Are MPs actually being given a vote on the European Arrest Warrant?

Today it is widely reported that MPs will vote on the Government's plans to opt back into the European Arrest Warrant. In fact reading the Home Secretary in the Sunday Telegraph you would think that she believed that as well.

However a close reading of the actual motion leaves her contention in some doubt. Here it is:

Secretary Theresa May That the draft Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No. 36) Regulations 2014, which were laid before this House on 3 November, be approved.

Well the Government's Explanatory memo  to the regulations mentions only 11 out of the 35 measures the Government proposes to opt into actually require legislation - the warrant not being one of them.

This will undoubtedly be brought up in the debate and why exactly it has been omitted is unclear (perhaps because motions on legislation are unamendable). However, many MPs will argue that it contradicts assurances given to them over a long period and sets a bad precedent.

EU budget debate sees rare outbreak of consensus in the House of Commons

Seasoned House of Commons watchers will be well used to the 'robust' nature of exchanges between MPs and government ministers, even those belonging to the same party. This confrontational approach is typified by the weekly shouting match at Prime Minister's Questions, while polite, consensual exchanges are very rare, usually limited to instances where the subject matter is solemn.

It is therefore worth flagging up, especially to international readers, how extraordinary this afternoon's debate about last week's EU budget summit was. The deal was welcomed by Labour leader Ed Miliband (who had teamed up with disgruntled Tory backbenchers to demand Cameron pursue a cut rather than a freeze in the negotiations), even if he made a point of not congratulating the PM in person:

"At a time when so many budgets are being cut at home, this House voted for a real-terms cut last October and it was right to do so. No doubt it was just an oversight that in your statement you forgot to express your thanks to members on your own side and this for giving you such a strong negotiating mandate."

Miliband also added that while the relative drop in CAP funding was welcome, this area of the budget was still far too big given the relative importance of agriculture to the EU economy. Cameron also received praise from Lib Dem MPs including Deputy leader Simon Hughes who said that:

"Both my colleagues here and our members of the European Parliament are supportive of the deal." 

Cameron also received praise from many Tory MPs, with Peter Lilley congratulated him for "demonstrating that when a British leader takes a resolute, reasoned and constructive approach on what is good for Britain and good for Europe, we can succeed in carrying other people with us". Significantly, Cameron even attracted praise from rarely pacified better-off-out backbenchers, highlighting how impressive his EU budget deal really is - even if there is still far to go on the substance.

Go local

Today we publish a report, written by ex-head of Policy Exchange Anthony Browne and our Director Mats Persson, suggesting a fresh EU strategy for the UK government - European localism. In yesterday's Sunday Times, we trailed the piece, arguing:

"closer union cannot continue for ever. In some ways the EU is already more centralised than a country — individual American states have more freedom over sales tax than do EU members. And what was right 50 years ago is not necessarily right now. When challenges change, so should institutions.

The euro crisis has tested to destruction the principle of ever closer union — its momentum required Greece to join the euro when it was not ready, directly leading to turmoil. As the crisis has unfolded, the debate has moved to an existential question: what kind of Europe do Europeans want?"

We go on to say:

"Popular support for the EU has plummeted even in the countries that were once most supportive and national parliaments have grown restive because their powers are being usurped. The euro crisis is also forcing Europe to develop a more variable approach to co-operation, with countries integrating at different speeds.

The EU is ripe for change and this presents Britain with an opportunity to push forward its own strategy — which we call European localism. Since it joined in 1973 Britain has never shared the strategic vision of ever closer union, but nor has it had an alternative strategy of its own. As a result it has remained disengaged from Brussels, focusing on defensive tactics limiting the perceived damage of European legislation, rather than trying to steer the direction of the EU. This is an unsatisfactory position."

But, we argue, in the wake of the crisis,

"Britain can position itself as the champion of European localism, taking the principles and rhetoric of localism widely endorsed at a national level and applying them at a European level. The same arguments apply: if you devolve where possible and centralise only where necessary, you get better democratic engagement, more flexibility and better policy making."

As we note in our press release, in terms of concrete proposals, this would include:

• Parliament should be given the right to approve the UK appointment of judges to the European Court of Justice, to hear their views on European integration, just as Congress approves presidential appointments to the Supreme Court in the US;

• The Government should consider taking the European Commission to the European Court of Justice for breaches of subsidiarity, the legal principle underpinning localism that is now enshrined as a founding principle of the EU in the Lisbon Treaty;

• The role of national parliaments should be strengthened by a new “red card” mechanism, whereby if two thirds – or in particularly sensitive areas, half – of national parliaments express concerns about EU legislation or European Court of Justice rulings, then the EU would have to abandon legislation or overturn the ruling;

• The UK Parliament should work with other national parliaments to set up an “Inter-parliamentary Task Force on Localism”, acting independently from EU institutions, to ensure that the EU does not involve itself in issues that should be left to national governments;

• A new mechanism should be introduced enabling member states to repatriate powers over certain policy areas, even if all 27 countries do not want to do so, resulting in a variable, more democratic Europe where powers can flow both to and from Brussels;

• The Government should use its legal rights under the Lisbon Treaty to unilaterally repatriate up to 90 Justice and Home Affairs laws, and should prioritise other areas where it wants to repatriate powers;

• The Government should subject all significant EU proposals to a robust subsidiarity test, and should hold the European Commission to account for rejecting parliament’s complaints about breaches of the subsidiarity principle;

• The Government should lobby for a new European Subsidiarity Court, to uphold breaches of subsidiarity;

• The Foreign Office should set up a ‘European Localism Unit’ to drive the localism agenda across Whitehall departments affected by the EU;

• Form a ‘localism bloc’ of like-minded EU nations, starting with a conference in London.

