EEA plus: a model for the future of the UK in Europe?

For all the noise about Europe in the UK, British sceptics (with some exceptions) aren't necessarily great at thinking outside the box. 

We have previously looked at the existing models used by countries that have decided against/been refused EU membership (i.e. Norway's EEA membership, Switzerland's Free Trade Agreements, Turkey's customs union with the EU, or simply the WTO) and concluded that they would all have drawbacks for a country and economy as large and diverse as the UK. In particular, the Norwegian model is pretty much a non-starter.

However, there is another hypothetical model, which we will set out in a forthcoming briefing, that could be more attractive if it could be secured: let's call it 'EEA plus'.

Now, we don't necessarily advocate this particular option and this is only a blogpost, but intellectually and politically, it's far more attractive than anything we've seen so far in terms of a fundamental replacement for the current EU structure. 

Over the last decade, several figures, including Jacques Delors, former EU Commission President, and Valery Giscard d’Estaing, former French President and author of the EU Constitution, have suggested the UK be given ‘associate membership’ or ‘special status’. Neither concepts have been fully fleshed out, but Giscard d’Estaing suggested that a ‘special status’ could allow the UK to opt-out of future EU policies, which could allow it to continue to vote on policies it took part in but not on those it didn’t. Lord Owen has made a similar argument - which he will expand on in a speech today.

From where we sit, there is one absolutely vital element that has to be added if this is going to work for the UK: voting rights. The great weakness of the EEA model at the moment is that a country like Norway, as we have noted repeatedly, is out of the EU but run by the EU. It just wouldn't work for the UK (which is home to 36% of the EU's wholesale finance market, for example).

So what 'EEA plus' would involve is single market access but with votes on all laws which are EEA relevant. For EU geeks, it would be a bit like EEA-EU co-decision over single market laws. There are several ways in which this could work. For example, an "EEA council" already exists with members from both the EU and EEA states. This could be expanded to be the effective decision-making body for the EU as a whole in the fields that apply to both constituencies. Alternatively, a majority could be needed in both the EU Council of Ministers and a comparable EEA body for it to become law in both. A range of other issues, such as an arbitrage mechanism and ECJ jurisdiction, would have to be thought through. Also, it would have to be designed so that only genuine single market measures made it into the agreement - not the add-ons such as employment laws (which Norway has to accept) - whilst the UK may wish to stay inside the EU customs union (which Norway and Switzerland are not part of). The UK may also want to be part of other areas, such as crime and police cooperation (perhaps on a bilateral opt-in basis) and there would also need to be consideration about the merits of retaining its veto over EU foreign policy for example.

But, crucially, such an arrangement would get around the massive drawbacks inherent in the Norwegian model. Another great advantage of this model is that it could provide an institutional wrapping for all those countries that for one reason or another cannot be full EU members, and certainly not eurozone members: the UK, Norway, Switzerland and maybe even Turkey. It would be a new mode of European membership - and, if the UK can get its act together, very much the "economic growth" tier.

If you think this is far-fetched, you might be right, but it's actually not a new idea. In 1989, ahead of the negotiations that would establish the EEA agreement, Delors mooted a “more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions”, which would have potentially given those countries market access and decision making powers, rather than the limited right of refusal that EEA countries currently have.

In a speech in 1989, discussing the potential approach to those countries who had remained in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Delors said:

“There are two options:

(i) we can stick to our present relations, essentially bilateral, with the ultimate aim of creating a free trade area encompassing the Community and EFTA;

(ii) or, alternatively, we can look for a new, more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions to make our activities more effective and to highlight the political dimension of our cooperation in the economic, social, financial and cultural spheres.

It would be premature to go into the details of this institutional framework. I have my own ideas, but they need to be discussed by the new Commission and then informally, without obligation, with the countries concerned. It should be noted however that the options would change if EFTA were to strengthen its own structures. In that case the framework for cooperation would rest on the two pillars of our organizations. If it did not, we would simply have a system based on Community rules, which could be extended — in specific areas — to interested EFTA countries and then perhaps, at some date in the future, to other European nations.

But if we leave the institutional aspect of such a venture aside for a moment and focus on the substance of this broader-based cooperation, several delicate questions arise. It becomes clear in fact that our EFTA friends are basically attracted, in varying degrees, by the prospect of enjoying the benefits of a frontier-free market. But we all know that the single market forms a whole with its advantages and disadvantages, its possibilities and limitations. Can our EFTA friends be allowed to pick and choose? I have some misgivings here.”

This option could probably qualify as both "in" and "out". For one, it would be very similar to the Single Market plus deal that Boris Johnson has argued for in the past and, could be defined as staying in the EU, although on a radically different basis.

