Juncker's investment plan gets cool reception

This is the name which has been given to the long touted €315bn investment fund which European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has put front and centre of his programme to deliver jobs and growth. The key points of the proposal (EC press release, Juncker speech, Katainen speech) are:

• €315bn investment from 2015 – 2017. This is made up of a €16bn guarantee from the EU budget (a 50% guarantee from €8bn of the budget) and €5bn from the European Investment Bank (EIB). This money will be used as a guarantee to raise the targeted €315bn from private financing on the market.**
• Of the total spend €240bn will go towards long term investments and €75bn to SMEs/mid-cap companies.
• The EFSI will be under the umbrella of the EIB but will have different goals and do a different type of lending.
• In conjunction with the EFSI the Commission will create a “project pipeline” along with technical assistance to help identify viable projects for investment at EU level.
• The investment plan will also contain a road map to remove sector specific regulations that hamper investment, with a focus on the financial sector to tie in with the push towards a Capital Markets Union.

This is the opening salvo of a plan which has long been muted. Judging by the initial reactions, the plan leaves something to be desired. Some thoughts below:

• As an opening salvo, the plan has already been watered down from what many had expected it to be – a real attempt at fiscal stimulus. Whether or not you agree with that prospect, it’s clear this plan does not constitute such an attempt. As it now enters the negotiation phase with approval from the member states and European parliament needed it could still be restricted and fudged further.

• This process seems very similar to previous attempts to create such a fund in 2012 (discussed by us here) and the failed attempt to leverage the European Financial Stability Facility from 2011 (which fell down on the reluctance of the ECB to be involved and the level of public guarantees were not sufficient and too highly correlated with potential risks). History suggests pinning significant hopes on these sorts of plans is not usually a good approach.

• It’s not clear that this buffer will be enough to encourage private investors to take on greater risk. There are numerous factors which are leading to a lack of private investment, risk (at these levels) is only part of it.

• Furthermore, to the point above, reports now suggest that the €21bn will actually be used by the EIB to borrow €63bn in bonds and cash which will then be used as a first loss buffer for the private investors – however, this does not seem to be mentioned in the press release, factsheets or Q&A. Additionally, we’re not sure what rating these bonds issued solely as loss protection would get or who would want to invest in them (seems akin to the lower riskier mezzanine tranches of asset backed securities).

• The promise to review the regulatory issues and create a central system of projects could actually prove to be more important than the funds themselves. That said, we have often heard the first point and the Commission has never followed through. The latter project has potential but the focus will be around “EU value added” and “EU objectives”. We’re not sure why the EU thinks it has a better idea of the returns and benefits on private investment than the market more broadly. Furthermore, these objectives already cloud what should be a simple idea – promote economic growth.

• More generally, questions can be asked about how these funds will be targeted. The focus seems heavily on pan-European infrastructure. While there are sectors where this could be useful – energy and high-tech – such a rigid focus is not needed for a general fund. Many parts of Europe (notably Spain) loaded up on infrastructure in the boom years; they do not really need more of it. What is really needed across Europe is investment in human capital, (re)training and R&D.

• All this once again highlights the huge amount of waste inside the EU budget, which could of course fill some of these roles. It also raises questions about whether the EIB should rethink its investment priorities.

Overall, the response from all sides has been very lukewarm. The plan seems very similar to previous iterations and, for better or worse, does not involve new money. Negotiations are likely to further impact the structure, while questions can be raised about the target and agenda included in the fund. The accompanying proposals for a project pipeline and improving regulation could be useful and tie in with plans for a single market in capital. That said, the EU’s track record on these fronts is not good and will likely take some time for any real impact to be seen.

**Correction: A previous version of this blog post said €294bn would be raised from private finance. However, the aim will actually be to use the €21bn as a guarantee on issuing €315bn worth of bonds on the market, meaning the entire €315bn will be private financing.

Aufstand im Bundestag: Who are Germany's most rebellious MPs?

On Thursday, the German Bundestag is expected to vote on the Cypriot bailout. The package is likely to be approved with a clear majority - the opposition SPD and Greens will mostly back it. In addition, the symbolically hugely important "chancellor's majority" - the threshold for the government to get an absolute majority with only the votes of its own MPs - is likely to be reached as well. Only around 12 MPs from the coalition parties (CDU, CSU, FDP) are likely to vote against. This is not particularly surprising. Remember, the bill for this rescue package was largely passed on to Cypriot depositors, and therefore enjoys much greater support in Germany.

Still, with the eurozone bailouts remaining ever-so contentious - and with a new anti-euro party on the German political scene - we thought we'd see how many coalition (CDU, CSU and FDP) MPs have so far rebelled on the various eurozone bailout votes. 

As the table below shows (click to enlarge), according to our calculations, at least 36 MPs have rebelled against Merkel on at least one occasion. Four MPs - Klaus-Pieter Willsch & Manfred Kolbe (CDU), Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Frank Schäffler (FDP) - have a 100% record in rebelling on eurozone votes - for the rest, there's a surprising spread.

Trying to find two more years for Greece

Ahead of today’s meeting of eurozone finance ministers we thought we’d (finally) get round to posting some of our thoughts on the last week’s leaked Troika report on Greece. The report, as may be expected, left much to be desired – and we’re not just talking about the copious glaring gaps where the eurozone and the IMF could not agree (the missing new debt sustainability analysis being the more prominent). The firefighters are fighting amongst themselves as one paper put it.

The report suggests that the cost of providing Greece with a two year bailout extension will be €32.6bn – very much in line with our estimates of between €28.5bn and €39bn. Interestingly, up to €20.3bn of this total is due broader problems with the original bailout programme, with the troika suggesting only €12.4bn will specifically be for the fiscal adjustment. This may not seem like it matters much but it highlights that the financing issues don’t just come from fiscal issues but also low growth, increasing arrears, banking sector problems and more.

Below we list a few other concerns from the report:

- The unemployment figures, as in the recent Greek budget, seem to be hopeless optimistic – potentially more so than before, since the Troika see unemployment in 2014-2016 being 0.4% below where the Greek government does. Elstat (Greek Statistics Agency) put unemployment at 25.4% at the end of August, while the Troika expects it to be 22.4% by the end of the year. A 3% drop in unemployment in a few months? That seems impossible anywhere but particularly in the current Greek economy.

- The report expresses some deep concerns over the banking sector not least the “plummeting” deposits and the likely need to run down capital buffers due to significant levels of bad loans. However, it still concludes current levels of recapitalisation should be sufficient – we’re sceptical.

- Despite, finally cutting defence spending, Greece still spends the third most (as % of GDP) in the EU. This continues to seem an obvious place to make savings, particular with NATO still going strong.

- The collapse in real investment of 40% since 2009 is staggering if not surprising, yet the forecasts for investment both in the troika and budget reports only looks ever more optimistic because of it.

