Yesterday Scotland, tomorrow the EU? Are there lessons for the 'In' and 'Out' camps?

Staying or leaving?

If David Cameron wins the May election he has promised an In/Out EU referendum by 2017. Even if he does not it is still probable there will be one at some point. National referendums are rare in the UK so with the Scottish vote we have a rare glimpse of what the EU referendum campaigns could look like. What should the nascent In/Out camps take away from it?

In trying to understand the motivations of the Scottish voters Lord Ashcroft's poll, conducted after the vote, sheds some interesting light. Voters made up their minds late in the day - 52% of voters made their mind up this year with 18% in the last month. The main issues driving independence voters were disaffection from Westminster and concerns about the NHS. Uncertainties over the pound and pensions drove the No side. 70% of Yes voters said they agreed with "The principle that all decisions about Scotland should be taken in Scotland" while No voters also felt the risks of independence were to great and conflicted with their attachment to the UK.

So are these findings and the Yes/No campaign relevant to a UK referendum on EU membership? here are some key issues:

	Scottish Yes/No	EU In/Out
The need for a clearly thought out alternative to the status quo	The Scottish 'Yes' campaign came unstuck on some key elements of their proposition. Notably confusion over the £ and EU membership. The difficulty ‘Yes’ had with these key policies dogged their campaign	The nascent EU ‘Out’ campaign has a similar problem as there is no settled view. What relationship will the UK have with the EU after exit? Will it be the EEA, a new free trade agreement, what will access to the Single Market be etc and what are the political trade-offs.
Harnessing optimism	The 'Yes' campaign was good at harnessing the ‘future’ and ‘change’ as a campaign weapon. The ‘No’ side failed to put forward a comparable future vision for the UK focusing instead on the risks of independence leading them to be portrayed as ‘negative'.	It will be difficult for the ‘In’ campaign to portray an optimistic vision of an EU future, given the likelihood of ongoing problems in the Eurozone – it will probably stick to pointing out what it sees as the risks of leaving. It remains unclear whether the ‘Out’ campaign will be able to manage to transform itself from campaigning against the EU’s negative record to wholeheartedly putting forward its own positive vision.
Who leads the campaigns matters - can they claim to be the anti-establishment?	In Scotland the ‘Yes’ campaign was united, had message discipline and was led by the First Minister of Scotland. This gave it the credibility of office and the ability to set the scene while remaining an outsider/underdog in relation to Westminster at the same time. By contrast the ‘No’ campaign was cross-party, divided and although ‘backed’ by the UK government was simultaneously seen as 'the Establishment' while being in opposition in Scotland.	It is unclear who the ‘In’ and ‘Out campaigns will be led by. However, on the basis that David Cameron is content with his renegotiation, the ‘In’ will have the advantage of the head of government and all the main party leaders.This could leave the ‘Out’ campaign run by UKIP and a number of backbench MPs. Although the ‘Out’ side would have the advantage of being ‘anti-establishment’ there would be a large imbalance in credibility and official resources that could tell in the campaign.
Foreign interventions helpful / unhelpful?	The ‘Yes’ campaign had to endure a series of interventions against them from UK allies and others including the USA, Australia, Germany, Spain, NATO and the EU.	While foreign interventions in the EU referendum are inevitable some will be more effective than others. While UKIP will not lose any sleep over an admonition by Mr Juncker, Germany or France, they may suffer some damage if Commonwealth allies or the US express a desire for the UK to stay in the EU.
Business interventions - do they matter?	'Yes' had to put up with major Scottish and UK companies threatening to relocate out of Scotland in the event of independence. To counter it Yes managed to organise some pro-independence business voices but the overwhelming balance of the warnings weighed on the campaign.	‘Out’ like ‘Yes’ is likely to have to endure a slew of major companies questioning the case for exit, particularly larger businesses. This too will be countered by pro-exit business voices. Without the currency issue to worry about, the business question will be about what market access the UK would have to the single market (see alternative to the status quo section above).
Emotional appeal of staying / leaving?	While 'Yes' managed to mobilise significant emotional appeal for independence the residual emotional appeal of the United Kingdom was also considerable.	The emotional appeal of the EU institutions in the UK is close to zero. While it is clear that the emotional desire to leave the EU is felt strongly by confirmed 'Outists', it is less clear what role political identity will play among the undecideds.
Devo Max / EU Devo Max - key to the middle ground voter?	While the campaign started as a polarised Yes/No campaign it quickly switched in the last week into a No+Devo Max v. separation. This managed to win over some of the wavering middle ground to No. For that to work the credibility of the offer being delivered was key.	The In/Out campaign will start from the basis that ‘EU Devo-Max’ has either been achieved or has failed. This will have a huge repercussion on the campaign. If the negotiation is still on-going and is in the form of a last minute ‘EU Vow’ it is unlikely the credibility of those offering it will be enough to swing the result.
Turnout and the undecided voters - Age groups voting	The Yes/No campaign had a very high turnout and a high level of voters who made their mind up in the last month. Older people tended to support the UK and younger people independence. As turnout was universally high the normal higher turnout among older voters probably did not tell.	An In/Out referendum is likely to have a lower turnout and a higher level of undecideds, making the last month and weeks of the campaign key. Older voters are more likely to vote for 'Out' and younger for 'In'. However, with a lower turnout older voters are more likely to make their voice heard.
Wild card issues	The Yes/No campaign spent a lot of time discussing the supposed ‘privatisation’ of the NHS - a policy area already devolved to Edinburgh.	Immigration aside, the dry nature of EU policy could mean the In/Out campaign comes to focus on unpredictable issues.
Rogue polls - who might they help?	The close nature of the polls probably drove turnout and drove ‘shy unionists’ who may have taken the result for granted to vote.	Polling is also very likely to be a large driver of the 'In' / 'Out' campaigns but it is unclear who this might benefit.

