publish the legal documents relating to the OMT is at best strange and at worst downright obstructive. It does beg the question: what are they trying to hide? Maybe nothing, but at the very least it seems they are trying to have the best of both worlds. By refusing to reveal the exact terms and conditions, the ECB can try to address German concerns over the extent of the OMT (as we have seen them doing in the run up to this case) while also being able to continuously reassure markets that the scheme is in fact "unlimited".

Such a balancing act is tough to pull off and may add to confusion if it breaks down. Some transparency would be welcomed. It needs to happen at some point, who's to say it would be better revealing the legal documentation just when the OMT is being tapped, surely by definition that would be a period of crisis?

13:05

The ECB's Jörg Asmussen is up now making the point that the ECB would actually adopt a legal ordinance before any bonds were purchased:

#ECB's Asmussen: #OMT Documentation Ready For Publication When Needed. OMT Documentation Can Be Published Within Days
— Holger Zschaepitz (@Schuldensuehner) June 11, 2013

#ECB's Asmussen: #OMT Cannot Be Activated Before Publication Of Guidelines
— Holger Zschaepitz (@Schuldensuehner) June 11, 2013

11:15

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has spoken, and as expected, he backed the ECB:

German FinMin Schäuble: #ECB Independence Gives It Wide Scope For Decision-Making
— Holger Zschaepitz (@Schuldensuehner) June 11, 2013

Schäuble tells court government sees no evidence that the ECB has overstepped the bounds of its mandate. #karlsruhe
— Michael Steen (@michaelsteen) June 11, 2013

German finance minister Schaeuble argues the court shouldn't even be considering the OMT case, as they've no jurisdiction there. #karlsruhe
— Jeff Black (@Jeffrey_Black) June 11, 2013

When ideology meets economic reality (Part II): Bundesbank says EU financial transaction tax could make banks more reliant on cheap ECB money

As was made evident by the internal memo about the EU financial transaction tax (FTT) - that we exclusively published yesterday - there are plenty of concerns amongst the supposed champions of the idea.

Today, another heavyweight institution raised the alarm: Die Bundesbank.

This could come across as a niche issue, as with most central banking issues. But as with most central banking issues it could also be of vital political importance in Germany.

As we noted in our flash analysis on the UK’s FTT challenge last Friday, the proposal could have a worrying impact on ECB monetary policy:

Increasing banks’ reliance on cheap ECB cash: With central bank lending exempt from the FTT but the market channels to obtain liquidity hit hard, the FTT actually provides a perverse incentive for banks to borrow cheap money from the ECB and central banks. This runs completely contrary to efforts in the Eurozone to get banks off ECB liquidity and could instead further entrench market fragmentation.

This is a point which has been rarely made in the FTT debate but whose implications for Germany - already deeply worried about weak banks over-reliance on cheap ECB funding - could be huge. Sure enough, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann today raised concerns over this very issue. In a speech in Dresden, he said:

The introduction of the tax has basically been decided but the unintended side effects could be considerable: In its currently envisaged form, the tax will cover asset-backed money market funds, so-called repo firms, and significantly damage the repo market. However, the repo market has a central role in ensuring the equalisation of liquidity between commercial banks.

If it does not function correctly, the corresponding institutions are diverted onto the Eurosystem, and the Central Banks remain massively and permanently involved in the liquidity equalisation between the Banks.

From a monetary policy perspective, the financial transactions tax in its current form is therefore to be viewed very critically, and it shows how important it is to precisely test a regulatory scheme before its introduction. This however takes a bit of time.

Exactly as we warned. More banks - particularly in the southern eurozone - borrowing from the ECB would not only increase German exposure to the crisis (ultimately, the ECB is taxpayer-backed). But it also negatively impacts the independence of ECB monetary policy since it will hamper the central bank's ability to exit its abnormal liquidity operations and therefore impact its ability to control policy.

This also gets to the heart of what we (and others) have been saying about the FTT.  Although the headline goals and figures look nice, the multitude of side effects (for financial markets, for pensions and even for central banks) mean the real impact of the FTT is far beyond what is envisaged or what can be effectively managed by the regulation.

Watch this space. This could become a big issue in Germany.

