Rien à voir ici? Hollande says treaty change is "not the priority" for France, but...

David Cameron and François Hollande have just held their joint press conference following the Anglo-French defence summit in Oxfordshire. Predictably, though, most of the questions focused instead on Cameron's EU renegotiation strategy and the prospects of it being achieved by changes to the EU treaties.

Here's what stood out for us:

• Significantly, Cameron explicitly said that renegotiation of the UK's EU membership "will involve elements of treaty change". This is quite a rare admission, and is the most explicit he's been so far on the need to change the EU treaties. As The Times's Sam Coates flagged up, the Prime Minister has been categorical about EU treaty change once before, speaking of "the treaty change that I’ll be putting in place before the referendum", on the Andrew Marr Show earlier this year - although the question was specifically on EU migrants' access to benefits. 

• The Prime Minister also reiterated that "the eurozone needs change...It needs greater co-ordination, it needs those elements that make a single currency succeed. That's why in recent years we've already seen treaty changes."

• Hollande said that "France wants more coordination and integration in the eurozone", but treaty change "is not the priority" for the time being. Though this is what the headlines are likely to focus on, this is nothing new, nor surprising. It's been the French position for ages. However, Hollande didn't rule treaty change out. He said it wasn't "urgent" or "the priority". As we have argued from the beginning (see here, for instance), the timetable remains a weakness in Cameron's plan - not least because discussions on changing the EU treaties can drag on for years and the eurozone remains on an uncertain development path.

• The French President also stressed that major treaty changes (he mentioned the Maastricht Treaty as an example) would have to be put to a referendum in France - while for smaller ones parliamentary approval would be enough.

A couple of points are worth making. It is no secret that one of the reasons France is wary of changing the EU treaties is that referenda are not exactly easy to win (think of the one on the EU Constitution in 2005, but also the one on the Maastricht Treaty, both of which split the country and the political establishment).

This is true assuming that the new Treaty gives the EU more powers. But this is not what Cameron is aiming for. So it is not entirely clear that any UK-led changes would necessarily have to be put to a vote in France.

That said, though, the common wisdom on this point is that an EU treaty change would be part of a 'grand bargain' to strengthen economic coordination in the eurozone - meaning that the UK's new relationship with the EU would be negotiated alongside greater central controls in the euro area. This type of treaty change could clearly trigger a referendum in France (and elsewhere).

The question remains open. With Germany likely to keep pushing for an EU treaty change to complete the overhaul of the eurozone structures, we still think Hollande may have to face the issue sooner rather than later - with the question being what deal Berlin can broker.

And yet again, that brings us back to Angela Merkel.

BAE/EADS deal collapse shows national interests still rule when it comes to defence

A lot of people on both sides of the Europe debate got very excited last month about the ‘Future of Europe’ report produced by a group of EU Foreign Ministers chaired by Germany’s Guido Westerwelle. The report was certainly controversial, not least for suggesting “more majority decisions in the Common Security and Defence Policy sphere… and in the longer-term a European defence policy which for some members could eventually involve a European army.”

As we argued after the report was published:

“There is significant momentum for more integration in economic, fiscal and banking affairs, but its hugely unlikely to spill over into foreign policy which exists in a parallel political sphere… The context for this whole initiative is effectively German domestic politics… For Merkel this serves as a useful exercise at a time when the German government is über-sensitive to accusations that it is not sufficiently ‘pro-European’ - but without actually having to do anything."

This interpretation has arguably been supported by Merkel’s actions over the BAE/EADS merger, when she pulled the plug on the deal. As the Guardian reported:

“Sources close to the deal said that the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, had emerged as the most significant obstacle to an ambitious transaction that would have created an industrial behemoth with 220,000 employees worldwide, making products from nuclear submarines and Typhoon fighter jets to the A380 superjumbo.”

“Speaking before the deal was officially terminated, the source said: "The fundamental problem is that Merkel does not feel comfortable with the deal, full stop. The source added that the German leader appeared to have deep concerns over the notion of merging a civil aerospace manufacturer with a defence group.”

So national interest considerations when it comes to defence are not dead yet it appears… even in Germany.

Poland and EU defence: Having your Pączek and eating it

Speaking to the Polish Parliament yesterday, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski pointed the finger at the UK for not pulling its weight in the domain of European defence, claiming that he was "disappointed" that the UK did not want to build up joint EU defence capabilities, and that those member states that wanted to ought to use the ‘enhanced co-operation’ clause in the Lisbon Treaty to go ahead without it.