Fact check: Can we take Danny Alexander's "3 million jobs" threat seriously?

In June, Liberal Democrat Chief Secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander said that, according to Treasury analysis, more than three million British jobs would be at risk if Britain left the European Union. This is what he said:

“Indeed, the latest Treasury analysis shows that 3.3 million British jobs are connected to Britain’s place in Europe. That is the measure of the risk that isolationists would have us take.”

What new analysis could this be? So we asked the Treasury. You can read the full response here, but this is perhaps the key part:

“As set out by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the Treasury estimate that 3.3 million jobs in the UK may be related to exports to other European Union countries. This figure is based on the assumption that the share of UK employment associated with UK exports to the EU is equal to the share of output that is exported to the EU, making allowance for the composition of the UK economy. It is not an estimate of the impact of EU membership on employment.”

The Times also reported on the FOI response today. Now, there are at least three things that are problematic with Mr Alexander's claims:

1. First of all, this is not in fact 'new' analysis. As the response to our FOI makes clear, Mr Alexander's remarks were based on the following methodology, which has been used and cited countless times before. In 2003, Ruth Kelly told Parliament that:

"The Treasury estimates that 3 million jobs in the UK are linked, directly and indirectly, to the export of goods and services to the European Union. This figure is based on the assumption that the share of total UK employment associated with UK exports to the EU is equal to the share of total UK value added (GVA) generated by UK exports to the EU. The information necessary to apply the same method to derive comparable estimates for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is not available."

In February 2014, Lord Livingston again confirmed this methodology as follows:

"The estimate of 3.5 million jobs linked to trade with the European Union is based on the assumption that the share of UK employment linked to trade with the EU is equal to the share of total UK value added (GDP) generated in the production of goods and services exported to the EU." 

"The calculation uses data from UK Input-Output tables to estimate the proportion of UK value-added content generated in exports of goods and services and applies this to the values of UK exports to the EU. This is then divided by total UK GDP and the resultant proportion then applied to the total UK labour force to estimate the proportion of the labour force linked to EU exports on a value-added basis."

In short, the methodology dates back more than ten years and does not seem to have been updated at all.

