In the end Greek banks were pushed to take part by the
government but their resistance (despite being reliant on the Greek Central
Bank for liquidity and the eurozone for a recapitalisation) was quite telling.
In any case, data is now beginning to emerge which sheds
some light on the issue but also provides plenty of questions (as always with
Greece data releases are some months behind elsewhere so the latest data
available is for January 2013).
Greek bank borrowing from the ECB and the Greek Central
Bank (via ELA) has dropped significantly since the bond buyback at the start of
December (down €21.3bn since November 2012).
Now, normally a sharp drop in borrowing from the ECB and
ELA would be a positive thing since it suggests reduced reliance on official
funding. However, in this case, we suspect that rather than improving their position,
banks are actually struggling to find sufficient assets to post as collateral
with the Bank of Greece to gain liquidity.
Other factors do support this argument. The Bank of Greece annual accounts show that the overall collateral pledged for central
bank liquidity fell by €11.7bn in the aftermath of the bond buyback, while
borrowing from the central banks fell by €7.5bn (data for January is not yet available).
Furthermore, with total assets pledged for collateral still totalling €217.1bn
or 50% of all bank assets in Greece it is easy to imagine that the banking
sector is working under significant collateral constraints.
Are there any other potential explanations?
Well, the first would be that banks repaid their
borrowings from the ECB’s Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) in January.
This seems very unlikely. The LTROs coincided with a period of extreme turmoil
in the Greek banking sector due to the Greek debt restructuring, a period in
which Greek banks could not access the ECB. Therefore, it is unlikely that
Greek banks borrowed much if anything from the LTRO. Besides, if they did, it
seems strange that they would give back a key source of long term funding
early.
The second explanation could simply be that confidence has
returned somewhat. There is some evidence to support this, not least the return of domestic deposits, which have increased by €12.1bn since November 2012. However,
that still leaves a drop in central bank borrowing of €10bn which does not seem
to have been filled by other sources of liquidity.
Lastly, the bank recapitalisation is being enacted, which
could reduce the Greek bank demands for liquidity, although since it isn’t
expected to be completed until end of April it would seem strange if the impact
showed up this early on.
Overall then, there seems to be some strong evidence that
the Greek bond buyback has hit the liquidity access of Greek banks, albeit not
in a catastrophic way. More importantly though it has happened at a time when
credit provided to the real economy continues to contract and economic growth
remains some way off.
Update 16:30 13/03/13:
@EfiEfthimiou has flagged up a good point over email. In December 2012 the ECB began accepting Greek government bonds as collateral again, this allowed banks to switch from using the more expensive ELA to standard ECB liquidity. The haircut on collateral may also be lower under standard ECB lending (we can't be certain since ELA terms are secret). This could have allowed the banks to reduce their liquidity needs and the level of collateral posted - another potential explanation then.
Update 16:30 13/03/13:
@EfiEfthimiou has flagged up a good point over email. In December 2012 the ECB began accepting Greek government bonds as collateral again, this allowed banks to switch from using the more expensive ELA to standard ECB liquidity. The haircut on collateral may also be lower under standard ECB lending (we can't be certain since ELA terms are secret). This could have allowed the banks to reduce their liquidity needs and the level of collateral posted - another potential explanation then.
3 comments:
If the ECB is accepting Greek government Bonds as collateral, it is accepting Bonds rated CCC/Caa1, which translates to "substantial risk".
I assume that no-one cares what i think, but I would not buy such Bonds for my own account in a million years.
No one would buy them unless under extreme pressure. The pressure is partly economic, to save the banks that have already foolishly invested; and political to save the euro at all costs. The cost of course in the ned will be the crushing of the Greek people, where youth unemployment is now 60%
The whole shilly-shallying in Greece and elsewhere is activity designed to demonstrate - er - ACTIVITY. It signifies nothing positive, merely a cover for more futile attempts to shore up the dream.
The sooner the project is wound up the better for everyone! The Gemans have at least got an anti-Euro party to vote for now but all these Club-Med countries seem to be frightened of being able to break and work their own salvation.
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