As we conclude in the Sunday Times piece, This "is a strategy that should command wide cross-party support in Britain and enable us at last to engage fully in the EU."

"Europe" won't leave the Coalition alone

The weekend's papers saw several interesting articles on the Coalition's Europe policy in the wake of the eurozone crisis.

Here's Tory MP Dominic Raab, hitting the nail on its head in the Sunday Times:

"This fluid geopolitical landscape opens opportunities for a third choice for Britain — between integration and withdrawal. And it is popular. YouGov found 50% want to halt or reverse integration; it would win over many of the 37% who favour withdrawal.

What would such a plan look like? Britain should ditch its ideological baggage in favour of a pragmatic euro-realism. Take the free movement of goods, services, capital and people — a potent force for good, promoting business growth and jobs. The single market is not perfect. Some aspects won’t get better unless the UK negotiates at the table to liberalise services and curtail state aid and agricultural subsidies. There is no economic reason why Britain could not opt out wholesale of the EU social and employment regulations, which cost our economy an estimated £148 billion between 1998 and 2008. Likewise, Britain could insist on immigration controls on prospective members such as Turkey.

The crossroads ahead offers Britain a unique opportunity to come up with a positive blueprint for our relationship with Europe."

Meanwhile, the Sunday Telegraph looked at the formation of a new group of Tory MPs, which is gaining traction, due to the initiative of Chris Heaton-Harris, George Eustice and Andrea Leadsom (amongst others) aimed at reversing European integration. In his Sunday Telegraph column, Tim Montgomerie made this very astute observation:

"...there are two good reasons why [Tory MPs] shouldn’t be in a rush to renegotiate the relationship with Brussels. First, any deal that happens soon will have to be signed off by Nick Clegg. The Liberal Democrats are Britain’s most Europhile party, and they won’t allow a big departure from the status quo. Renegotiation will be more substantial if it happens at the end of the parliament, and David Cameron can turn the terms of a deal into an election issue. Second, there is no plan for renegotiation. Tory Eurosceptics are large in number, but there’s a People’s Front of Judea quality to their organisation."

We hasten to add that, in general, Tory Eurosceptics also need to develop a better understanding of exactly how fluid and fast-moving the situation in Europe is - and of the various forces at work - if they want to achieve a strategic vision of how to capitalise on the shifting politics. Sounds obvious, but Europe can no longer be reduced to some sort of black-and-white struggle between 'federalists' and 'eurosceptics' (it probably never could but even less so now), nor a sceptical Britain vs. the Rest.

Looking at the Franco-German deal last week, we note over on Guardian Comment is Free that,

"aside from the disappointing content, the latest Sarko-Merkel political charge is very interesting for wider reasons – particularly for the UK. Alas, it has been widely misunderstood in Britain and beyond. First, it is not part of some sort of German grand plan to again become the dominant force in Europe – no one in Germany is interested in "colonising" countries in any form."

We go on to argue - and this is important:

"Second, the Franco-German proposal is not a step towards "EU federalism" per se. In fact, the letter circulated by the two leaders envisages a limited role for the European commission in the eurozone's economic governance, with the eurogroup's 17 members instead meeting separately.

In Brussels speak, this is known as intergovernmentalism, often described as the opposite to federalism...Why does this matter? Because British reflexes tend to favour intergovernmentalism modelled around decisions made by sovereign states rather than the Brussels-based institutions. Far from counteracting British thinking, this Franco-German proposal seems to reinforce it."

There is another reason, we note,

"why the agreement seems in line with what many Brits would instinctively argue for: European variable geometry. Responding to the opposition this proposal generated in many capitals, German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle said in private (according to Financial Times Deutschland) that any member states that don't implement the Franco-German plans "shouldn't be allowed to stop the rest" from doing so, adding that "there should be more differentiated co-operation", presumably both in the EU and eurozone.

This is an acknowledgement that, in order for it to work, the EU simply needs to be broken down into smaller units. It's the type of flexible approach to European co-operation which many in the UK would feel most comfortable with – and also a reminder to those who argue a two-speed Europe is defined by euro membership alone (with Britain in the slow lane) that such a division is simplistic.

If the EU, in the wake of this crisis, is heading towards a more intergovernmental, variable approach to European co-operation – sometimes merging policies and institutions, at others keeping them separate, as national democratic preferences dictate – this could well be in Britain's interest."

This is not an endorsement of the content of the Franco-German deal (which we hopefully have made abundantly clear) nor an endorsement of the greater role envisioned for Council President Herman Van Rompuy. It's merely a reflection on the fact that, when European policy strikes at the heart of national democracy (the eurozone crisis has now fully entered the domain of taxation and spending as opposed to regulations, complex treaties or judicial cooperation), intergovernmentalism is still king.

Although we shouldn't read too much into it, the subtext of the Franco-German summit may prove to be a turning point.