2. Perhaps most crucially, as the Treasury's response makes clear, this study "is not an estimate of the impact of EU membership on employment." So it is rather misleading, to say the least, of Mr Alexander to suggest that these jobs are at "risk". To say that X number of jobs are linked (directly or indirectly) to exports to the EU is clearly not the same thing as suggesting that they are dependent on EU membership. To be fair to Mr Alexander the Treasury's position on this is somewhat confused itself - it claims that this is not an estimate of the impact of EU membership on employment, however, that is exactly what the simplistic calculation and, importantly, its flawed counterfactual seem to suggest (see below). 

3. Thirdly,  is immediately apparent, it is a very simple approximation, not detailed analysis which one might have expected from HMT on such an important question. The methodology used is very simplistic, for a number of reasons:

• A flawed counter-factual: We have always stressed the importance of the counter-factual when assessing the future of the EU/UK relationship. The counter-factual here is essentially that these jobs would not exist without the EU.  This is odd for at least two reasons: first, it effectively assumes an end to all exports to Europe should the UK withdraw from the EU. We can argue about the level of market access a post-Brexit UK may be granted (we've done a lot of work on this) but one thing is clear: there will be exports from the UK to the EU under any scenario. Secondly, by definition the analysis assumes that all value added by jobs related to EU exports would not exist without the EU membership. A simple common sense check suggests that, actually many of these jobs may still produce some value even if the goods did not find their way to the EU and that the resources could be alternatively employed.
• Assumes productivity is the same across the UK economy: While it is claimed that the calculation "takes account of the composition of the UK economy" it is not clear exactly how this is done. On the surface the calculation also seems to implicitly assume that labour productivity (broadly output per worker or per hour) is the same across the entire economy (by saying the basic proportion of output corresponds to the same proportion of employment). Fundamentally we know this is not true - on the most basic level, we know that skilled and unskilled jobs will have different productivity levels. A quick glance at the most recent ONS labour productivity statistics confirms this and highlights that over the decade since this methodology was created, different sectors' and regions' productivity rates have grown in different ways. Unless this is accounted for in a detailed way in the methodology it is likely to distort the figure.

The final point above suggests that there is either some continuing lack of transparency with regards to the calculation or it really is just overly simplistic (if not both). This is all quite ironic given that UKIP and Better Off Outers in general are often criticised - and often justifiably so - for not establishing a credible counter-factual whilst relying on heroic assumptions.

Mr Alexander should know better.

Labour finally wake up to the fact there is a European election next week

Do Ed Balls and Ed Miliband see eye-to-eye on the EU?

Anyone following Labour's election campaign up until now would be forgiven for thinking the party was fighting a general election as opposed to a European one - any references to Europe were hard to come by. However, Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls has emerged with a hard-hitting piece in yesterday's Evening Standard in which he argues that:

"Europe needs to work better to respond to public concerns, deliver better value for money for taxpayers and secure rising prosperity."

"First, we need the EU to be better focused on creating jobs and growth. An EU Commissioner focused on growth, and an independent audit of the impact of any new piece of EU legislation on growth, would be key to helping re-focusing the Union on this key task. And we need to drive forward the completion of the single market in digital, energy and services."

"Second, our reforms will help ensure that EU citizens seeking work here contribute to our economy and society. So we will extend the period of time that people from new member states have to wait before being able to come to the UK to look for work. We will work to stop the payment of benefits to those not resident in this country, consult on changing the rules on deporting someone who receives a custodial sentence shortly after arriving in the UK, and have called on the government to double the time that an EU migrant has to wait before being able to claim the basic Job Seekers Allowance."

 "And third, any agenda for change in Europe must also address people's concerns about how power is exercised at a European level. So we have called for national parliaments to have a greater role in EU decision making by being able to 'red-card' any new EU legislation before it comes into force; for serious reform of the EU Commission."