- Government arrears continue to mount up, topping €8bn now. Despite presenting a significant challenge to wind down in the near future, these could also represent a drag on the domestic economy since most of the money is owned to domestic firms. 

That is to name but a few from an incomplete report – i.e. there are plenty more to come.

As for the outcome of today’s meeting, we have low expectations as usual. The target is for a political agreement on the releasing the next two tranches of Greek funds (worth €44bn). This doesn’t sound much of a stretch but it will require confirming Greece has completed the necessary ‘prior actions’, as it claims, while the IMF is hesitant to release any more funds until it has settled on a plan which sticks to its view of Greek debt sustainability. The final part will be tricky with the IMF and the eurozone still seemingly someway apart on what they see as sustainable (despite the two of them also being someway apart from the rest of the economic and financial professions).

A deal on how to fund the two year extension in the Greek bailout will likely need another meeting, while the release of funds still has to withstand the hazardous approval process of the German, Dutch and Finnish parliaments.

Expect the debate over the issues above and more to dominate for another few weeks.

Some preliminary thoughts on the stress tests for Spanish banks: lots of optimistic assumptions...

Here is the full report (and the bank-by-bank results) from the latest Spanish bank stress test exercise. Below we provide the key points and our initial thoughts on them.

The tests put the total capital needs of Spanish banks at €59.3bn, but Spanish Deputy Finance Minister Fernando Jiménez Latorre (in the picture) just told journalists during the press conference that, assuming that Spanish banks manage to raise part of the money from other sources, the Spanish government could ask the EFSF for "around €40bn" (as we anticipated here).

Key points: 

• 14 banks assessed, 7 found to be well capitalised, 7 found to need capital injection. Total needs put at €59.3bn. This falls to €53.75bn when the mergers under way and the tax effects are considered;

• €24.7bn of the total amount is earmarked for Bankia alone, with a further €10.8bn for CatalunyaCaixa and €7.2bn for NovaGalicia;

• The adverse economic scenario assessed was: 6.5% cumulative GDP drop, unemployment reaching 27.2% and additional drops in house and land price indices of 25% and 60% respectively, for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014;

• Cumulative credit losses for the in-scope domestic back book of lending assets are approximately €270bn for the adverse (stress) scenario, of which €265bn correspond to the existing book. This compares with cumulative credit losses amounting to approximately €183bn under the base scenario.

Open Europe take: 

• The base case scenario seems overly optimistic, the adverse scenario looks more realistic - although we expect a fall in house prices of around 35% rather than the 25% assumed. The prediction that unemployment will peak at 27.2% also seems optimistic given that there is plenty more austerity and internal devaluation to come while the structural labour market reforms are yet to take effect.

• Oliver Wyman's report strongly assumes that all the previous capital buffers and loan loss provisions have been well implemented with suitable quality of assets. However, this is far from assured;

• The level of non-performing mortgage loans seems incredibly low at 3.3% currently with losses only predicted to rise to 4.1% under the adverse scenario. This number could well be distorted by forbearance (delaying foreclosing on loans likely to default to avoid taking losses) by struggling banks. It will also massively increase if unemployment and economic growth turn out to be worse than predicted;

• The levels of recovery on foreclosed assets seem a bit too positive (admittedly a wide range of between 37% - 79% losses depending on type of asset) given the continuing oversupply in the real estate market in Spain. Until the market has fully adjusted, the huge mismatch between supply and demand is likely to keep resale value on foreclosed assets incredibly low;

• These tests do look to be more intense than the previous ones but ultimately the optimistic assumptions do instantly raise questions over their credibility. The structure of the bailout request is also unlikely to enamour investors, who like to see grand gestures, however, it always positive that taxpayer participation may be limited. 

 

Has Draghi really saved the universe?

So it continues.

During a highly anticipated press conference, ECB head Mario Draghi - the man tasked with saving the universe after eurozone leader's consistent failures - announced today that the ECB will buy 'unlimited' government debt, albeit short-term.

So the central bank that once wouldn't touch government debt with a bargepole, has now said it's willing to underwrite governments, in theory indefinitely. In fairness, we're talking short-term, sterilised bonds from countries who enter an EFSF/ESM bailout programme - so there are several catches. Still, this is a big move, which is why markets have reacted positively.

How long it'll last is, as ever, an open question. You can read our full take on the decision (and all the technical details) here. The key concerns / questions:

• Purchases of short term debt don’t tackle the rising cost for Spain and Italy of refinancing long-term debt, and may force countries to focus more short term funding, making them more susceptible to higher borrowing costs.
• Despite all the talk of conditionality, can the ECB really cut off bond purchases from a country when it is already in trouble? We doubt it, at least not without causing huge problems in the markets (which the policy is meant to avoid).
• The sterilisation (removal of the money created) is almost irrelevant given the already unlimited lending provided by the ECB.
• Although it claims to no longer be senior to other bondholders, would the ECB really take losses, meaning that it crosses the mark for directly financing governments, if push came to shove?
• With the interbank lending market still dead and buried will a few sovereign bond purchases really restore monetary policy to ‘normality’?
• These purchases tackle a symptom not a cause of the crisis, lack of competitiveness, poor growth prospects, unsustainable debt and undercapitalised banks still weigh down the struggling countries.

The markets might be buoyed, but this one will drag on for much longer.

Where does the ESM stand?

Keeping track of the European bailout funds is hard enough, let alone trying to figure out when the changeover between the two largest ones, the EFSF and ESM, will take place.

Originally the plan was for the ESM to come into force on 1 July. However, this was then adjusted to the 9 July with eurozone leaders hopeful that they could announce it following their meeting that day. Now even that looks optimistic. Below we outline the state of play for the ESM treaty in the relevant parliaments:

Ratified: France, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Finland, Slovakia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, Cyprus and Ireland

In the process of ratifying: Italy and Germany

In the next month: Malta and Estonia 

So when will it come into force? 

The next obvious target is the newly announced Eurogroup meeting on 20 July. One important point to remember is that it really comes down to Italy and Germany since, once it is ratified by members representing 90% of the capital subscription, it will automatically come into force. However, the process in these two countries is still uncertain and putting a definite date on completion is tricky.

In Italy the Senate needs to vote on it first, before the lower house can approve it, although there is no vote scheduled for the next week at least (the agenda gets updated on a weekly basis).

In Germany, both houses of the parliament have approved it, however, the Constitutional Court has asked the President to delay signing off on it due to the large number of challenges against the legality of the treaty – something which he agreed to. The court will analyse these challenges (thought to be around six distinct complaints) on the 10 July, although this could take a few days to complete. It will then decide whether to issue a temporary injunction against the treaty if any of the cases have merit. This seems unlikely and even Eurosceptic MPs such as the CDU’s Wolfgang Bosbach have said, "The judges do indeed decide only according to legal and constitutional criteria, but they also know what kind of impact a categorical 'no' would have in terms of foreign policy and financial policy."

