IMF takes a more critical line on Greece

The IMF  released its latest review of the Greek bailout on Wednesday. As might be expected it was a bit more critical than the version released by the European Commission and ECB a couple of days ago.

As also might be expected the press has focused on the fact that the report reveals an €11bn funding gap for Greece between 2014 and 2016 (higher than that suggested by the eurozone). The report also calls for the eurozone to consider further debt relief for Greece. Neither of these revelations is brand new, with both having been included in the leaked version of the Troika report a few weeks ago.

There are a couple of other interesting points in the 207 page report, including some concrete forecasts on the shares of Greek debt.

These amounts are pretty much as we predicted back in March 2012, where we forecast that by 2015 around 76% of Greek debt could be held by the IMF and eurozone (NB – it’s not clear how the ECB and national central banks holdings of debt [circa €40bn] are classified in the IMF figures. If they fall under private sector here, then the holdings by official creditors may well be higher in reality).

In any case, these amounts drive home that the real question facing Greece and the eurozone (after the German elections) is whether to write down these ‘official creditors’ or not – known as ‘official sector involvement’ (OSI). There will likely be a push to extend the loans further and cut their interest rates but, as the funding gap highlights, there are immediate liquidity and solvency questions facing Greece.

Other interesting points in the report include:

• The IMF warning of further social unrest: “The risk of political instability remains acute, especially in light of high unemployment and on-going social hardship. Further ambitious fiscal adjustment is needed for public sector debt to decline steadily, which exacerbates the possibility of social stress and political resistance.”

• Arrears clearance seems to be behind schedule with only €1.4bn of the targeted €4.5bn being paid off. However, Kathimerini reports that this has now been increased to €4bn according to Greek government data.

• Greece only just manages to quality for IMF assistance, with the IMF saying, “The program continues to satisfy the substantive criteria for exceptional access but with little to no margin.” The explanation involves a few stretches on the debt sustainability front, with the fund arguing, “The risk of international systemic spill overs in case of a permanent interruption of the program remains high and justifies exceptional access.” This raises an interesting question of whether, with the OMT and talk of a eurozone turnaround, the spill over effects are still significant enough to justify such IMF action?

• The comments by Paulo Nogueira Batista, the Latin American representative on the IMF board, who slammed the overly optimistic assumptions in the debt sustainability analysis and suggested the programme was flawed. He has since backtracked from his comments, while the Brazilian government has issued its support for the bailout programme. Nevertheless, the outburst is a timely reminder of the on-going disputes behind the scenes in the IMF, between the US/Europe and the emerging market countries.

Full letter from the Cypriot President to the Troika slamming Cypriot bailout

As we reported last week in our press summary and which the FT is today reporting on (and presenting as a bit of a scoop), Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades has sent a scathing letter to the EU/IMF/ECB Troika slamming the terms of the Cypriot bail-out/bail-in package and calling for it to potentially be re-examined.

Below we post the letter in full, courtesy of the Cypriot website StockWatch, which published it over a week ago (added emphasis ours):

I am writing to update you on the economic and banking system developments in Cyprus following the Eurogroup decisions of last March and to request your support regarding a number of very pressing issues which need to be addressed the soonest.

1. The Cypriot economy is adapting to major shocks

The Cypriot economy is adapting to major shocks. Substantial private wealth has been lost and a significant number of Cypriot firms have lost their working capital at the two systemically important financial institutions which were subject to the bail - in. Restrictive measures, including capital controls, are seriously hampering the conduct of business and confidence in the banking system has been shaken. As a result the economy is driven into a deep recession, leading to a further rise in unemployment and making fiscal consolidation all the more difficult.

2. Application of bail-in was implemented without careful preparation

It is my humble submission that the bail-in was implemented without careful preparation. Its form was changed drastically within a week. Originally designed as a general bail-in across the banking system, it eventually became focused on the two distressed banks, the Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus (BOC). There was no clear understanding of how a bail-in was to be implemented, legal issues are being raised and major delays in completing the process are being observed. Moreover, no distinction was made between long-term deposits earning high returns and money flowing through current accounts, such as firms' working capital. This amounted to a significant loss of working capital for businesses. An alternative, Ionger-term, downsizing of the banking system away from publicity and without bank-runs was a credible alternative that would not have produced such a deep recession and loss of confidence in the banking system.