A final sobering thought: the final result of the EEA talks only granted EEA states ‘decision-shaping’ powers through representation on non-legislative committees and consultation with the EU Commission and a right of refusal that is relatively weak becuase it can result in loss of market access – giving an indication that this will be a challenge to achieve.

Britain should not ape Norway - but new EU membership terms are fully possible

In today's Telegraph, we argue,

During Prohibition in America, the bootleggers and Baptists found themselves in an unholy alliance. One liked Prohibition for commercial reasons, the other backed it due to religious conviction. The alliance proved short-lived. A similar union has now grown up between certain Europhiles and Eurosceptics. Both say that renegotiating new EU membership terms for Britain is impossible: one group because it thinks the status quo in Europe should prevail, the other because it thinks the UK should leave the EU altogether. Both positions miss the point.



From Open Europe "Trading Places" report.

The argument the Eurosceptics make is that Britain should “become like Norway”, i.e. leave the EU and join its more detached cousin, the European Economic Area. But this would actually be a much worse deal than the existing relationship. First, Norway is almost as much of an EU member as Britain is, implementing roughly 75 per cent of all EU laws, from labour market rules (such as the working time directive) to crime and policing measures.

Second, despite being forced to accept all these laws, Oslo has no representation in the EU’s institutions and virtually no way of influencing the decision-making process to reflect its national interests. Should Britain “become like Norway”, it would be home to 36 per cent of Europe’s retail finance market, but with no say over huge swathes of regulation governing that market. And it would have to accept EU employment law – currently costing UK employers £8.6 billion a year – but with no way of influencing it. The net effect would be less opportunity to hold Brussels to account, not more.

Finally, Norwegian companies face extra costs when selling manufactured goods to Europe, stemming from the EU’s arcane “Rules of Origin”, which impose a tariff on any imports that contain components from outside the EU, and lots of extra paperwork. This has been acceptable to Norway, since 62 per cent of its goods exports come in the form of fish or natural resources, which are not affected by these rules. Applied to the UK – its car manufacturing or pharmaceuticals industries – it would bring sudden additional costs and a competitive disadvantage.

In return for its deal, Norway gets control over its farming and fishing industries. This has economic benefits and helps the country manage and maintain its heritage. But fishing and farming only account for 0.7 per cent of UK GDP. As maddening as the EU’s policies covering these two areas are, would the trade-off really be in the UK’s interests? Pursuing a “Swiss model” – based on a cobweb of bilateral agreements – might be a slightly better fit, but it would present similar problems, for example limited access to the Single Market for the UK’s large services sector.

Europhiles are equally wrong in thinking that the status quo is an option. Whether the eurozone integrates further or breaks up, the rules of the game will change. It is clear that the British public will never accept being dragged deeper into a centralised EU.

As the newly launched Fresh Start group of Tory MPs argued yesterday, Britain should set out a new vision for its place in the EU. This should allow countries to integrate with each other to different degrees. To avoid the pitfalls of the Norwegian model, Britain must not only maintain access to the internal market for goods and services, but also a vote on making the rules, and therefore remain an EU member. But it could take a pick and mix approach in other areas, including retaining its opt-in arrangement on EU policing laws, while participating in a better-targeted EU budget and some environmental measures.

As Europe goes through profound political changes in the wake of the crisis, Britain will have plenty of opportunities to advance this position, including in budget talks and future treaty negotiations, over which it will have vetoes. Once new terms have been agreed, they could confidently be put to the electorate in a referendum.

But to show he can be trusted on Europe – and to avoid a stinging defeat at the 2014 European elections at the hands of Ukip – David Cameron must get to work right away. First, in the ongoing talks over the EU’s long-term budget, he should use his veto to insist on UK economic support being limited to the poorer member states, ending the irrational redistribution of money among richer countries. This would save taxpayers billions. Second, under a loophole in EU law, he could instantly bring more than 100 crime and policing laws back under the control of MPs. Last, as the eurozone presses ahead with a “banking union”, he is right to explore safeguards against its 17 members writing rules for all 27 EU states.

Contrary to what reform-sceptics on both sides say, Britain has leverage in Europe. If the choice is between the UK leaving or getting some powers back, liberal, northern EU countries in particular may – after a lot of posturing and negotiation – go for the latter. The alternative would be losing a key ally in upholding a rules-based system of liberal trade as Europe goes through a highly defensive phase. Germany fears a Mediterranean-dominated EU as much as anyone.

Britain is one of the world’s largest economies, and therefore a major market for other member states, a huge contributor to the EU budget, a powerful military force and a global leader in finance. It lends clout and reach to the EU in world affairs. If it makes the effort, it will most certainly achieve a better deal for both itself and for Europe as a whole.