So the situation is still unclear in the two countries that matter, but will hopefully become clearer in the next couple of weeks. There is still plenty of opportunity for a surprise but ultimately it looks increasingly likely that the ESM will be in force towards the end of the month. Whether Spain and Cyprus will be able to wait until then is even less certain though, and as we’ve heard today (and covered before) using the EFSF to disperse the funds throws up plenty of problems in itself (such as Finnish collateral demands).

Update 05/07/12 16.50

During his statement on the EU summit earlier this afternoon, Mario Monti has urged the Italian parliament to complete the ratification of both the fiscal treaty and the ESM "by the end of the month." Italian news agency AGI notes that only some 40 (out of 205) MPs from Silvio Berlusconi's party were listening to the statement. 

Update 05/07/12 15.30

It looks as if Malta has actually ratified the treaty, although in practice that makes no difference to when the ESM will come into force.

One final point to note is that, if the ESM does come into force quickly enough and does disperse the Spanish bailout, these loans will still be senior to other Spanish debt. The recent summit only concluded that loans which are issued by the EFSF then transferred to the ESM will remain pari passu (same seniority) with other debt.

Finland and Netherlands raise doubts over summit conclusions

As we expected, doubts are already arising over the package agreed at last week’s summit. In particular, Finland and the Netherlands have today expressed strong reservations about the plans to allow the EFSF and ESM to purchase the debt of struggling countries.

Finland suggested today that it will not support any bond purchases by the bailout funds, while the Netherlands took a less stringent line simply saying that it would assess each purchase on a case by case basis (although behind the scenes it is widely thought not to be keen on the idea).

However, as has been noted, the countries may have backed themselves into a corner here with one of the previous summit amendments to the ESM treaty, which says:

“An emergency voting procedure shall be used where the Commission and the ECB both conclude that a failure to urgently adopt a decision to grant or implement financial assistance, as defined in Articles 13 to 18, would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro area. The adoption of a decision by mutual agreement by the Board of Governors referred to in points (f) and (g) of Article 5(6) and the Board of Directors under that emergency procedure requires a qualified majority of 85% of the votes cast.”

It is worth remembering though that under the EFSF unanimity is still needed so in the short term they can block any attempt to purchase bonds. However, once the ESM comes into force, in around a week’s time if done on schedule, the countries could well be outvoted, since they control less than 8% of the votes combined. It is obviously not completely clear cut, the ‘emergency procedure’ would need support from the ECB and/or the Commission, although it is unlikely that the purchases would be started up in a non-emergency situation. At the very least it should make for an interesting vote on the ESM in the upper house of the Dutch parliament tomorrow and even though ratification is likely (especially since the lower house has already approved it) we’d hazard a guess that this isn’t the last we’ve seen of this issue.

A summit plus for Greece?

Given that Greece lacked any real political presence at last week’s EU summit, discussions on the crisis in Athens were fairly minimal and it was largely overlooked during the ensuing press coverage.

However, Kathimerini has an interesting report today suggesting that Greece could attempt to get the cost of its bank recapitalisation removed from its sovereign debt levels – in the same way that Spain is hoping to do. This could well be seen by eurozone leaders as a way to quickly reduce Greece’s debt burden – although we don’t think it will change any of the fundamental problems which it faces.

A large amount of the second Greek bailout – around €50bn – is actually going to Greek banks to help them absorb the large losses they faced from the Greek debt restructuring. With Greek debt currently standing at around €327bn or 160% of GDP, removing €50bn from this figure could provide a significant boost to Greek debt sustainability – bringing the figure down to 136% of GDP.

There are, however, a few important caveats to note here:

• Firstly, 136% is still an unsustainable debt level, even with this reduction the Greek debt burden is still huge and the need and demands for austerity are not likely to waiver . 
• Secondly, and possibly more importantly, is that this will only be an adjustment on paper for all intents and purposes. Greek banks are dead on their feet, living off liquidity from the ECB and the Greek Central Bank. They will never be able to repay this money and it will still ultimately be underwritten by the Greek state. So, even if this debt is shifted off the official figures it will still be a burden of the state – in reality little will have changed. 
• Lastly, this process will not happen anytime soon. The bailout funds cannot lend directly to banks until the ECB is in place as the eurozone’s financial supervisor, and as we have noted, this will be at the earliest the start of next year. This also happens to be the period by which we have suggested that leaving the euro may become more attractive from a Greek perspective. 

An interesting development which seems to have mostly slipped under the radar then. We wouldn’t be surprised to see the eurozone and Greek leaders take advantage of this opportunity to gain a large reduction in the superficial figures on Greek debt – it would make for an effective headline figure and would likely buy them some more time in terms of making Greek debt look sustainable in their and the IMF's models. Ultimately, though, it would only be window dressing, further shifting of funds around to try to make the situation seem better than it is. In the end, as we have always said, there are no easy answers to the Greek or eurozone crisis.

No, the euro hasn't been saved yet

On the Telegraph blog, we argue:

Judging from some media reports across Europe – and some positive market reactions, the eurozone crisis has just been solved. Italy and Spain scored a massive victory over Germany. Angela Merkel has caved in. Berlin has blinked.

Hardly. Though Merkel took a bit of a beating and some unexpected progress (the term is used loosely) was made, the primary achievement was to shift yet more of the burden from banks and governments in the south to taxpayers in the north, via the eurozone bailout funds. Nothing fundamental has been solved. Here’s why:

Recapitalisation of Spanish banks still faces hurdles: In future, the eurozone’s permanent bailout fund, the ESM, will be able to directly recapitalise banks in the eurozone, without first passing the cash through national governments. This could help Spain, as the loans won’t count towards Spanish government debt. But no more money is on the table, and the changes will only happen when the ECB has shouldered the role as supervisor for banks in the eurozone and ESM rules are reworked. Judging on past record, this can take time. Merkel has also indicated that the changes to the ESM will have to be approved by the Bundestag, which won’t be comfortable given the already strong reaction from backbench MPs.

The bailout funds are still not big enough to stand behind Spain and Italy: The two bailout funds – the EFSF and ESM – could be allowed to buy government bonds with only existing EU targets in place, ie. no Greece-style monitoring programme. To consider this a game-changing move is an illusion. First, it is merely activating a previous EU decision – so Germany has agreed to no new instrument. Second, unlike the ECB, the EFSF and ESM don’t actually have the funds to backstop Italy and Spain – their bond buying is likely to be tested by the markets and could prove counterproductive. Perversely, if conditionality is indeed relaxed it would provide a pretty strong incentives for other countries – such as Italy – to tap the bailout fund. Hardly desirable.

EU loans will remain senior: The conclusions suggest that any loans made by the EFSF and then transferred to the ESM (i.e. the Spanish bailout) will not be “senior”, ie taxpayers and financial institutions will take losses simultaneously if a debtor country fails to pay back the cash. In reality though, as the restructuring in Greece showed, official loans have always been treated as de facto senior. This is not necessarily a bad thing since it protects taxpayers, but it simply adds to the confusion and often only delays the pain.