3. Cyprus was forced to pay the cost to ring-fence Greece but no reciprocity has been granted

Another feature of the current solution was that deposits at the branches of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus in Greece were spared from a haircut to prevent contagion. These deposits amounted to €15 billion. The wish to avoid contagion to Greece was also evident in the Eurogroup's insistence that Cypriot banks sell their Greek branches. In addition and as a result of the sale, the Cypriot banks have lost their Greek deferred tax assets. As understandable as ring-fencing may be, this was absent at the time of deciding the Greek PSI in relation to the Greek Government Bonds which cost Cyprus 25% of its GDP (€4.5 billion). The heavy burden placed on Cyprus by the restructuring of Greek debt was not taken into consideration when it was Cyprus' turn to seek help.

4. Imposition of Laiki's ELA liability to Bank of Cyprus

The implementation of the sale of the Greek branches of the Cypriot banks, as urged by the Eurogroup, resulted in Laiki selling assets that were pledged against its ELA liability to Piraeus Bank, without Piraeus assuming the corresponding ELA liability. As such, Laiki was left with the related ELA liability but without the aforementioned assets. The ELA liability which was left "unsecured" as a result of the sale amounts to around €3.8 billion and was imposed on Bank of Cyprus as a result of the Eurogroup decision. It is worth reminding that a substantial part (in excess of €4 billion) of Laiki's ELA liability was required in the first place in order to cover deposit outflows experienced by Laiki's Greek branches.

Bank of Cyprus itself has a total ELA liability of around €2 billion. By taking an additional €9 billion from Laiki, which was accumulated over the course of the last year under very questionable circumstances, BOC has substantially increased the vulnerability of its own funding structure, with its cumulative ELA liability reaching a very high €11 billion. BOC was called to pledge its own assets to cover for the collateral shortfall for the €3.8 billion liability carried over by Laiki. Such a high amount of ELA liability hinders BOC's funding sources as the room for obtaining additional ELA is limited. The imposition of Laiki's ELA liability on Bank of Cyprus is the main contributor to the liquidity strain Bank of Cyprus faces.

5. Urgent need for Troika to provide a long-term sustainable and viable solution to the liquidity issues Bank of Cyprus is facing as a result of the Eurogroup decisions

Instead of addressing the issue of severe liquidity strain on Cyprus' mega-systemic bank through a long-term sustainable and viable solution, the Troika partners seem to have chosen the path of maintaining strict capital restrictions. Artificial measures such as capital restrictions may seem to prevent a bank run in the short term but will only aggravate the depositors the longer they persist. Rather than creating confidence in the banking system they are eroding it by the day. Maintaining capital restrictions for a long period will inevitably have devastating effects on the local economy, will also affect the country's international business and will have an adverse impact on GDP. Under such scenarios spill over effects will no doubt register on other local banks through higher non-performing loans as a result of dampened economic activity. In addition, increased deposit withdrawals from other local banks, as fear of lack of liquidity of the only systemic bank will have a domino effect on the entire banking system.

I stress the systemic importance of BOC, not only in terms of the banking system but also for the entire economy. The success of the programme approved by the Eurogroup and the Troika depends upon the emergence of a strong and viable BOC. It is for this reason that I urge you to support a long-term solution to Bank of Cyprus' thin liquidity position. Such a solution will re-instate depositor confidence in the banking system and will allow the full functioning of the economy away from restrictive measures and capital controls. It will also facilitate the attraction of foreign direct investment in Cyprus.

My Finance Minister has alerted the Troika Mission Chiefs in writing on 19 May 2013, in relation to the need to implement a long-term viable solution to Bank of Cyprus' liquidity position. No response has been received yet.

A possible long-term solution could be the conversion of part of Laiki's ELA liability into long term bonds and the transfer of these bonds and corresponding assets into a separate vehicle. Another solution could be the reversal of the Eurogroup decision in relation to the merger of Good Laiki (carrying the €9 billion ELA liability) into Bank of Cyprus. In any case the BOC should exit resolution status without any further delays and should be granted eligible counter-party status by the ECB. Of course more options need to be examined. I should mention that an interim Board and an interim CEO is already in place at BOC and the final asset valuation is progressing according to schedule.