This commitment to reform is very welcome, even if this is merely a re-statement of existing Labour EU policy. It's worth noting that these reforms are not a million miles away from David Cameron's own priorities for EU reform - especially the further restrictions on EU migrants' access to benefits and the red card for national parliaments. Yet more evidence - as we've pointed out before - that tone and rhetoric aside, there is a surprising degree of consensus among the main parties when it comes to the substance of EU reform. 

As the New Statesman's George Eaton pointed out recently, there is a lot of frustration within Labour over how to deal with the EU question:

"Other shadow cabinet members complain of the party's failure to promote its commitment to reform the EU, which they regarded as a quid pro quo for Miliband's refusal to guarantee an in/out referendum under a Labour government."

It appears that Ed Balls is among the Labour heavy hitters keen to address this disparity.

The Farage Paradox: UKIP on the rise but so is public support for EU membership

Poll watchers in the last few years would have seen many polls showing a majority of Brits would vote 'out' in a referendum of the UK's membership of the EU. In the last few months this trend has been slowly reversing, and a new Ipsos-MORI poll out today shows that if a referendum were held right now, 54% would vote to stay in - the highest support for the EU for a few years - and 37% would vote to leave.

Why is this the case? The most obvious factor is the improving economic situation in both the UK and (most of) the eurozone. Another factor could be that as the EU debate has become more prominent, it has forced people to consider the issue and come down on one side or the other - it is notable that only 10% say they don't know how they would vote.

Likewise, the concerted focus on EU reform primarily by the Conservatives but also to a lesser extent by Labour and the Lib Dems may have reassured voters that the EU may be moving in the right direction. This has also involved much sharper and clearer communication by David Cameron of what kind of EU reforms he will prioritise, as well as high profile interventions by EU politicians calling on the UK to stay in and emphasising the UK's importance to the EU.

The irony is that the upswing in support is happening at exactly the same time that UKIP is riding high in the national polls and could well come first in next week's European elections, and UKIP leader Nigel Farage was widely seen as having beaten Nick Clegg in the EU debates. These figures lend credence to the theory put out by some including British Future's Sunder Katwala that while Farage is effective at maximising the UKIP vote, his message and rhetoric, including the overwhelmingly negative focus on immigration, is actually a turn-off for potential supporters of a UK exit (Douglas Carswell has also made this point).

Hört auf die Briten (und Open Europe)!

One of the constant frustrations at Open Europe is that the EU debate  is too often artificially framed between two camps: "in at any cost" and "out at any price."

That media likes a good shouting match is nothing new, but the biggest victim from framing the debate in such a way is substance. UK media and politics are inherently adversarial, following the logic of two politicians debating over the despatch box. It has its charm and benefits, but when translated to European politics it doesn't quite work, primarily because there are many positions on Europe, with the majority position still being staying in a heavily reformed Europe.

As we noted before, for their part, European media are often far too keen to simply copy the artificial two-camp narrative, leading to a conversation of the deaf.

This may now be changing slowly.  Earlier this year, Open Europe and the Fresh Start group of MPs brought together 400 of Europe's leading reformers at our EU Reform Conference to discuss the next steps. After all, saying reform is necessary without the policy to back it up is all talk and no trousers.

Which is why it's encouraging to see John F. Jungclaussen, the London correspondent for German weekly, Die Zeit, noting that:

There are not only shrill tones in the cacophony of the British Europe debate. In the lower frequencies, there are contributions which Europe should urgently listen to. They come from a group of parliamentarians from both Houses [of Parliament] and different parties that joined efforts because they want to engage constructively. Together with the think tank Open Europe, they develop concrete reform proposals which are just as pragmatic as they are meaningful.

Jungclaussen cites Open Europe’s report showing that further liberalising the EU’s services markets would produce a permanent increase to EU-wide GDP of up to 2.3% or €294bn, as a "particularly good example" of one such proposal.

Jungclaussen's piece shows that this more nuanced understanding of the debate carries traction, not only in the UK, but across Europe.

Second Clegg/Farage debate highlights that the EU status quo is indefensible

The majority of the UK public was not represented at last night's debate

The second EU debate between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage was an altogether more scrappy and bad-tempered affair with more personal attacks and fewer statbombs being thrown about. 