Ireland will get easier terms on its bailout: This is significant for Ireland, and an effective admission that the EU might have been wrong to force the country to bail out its banks and carry the burden on its sovereign debt alone. How much can be done this far down the line is unclear, but the positive sentiment could help the Irish recovery.

The ECB as bank supervisor has merits – but comes with pitfalls: The aim seems now to have the ECB taking over the responsibility as chief bank supervisor in the eurozone by the end of the year, or at least an agreement to that effect. As I’ve noted before, the proposal comes with merits, but for better or worse, could be very significant for the UK if taking to its logical conclusion (resolution fund, deposit guarantee scheme, super-harmonised regulation), with the risk of fragmentation of the single market (as UK itself cannot take part). But this will take a lot of fiddling to sort out.

What’s clear is that Germany has not moved on debt pooling, including eurobonds. The German government firmly denied suggestions this morning that anything had been agreed on this front. But the summit deal has caused a lot of bad blood within Germany. Apparently, Italy and Spain threatened to veto the €120bn growth package proposed by Hollande if Merkel didn’t give way (incidentally, given that these two countries were meant to be the chief beneficiaries of the ‘growth’ package, its a sign of how seriously – or not – people take this proposal). The episode has left Germany seriously frustrated and with a feeling of an ever increasing weight on its shoulders.

Paradoxically, this may have the effect of hardening German resistance to debt pooling in the eurozone. Yet again, the focus shifts to German domestic politics.

Why always me?

Another great picture on the back of last night's summit, h/t to talksport for the pic, although we couldn't resist adding our own touch....

A great way to run down a bailout fund?

Ahead of the summit today the proposals for the EFSF/ESM to start purchasing sovereign debt began rearing its muddled head again, with some indication that this is actually one of the few things that could be agreed at the summit. We hate to be party poopers but as we have already noted (at length) this is a confused idea and will likely provide little help relief to those countries embroiled in the eurozone crisis. Below we outline some of our key concerns with the plan:

• The capacity will be tested: this role was previously filled by the ECB. Markets know that the ECB can provide an unlimited backstop and will rarely test its resolve in keeping yields down. However the EFSF only has around €250bn left, while the ESM has a lending cap of €500bn (as we have shown though this will also not be fully operational for some time). In any case markets are likely to test the resolve of these funds, meaning they may spend more than is needed and may be less effective than the ECB was. 
• Will deplete the funds of the EFSF/ESM: further to the point above, the money in the bailout funds will be severely depleted reducing the capacity for them to fully backstop countries which may need full bailouts. Particularly a worry if Portugal needs a second bailout, Greece a third and Spain possibly a full one on top of its bank rescue package. 
• Subordination: if ESM purchases bonds other debt of the recipient countries will become junior. This increases market jitters. Would be less of a concern if these purchases solved any of the issues but they only simply delay them at best.
• Secondary market purchases: if the buying is on the secondary market, the benefit is limited in terms of countries actually being able to issue debt. Still rely on domestic markets and the sovereign-banking-loop in problem countries may become more entrenched. 
• Primary market purchases: if done in primary market, then this will be a direct transfer between countries and could lay the groundwork for debt pooling, something which could cause political outcries across northern Europe. 
• Risk transfer: holders of peripheral sovereign debt will likely see this as an opportunity to sell off their holdings at a higher than expected price, shifting risk to the eurozone level. 
• De facto Eurobonds: the funds will issue bonds to raise money to buy debt off struggling countries. Building on the two points above, this means that investors will sell national debt and buy European backed debt, again essentially creating a de facto European bond and debt union. 
• Conditions: must come with clear conditions otherwise could be self-defeating (removes incentive to reform). Furthermore, if, as is currently the case, countries must enter an adjustment programme to allow the EFSF/ESM to buy its bonds, there could be significant stigma attached (again reducing the benefit).  It could also mean other countries picking up the slack if a government does not properly implement its own fiscal policy (however, without a clear say on the spending programmes).

All in all then, a very mixed bag. At best this plan could provide some temporary relief to high yields but the side effects could be large and frankly these funds just aren’t big enough to fulfil this role (and their other roles) on a consistent basis. Besides, even if some time is bought they are still yet to outline to what end it would be used – better then to agree on this before starting to run down the one of the few backstops still in place to the eurozone crisis.

Are the rumours of a new(ish) eurozone backstop true?

The press have got very excited over suggestions from European leaders at the G20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, that they will activate the EFSF to buy eurozone government bonds from the secondary market in an attempt to reduce borrowing costs for Italy and Spain - a function which the fund has always had but has never been used (since the ECB has filled this role with its bond buying programme). Berlin has already moved to deny this, but there could be truth in it - not least because it's legally possible but also because we've seen over the past few weeks that the ECB has refused to buy bonds despite the persistent rise of Spanish borrowing costs. It has become increasingly clear that Spain cannot withstand these interest rates for long - something needs to  be done.

If true, this could prove a important change. Despite always being possible, bond buying from the EFSF has up until now only been theoretical. When it comes to the unenviable task of backstopping Spanish and Italian government debt, the ECB has now officially passed the buck to eurozone governments. Over the last two years, the ECB has effectively managed to manipulate government bond yields by buying a limited amount of government bonds – some tens of billions a month at its peak (although with mixed success). In August last year, for example, the mere willingness of the ECB to buy Italian government debt may have prevented a full-scale run on that country as political uncertainty ran wild. But there’s a key difference between the ECB and the EFSF – while the former has deep enough pockets to move markets, the EFSF’s lending capacity is inevitably limited, meaning that making it into a lender of last resort for a country the size of Spain (let alone Italy) could prove risky. The ECB could stand behind Spain and Italy with, at least in theory, the ability to massively expand its balance sheet and thereby quarantine these problem countries. But the EFSF only has €250bn left to lend – to top up its lending capacity, it will need to pass 17 hostile national parliaments, which ain’t gonna happen anytime soon.

This is to say that, if the buck has indeed been passed from ECB to the EFSF, then the Eurozone’s firewall just became a lot weaker - many have rightly previously questioned its capacity to purchase bonds and fund lending programmes to struggling countries simultaneously. Furthermore, the EFSF treaty states that secondary market intervention can only take place at the request of the recipient country and will come with some conditions (although probably not a full reform programme). Clearly this will come with significant stigma (once you go down the path of any external aid it is hard to return, as Spain is now finding out), while it is hard to imagine a country signing up to extra conditions just to manage its secondary bond market (especially since the ECB was previously doing this without any clear conditionality).