I urge you to review the possibilities in order to determine a viable prospect for Cyprus and its people. The new government of Cyprus, despite its expressed disagreements, has abided by the Eurozone decisions and remains determined to implement the programme fully and effectively. I am personally determined to lead Cyprus out of this dire situation and towards a path of sustainable growth and development. We are also fully committed to re-establishing Cyprus's stance as a credible EU partner. However, at this crucial juncture, we are calling upon you for active and tangible support.

Very strong stuff indeed. We can't imagine the Troika will take to it too kindly.

Details of Cypriot bailout agreement filtering through

The package is coming together. The IMF has officially announced that it will take part in the Cypriot bailout, providing €1bn of the total €10bn in loans - that gives a UK share of around €50m (see our thoughts here on UK IMF shares). That leaves €9bn to be provided by the eurozone, likely through the ESM. Below we breakdown the country shares (click to enlarge):

Other details of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) filtering through include:

• 2.5% interest rate on the loan, with a 10 year grace period on repayments, it will then be repayable over a 12 year period (repayments start in 2023 and finish in 2035).
• 4.5% in cuts/savings to be found before 2018 (on top of the 7% already scheduled by 2015) to drive Cyprus from a 2.4% primary deficit now to a 4% primary surplus in 2018 (two years later than previously envisaged).
• The figures given in the MoU leaked yesterday (which reports suggest are the same in the final agreement) imply an 8% contraction in GDP this year and 3% next year. This seems optimistic and could be closer to 10% and 5% respectively, if not worse, but ultimately depends on how long the capital controls are in place for.
• Eurozone officials will review the agreement tomorrow, with a final proposal to be presented on 9 April, which eurozone finance ministers are expected to approve at an informal Eurogroup meeting in Dublin on the 12 April.
• The Bundestag could vote on the deal around the 15 April. IMF board expected to approve the deal in early May.
• First tranche of bailout funds expected in early May, ahead of debt maturing at the start of June which Cyprus needs to pay off.

A few hurdles left to jump then in terms of approval from national parliaments – which is no mean feat given that the figures underpinning the bailout are likely to come under some well-deserved scrutiny.

Buying back Greece: another ad hoc deal or a step towards a solution?

Early on Tuesday morning the eurozone and the IMF reached an agreement which has been widely billed as their most comprehensive package to aid Greece. Now that the dust has settled somewhat, Open Europe has published a new flash analysis assessing the key components of the deal.

For all the talk and all the figures flying around there is still only one that really matters – 124% debt to GDP ratio in 2020, clearly this is not sustainable. Further measures will be needed and the ad hoc nature of this deal, particularly the way it skirts the big decisions, suggests that fears over a ‘Grexit’ will return as soon as Greece begins missing its targets once again.

Although reaching some deal was better than nothing, there are still significant doubts over the deal. The mixture of measures do provide some short term relief but in most cases fail to solve any of Greece's real solvency problems. The policy with the most unanswered questions is probably the most important one - the debt buy back.  A key question is: who actually owns Greek debt now? Below we break down the shares of Greek debt (click to enlarge):

We expect that the only bonds actually eligible for the buyback would be those held by foreign financial institutions (€30bn). However many of these bondholders may be reluctant to take part for a multitude of reasons.

See here for the full analysis.

Trying to find two more years for Greece

Ahead of today’s meeting of eurozone finance ministers we thought we’d (finally) get round to posting some of our thoughts on the last week’s leaked Troika report on Greece. The report, as may be expected, left much to be desired – and we’re not just talking about the copious glaring gaps where the eurozone and the IMF could not agree (the missing new debt sustainability analysis being the more prominent). The firefighters are fighting amongst themselves as one paper put it.

The report suggests that the cost of providing Greece with a two year bailout extension will be €32.6bn – very much in line with our estimates of between €28.5bn and €39bn. Interestingly, up to €20.3bn of this total is due broader problems with the original bailout programme, with the troika suggesting only €12.4bn will specifically be for the fiscal adjustment. This may not seem like it matters much but it highlights that the financing issues don’t just come from fiscal issues but also low growth, increasing arrears, banking sector problems and more.

Below we list a few other concerns from the report:

- The unemployment figures, as in the recent Greek budget, seem to be hopeless optimistic – potentially more so than before, since the Troika see unemployment in 2014-2016 being 0.4% below where the Greek government does. Elstat (Greek Statistics Agency) put unemployment at 25.4% at the end of August, while the Troika expects it to be 22.4% by the end of the year. A 3% drop in unemployment in a few months? That seems impossible anywhere but particularly in the current Greek economy.