Sikorski set out a slightly distopian vision of the future in which:

"Tired by parsimony on defence budgets and Europe's general inefficiency, the US leaves Nato. The post-Western vacuum is filled by Russia in the east and by China in Asia. Transformational crises continue in the Arab world [but] Europe no longer sets a good example. And where is Poland in this black vision? Left to its own devices, on the periphery of a Europe mired in lethargy. Struggling with unfinished modernisation and deprived of a solid basis for national security."

However, actions speak larger than words, and it worth pointing out that Poland’s record on defence spending falls short of Sikorski’s rhetoric; 1.9% of GDP - below the 2% recommended minimum set by NATO. Moreover, when offered an opportunity to cooperate with other European and NATO countries in last years’ Libyan operation it decided to not to get involved, despite being pressed to do so by NATO leaders (although the government did volunteer logistical support).

Sikorski is however right about one thing – Europe’s unwillingness to shoulder the burden of its own defence. The Libyan operation exposed this on a grand scale; although on paper it was an impressive show of European (and non European) cooperation, with states such as France, the UK, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden all sending planes to enforce to no-fly zone. Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Spain and Turkey also helped to some extent and Estonia and Croatian said they would also help if need be, but Poland and Germany did not help and Cyprus was actively opposed.

Furthermore, the operation exposed Europe’s continued reliance on the US. France and the UK were for instance unable to operate independently, having to rely on US command and control, logistics and assets, with the strains on their forces quickly exposed.

So why has Sikorski decided to attack the UK for preventing the EU having a larger role in defence? Most likely it is a form of political displacement activity: Sikorski knows EU defence budgets are under pressure and there is no real prospect of EU states increasing their capabilities. He knows this structural problem would not be alleviated by more EU structures or headquarters duplicating those that already exist in NATO, but by blaming Europe’s defence failings on the UK he is at least fuelling a debate over the future of Europe’s defensive structures.

In our view, if Poland and other European states want to be serious on defence (if they don't that's a national democratic choice which others have to accept) then they should actually stick to the 2% of GDP NATO minimum guideline. Ironically the only EU member states to comfortably exceed it at the moment (apart from the UK at 2.7%) is Greece (2.9%) – the one country that should cut its defence budget. The USA by contrast to the EU average of 1.7% spends a staggering 5.4% of its GDP on defence. EU countries should also reform their defence capabilities by investing in deployable modern forces. In the modern world cooperation will, as seen in Libya, be via variable alliances and groupings, in that the breath of NATO is indispensable. It is not only Poland that fears a defenceless Europe beholden to Russia, but if it is going to lead on this issue it will have to pulls its own weight first.

EU military HQ always going to be a non-starter for the UK

As if the EU hasn’t got enough on its plate, yesterday saw EU Foreign Minister Baroness Ashton present a proposal, at a meeting between EU foreign ministers, calling for the creation of an EU military headquarters (a so-called ‘Operations Headquarters’ OHQ). This comes despite the fact that the new External Action Service itself is barely even up and running. And despite the increasing number of voices that doubt that a single EU foreign policy is even possible.

According to the Sunday Times, Ashton wants the OHQ to “command and control” future European civilian and military campaigns. The idea has been knocking around since 2003, when it was rebuffed by the UK and the US, among others, but has been revived with the backing of France, Germany and Poland. French support for the measure goes back some time but it has always met with staunch opposition from the UK, which sees it as an unnecessary duplication of existing NATO arrangements.

Given that this is a decision that would require unanimity and that the UK is one of only two major EU military powers (France being the other), yesterday’s proposal seemed an unwise, direct challenge to the UK. The response from William Hague was expectedly unequivocal,

"There is no way we will agree to this, now or in the future...We won't be agreeing to a permanent operational headquarters and therefore we are not able to welcome today's report by Cathy Ashton, the High Representative, on this matter".

"We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning”

"Secondly, it's likely to be a much more costly solution than existing structures; and thirdly, a lot can be done by improving the structures that already exist"

This isn't simply a case of the UK 'not seeing the need' for a permanent EU military HQ, it is that it sees it as a potential threat to the UK's national interests. Britain will veto anything that looks like it might threaten NATO because, when it comes to defence, the transatlantic alliance remains paramount (and probably always will).

It is often said that the UK doesn't 'understand Europe' but this example illustrates that this also works the other way.