There are additional questions over what this means for the permanent eurozone bailout fund, the ESM, which is meant to be up and running this summer. Presumably, it will have to take over this bond buying role once it comes into force. The same problems apply here as do with the EFSF, but the ESM is also senior to other debt, meaning that as it buys up debt of a country other holders of this country's debt become subordinated - this can result in further market uncertainty making it counter productive. Ultimately, if the ESM is to serve as a lender of last resort in any way, it almost has to be equipped with a banking license in order to allow it to lend and borrow freely, without being hostage to national parliamentary politics or very limited in size. Giving the ESM a banking license is a hot potato in Germany, but will Berlin have any choice if the markets start to question the firepower of the fund?

On the current path, presenting the EFSF/ ESM as lender of last resort – for Spain in particular – but without equipping it with the cash to actually allow it to fulfil this function, could set the stage for a showdown between markets and the funds - in that scenario we can only see one winner.

Italy’s Five Star movement isn’t funny for Monti

We've got a piece in City AM today, looking at the potential spillover from Spain to Italy, particularly in light of the increasingly worrying political situation there. By all accounts it seems that technocratic Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti has slightly lost touch with domestic issues in search of a grand eurozone solution.

See below for the full piece:

SPAIN’S €100bn bailout plan has failed to reassure markets. The permanent fear of contagion means nervous glances are once again being directed at Italy. Austria’s Finance Minister Maria Fekter was the first political leader to claim that Italy may have to tap into the Eurozone’s rescue funds – a statement which did not go down well in Rome.

Since entering office last November, Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Monti, and his cabinet of technocrats, have done more to reform the country’s stagnating economy than almost any previous government over the last few decades.

However, Monti has recently become more concerned with convincing Germany and others to go ahead with grand plans for a political union in the Eurozone – Eurobonds and a banking union – than completing crucial domestic reforms. Worryingly, the pace of reform has slowed down, even though there are no shortage of items on the Italian government’s to-do list – including plans to increase labour market flexibility in the public sector, a comprehensive anti-corruption bill and, ideally, a new electoral law to be adopted ahead of the next general elections in 2013.

There’s a lesson here: the loss of momentum in Italy’s reform programme perfectly summarises why, beyond the pro-integration rhetoric, Germany remains so wary of a political union in which Berlin joins liabilities with Athens, Madrid or Rome – from Eurobonds to a single bank resolution fund. From the government to the media, Germans are simply too concerned that Club Med countries would see risk-pooling in the Eurozone as an excuse to delay the necessary reforms and give in to the temptation to fund growth via more debt – which is what put them in the current mess.

But there’s another reason why Monti should focus more of his attention on the home front. Recent polls show that support for the Italian Prime Minister is at its lowest since he took office, and the political parties that back him in parliament are also struggling. Voters have had their heads turned by a rather unlikely alternative – the so-called Five Star movement, led by the comedian Beppe Grillo.

A political maverick, Grillo has mainly been campaigning for a clean-up of Italian politics. But he has also suggested that Italy should consider dropping the euro while still remaining a member of the EU, and write off at least part of its gigantic public debt. Despite having very little cash to fund its campaign, the Five Star movement did incredibly well in the latest mayoral elections, and is polling at 20 per cent – leading Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party by several percentage points.

Instead of planning new grand European projects, Monti should re-focus his attention on the domestic reform programme. This is not the time to have your head in the EU clouds. As the rise of Beppe the comedian illustrates, public support for the euro in Italy can no longer be taken for granted.

Do not adjust your television set, this is not a Spanish rescue (despite looking an awful lot like one...)

Well, that was the line that Spanish Economy Minister Luis de Guindos was spinning yesterday. Sorry Luis, this is essentially a Spanish rescue - external funding sources filling a gap which the state can't (check), monitoring of a large chunk of the economy (check), involvement of all the big international organisations (check - EU, IMF, ECB etc.), the list goes on.

Meanwhile, the oft absent Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy held a press conference today, declaring the package a 'victory' for the euro and stating that if it were not for the current government's reforms it would have been a full bailout package. If this is a victory (finally dealing with a glaring problem after four years) then we don't want to see a defeat, but at least Rajoy made a public appearance this time. That said, in the midst of the worst crisis his country has faced since the financial crisis hit, Rajoy is now jetting off Poland to watch Spain vs. Italy (a mouth watering prospect admittedly but his timing could take some work), while the likes of the Education Minister are heading to Roland Garros to watch Rafael Nadal - the Spanish government not quite in crisis mode then, we're not sure if that should inspire confidence or not...

In any case, as we predicted over two months ago, European assistance to help Spain deal with its banks is now official, so what does this rescue mean for Spain and the eurozone, below we outline some of the key points and our take:

The plan
Spain will access a loan from the EFSF/ESM (the eurozone bailout funds) which it will use to recapitalise its ailing banking sector. The money will be channelled through the FROB (the bank restructuring fund) but will still be a state liability (it will not go directly to the banks). However, unlike the other bailouts it will not come with fiscal conditions but only conditions for reforming the financial sector.

Open Europe take:
Firstly, the ESM will not be in place in time to provide the loan (the treaty is yet to be ratified by numerous countries and has faced many delays) so at least initially it will come from the EFSF. As others have pointed out, this is important because ESM loans are senior to other types of Spanish debt while EFSF loans are not. This may make things easier to start with (as it removes the threat of legal challenges based on clauses in other Spanish sovereign debt which could be triggered if it suddenly became junior), however, Finland has already raised concerns over its exposure and role in the rescue - an issue we tackle in more detail below.

The lack of additional fiscal conditions is fair given that Spain is already subject to a deficit reduction programme and that this is ultimately a financial sector problem. There are questions over conditionality and moral hazard though - we would like to see bank bondholders and shareholders sharing more of the burden (bail-ins) to ensure the necessary reforms take place. As things stand its hard to see how the banks will 'pay' for this capital, particularly given the Spanish regulators previous failures (during and after the property bubble).

De Guindos confirmed that the funds would be counted as Spanish debt, so Spanish debt to GDP could be about to jump by 10% in the near future and given its current path this could put Spain over 90% debt to GDP (the level beyond which sustainability becomes questionable) much sooner than had been anticipated. This will require adjustments in its reform programme and lead to increasing market pressure.
 
Size - is it enough?
This is the key question - the total amount has been put at "up to" €100bn. That is much higher than was suggested by the IMF assessment released on Friday night, which suggested €40bn.

Open Europe take:
It sounds like a big number, but upon closer inspection it may not stretch as far as many expect. Consider that Bankia requires €19bn, while three other very troubled cajas need around €30bn (Banco de Valecia, Novagalicia and Catalunya Caixa) meaning half the money could already be eaten up, leaving only €50bn for the rest of the huge banking sector.

This compares to around €140bn in doubtful loans, and a total €400bn exposure to the bust real estate and construction sector. Doubtful loans to this sector total around €80bn currently, but we expect house prices to fall by a further 35%, broadly meaning that the number of doubtful loans could easily double. On top of this we have further losses on mortgage loans as well as losses on other corporate debt and a decrease in the value of Spanish debt held by banks. So huge number of issues - putting a clear figure on it is difficult due to the difference between tier one capital and 'loss provisions' (tier two capital). But even if this €50bn is given in tier one capital and stretched to increase provisions its hard to see that it will be enough given the huge exposure to mortgages and the bust sectors, especially at a time when growth is falling further and unemployment continues to rise.