- The report expresses some deep concerns over the banking sector not least the “plummeting” deposits and the likely need to run down capital buffers due to significant levels of bad loans. However, it still concludes current levels of recapitalisation should be sufficient – we’re sceptical.

- Despite, finally cutting defence spending, Greece still spends the third most (as % of GDP) in the EU. This continues to seem an obvious place to make savings, particular with NATO still going strong.

- The collapse in real investment of 40% since 2009 is staggering if not surprising, yet the forecasts for investment both in the troika and budget reports only looks ever more optimistic because of it.

- Government arrears continue to mount up, topping €8bn now. Despite presenting a significant challenge to wind down in the near future, these could also represent a drag on the domestic economy since most of the money is owned to domestic firms. 

That is to name but a few from an incomplete report – i.e. there are plenty more to come.

As for the outcome of today’s meeting, we have low expectations as usual. The target is for a political agreement on the releasing the next two tranches of Greek funds (worth €44bn). This doesn’t sound much of a stretch but it will require confirming Greece has completed the necessary ‘prior actions’, as it claims, while the IMF is hesitant to release any more funds until it has settled on a plan which sticks to its view of Greek debt sustainability. The final part will be tricky with the IMF and the eurozone still seemingly someway apart on what they see as sustainable (despite the two of them also being someway apart from the rest of the economic and financial professions).

A deal on how to fund the two year extension in the Greek bailout will likely need another meeting, while the release of funds still has to withstand the hazardous approval process of the German, Dutch and Finnish parliaments.

Expect the debate over the issues above and more to dominate for another few weeks.

Another disastrous budget for Greece

This week saw the release of the Greek budget plan for 2013-2016 and it did not make for happy reading. The English version is yet to be released but below we reproduce some of the key facts and figures from the Greek report. The table below essentially sums up the report and the crushing blow it delivers to hopes of a Greek recovery:

Debt peaking at a 192% of GDP in 2014! Astonishing given that less than six months ago the EU/IMF/ECB Troika seemed supremely confident that Greek GDP could stabilise at 120% of GDP by 2020 and would peak in 2013 at only 167% of GDP. (It’s also worth checking out this FT Alphaville post which highlights just how wrong some of the previous estimates were).

It’s easy to say that Greece failed to fully implement reforms and adhere to the bailout conditions (which it did) but at some point the failure of policies themselves and the fudging of the numbers must be admitted.

To many of us all of this was already abundantly clear but the release of the official figures confirming it at least ensures that the political debate will need to be moved on – expect ‘Grexit’ discussions to return to the headlines with a vengeance.

There are also a few interesting nuggets in the budget which suggest to us that further revisions may be likely:

• Firstly, unemployment is expected to go from 22.4% this year to 22.8% next year and then decline to 17.1% in 2016. It’s hard to see how this can happen with both government and private spending expected to fall over this period, while there will also be plenty of labour market reforms which tend to increase unemployment, at least in the short term. 
• Despite dropping by 15% this year, investments are expected to fall by only 3.7% next year and then return to growth. Again this seems massively optimistic without a permanent fiscal transfer supporting Greece and remove the cloud of a Grexit which continues to deter investors. 
• Exports are expected to grow at an increasing rate over the next five years, despite the eurozone and the global economy potentially posting low levels of growth. 
• Private consumption is expected to fall by 7% next year (after 7.7% this year), and yet this is expected to be consistent with a 4.5% contraction in GDP rather than a 6.5% one seen this year. Combined with falling government spending and structural reform this is again hard to imagine. 
• Table 2.5 highlights what could happen if Greece does not implement its medium term fiscal strategy (aka. its austerity packages and structural reforms), putting debt at 220% of GDP in 2016. This highlights how easily the levels could once again veer off track if many of these unrealistic targets are not met. 

As we mentioned in our recent note, a two year extension will be far from enough for Greece and this budget further reinforces that fact. With it now out in the open, discussions over the next few weeks should focus on more than just Greece’s next two years, but the fundamental decision of whether Greece belongs in the euro.

The Greek government and the Troika - not quite the stand of the 300

How would you feel right now if you were a government ‘swing’ voter in Greece?