The polls hand Farage a clear victory - 68%/27% in the Sun/YouGov poll and 69%/31% in the Guardian/ICM poll - a more comprehensive margin than last week.

So clearly a bad evening for Nick Clegg, although the calculations of the Lib Dem strategists seems to be that the combination of the additional exposure and full-throated defence of the EU will allow the party to pick up some extra votes in May's European elections.

However, it remains to be seen what the longer term repercussions of the debates will be. It was striking that, over the course of two hours, Clegg had virtually nothing to say about the EU's flaws and failings and what reforms he'd like to see. Indeed, in response to a question from the audience about how the EU would look in 10 years' time, he said that it would look "quite similar to what it is now". Given what is happening in the eurozone, which will indirectly also affect the UK's position in the EU (something Clegg has himself mentioned on previous occasions), this is simply not credible. It also completely dismisses the public appetite for EU reform.

What is interesting is that, despite Farage's overwhelming victory in the debate, the Sun/YouGov before/after poll showed that public opinion on the In/Out question remained pretty finely balanced. Before the debate there was a small majority in favour of staying in the EU - 48% compared with 42% in favour of leaving - after the debate this was reversed slightly with 45% in favour of staying in and 48% in favour of leaving.

Polling has consistently shown that when the public are offered options that go beyond the binary in/out question, the majority of the public fall between the Clegg and Farage positions, with a far larger constituency in favour of staying in a reformed/slimmed down EU.

People hold different views about how they would like to see the European Union develop. Which of these statements comes closest to your view? (click to enlarge)

Source: YouGov poll for Open Europe, February 2014

Clegg's decision to talk only to the limited number of 'in no matter what' voters might be a clever Lib Dem 'core vote' strategy but it will turn off many swing voters in any future In campaign. All the more reason for politicians to represent the view held by the majority of voters and to test the limits of EU reform before forcing them to choose between In or Out.

Miliband’s EU pledge divides UK media – but is largely ignored in Europe

There is this much chance we will hold an
EU referendum if I'm Prime Minister

Ed Miliband’s intervention yesterday – in which he said he would only hold an In/Out referendum in the event of a new EU Treaty transferring specific powers from the UK to Brussels – has, as expected, divided commentators and media opinion in Britain.

Echoing a similar point we made in our response yesterday, the Telegraph’s leader describes Labour's new policy as a "classic fudge" and argues that:

"Effectively, Mr Miliband is offering either more Europe or no Europe... The Tories and Labour like to give the impression that they have fundamentally different policies. But they are, in truth, remarkably similar”.

Also in the Telegraph, Peter Oborne argues that the new policy is

"by far the biggest mistake of [Miliband's] leadership... [this] unforced error is a priceless gift for David Cameron because it amounts to an unequivocal vindication of the Prime Minister’s decision last year to promise a referendum on Europe after the election.” 

However, on Conservative Home, Lord Ashcroft warns that Miliband’s announcement could lure the Tories into talking only about one thing – Europe, arguing:

“the Conservative Party would not only be missing the chance to talk about the things most voters care about more, like the economy, jobs and public services. It would also, as far as these voters are concerned, be proving again the out-of-touchness (outness of touch?) of which it has for so long been accused." 

The Sun has commissioned a snap YouGov poll which found that 50% of voters disagreed with Miliband’s pledge to only hold an in/out referendum if more powers are transferred to the EU – a move he admits is “unlikely” - while 32% backed his policy but nearly twice as many people regard it as a cowardly move rather than a bold one. The Sun's leader argues that the wait-and-see approach has made Miliband “even more unpopular” with voters and the paper concluding that he'd have been better off "keeping schtum".

The FT broadly endorses Miliband's speech though echoes our caveat that “Mr Miliband’s policy does not guarantee the British people the right they should have to an in-out referendum if the bloc ultimately redesigns the way it operates in the wake of the eurozone crisis.”