Finland and Ireland - flies in the ointment?
If the EFSF is used (which looks likely) the Finnish government is obliged to ask for 'collateral' as it did with Greece - the noises coming out of Finland suggest it will, especially given its objection to 'small' countries bailing out 'larger' ones. Ireland has also suggested that if Spain is able to avoid fiscal conditions on its bank bailout then it could request similar treatment (i.e. a loosening of 'austerity').

Open Europe take:
The Finland issue will get messy, as it did in Greece. It will add another complex layer to negotiations, while politically it will help the (True) Finns who are already launching a campaign against further bailouts. It could also lead to legal challenges - as we pointed out with Greece, it could trigger 'negative pledge' clauses on Spanish bonds given that they essentially become subordinated to Finland's claim on Spain. Not guaranteed, but a legal grey area which adds to the confusion.

As for Ireland, they have a fairly strong case here. Ultimately, their fiscal troubles stemmed from bailing out their banks, something Spain is now able to dodge thanks to external help. Ireland already feels that it is paying a huge price for protecting the European banking system - this will only add to this ill feeling. Given Ireland's perceived 'success' in Germany some flexibility may be forthcoming but we doubt enough to assuage Irish anger.

Impact on the UK?
The IMF will only play a 'monitoring' role, meaning the UK will not be liable for the money provided to Spain. However, given the links between the UK and Spanish banking systems it is imperative that the problems in the Spanish financial sector are finally dealt with - whether that will happen this time around is yet to be seen but given the points above it is not off to a great start.

Impact on the eurozone - Open Europe concluding remarks:
Markets responded positively to rumours of external aid for Spain on Friday afternoon, but, given the points above, a huge amount of uncertainty remains which will keep markets jittery and increase pressure on the eurozone. That is far from needed given the uncertainty surrounding the Greek elections. Given the ongoing assessment of the actual needs of Spanish banks the rescue will now enter a state of limbo as attention turns back to Greece, in the meantime Spain is likely to find it difficult to access the market (since this is broadly an admission it cannot raise any substantial funds itself).

Questions will also arise over the strength of the eurozone bailout funds - Spain guarantees around 12% of them, surely its guarantees are now worthless or would do more harm than good. Additionally, now that one of the larger countries has asked for support pressure will intensify on Italy (particularly with the falling support for the technocratic government and the slow pace of reform).

Spain races against time

Things are looking sticky in Spain.

Firstly, the Spanish government announced a bail out of Bankia to the tune of €19bn in addition to the €4.5bn already put in - and is currently looking at the least painful way of getting cash to the bank. The plan is still up in the air. Yesterday there was talk about swopping government bonds for shares in the bank (Bankia could then use the bonds as collateral to get more cash from the ECB). This made a lot of people nervous, not least the Germans, who already worry that the link between states and ECB funding, via banks, is getting a bit too strong. Today's talk has instead focused on issuing bonds from Spain's specific bank bailout fund, FROB, to raise the cash Bankia needs.

Secondly, Catalonia - Spain’s wealthiest region - has asked the central government for financial assistance to repay its €13bn debt; bad news for the central government's debt and deficit. Thirdly, the the spread between Spain and Germany’s ten-year bonds reached its highest level since the introduction of the euro, with Spanish ten year bonds currently at around 6.4%.

There are a huge number of issues on the table here, but these events highlight three things that we pointed to in our April 3 briefing on Spain:

• Despite Spanish PM Rajoy's remarks to the contrary, it looks increasingly as if Spain is slowly realising that it may not be able to afford to directly fund Bankia or other banks that run out of cash. And the numbers could well go up. This, in combination with talks and leaks over recent days that European money will be needed to backstop the Spanish banking system (Rajoy is very keen on more from the ECB), indicates that Spain is now moving ever closer to bank bailout via the EFSF.

• A huge battle looms over the finances and economic autonomy of Spanish regions, that remain a massive liability for the central government's attempt to cut its debt and deficits.

• Spain is racing against the clock. Naturally it will take time for the structural reforms that Spain is pursuing to have an impact - time that markets just won't give it at the moment.

Instead, it looks as though that time may soon have to be bought by eurozone taxpayers.

Is the ECB trying to push Greece out of the euro? We’re not so sure…

A story seems to have taken hold today that suggests the ECB may be indirectly trying to push Greece out of the euro by reducing its liquidity support to its banks which, the theory goes, would threaten a banking collapse and cause Greece to leave the euro in order to use its own central bank to support its banks. This seems par for the course with many of the headlines doing the round at the moment, but after some further inspection we're not certain that any decrease can really be seen as the ECB trying to force Greece out. 

The story started from an overnight report from Dutch daily Het Financieele Dagblad which claimed that, according to unnamed central bank sources, the ECB is winding down its lending to Greek banks due to concerns over their capital levels. According to the article the liquidity provision from the ECB to Greek banks has dropped by almost half since they last publicly recorded level of €73bn in January.

Now, the report could be accurate but there are some caveats here which need to be noted.

First, ECB lending to Greece was always going to fall post restructuring.

Most of the €73bn borrowing by Greek banks from the ECB uses Greek bonds as collateral, when these were written down by over half, the banks were always going to have much fewer assets to post as collateral. This problem has also been exacerbated by the fall in the value of the new Greek bonds, which would have ensured that they were subject to huge haircuts in value at the ECB’s liquidity operations.

So, the Greek banks would probably have always had to cut their borrowing from the ECB simple due to collateral constraints.

The slack will naturally be taken up by the ‘Emergency Liquidity Assistance’ ( ELA, provided by the Greek Central bank under less stringent capital requirements, see here for a full discussion) resulting in a decrease in the level of lending by the ECB directly to Greek banks. Some lending would have been maintained by the €35bn in guarantees which the EFSF provided to help insulate the ECB against additional risk. However, these fall far short of covering the entire €73bn borrowing by Greek banks from the ECB (against which they would have needed to post around €100bn in collateral due to the large haircuts which the ECB applies).

One of the motivations for the ECB's supposed reduction in lending is the slow progress in the bank recapitalisation. This could well be true, however, the fact is that without this new capital the banks will continue to be short of collateral to use at the ECB, meaning lending must take place under the ELA in the interim.

Lastly, the size of the balance sheets which Greek banks need to service would also have been reduced by the restructuring meaning they may need less liquidity than before.

In summary, a fairly large decrease in ECB lending to Greek banks would have been expected in the aftermath of the restructuring, even if it were just moved onto the ELA. It could in fact have been motivated by constraints on the banks themselves rather than the ECB.