Following its very first meeting with the EU/IMF/ECB troika the new Greek government looks to have abandoned its hope for renegotiation, at least in the short term. Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras announced:

“The [Greek reform] programme is off-track and we can’t ask for anything from our creditors before we get it back on course.” 

In May we predicted that "given the huge stakes, it may well be the Greek parties that blink first".Well, they may just have done precisely that.

We’re not disputing that the Greek programme is off track – following months of delays from the elections and the near impossibility of achieving the cuts in the first place, even imagining it would be anywhere near on target would have been frankly living in a dream world.

However, there are swathes of voters who switched from anti-bailout parties and smaller groups to support this new coalition on the back of promises of 'responsible' renegotiation. The fact that after the first meeting and only a few weeks in office the government looks to have already folded may be a slap in the face for many. The nature of the U-turn may also be difficult to swallow. Press reports suggest that Prime Minister Antonis Samaras was hesitant to make any requests (following some frosty comments by IMF Director Christine Lagarde) and looked more to highlight the increase in privatisations – a significant change in tact even if it is a good if difficult to achieve aim.

As we always suggested, renegotiating will be tricky and the prospects for Greece in the euro look increasingly unsustainable. But this could also add another layer of political and social problems. Firstly, it is an open goal from opposition leader Alexis Tsipras who has railed against the bailout and the nature of the government politicians (part of the failed ruling elite according to him). He even made the direct accusation that they would not stick to their promises for renegotiation – clearly this will only put wind in his sails. Secondly, those voters who supported the government in good faith, trying to balance their support for the EU and the euro with the economic troubles they face, may find themselves increasingly disillusioned.

It’s early days but if the government continues along this line we wouldn’t be surprised to see an increasing number of protests and even more rioting. The next polls should be revealing and again we would hazard a guess that Tsipras may turn out to be the big winner from all this. In the meantime it seems that the Greek economy and people will continue to struggle along with little light at the end of the tunnel.

And on the second day...

The second day of talks on the formation of the new Greek government has so far seen no major surprises. As we predicted in our response to the election results that we put out yesterday, PASOK leader Evangelos Venizelos' refusal to join a 'national unity government'. unless left-wing SYRIZA were on board, for most part turned out to be political posturing. Things now seem to be heading towards a three-party coalition with election winner New Democracy, PASOK and Democratic Left.

The latest developments:

• As widely expected, both SYRIZA and right-wing populist Independent Greeks have said "Thanks, but no thanks" to New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras' offer to take part in the new coalition;

• Samaras also met Venizelos and Democratic Left leader Fotis Kouvelis yesterday. After the meeting, Venizelos insisted that the best solution would be to have a four-party coalition with SYRIZA in, although he stressed that "the country must have a government by tomorrow [i.e. today]";

• Kouvelis suggested that his party was willing to form part of the new government, although he added that he would sign "no blank cheques" to Samaras;

• Venizelos and Kouvelis (in the picture) met this morning. After the meeting, Kouvelis said an agreement is in sight and could be reached "within hours". A tripartite coalition with New Democracy, PASOK and Democratic Left would hold 179 of the 300 seats in the Greek Vouli - which the European Commission and other eurozone countries could see as sufficient to start talking of minor revisions of the Greek bailout programme; 

• Venizelos suggested that, in parallel to the new government, Greece should also set up a negotiating team to discuss the revision of the bailout terms in Brussels. This group, he said, should clearly include SYRIZA - now the second-largest party of the country. However, SYRIZA has dismissed Venizelos' plan as a "publicity stunt"; 

• Meanwhile, there seems to be a bit of confusion on what Greece could actually achieve from the re-negotiation of its bailout terms - which, according to us, will be a couple of minor adjustments but no changes to the thrust of the agreement. A senior European official is quoted as saying, "If we were not to change the [EU-IMF] Memorandum of Understanding we would be signing off on an illusion. There is scope for revision." He added that a new MoU would be signed "during the summer." However, the prompt reply from European Commission spokesman Amadeu Altafaj Tardio is that "nobody is talking about a new MoU". 

• On a slightly separate note, Die Welt notes that PASOK - the party - is actually proportionally in more debt that Greece itself. It owes banks some €130 million - i.e. 18 times its annual income. Election winner New Democracy is also reported to be heavily indebted. This is partly due to the fact that Greek political parties get state funding based on their share of votes in the general elections, and support for PASOK has been shrinking since its last victory in 2009.