Gas talks stall as Russia pushes for EU guarantees on Ukrainian gas payments

Update 11.50 30/10/14:
Reuters is reporting that an EU spokesperson has said a deal is "very close" and talks will continue today, as we note below. As we also say below, a deal is still doable and likely, the question remains whether any form of EU payment guarantee will be needed and if this can get sufficient support within the broader EU member states.

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Despite another round of talks between Ukraine, Russia and the EU which ran late into the night yesterday the negotiations seem to have reached somewhat of a stalemate.

Earlier in the year the halting of gas supply between Russia and Ukraine (for Ukraine’s own use at least) was not seen as too big of an issue and it was hoped Ukraine would be able to leverage the combination of economic pain from sanctions and the Russian government’s reliance on commodities exports for funding to secure a relatively favourable deal. However, on the cusp of the harsh Ukrainian winter the power balance has steadily shifted and Russia has continued to hold firm and even broadened its demands.

What has been agreed so far?
Quite significant progress has actually been made compared to the starting point:

• Ukraine has agreed to pay for previous gas supply at a price of $268.5 per thousand cubic metres. This means $1.45bn will be paid by the end of October and $1.65bn ($3.1bn total) by the end of the year. Ukraine’s Naftogaz has set aside $3.2bn in an escrow account to pay for this.
• Going forward Ukraine will prepay on a monthly basis for its gas this winter at a price of $385 per thousand cubic metres. Russia has agreed to pay transit costs.

Russia has clearly shifted from its original price demand (at least with regards to back dated payments), but Ukraine has also compromised by agreeing to prepay and pay off existing debts.

What are the key sticking points?
There is really only one, but it’s a biggie. While Ukraine has proven that it can afford to pay off its existing debts there is much less certainty about its ability to prepay going forward.

We have noted before the significant downward spiral in the Ukrainian economy. While the fighting has calmed down to an extent, things are still far from normal, not least because the conflict has become frozen in the East with part of the country still de facto cut off.

Ukraine is now totally reliant on external funding from the EU and IMF. As we have seen in the Eurozone crisis the release of such funding is often more complicated than expected and creates a staggered cash flow linked to economic reforms. Such reforms should pick up following the election but remain tricky to implement in a country caught in the proverbial no man’s land in the sanctions war between Russia and the EU.

For these reasons Russia has continued to demand some form of explicit guarantee from the EU that Ukraine will be able to pay for the supplies over the winter – they are expected to cost around $1.6bn, though this could increase if the winter is particularly harsh.

Is a deal likely?
It’s looking difficult as this meeting was earmarked as the most likely one for a deal. Russia seems to be using this arena to flex its muscles given that it believes it has the upper hand. That said, the economic costs of sanctions and a falling oil price are creating problems for the Russian economy, though it’s not always clear whether economic logic is sufficient to alter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position.

Getting explicit EU support for around $2bn to guarantee prepayment would be difficult. But, so far, the EU has been fairly supportive of Ukraine and may be willing to offer a more tacit agreement to provide further funding rather than outright underwriting of the payments. Furthermore, without a deal there will be a huge temptation for Ukraine to siphon off gas which it is transiting from Russia to Europe. This could cause Russia to halt all gas flow through Russia, something Europe is keen to avoid to say the least.

Talks are set to resume later today according to RIA Novosti. With all this in mind, and the fact that a deal remains in all sides' interests, we would think one could still be struck.

What are the lessons here?
Ultimately, this dispute is teasing out a key question for the EU in the wake of this crisis. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ukraine is economically devastated in the wake of the war and the sanctions. The offer of opening up markets in the EU is unlikely to be sufficient and the EU and IMF will have to face up to the fact that in the short and medium term they will probably have to offer significant amounts of cash to Ukraine to help stabilise its economy, currency and energy supply.

Putin is aware of how politically sensitive this is for the EU – it has just gone through a series of its own bailouts in the Eurozone crisis and now countries are being asked to stump up cash for a country which is not even a member (and is unlikely to be one for the foreseeable future, if ever). As with the sanctions, this narrative is likely to expose dividing lines within the EU and set the tone for the negotiations over the future of Ukraine.

Russia suspends gas flow to Ukraine as talks fail to yield compromise

As has long been feared, negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the EU over Russian gas supplies to Ukraine have ground to a halt.