Now, that’s not to say that the ECB is not annoyed by the lack of progress in the Greek bank recapitalisation but we all know that the correlation of these events does not mean causation. Things will be clearer when the full figures are released, but until then we’d be very wary of suggestions that the ECB is trying to force Greece out the euro, it’s not like the eurozone is short of dramatic headlines anyway.

The beginning of the end game in Greece?

At some point you have to wonder if Greece just enjoys the limelight…

This weekend’s election was expected to be relatively predictable with the largest parties forming a coalition and eventually adhering to the latest EU/IMF bailout package. Most eyes were on the French Presidential election and its impact on the Franco-German axis. Unfortunately, as we predicted, there were still a few surprises in store in Greece. Here’s the (almost) final result:

New Democracy – (18.86%) 108 seats

SYRIZA – (16.77%) 52 seats

Pasok – (13.18%) 41 seats

Independent Greeks – (10.6%) 33 seats

KKE (Communist party) – (8.48%) 26 seats

Golden Dawn (far-right) – (6.97%) 21 seats

Democratic Left – (6.1%) 19 seats

The biggest surprise is clearly the huge rise in SYRIZA’s share of the vote and the drastic fall in Pasok’s share.

In our post in the run up to the elections we laid out three scenarios: a stable ND-Pasok coalition, an unstable coalition leading to new elections where ND win a majority and an unstable coalition which falls leading to a cycle of elections where no-one can win a clear mandate. Those three scenarios clearly still hold, but the probabilities have definitely changed. Previously, the likelihood ran in order, however, now the second and third scenarios are looking increasingly probable.

ND and Pasok only hold 149 seats, short of the 151 majority they need. The Democratic Left has ruled out joining a three-way coalition. This makes new elections (probably in June) essentially inevitable as there is no stable coalition to be formed.

However, given the showing in the elections it is hard to imagine ND, or any party, gaining a clear majority. Given the strength of the anti-austerity feeling in Greece it is unlikely that these results would be a one-off. The anti-austerity parties only look likely to gain ground in subsequent elections, making a stable coalition less likely. This analysis suggests that a cycle of elections looks increasingly probable in Greece.

What does all this mean for the eurozone?

More uncertainty, that’s for sure. Germany and the EU have already both come out to reiterate the need for Greece to maintain its commitment to the latest bailout packages, stress that keeping Greece in the euro requires strong participation from both sides (rather ominous if you ask us).

Unfortunately, this looks unlikely, even if by some miracle ND and Pasok manage to form a workable coalition at some point. ND leader Antonis Samaras has already come out saying that he will “modify the memorandum [of understanding]” with Greece’s creditors to focus on growth. This can probably be seen as the start of his next election campaign but will still send shivers down the spines of German politicians.

A renegotiation of some form looks on the cards and will not be well received. Samaras would still be the EU’s preference given his history of strong rhetoric but then still signing up to the bailout programme. The alternatives are not appealing from eurozone leaders’ perspective: either there is a cycle of elections leaving no government in place to implement the reforms or the anti-austerity feeling grows so strong that a SYRIZA led government of some form comes to power, signalling the end of the bailout programme for good.

There is a confluence of factors here which increases the prospect of a Greek exit from the eurozone. The broader feeling in Greece although still in favour of the euro is shifting strongly against austerity – how this tension will play out is unclear but the usual fall-back of broad public support for the eurozone looks shakier than it has ever been.

Since the last round of poisonous bailout negotiations the eurozone and financial markets have been preparing for a Greek exit, if not publicly than definitely behind the scenes. The stance against any renegotiation and flexibility on reforms has hardened from eurozone leaders. Furthermore, Greece is approaching a primary surplus, the point where an exit and a full default look slightly more attractive as the country could (at least in theory) survive without access to financial markets or direct support.

Greece’s future will not be decided in the next few days but the coming weeks and months could well settle its place in the eurozone once and for all. This election may not provide many answers, as we expected, but it could mark the beginning of the end game in Greece.

Greek elections unlikely to yield any answers

The Greek elections are almost upon us. Much of the attention (including ours) has been focused on the French election, possibly rightly given the potential impact on the Franco-German axis and the austerity approach to the eurozone crisis. The lack of attention may be down to Greece-fatigue following the intense start to the year with the Greek restructuring, or the fact that with a bailout and strict programme in place the room for flexibility with the new government is severely limited. That said, the Greek elections have the potential to be almost as important.

Despite the well documented rise of fringe parties and the strong talk from New Democracy (ND), a coalition between Pasok and ND looks to be the most likely outcome. Combined the parties may gain around 35% - 40% of the vote. The largest party (likely to be ND) gets an extra 50 seats under Greek electoral rules, meaning that the coalition would be the largest combined group in the Parliament and may just scrape a majority. This position will be aided by the fact that all the other parties are fairly disparate and unlikely to form any cohesive opposition.

However, even if this coalition is formed there numerous ways in which it could play out:

1)      Stable coalition – ND and Pasok manage to gain and hold a majority in the Parliament. They set about attempting to implement the EU/IMF bailout package. May be some talk of renegotiating elements of the package, particularly to boost growth. If anyone is to have success on this front it would be this coalition as it has at least some experience and knowledge of negotiating with EU/IMF.

Impact on the eurozone: This added stability would likely be positive for markets and the eurozone in the short term. Ultimately, it will not make much difference since Greek debt still looks unsustainable and implementing the necessary reforms will be a massive challenge on the ground even if they are pushed through parliament. There is less chance of external financing being cut off anytime soon, since the government will at least try to adhere to the programme.

2)      Coalition breaks up, new elections where ND wins a majority – The coalition fails to gain a full majority in Parliament (possibly due to Pasok defections after the deal is struck) or fails after a very short time due to lack of cohesion between parties (especially if ND leader Antonis Samaras feels he could gain a full majority in new elections). Elections delay implementation of EU/IMF package but once ND government comes into power the implementation continues, although calls for growth policies will grow louder.

Impact on the eurozone: Ultimately, depends on how long the coalition lasts and the policies which ND uses in the new election to gain a majority (potentially shift further right if there is growing disillusionment with the EU/IMF austerity).  ND unlikely to push for euro exit or full renegotiation of EU/IMF package so that adds certainty, but the inherent problems with the package (mentioned above and covered in detail here) still hold true. The turnover between elections could be important. Any delay in implementing the package will not go down well with the EU or IMF and could reduce its effectiveness even further.

3)      Coalition breaks up, new elections fail to deliver suitable replacement leading to an election cycle – Coalition breaks down as mentioned above, but this time the new elections fail to deliver a clear winner, possibly with an even greater move towards the far left and far right parties. This would likely trigger a series of unstable coalitions and probably more elections. Once this cycle has begun it will be hard to break, particularly with Greece’s economic situation seemingly only getting worse.  

Impact on the eurozone: This would be the worst of all outcomes. The EU/IMF package would fall by the wayside due to lack of willingness or a government to implement it. If a cycle of elections does take hold it could feed anti-euro sentiment, although anger has, for now, been largely directed at the austerity bailout rather than euro membership more generally. This would eventually result in funding being cut off and Greece probably having to exit the eurozone. This is unless such a threat galvanises the population to vote a single party supporting the euro into power.