In a less coherent leader, the Guardian argues that Miliband is desperate to avoid having to deal with a referendum if elected as:

"Trying to avert an "out" vote would drain all energy from anything else a Miliband government might want to do; enduring one would sink it entirely."

What about European media? Well, surprisingly, Miliband has been largely ignored. There’s almost nothing at all in the German press, though Der Spiegel's Carsten Volkery – not known for being the Tories' greatest fan – argues that:

“Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande and the EU Commission should now secretly have their fingers crossed for Miliband. For all public expressions of sympathy for Cameron’s reforms, the British referendum seen as a massive nuisance in the rest of the EU.”

Walter Oppenheimer, London correspondent for Spanish daily El País, writes that Miliband's decision not to hold an EU referendum:

"It is, however, a very calculated risk: it can cost Miliband some votes – and who knows whether those votes can cost him the election – but leaves his hands free if he manages to get into Downing Street."

The French press has almost nothing bar news agency write ups, ditto in the Italian and Spanish press, although Miliband got a couple of hits in Switzerland. The speech was picked up by the Polish Press Agency but they focused on the immigration/access to benefits angle and completely ignored the wider referendum issue. The Nordics are quiet too, despite Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt trying to weigh in on the debate yesterday.

We won’t pass judgement as to why Europe has so profoundly ignored Miliband.

Ed Miliband confuses with a new EU referendum lock he says is "unlikely" to be triggered

Ed Miliband will today set out the Labour Party's position on an EU referendum. Previewing his speech in today's FT, Miliband says:

"I am announcing that the next Labour government will legislate for a new lock: there would be no transfer of powers from the UK to the EU without a referendum on our continued membership of the EU."

So, unlike the existing 'referendum lock' put in place by the Coalition, it would not simply be a referendum on a specific transfer of power to the EU or treaty change but would mean that any proposed transfer of powers to the UK would trigger a straight In/Out vote.

It is not entirely clear whether Labour would therefore repeal the existing referendum lock and replace it with theirs. If not, we might be faced with the strange situation of two referendums - one on the specific treaty change and one on whether to remain in the EU altogether - with no guarantee that they would go in the same direction. If they do replace it, then we could be left with a much blunter instrument, where any transfer of power requires an In/Out referendum. Far from ideal if you wish to stay in the EU but also want to push for reform or dislike the transfer of power on offer.

Miliband himself notes that it is "unlikely" that his referendum lock will be triggered, emphasising that "there are no current proposals – from either the EU or any member state – for a further transfer of powers from Britain. Therefore it is unlikely there will be any such proposals in the next parliament." However, what would happen if, for example, the fiscal compact were to be incorporated into the EU treaties as is envisaged? This would not be a transfer of powers per se but would potentially alter the UK's relationship with the EU substantially.

In the rest of the article Miliband is keen to stress his reform credentials, saying that:

"I know the reputation of the EU is, with reason, at a low ebb. If Britain’s future in Europe is to be secured, Europe needs to work better for Britain. And Britain needs to work more effectively for change within the EU."

Labour has so far been rather vague about its proposals for reform. The Labour leader cites three main areas in his article. On economic competitiveness:

"Europe must do more to address common economic challenges by improving competitiveness, tackling youth unemployment and building an economy that better promotes prosperity."

On EU migration:

"A Labour government would work with our EU partners to lengthen the existing transitional arrangements for countries joining the EU so that their citizens have to wait longer before gaining rights to work here. There should be reforms to rules allowing people to claim child benefit or child tax credit when their children live abroad. And we should look at ways to make it easier to deport people who have recently arrived in this country when they commit crime."

On the democratic deficit:

"The agenda for change, however, must address people’s concerns about how power is exercised in the EU. This means giving back more control to national parliaments. And it means responding to concern that the EU is intent on an inexorable drive to an ever closer union. I am clear this is not Labour’s vision for Europe."

These proposals all sound very much like what David Cameron, and others, have been saying on EU reform.