The Libyan conflict has shown that European countries can and need to work together when there is the political will to do so. However, like over Iraq, it has also shown that there are often fundamental disagreements on the use of military force among EU member states, this time with France and Britain on the one side and Germany on the other. If they are serious about defence, European governments need to boost their individual capabilities and improve interoperability on an ad hoc basis. EU mission creep is simply an unnecessary and potentially damaging distraction.

Caught between Ukraine and Majorca

EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton is absent from the meeting of EU defence ministers in Majorca today - the first to be held since the Lisbon Treaty came into force.

AFP reports that the defence ministers will be considering increased permanent structured co-operation, where several member states can move cooperation on common security and defence policy forward on their own under the terms of the Treaty, with the say-so of only a qualified majority of member states.

However, Lady Ashton has been double booked, and will instead attend the investiture ceremony of the new Ukranian President, missing discussions on how Lisbon will impact on defence cooperation. One EU diplomat said they has been really looking forward to hearing Ashton's views, "Especially as, thanks to the treaty, the opportunity is there to reinforce Europe's defence, to give it more visibility".

Another rather snippy EU diplomat also said, "Her predecessor Javier Solana didn't miss a single meeting of this type with the defence ministers. Something has changed in the order of priorities." Jean Quatremer describes Ashton's "empty-chair policy" as "all the more infuriating" because NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is to attend.

Spain, current holder of the EU Presidency, has made relaunching EU defence strategy one of its priorities of its six month term. The Spanish Defence Minister Carme Chacon has said that one of the issues defence ministers are working towards is "progress towards a European armed force; step by step, but that is our objective." She has that objective in common with Germany, whose Foreign Minister said earlier in the month that the creation of a European army should be the long term goal of common security and defence policy.

With various EU defence ministers dreaming of a European army, the US yesterday made more noises about Europe's unwillingness to contribute to NATO, with Defence Secretary Robert Gates saying that the "pacification of Europe" has gone too far and is "an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st [century]", and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for an "honest discussion" of European defence spending.

Ashton's decision to make a ceremonial visit to the Ukraine rather than discuss co-ordinated EU defence policy will not doubt be frustrating for the French and Germans, who have been talking about a Franco-German security policy driving EU defence, but is a telling reminder to the outside world of the EU's preference for pomp and ceremony over dealing with the challenges of the here and now. For one, the US' patience is clearly running out.

Whose side would a European army be on?

Following German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's speech at the weekend, announcing that the long term goal of EU security and defence policy under Lisbon should be the creation of a European army, the French Defence Minister Hervé Morin today made a rather different, but nonetheless important announcement.

He revealed that, after much um-ing and ah-ing, France is to sell one, and possibly as many as four, amphibious assault ships to Russia. The Economist's Charlemagne correspondent notes that after seeing one of these ships at St Petersburg in November 2009, Russian PM Vladimir Putin said on a visit to Paris: "I can assure you that if we purchase this armament, we will use it wherever deemed necessary." Similarly a senior Russian admiral declared that if such ships had been in the fleet in 2008, Russian forces would have overrun Georgia "within 40 minutes", rather than in 26 hours.

The WSJ notes that both the US and the eastern European members of NATO are not amused and it's certainly unlikely that France's decision will do anything to dispell the concerns in both the UK and the EU accession states that its vision for EU defence policy poses a threat to the transatlantic alliance.

Franco-British military cooperation is back in vogue within the MoD but actions like this highlight the fact that on crucial questions such as engagement with Russia, Iran's nuclear programme and other key foreign policy questions of the day - opinion in the EU is divergent, and that is not something that the Lisbon Treaty could, or did, magic away.

A blank cheque

While the Irish government continues to play down the EU's ambitions in defence policy in order to get the Lisbon Treaty safely passed, some telling comments have been forthcoming from other Europeans this week, which give us some insight into the kind of agenda that Lisbon will effectively authorise.

First there was the news that French Europe Minister Pierre Lellouche was in favour of a budget specifically dedicated to EU defence, just as there is one for agriculture:

He said that, "In order to progress with 'defence Europe', it should not be that spending linked to security is completely separate from the EU's financial perspectives. Why should three member states contribute to the equivalent of two thirds of the military spending of the 27?..We need to put these questions on the table, in the same way as agricultural policy, technological innovation, or the environment."