Overall, a ND-Pasok coalition looks likely but it will probably be far from stable. It is definitely hard to see it serving a full term. The most likely outcomes (1 and 2 above) may deliver some short term certainty but problems loom large for Greece over the medium to long term. The EU/IMF package still looks unachievable for Greece and will not solve its debt sustainability problems, while there is surely a tipping point where the Greek population withdraws its support for the euro more. At the moment this is still some way off. These elections will certainly not deliver a definitive answer to long term issues in Greece and there is still a chance that an uncertain outcome could worsen Greece’s situation.

S&P compounds a bad week for Spain all round

It's been a tough week in Madrid and Barcelona with the economic problems rivalling even the footballing troubles for coverage.

At the start of the month we highlighted the significant risks still in play in the Spanish banking sector and some of the wider policy issues in Spain. Echoing the conclusions in our briefing, over the past few weeks the calls for Spain to address these issues have grown louder while markets have grown increasingly jittery.

However, the pressure has noticeably picked up this week. The obvious example is last night’s decision by S&P to downgrade Spain to BBB+. This hasn’t had a huge impact on the markets, given that it was mostly expected and priced in, but the reasons behind the downgrade are nonetheless interesting and align with some similar points which we highlighted in our briefing:

- The on-going problems in the banking sector mean that a new injection of public money may well be needed at some point – which would significantly worsen Spanish debt sustainability and the ability of the government to meet deficit targets
- The continuing growth challenges and competitiveness problems in Spain
- Although encouraging the structural reforms will take some time before they boost economic growth
- In the short term these structural reforms could actually increase unemployment (supported by today’s figures which show unemployment increase by 1.5% over the past three months) 

S&P also went on to criticise the wider handling of the crisis at the eurozone level and the continued failure of eurozone leaders to address the true cause of the crisis (something which we’ve mentioned countless times throughout the crisis).

On top of this move, the IMF also warned earlier this week that some of the smaller Spanish banks could need public money to boost their capital ratios and/or provisions against losses on exposure to the bust real estate and construction sectors. In our report we suggested that, given deteriorating economic conditions and falling house prices, the banking sector as a whole may need to double its provisions against souring loans. Goldman Sachs recently made a similar estimate, suggesting that a further €58bn may be needed on top of the current provisions of €54bn.

If this does happen, the question remains over whether it will be done with Spanish or European funds. Despite the clear limits on the amounts available to the Spanish government the stigma attached to asking for even a precautionary loan from the EFSF/ESM will make it a last resort. Not to mention the fact that, since it has to go through the state, any loan would increase the debt levels further.

Separately, in a move that doesn't inspire confidence the Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo today warned that the country faced a crisis of “massive proportions” and that “if it goes badly for us, it’ll go badly for others too”. Even worse, in a warning to Germany, he compared the eurozone to the Titanic, stating that when it went down the 1st class passengers went down with it before issuing the usual rallying cry for more growth. 

Despite increasing concerns a bailout for Spain is, as we have said before, not yet a foregone conclusion. But the government needs to begin making headway convincing the market of its commitment to cleaning up the banking sector and promoting growth, but obviously both are easier said than done. With election season seemingly upon us in Europe it could be a long few months in Spain which could make or break the eurozone.

Should the UK contribute to the IMF?

George Osborne is in Washington DC today for an IMF meeting. In another one of those ‘domestic politics meet financial crisis’, Osborne is under pressure from his MPs not to contribute any more cash to the IMF unless there are guarantees that the money won’t be used, as the popular phrase is in Westminster goes, to “bail out a currency” (and no, we’re not talking about the Yen). There are a whole range of confusions surrounding this entire debate, so here’s an effort to clear them up:

Where are we at?

The UK can provide £10bn without a vote in Parliament, as this cash goes back to a previous commitment. For anything more, it needs approval from its MPs, which could be sticky (see below). Osborne has so far refused to contribute the £10bn, let alone even more, until certain conditions have been met.

Is contributing to the IMF the same as giving to, say, the EFSF (the euro bailout fund)?

Certainly not. The IMF is (a) a serious organisation that has saved many countries including the UK (b) its loans rank senior to other debts and so are always repaid (c) nobody has ever lost a cent on the IMF and (d) this would actually be an opportunity to modernise a 1948 organisation by giving the BRICs a more proportionate say in return for fresh capital (if you want to keep the IMF relevant, this is inevitable).

Are Tory MPs really that opposed?

There’s been a lot of shouting to the press over this issue, but the feeling is that most Tory MPs realise that contributing to the IMF could be a sensible move provided that certain conditions are fulfilled.

So what conditions need to be fulfilled for the UK to contribute?

The UK government has set out two: the top-up needs to be global (all countries contributing not only EU ones) and the money can’t be used specifically to bail out the euro.

We would add that there also needs to be a change in tact. As we told BBC five live this morning, “The main problem is that the eurozone’s approach to the crisis hasn’t changed, despite widespread criticism including from the IMF, it still fails to address the underlying problems: the lack of growth, the lack of competitiveness in the peripheral countries and the massive risks still held by the under capitalised European banking sector. Any further contributions should be conditional on a change in tack and some acceptance that this bailout and austerity policy has failed.”

What is likely to happen?

At the moment it looks as if the IMF will reach its target of $400bn, possibly even without funds from the UK, US and Canada. The two latter countries look unlikely to contribute additional funds, so the prospect for additional contributions from the full membership looks dim.

The question is, what will the IMF need to give in return? A rebalancing of power towards emerging market members is inevitable and the BRICs are pushing for it to start in exchange for funds this time around. That means there are plenty of complex negotiations still to take place. A broad political agreement may be in place by the end of the weekend, but there will be plenty of legal and technical details to be fleshed out.

Will the increase change anything?

Not really. Ultimately dispersal of IMF funds in the eurozone crisis is reliant on similar provisions from the eurozone bailout funds. So far the format has been 2/3 eurozone and 1/3 IMF. As we have previously noted, despite EU claims, the lending capacity of the eurozone bailout funds remains €500bn. This means the maximum which will likely be able to be tapped from the IMF is €250bn (although it is incredibly doubtful the IMF would ever put up that much unless the eurozone were teetering on the brink). As is often the case, the issue of IMF funds is tinkering at the edges of the crisis, eurozone leaders still fail to address the underlying problems of the crisis or even put up a sizeable bailout fund of their own.

Should the UK contribute then?

Well, first the government should wait and see if the $400bn target can be met without a UK contribution. If that is the case all the better. If not, and if all the BRICs have contributed, the UK may need to put up its £10bn (which has already been approved by Parliament). Obviously, as we have noted the usual caveats and conditions should apply and the UK along with the IMF should continue to push for a reformed approach to the crisis.