Germans vs Inflation: the battle continues

In our daily review of UK and continental press, we spotted an interesting consumer analysis survey referenced on the front page of Bild yesterday. The survey - conducted by Axel Springer AG and the Bauer Media Group - found that Germans were conservative and prudent in terms of their finances with 67.9% of respondents possessing a savings book, 57.2% setting aside a specific sum every month, with only 33.8% having a credit card.

In contrast, in 2010, 64% of the UK’s adult population had a credit card – almost double that of Germany’s. This could possibly help to explain how the German and UK debates on the eurozone pass each other by so often, especially when it comes to the role of the ECB. The view from Berlin is that the ECB ought to remain as the guardian of price stability and not engage in activist monetary policies such as bond-buying, while the view from London, Washington and indeed other European capitals is that Draghi’s recent actions mark a decisive turning point in the crisis, and that it is good that he has been able to overcome German resistance – as argued by David Laws at an Open Europe fringe event at the Lib Dem conference.

Incidentally, former ECB chief economist Otmar Issing has an interview in yesterday’s Die Welt in which he warns against the social and economic damage of unchecked inflation:

“Many people come up to me on the street. Savers are deeply insecure and they have every reason to be. [The ECB’s] monetary policy has reached its limits [it] risks losing its credibility.” 

"There is no immediate risk of inflation. However I have my doubts that the ECB will stop its immense liquidity at the correct time. If this fails, prices will rise. I do not anticipate hyperinflation. However, even an inflation rate of 4 to 5% disposes savers and creates social problems… The social partnership between employers and unions, everything depends on a reliable monetary policy. Inflation is the most anti-social policy.” 

“[Pumping more liquidity into the system] is a dangerous argument. In putting out a fire, it is also the case that more water is not always better per se. Ultimately it could turn out that the damage caused by the water exceeds the actual fire damage.” 

Speaking to the German Industry Federation (BDI) yesterday, ECB President Mario Draghi defended the ECB’s new bond-buying programme, and in an apparent swipe at German fears of inflation, that in times of crisis “we cannot always look to the past for answers”. While Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann may have been isolated in voting against the OMT programme, he retains the backing of a huge swathe of German public opinion which is deeply rooted in the country’s culture of savings and financial prudence.

This battle is not over by any stretch of the imagination.

Merkel caught in the middle between the Bundesbank and the ECB

In her traditional news conference following the summer recess, German Chancellor Angela Merkel walked a fine line in questions about the eurozone crisis, having to maintain a delicate balancing act with regards to different elements within her governing coalition.

For starters, she has to contend with the increasingly fractious rhetoric from the CSU – the Bavarian sister party of her own CDU – on the eurozone (see here and here for examples). The latest example being Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer’s argument that the €190bn cap on German liability imposed by the German Constitutional Court in its ruling on the ESM and fiscal treaty last week should apply to the euro-rescue effort as whole, including the ECB’s new OMT bond purchasing programme. However Merkel has rejected this interpretation on the basis the two are not linked. Speaking earlier today, she told reporters that:

“If the ECB determines that monetary transmission has become difficult, then it must take measures to ensure price stability - it is not up to us to set it limits.” 

Seehofer later confirmed that “this is the only issue which we interpret somewhat differently than in Berlin”, adding that it was nonsensical for the Court to cap Germany’s liability at €190bn only for “it to be suddenly increased by many multiples through other means”.

On the other hand however, Merkel did not issue a statement of blanket support for the ECB’s actions, adding that Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann’s recent interventions – in which he has been fiercely critical of renewed ECB bond-buying were “understandable and always welcome”, a statement widely interpreted in Germany as a subtle rebuke of Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s comments in an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung yesterday in which he criticised Weidmann for his public dissent, arguing that “I'm not sure that making this debate semi-public helps to build confidence in the [European] central bank.”

Merkel is in a tough position because, having invested so much in the euro-rescue, she cannot afford to oppose the ECB’s ‘big-bazooka’ strategy. At the same time however she cannot allow Weidmann – whose views are widely respected and shared by the German public – to become completely isolated for fear this would provoke a substantial domestic backlash.

How long Merkel will be able to keep her fractious coalition together on one hand while also keeping the German public – whose support for the EU and euro has hit an all-time low – onside remains to be seen, especially in the event of unforeseen developments such as Germany actually suffering direct losses on its loans to Greece and/or losses on ECB holdings of Greek debt.