Despite last ditch negotiations over the weekend a deal did not materialise and the two sides remain some way from reaching a deal. Ukraine is willing to pay a price of $326 per 1,000 cubic metres, however Russia continues to demand $385. Russia also insists that Ukraine owes debts of $4.5bn, of which it wants $1.95bn paid immediately. Reports over the weekend suggested Ukraine (pushed by the EU) was willing to offer a $1bn payment immediately – an offer which was swiftly rejected.

What does this mean for Ukraine?

• Reports suggest that Ukraine has sensibly built up sizeable gas reserves – around 14 billion cubic metres, enough to last the country until December. This reduces the immediate pressure on the negotiations.
• However, both sides are now playing hardball and have filed lawsuits at the Stockholm international commercial arbitration court. Russia is also refusing to countenance any further talks until a sizeable chunk of the outstanding debt is paid. The hope of a quick solution then seems to be fading

What does this mean for the EU?

• So far, the direct impact will be limited. Russia has said it will continue to transit gas through Ukraine to the rest of Europe and Ukraine is obliged to ensure all gas is delivered. This is vital given that Europe receives just over 30% of its gas from Russia, 16% of which comes through Ukraine (according to the EIA).

• That said, this assumes Ukraine will not siphon off any gas for itself (although as pointed out above it does have sufficient reserves), as it did back in 2009 when a similar situation arose. That time Ukraine's decision was driven by mostly by simple economic necessity. Even though it has sufficient reserves this time around it does not guarantee it will not adopt a similar approach. Any disruption in supply to Europe would force the EU to become more involved, possibly to the benefit of Ukraine – clearly, if the situation continues to worsen there may be an incentive for such action (although of course the political fallout in Europe would not be positive).
• In the longer term the indirect impact could be that this because another area of Ukraine where the EU has to become more involved. At the very least, future bailout funds could be primarily earmarked to prepay for Russian gas, something Russia seems intent on enforcing. This could either increase the cost or reduce the impact of the bailout.

In the end, despite the current intransigence of both sides, it remains in their interests to strike a deal. Russia seems to have the upper hand at the moment but equally Ukraine remains an important market for it and pushing the country further away may only exacerbate the original issue it took exception to – Ukraine moving closer to the EU.

However, this state of affairs only holds as long as the gas continues to flow through Ukraine. If this stops, then the volatility of the situation would increase significantly and the incentives would shift radically (as we have said before, neither side would want a breakdown in energy relations between the EU and Russia). This is the key point to watch in coming days and months.

Does Russia’s gas deal with China change things for the EU?

News just out is that Russia and China have finally signed a gas deal, the negotiations of which have been going-on for a decade. (As the picture above, taken from a Gazprom investor presentation showed, this is something Gazprom has been targeting).

This is a pretty surprising turnaround given that every news outlet was reporting overnight that Russian President Vladimir Putin had failed in his attempts to finalise the deal in his current trip to China which ends tonight.

The key points of the deal are follows:

• The contract will be over 30 years and is unofficially estimated to be worth $400bn (19% of Russian GDP).

• It will see Gazprom supply up to 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to China per year from 2018. Once further pipelines are complete, this could be expanded to 61 bcm per year. As a comparison, over the past four years Gazprom has exported an average of 157 bcm per year to Europe (including Turkey).

• No official price has been revealed but the biggest sticking point has been that China believed Russia’s price demands were too high. It will be interesting to see if Russia gave in on this point.

• This deal has proved increasingly important for Russia as it looks to shift it’s away from relying on European demand for its energy exports.

What does this deal mean for the EU?

• In the short term, not too much. The economic links between Russia and Europe will continue to be significant and they will continue to be reliant on each other when it comes to energy (the former to sell the latter to buy).

• The deal will not be in place until 2018 and even then will only see Russia selling a fraction of its gas exports to China every year, exports to the EU could still well be two to four times the size.

• For these reasons, it is unlikely to change the potential impact which EU sanctions would have on Russia. Although of course Russia remains relatively unconcerned by such threats when it knows of the huge divides within the EU on the issue.

• All that said, it is symbolically important and could have longer term impacts. It highlights Russia’s desire to move away from links with Europe. Combine this with Europe’s desire to increase energy security and the relations between the two sides could become increasingly cold and distant. Although, some countries due to geographical proximity (Bulgaria/Hungary) or due to long standing economic links (Germany) will surely continue to have good relationships with Russia.