He also confirmed that the French Foreign Office was already working on the establishment of the EU Diplomatic Force, which should only come into effect if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, saying "In the Quai d'Orsay, we are already working on defining the nature, the scope, and the missions of this new service, in close relations with our partners."

We wonder if one of these partners was Ireland, seeing as they have not yet made a decision on whether or not they even want the Treaty yet? (or rather they have, but they're being given a second opportunity to make the 'right' choice).

And now we have the French Defence Minister Hervé Morin saying that he is "convinced" that the EU will have its own permament military headquarters in Brussels, and that it will not be possible to deploy tactical groupings of 1,500 soldiers without such a headquarters.

He suggested British reluctance is holding up progress towards this goal, but predicted that within "one, two or five years, we will end up with a command, planning and operations centre in Europe."

He also said he hoped that there would be "one day, a Council of European defence ministers" in Brussels, as there is for agirculture or foreign affairs ministers.

Of course, noone should really be surprised at this, given that the warning signs that France was chomping at the bit to move ahead with this have been there for a while. But this talk of actually creating an EU defence policy, funded from the EU budget, and with decisions taken by the Council of Ministers just as they decide on agricultural policy, is big news.

Meanwhile, the Polish government has announced this week that its top priority for its EU Presidency in the latter half of 2011 will be the development of a "European defence policy".

According to Coulisses de Bruxelles:

"Warsaw wants the EU to have a fleet of A400M military transport planes so it can independently carry out military operations outside Europe. The planes could be bought by a European Armaments Agency whose powers would be considerably strengthened. Poland is also proposing a deputy EU Foreign Minister in charge of security questions, and Warsaw wants the future EU Foreign Minister to take part in Nato meetings! One can only imagine the reaction of the Brits to such proposals, which will delight Paris to find in them a strong ally in the East."

The combination of all these statements is important. A dedicated EU defence budget, open to mistargeted spending and abuse on the same scale as the agriculture budget?

An unelected Deputy EU Foreign Minister as well as an unelected Foreign Minister and President Blair?

Presumably the feeling in Brussels is that once Lisbon is ratified, people can put forward all sorts of ideas for new jobs without bothering with any more pesky EU Treaties to authorise them. And allowing the Foreign Minister to take part in NATO meetings will no doubt be one of the inevitable consequences of allowing so much of the Foreign Minister role to go undefined in the Treaty. (He's going to look pretty out of place sitting there next to all the democratically-elected Foreign Ministers around the NATO table. Or maybe he'll eventually be sent instead and on behalf of EU ministers?)

On top of everything else, it is deeply worrying that these ideas are being discussed and touted behind the scenes, and the shape of the future of the EU's defence policy is being quietly nudged along in the Quai d'Orsay and other such locations, away from prying eyes.

Moving apace

Anyone who said that France was re-joining NATO's military structures with a view to setting up a single, EU military headquarters may well feel vindicated by the words of French Europe Minister Bruno Le Maire this afternoon.

He told a French radio station:

“While it may be a difficult objective, in time we will need to have a single military command for the European Union, a European staff headquarters which could be installed for example in Brussels, and which would allow us to command European operations wherever European security interests are at stake. Today there are three staff headquarters which do that: one in England, one in France, one in Germany. I think it would be more logical, more reasonable and also more economic for public money to have a single operational headquarters.”

He admitted it would be “very difficult” to convince Britain of the need for a single headquarters, which has for years blocked the creation of a proper permanent EU military headquarters, because of the risk of duplicating NATO structures. But, Mr. Le Maire said, with the return of France into the integrated military structures of NATO, “we can no longer be accused (…) of doing it against NATO because we are now fully in NATO.”

All over the place

The European Parliament has today voted to back this report from German MEP Karl von Wogau, which the Telegraph has described as a "blueprint charting a path to a European Union army."

And reading the report it is easy to see why. It says: "Common defence policy in Europe requires an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability". (See here for detailed analysis from Richard North)

A Conservative press release notes that 16 out of 19 Labour MEPs voted for the proposals, including their leader Glenis Willmott.

And yet it was only on Tuesday that Europe Minister Caroline Flint wrote to the Guardian shouting: "Let me be clear - there are no plans for a European army."

On neutrality

An article in the Irish Times over Christmas has reminded us of a series of interesting pieces that appeared in the paper in November from Dr Karen Devine, postdoctoral research fellow at Dublin City University.