The death of the Bundesbank? Germans come out swinging against ECB bond-buying

Although Jens Weidmann may have been alone on the ECB executive board in opposing yesterday’s ECB decision to buy government bonds, he looks to have the full-force of German public and media opinion right behind him. Over the last 24 hours, the German media, with surprisingly few exceptions, has fired a broadside against the ECB. No holds barred. Mario Draghi may have pleased markets, but he now has a very frustrated Germany – whose taxpayers are implicitly underwriting his institution (and the euro) – on his tail.

One of the most interesting reactions came from the Bundesbank itself, which unusually issued a public statement which ran directly contrary to the ECB’s decision. A Bundesbank spokesperson said:

Weidmann regarded the bond purchases “as being tantamount to financing governments by printing banknotes,” adding, “The announced interventions carry the additional danger that the central bank may ultimately redistribute considerable risks among various countries’ taxpayers.” 

Süddeutsche Zeiting’s Marc Beise has a blistering piece, crediting “Weidmann’s persistent opposition” as the reason why the ECB is ‘only’ buying short-term debt. But, goes on to argue, “Saving the euro is worth a lot of effort but there are two important limitations. A euro rescue at any price can be a disaster economically, that is the red line that must not be exceeded. The other limit is the law: never in a rules based community can the end justify the means. A Euro-community based on breached contracts will always be based on fragile foundations. On Thursday, the ECB has unfortunately crossed both these red lines.”

Meanwhike, Die Welt led with the headline “Financial markets celebrate the death of the Bundesbank”, adding, “For Germany, the nightmare begins. There it was: the word that everyone was waiting for: unlimited…ECB President Draghi brazenly breaks with the principles of German monetary policy.” Bild runs with a similarly eye-catching headline, warning against "Draghi's blank-cheque for debt-states".

FAZ's editor-in-chief Holger Steltzner also took a strong line, saying, “In the eurozone there isn't any division any more between monetary and fiscal policy…We should be curious to hear what the German Constitutional Court thinks about that.”

The warning on the German Constitutional Court is an interesting one (a topic we’ll discuss in future posts) but some politicians went even further, with Hessen Europe Minister Jörg-Uwe Hahn of the FDP and CDU’s Klaus-Peter Willsch (already the initiator of one of the ESM complaints to the German Constitutional Court) calling for the German government to seriously consider taking the ECB to the European Court of Justice for violating its legal mandate.

The ECB wasn’t the only institution on the receiving end though, with the German government and Chancellor Merkel also taking flak. Handelsblatt's deputy editor in chief, Florian von Kolf wrote, “Today is a black day for democracy…Merkel is silent…seemingly happy to have been partly relieved from her here Sisiphus task to save the euro”. DPA reports that SPD parliamentary leader Frank-Walter Steinmeier argued that the ECB’s decision is the “documentation of Chancellor Merkel’s failure...[while Weidmann] protests but Merkel gives the green light”, while the Green party decribed the CDU and FDP opposition as “hypocritical” since it was their failure to take any significant decisions on the crisis which forced the ECB to act.

We’ll continue to cover reaction throughout the day on the blog so stay tuned, but we can’t help but recall all those times we warned that saving the euro at any cost could drive a wedge between countries rather than bringing them closer together…

Germany faces some tough decisions on the ECB

As the next ECB meeting approaches on 6 September, the debate about potential ECB intervention is heating up. This past weekend was particularly interesting with two key German players weighing in with their views – even more importantly these views turned out to be increasingly divergent.

German ECB Executive board member Jörg Asmussen (on the right of the picture) revealed more details on potential ECB intervention yesterday, saying, “Under the framework of the new programme, the ECB will only buy bonds with short maturities,” adding the caveat that, “The whole discussion will be led by the requirement that any concerns about treaty-violating state financing are dispelled. We will only act within our mandate.” Asmussen also stressed that he would like to see any ECB intervention initiated in tandem with use of the eurozone bailout funds, saying, “The error with Italy…must not be repeated,” seemingly referring to the Italian government's failure to take full advantage of the time bought by the ECB over the past year.

Meanwhile, Der Spiegel has a lengthy and interesting interview with Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, the other German on the ECB’s Governing Council, in which he renews his opposition to any greater intervention by the ECB, warning, “We shouldn't underestimate the danger that central bank financing can become addictive like a drug,” adding that proposals for ECB bond purchases were "too close to state financing via the money press”.