• It also raises questions over future tie ups between Russia and China. Areas such as payments systems, broader financial markets, transportation and machinery have all been touted as sectors for potential cooperation between the two countries. Again while a long term issue, such ties up may concern the West since Russia and China are currently reliant on their exports in many of these areas. Both the EU and US will need to figure a clearer policy for how to deal with such changes, with the EU in particular in need of updating its policy towards its eastern neighbourhood.

What’s wrong with Finland? Part 2

Since our last post on this issue things seem to have only got worse for Finland.

The European Commission’s latest economic forecast (see table below, click to enlarge) made pretty dire reading with Finland expected to be one of the worst performers in terms of economic growth over the next two years.

Furthermore, it seems that the credit rating agency S&P has finally caught up with our analysis of Finland, putting its AAA rating on negative outlook, suggesting that it may lose it in the next couple of years. Similar to our concerns about the rebalancing of the Finnish economy, the demographic problems and a stubborn lack of competitiveness, S&P noted:

“Finland’s persistent subpar growth rate reflects deep structural demographic and economic imbalances that hamper the government’s efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation. We consider that there are downside risks to growth and policy implementation.”

“We believe that the economy remains vulnerable to any slowdown of economic activity in the euro area or among other major trading partners, such as Russia.”

As the second part of the quote suggests, the situation in Ukraine and the potential sanctions on Russia are also likely to worsen the outlook for Finland.

The graphs above (data from Bank of Finland) highlight that Russia accounts for a decent chunk of Finnish trade and given the dwindling sources of growth any hit to this could certainly hamper the rebalancing of the economy and the reform/recovery process.

Furthermore, as we have flagged up before, Finland is one of the many countries heavily reliant on Russia for gas and energy more generally. With Putin’s threat to cut off gas to Ukraine the situation has potentially escalated another step, at least in economic terms, Finland is one (of the many countries, including Russia) which is on the front line.

Once again, all this is not to say that Finland is an economic basket case, far from it, but that even the healthy economies in Europe are undergoing some serious overhauls and reforms, further complicating the crisis response and, now, dealing with issues such as the Ukraine-Russia crisis.

Could Ukrainian shale gas break Ukraine's dependence on Russia?

Could Ukraine's shale gas turn the tables on Russia?

Ukraine is currently both dependant on Russian gas imports (60% of Ukrainian gas comes from Russia) and a major transhipment route for gas to Russia's export markets in the EU. This has historically put Ukraine in a weak position vis-a-vis its eastern neighbour. A fact underlined in the last few days when Gazprom increased the price it charged following the change of government in Kiev, forcing Ukraine to seek emergency finance from the west.

This could however change. Ukraine has two large shale gas deposits, one (the Lubin basin) in the Ukrainian speaking west and another (the Dniper-Donets basin) in the Russian speaking east. The eastern one has, according to the energy consultancy Advanced Resources International, nearly 76 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of potentially recoverable gas, the western basin shared by Moldova and Poland another 72.5 (Tcf). For context, the same consultancy suggests there are 26 Tcf in the UK and 136.6 Tct in Poland.

Ukraine is in the middle of Russia's export pipe line to the EU

These deposits are therefore sizeable and close to existing pipelines making both production for domestic consumption and export possible. If Ukraine could attract investment to develop these fields then it could measurably improve its energy and economic independence from Russia.

However, Ukraine should not get its hopes up quite yet. Although large in themselves the deposits are small by US standards (they have 1,161 Tcf  of technically recoverable shale) and for that matter Russian (285 Tcf). It is also unlikely they could come on stream in the near future.

The eastern gas deposit falls within
Ukraine's Russian speaking regions

The larger, more obvious problem is political instability. The eastern basin falls exclusively in the Russian speaking part of the country and until the impasse with Russia is broken it is unlikely international energy companies would want to sink the investment needed into an unstable political environment. So if energy independence could help Ukraine escape from Russia's orbit and calm the political crisis, it cannot do so until it has settled its current dispute with Russia. Of course Russia knows this too and Ukraine's shale reserves therefore present another factor in this deeply complicated and difficult geopolitical standoff.

Greece appeals to Russia over natural gas prices

As we reported in today’s press summary, there were some interesting reports circulating in the Greek press this morning about Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras sending a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin to request assistance with cost of Greek gas – namely the gas which Greece imports via Gazprom.