The articles explore in detail the meaning, history and future of concepts of neutrality, and the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for Irish neutrality - concluding that:

Common defence can be interpreted as the EU term for collective defence. A neutral state cannot legally or politically sign up to this Article 28A(2) in the Lisbon Treaty because it confirms a definite, rather than a possible, intention to create a common/collective defence that involves going beyond military alliance commitments.

All four articles are worth a read (here, here, here), but the specific explanation of Lisbon's impact is as follows:

While the Government claimed military neutrality was not affected because of the clause in the Constitution prohibiting membership of a future EU military alliance, it is worth noting that academic analysts of the treaty, and the European Civil Society groups, concluded that the treaty's ESDP provisions would put an end to states' neutrality.

[...]

The primary "non-involvement in [other countries'] wars" element is compromised under article 28B, which places no limits on EU military missions. The concept of using force only in cases of self-defence is eliminated, as article 28B provides a capacity for pre-emptive action (as envisaged in the European Security Strategy).

Ireland may be associated with "high intensity" EU operations even if the state is not a participant.

"Non-aggression" and "peace promotion" values appear to be under threat, given that the neutrals' clauses proposed at the convention to limit the scope of EU military action and repudiate war were rejected.

The primacy of the UN and its peacekeeping is eliminated under article 28A(1), as EU missions do not require a UN mandate. The neutrals' proposals for EU missions to require a UN mandate were rejected.

The inter-related neutrality characteristics of "impartiality", "anti-big-power politics" and independent decision-making amid big-power pressure are compromised under articles 10 and 280E(2) that lift the ban on enhanced co-operation in the field of European Security and Defence Policy.

Article 28A(6) provides for permanent, structured co-operation in defence matters, and designates larger states to execute the "most demanding" military acts. Neutral state representatives argued that large state missions going ahead in the name of the EU in the face of objections from smaller states will have little credibility, as they would clearly show that there is no genuine common foreign policy.

These provisions, combined with article 15B/201a on Constructive Abstention, make unanimity as a decision-making rule a non sequitur, while articles 280B, 11(2-3) and 16b, also objected to by neutral states' representatives, eliminate abstaining states' independence in action.

The "anti-militarism" value is affected by article 28A(3) which commits member states to increased military spending and a common arms policy within the article 28D-supported European Defence Agency.

Finally, the military neutrality concept of non-membership of a military alliance is eliminated under the article 49c(7) mutual defence clause that effectively constitutes a new EU military alliance, and the article 188R solidarity clause.

Neutral states' representatives tried at first to eliminate these alliances, and thereafter, to make these clauses non-binding, but ultimately failed in both endeavours. The clause stating that the mutual defence guarantee will "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States" is so vague as to be devoid of any legal effect; opt-out protocols are the only way to avoid these obligations.

The conditions under which Ireland would join the EC common defence, as laid out by politicians in Dáil Éireann over the years - ie once the EC had evolved into "a genuine federation or confederation, with a common foreign policy" (Garret FitzGerald, May 11th, 1982), or once there was "co-decision of the European Parliament with the Council" to exercise adequate democratic controls over ESDP (Proinsias De Rossa, November 29th, 1991) - have not been met.

While ESDP structures and capabilities are sketched in the Lisbon Treaty, the circumstances under which they will be used and against whom would be decided in the future by the European Council; in the absence of any democratic controls, ESDP is a leap too far into the unknown for many voters. Compared with the neutral traditions of Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland that go back decades or centuries, and are part of people's national identities, ESDP is a very recent policy conceived by a handful of elites in the absence of a European identity that is seen as necessary for its acceptance, legitimacy and success.

Henry Kissinger once observed: "No foreign policy - no matter how ingenious - has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none."
His insight illustrates the problems faced by advocates of the Lisbon Treaty's Common Security and Defence Policy that overrides, rather than accommodates, the foreign policies of neutral states.

MoD predicts future chaos

The First Post has picked up on a Ministry of Defence Global Strategic Trends paper that looks ahead to 2037.

Their vision apparently includes lawless mega cities, neutron bombs and 'electromagnetic pulse weapons' with the power to destroy enemy communications systems in a potential 'world city'. They also speculate that young Europeans might vote for euthanasia to reduce the costs of ageing populations and that dictators might develop age reversing drugs so they can stay in power for ever. They also suggest that the middle classes might become the new revolutionaries in society taking the place of Marx's proletariat.

The answer to these scary scenarios? Unsurprisingly they suggest more surveillance and greater military force. Worth a read.