Together, these two men represent Germany at the ECB, so for them to strike such different tones is rather surprising (although it has been hinted at previously). Asmussen remains much more positive and supportive of Draghi’s position, while Weidmann takes a more traditional German stance against any prospect of monetary financing of government debt (a position which has garnered significant support with the German public).

The real question though, is who has the support of German Chancellor Angela Merkel? That remains unclear, particularly with both having previously been close advisors to Merkel. The Spiegel article suggests that Merkel has become somewhat impatient with Weidmann's strict ideological stance, especially as it begins to hamper a potential path to crisis resolution (at least in her eyes). However, last week Handelsblatt suggested Merkel had in fact decided to side with Weidmann over Asmussen.

If this divide continues, the issue will likely come to a head leading to some tough decisions for all involved – in fact any decision to sanction greater intervention would make Weidmann’s position in particular quite difficult. Choosing who to support will be a difficult political decision for Merkel which goes beyond just figuring out how best to solve the crisis – she must weigh the public response at home and abroad, the market impact, her relationship with ECB President Mario Draghi and her support within her own party and the broader German coalition. Asmussen also has to tread a careful line as, despite being independent, he risks seeing his influence and support within Germany decline rapidly. Weidmann, whom many have suggested has already become isolated, risks a similar erosion of support, although abroad and within the ECB rather than Germany. If greater intervention comes to pass, as seems increasingly likely, the spectre of his predecessors Weber and Stark, both of whom resigned from the ECB Council in protest, will undoubtedly loom large.

As we have noted countless times before the role of the ECB cuts right to the heart of the German approach to the eurozone. Expect plenty more developments on this front in the near future.

The day after Draghi: Contrasting views from Spain and Germany

The day after the monthly meeting of the ECB's Governing Council and Mario Draghi's subsequent press conference - during which he said that the ECB is willing to intervene on the debt markets again but will hold fire for the moment - we've summed up a few media reactions from Spain and Geremany, opposite sides of the debate on what the ECB's role in the crisis should be. The discrepancy between what the Spanish and German press have made of Draghi's words is fascinating.

An article in El País with the headline, “Draghi pushes Spain towards another bailout” argues that:

"With a single shot, Draghi has shifted all the pressure onto [eurozone] countries verging on intervention. That is, onto Spain. Therefore, Mariano Rajoy’s government finds itself in the thorny condition of someone who has to choose between requesting a bailout – the second, after the one for [Spanish] banks less than two months ago – or burn in the markets."

A similar headline in Spain’s main business daily Expansión reads, "Europe pushes Spain towards a soft bailout”. Interestingly, the paper notes,

"Make no mistake. Neither is Draghi the first high-ranking European official to show Spain the way to the [eurozone] bailout funds, nor did the [Spanish] government realise yesterday that this is what it is being asked to do."

In fact, the article goes on, other top European politicians, from EU Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia and Eurogroup Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker, made similar remarks over the past few weeks.

An opinion piece in another Spanish business daily, El Economista, carries the headline, “ECB to Spain: Seek a bailout”. The article says,

“The ECB is now an inoperative institution, the guardian of an ancient orthodoxy. At the moment, the ECB doesn’t want to be the solution…but is part of the problem…Spain will predictably see itself obliged to ask for a bailout. Sooner or later, the fearsome Troika (ECB, IMF and European Commission) will take the helm of our economy and our [public] accounts.”

Bernardo de Miguel, Brussels correspondent for Spanish business daily Cinco Días, writes on his blog that Draghi has made Italy and Spain a Godfather-style “offer they can’t refuse”, adding,

"Madrid and Rome have few options at their disposal, apart from Draghi’s offer, if they want to avoid a full bailout."

Meanwhile, over in Germany, the media have focused more heavily on the implications for German taxpayers and the fraught relations between Draghi and Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann.

Mass circulation Bild, referring to the lack of concrete details announced yesterday, carries the headline, “Could…Would…Should…What does Draghi’s euro wishy-washy mean for our money?” Still, the good news for Draghi is that as long as the ECB’s ‘monetary floodgates’ remain closed, Bild have said he can keep his Pickelhaube.

Writing in Die Welt, Sebastian Jost is less complimentary towards Draghi, accusing him of “taunting” the Bundesbank. Jost argues that:

"ECB Chief Mario Draghi obviously feels comfortable in his role of the euro-saviour. However, not yet able to offer money, he had to make do with strong words and hidden side-swipes."