Looking at the data it’s clear why the Greek government is concerned about this:

As the graph shows, in the second half last year, Greek gas prices were the highest in the EU not including taxes and third highest including taxes. This is very problematic for Greece for a few reasons:

• Obviously in the depth of a deep recession very high energy prices can act as a significant drag on the economy (both on supply as it impacts business and consumption as it eats into the spending power of consumers).
• Greece is completely reliant on imports for much of its energy supply, particularly gas and oil. This makes it vulnerable to future price shocks and gives it little control. Incidentally it also makes its current account adjustment (moving to a surplus) more difficult since it has an almost permanent deficit from energy imports.
• Surprisingly, Greece has so far managed to keep fairly low electricity prices. This is positive for consumers but problematic for the producers facing very low margins. Usually, this might be an easy problem to balance out, however, with the government looking privatise the sector it makes investment look much less appealing. Partly in response to this, the government has allowed prices to be pushed up further squeezing the standard of living.

Even though the request may be understandable then, it treads on unsteady ground for the EU. 

As we noted during the Cypriot crisis, Russian influence in the region (particularly in relation to energy) is a very dicey issue, which brings out conflicting goals in various EU member states.

Natural Gas Europe reported last week that negotiations between Gazprom and Greece have been on-going for some time but are at somewhat of an impasse with the former offering price reductions of around 10% and the latter requesting up to 20%.

Any favour on gas prices from Gazprom (via Putin) is unlikely to come for free. The EU (and the US for that matter) will likely be mindful of ceding further influence over an EU member to Russia, especially one in as strategically important position as Greece. Gazprom has also widely been mooted as the likely buyer of DEPA, the Greek gas monopoly which is being privatised, although it did refrain from bidding earlier this year. Still the prospect for increasing Russian presence in Greece and the Greek energy market is clear, while hope of Greece tapping into 'vast' reserves under the Mediterranean are still a pipe dream to a large extent.

All that said, its clearly early days and we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves. But we’re certain other EU leaders will be watching this one closely.

The UK manages to water down the EU's north sea power grab - to Scotland's benefit

MEPs yesterday voted on a new safety regime for offshore oil and gas platforms. And what do you know, it appears that the UK has managed to come up with an acceptable solution.

Fears that the Commission's original plan to push its plans via a regulation (which have direct effect) have not materialised and it is now to be done via a directive, giving states some leeway, and through careful negotiation the final outcome is similar to the existing UK rules.

This is interesting on a number levels. Firstly it is a good example of the UK successfully pushing its case in the EU. It is also a good example of how the UK can use its weight to influence MEPs and the Council of Ministers - and for the benefit of an industry based primarily in Scotland.

One interesting question is whether an independent Scotland within the EU would have the same potential to succeed (This is of course if they were in the EU at all.)

Where will Cypriot growth come from?

This is now emerging as the key question for Cyprus following the severe mishandling of its bailout. The financial services sector, along with real estate and related businesses, which accounted for around 30% of Gross Value Added in the economy is now essentially gone as a source of growth.

Cyprus’ main trading partners, Greece in particular, remain mired in recession. Its two largest banks – key employers – will be restructured and unemployment will undoubtedly rise. Meanwhile, the government will be cutting spending and raising taxes, laying off public sector workers and embarking on some strict labour and product market reforms – as part of the standard Troika bailout package. Many of these reforms are needed but as we have seen across Europe, when combined with other impacts mentioned above, a downward spiral can be created.

The key hope for growth remains tourism. However, with the euro remaining strong and the prospect for political and social unrest in Cyprus still high, it is difficult to see a huge boost in this area. It will continue to truck along but is unlikely to fill the gap left by other areas of the economy shrinking. As we have discussed before, the prospect of growth from large gas revenues remains a pipe dream for now.

With all of this in mind we have put together a comparison of some of the previous growth estimates, along with the implicit ones included in the latest troika report and some of OE’s initial (optimistic) projections (click to enlarge).

All of this remains uncertain, depending on when capital controls are removed and how investors respond but it does not make pretty reading. All previous hopes for the economy are off the table and expectations need to be severely adjusted. The Troika's estimates are very optimistic, particularly in terms of returning to rapid growth in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, if the growth estimates included in the bailout prove to be overly optimistic it means Cyprus will, just as Greece did, require further financial assistance.