But, on Labour's conditions for a referendum, it remains to be seen what political impact it will have. On the one hand, Miliband has raised the prospect of a vote (presumably in an attempt to avoid accusations of denying people a say). But, with the other, he is saying that the likelihood of his conditions ever being met is very small. What will the British electorate and other EU governments make of that?

Is the EU Referendum Bill dead?

The EU referendum Bill - pushed forward by Tory backbenchers aiming to legislate now for an EU referendum to be held in next Parliament (post-2015) - passed through the Commons with flying colours but is now stuck in the House of Lords.

Labour and Lib Dem Peers in the Lords have just managed to pass two amendments. These amendments are now sent back to the Commons which will have to decide whether to accept or reject them.

Big question now is whether this Bill will run out of the time, and therefore die an early death. This happens if the 2013-2014 Parliament session runs out before the Bill is passed (in the UK system, all proposals are chopped by the end of a parliamentary session). This ends at the end of April.

The short answer is that's we don't know yet, but it'll go down to the wire.

Parliament could attempt a round of Parliamentary Ping Pong, or "Wiff Waff" as Boris Johnson called it, as the amendments are returned to the Commons to be debated - probably on Friday the 28 February. If their Lordships amendments are reversed by MPs they will be ponged back just in time for the end of the session - at the end of April.

But does the Commons actually need to pong them back or could they simply accept it all in order to speed the Bill on its way? Well, the first amendment is about the actual referendum question:

"Do you think that the UK should be a member of the EU?"

Which the Peers want to change to:

"Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave the EU?"

Well, opinions are divided as to whether the question will make any difference on the outcome - something we looked at here. But the Electoral Commission felt that some Britons were blissfully unaware the UK was in the EU at all, hence their suggested change. The second amendment, to Commission an impact assessment on the consequences of an EU exit, seems harmless enough but will not really settle anything as any impact assesment will become the subject of the dispute. In any event legislation is not required. So perhaps the Commons could accept this one aswell?

Or would it be better to reject the amendments and use the Parliament Act in the next session as we looked at here?

Regardless, this is a setback to the Conservatives, who will take comfort from the political advantage to be made from telling the public that - in their view - Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband do not trust them.

Behind the rhetoric is Clegg preparing the ground for accepting an EU referendum?

 

Nick Clegg in a speech today sheds some light on his party's Europe policy and more specifically on his thoughts on an in/out referendum. He says:

We are no longer asking if Britain will have a referendum on continued membership, we are asking when Britain will have a referendum on continued membership.

 

The parties differ on the timing. The Conservative party want one in 2017, regardless of what’s happening in Europe at that time: it’s a date chosen for internal party management as much as anything else. The Liberal Democrats believe it will be far better to have the referendum when a serious change to Europe’s rules, affecting the UK, next arises. But we all agree that it will happen at some point or another...

If you want to know my position, it's very simple: yes to staying in Europe; yes to reforming the EU and improving our relationship with it; yes to a referendum when the time is right.

On the face of it that is not a change. The Liberal Democrats have in the past promised in/out referendums on the EU to be held at the next treaty change. Cynics would point out that when the last major Treaty change came, on the Lisbon Treaty, the Liberal Democrats were less than enthusiastic on having a referendum. But, the wording here looks like a change in emphasis, opening up the possibility of future support - in turn perhaps also opening up for another coalition with the Tories.

What else is new? Nick Clegg has also made some welcome moves in other areas. For a former MEP and supporter of the Lisbon treaty's transfer of powers to the European Parliament he is refreshingly honest about the need to reinforce the powers of national parliaments in the EU decision making process. He says:

I want to see a much more active role for national parliaments in scrutinising EU decisions and policing the principle of subsidiarity. We're still not fully exploiting the provisions made for this under the Lisbon Treaty.

Beyond this his speech has some of the normal party political aspects. For instance he accuses the Conservatives of wanting a "unilateral renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with the EU", when what most are suggesting are EU-wide solutions - but he does rather half heatedly admit that:

Of course a future British Government will be able to cobble together a package of reforms with Germany and other member states with likeminded views on European competitiveness and so on.

 Good, that is a start, so lets get on with it...