An article on Handelsblatt’s frontpage asks, “How long can [Bundesbank President Jens] Weidmann hold out in isolation?”, arguing that:

“At the ECB headquarters in Frankfurt, the warnings from Germany are hardly being heard, and they clearly have no influence on decision-making.”

However, Draghi could console himself by reading FT Deutschland’s leader, entitled “Draghi’s wise plan”, which interestingly argues that:

"It would have been good not to interfere with the psychological impact of Draghi's announcement. But once again opposition came from Germany, from the head of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, apparently the only one who voted against Draghi's plan in the Governing Council… It is indeed unwise to break the ranks of the Governing Council in this situation. Weidmann is fanning mistrust where he should be fostering confidence."

Two countries, two completely different roles in the eurozone crisis, two completely different interpretations of the same words. Meanwhile, European stock markets seem to have recovered from yesterday's losses. The interest rate on Spain's ten-year bonds has also decreased, after peaking at over 7.4% this morning.

The situation looks increasingly like another eurozone 'game of chicken'. On the one hand, Draghi yesterday effectively urged eurozone governments (primarily Spain, but also Italy) to show their hands first -  that is, if they think they need help to bring their borrowing costs down they should request EFSF assistance. But at his press conference less than two hours ago, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy insisted that he first wants to see what the ECB's announced "non-standard monetary policy measures" actually involve, adding that, as regards the possibility of Madrid asking the eurozone bailout funds to buy Spanish bonds,

"I haven't made any decision. I will do what suits the general interest of Spaniards."

Who will blink first?

German inflation backlash alert (it took about 12 hours)

Well, it didn't take long. You may have thought that yesterday's comments from people allegedly close to Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann to the effect that Germany could live with the shocking inflation rate of 2-3% were in any way a sign that Germany was about to cave in on its resistance to anything that resembles high inflation. Well the front page of Bild Zeitung - the gold standard of European tabloids (pun intended) - says it all:

The “Bundesbank is going soft on the euro”, adding that:

“Over the next few years prices in Germany will rise much faster than before. Our venerable Bundesbank, the sacred guardian of price stability, will do nothing about this since it considers it to be ‘manageable’”.

And in case the 13 million or so Bild readers didn't get the message, page 2 features a giant picture of a one trillion DM banknote from the Weimar era:

An op-ed by the paper's chief editor Nikolas Blome argues that:

“[inflation] will above all hit workers, employees and pensioners. Precisely those who kept a cool head and ploughed on through the crisis. This is unfair. It gnaws at our trust in money and our major institutions, in politics and central banks… since Germans have bitterly experienced it themselves they know that high inflation ultimately breaks down every society”. 

It wasn't only Bild though. The man himself, Weidmann, moved swiftly to deny the reports, claiming in an interview with Süddeutsche that this was an “absurd discussion”. He clarified that keeping inflation below 2% in the eurozone as a whole meant that “in some cases” German inflation would be higher, but that “we will ensure [in the ECB’s governing council] that inflation in Germany will not run out of control. Citizens can rely on the vigilance of the Bundesbank”.

This is one national core belief you don't mess with.

Is the Bundesbank going soft?

Shock horror. According to Reuters Deutschland, an unnamed central banker close to Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann today said the following, in response to the wide rumours that the Bundesbank may be willing to accept higher inflation to help solve the eurozone crisis:

“By this it is meant [that with] a rate of inflation that is moderately above the target of the ECB which is just under 2 per cent...No one need be afraid of massive currency devaluation”. 

 Apparently, the belief is that the Bundesbank 'can live with' 2.5% or 2.6% inflation.  

This follows an interview with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble,  published by Focus over the weekend, in which he said thus:

“It is fine if German wages are currently increasing more sharply than in all other EU countries”. 

After many years of reforms, he said, Germany has done its homework and can afford higher collective wage settlements than other countries.

So is this a sign that Germany is starting to follow the advice of a whole host of Anglo-Saxon commentators who see higher inflation in Germany as vital if the euro is to survive? 

We wouldn't bet on it. When commentators talk about higher inflation, they have something much higher than 2.5% in mind (though some commentators may not realise that themselves) - this certainly doesn't seem high enough to encourage the re-balancing and evening-out of competitiveness which many believe the eurozone needs to survive in the long term. The media may be getting ahead of itself on this one.