Out of the euro but run by the euro? The UK & ECB prepare to lock horns at the ECJ in what could be the most important case yet...

Could euro clearing be moved from the City to the eurozone?

Tomorrow will see the first hearing of the next in the line of important UK cases at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The case in question is the UK’s challenge against the ECB’s location policy – and it could be the most important of all the cases. The case is shrouded in technical detail but, fundamentally, is whether we're moving towards a two-tier single market and an EU run by the euro for the euro.

Background
On the 5 July 2011 the ECB published its Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework, which argued:

As a matter of principle, infrastructures that settle euro-denominated payment transactions should settle these transactions in central bank money and be legally incorporated in the euro area with full managerial and operational control and responsibility over all core functions for processing euro denominated transactions, exercised from within the euro area.

In that paper and future opinions the ECB has stressed that it will not provide central bank liquidity to clearing houses outside the eurozone but that all such institutions should have access to it.

The UK quickly challenged the policy in September 2011, calling for the ECB’s policies to be annulled, and has launched two further challenges at the ECJ, in which it updates its list of complaints, the key points of which are as follows:

• The ECB lacks powers in the specified areas, especially since it did not include the plans in a regulation to be adopted by the Council or by the ECB itself, simply decreed it in a policy paper and opinion.
• “De jure or de facto” the rules will impose a residence requirement on clearing houses which want to clear euros, meaning existing clearing houses will face a choice of moving within the eurozone or changing their business approach.
• The rules offend the principle of equality in the single market since firms incorporated in different EU member states will be viewed differently and the rules will not apply equally.
• There are less onerous methods for achieving the same goals (namely security of the financial system) cited by the ECB.

Why is this case so important?
The case manages to combine two crucially important issues:

1. The question of maintaining the EU single market and whether countries outside the eurozone will be dominated by those inside
2. How to ensure the safety, transparency and security of the modern financial system in Europe to avoid a similar crisis to one we have barely overcome

For the UK, there are additional concerns:

• Firstly, it will once again play a role in setting the boundaries of action the ECB and eurozone can take without the non-euro members. It will also create a clearer boundary on what powers the ECB has. 
• If the ruling goes against the UK, there would be a clear split in the single market and, the precedent set, will make it harder for the UK to stay in the EU
• It would raise further questions about whether the UK can trust the ECJ as a neutral arbiter.
• It would undermine the role of the City of London as a financial centre serving the eurozone (the City remains a trading hub for a single currency of which the UK cannot take part), meaning London could lose business to Paris and/or Frankfurt.

Does the ECB have a point?
From the financial stability perspective it is easy to have some sympathy with the ECB’s stance. More and more transactions are being directed on to exchanges and through central counterparties (clearing houses) therefore it makes sense for them to have access to sufficient liquidity. Then again, the LCH Clearnet clears products in 17 different currencies without the need for central banks backstops in all of them.

Given that, and the huge political stakes, one option would be to establish a permanent swap line between the ECB and the Bank of England (or all non-eurozone central banks). Such swap lines are well tested and were used extensively during the financial crisis. In exchange, the ECB would likely require some greater involvement in terms of supervision of institutions which may receive such cash. The easiest and most practical way to achieve this would be through the existing EU institutions such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

Needless to say, the UK also has a strong case since its hard to say this will not hamper the single market at the very least. In any case, whatever the outcome there will likely need to be changes made to accommodate a new structure, hence the repercussions of the ruling will be widely felt.

On what and how might the ECJ rule?
Trying to second guess the ECJ is a hazardous business. That said, this case is interesting because there are a few different elements which the ECJ could choose to rule on or not.

Whether the ECB has competence or not? The first relates to the UK’s first point of challenge regarding whether the ECB has competence in this area. While the ECB does have control of payment systems and gave an extensive legal grounding in its original policy paper its clear that this is a very political decision. Determining who has competence should be a fairly basic question which the ECJ can rule on.

Which has primacy - ECB policy or EMIR? That said, the matter is complicated by the recent European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). In the preamble point 47 and 52, as article 85 in the main text, all stress that there must be no “discrimination” with regards to where currencies can be cleared and that nothing should “restrict or impede” clearing houses based in other jurisdictions from clearing foreign currencies. As such, the ECJ may have determine who has primacy in this area, as currently it isn’t clear which set of rules should be adhered to (although given that euros are still being cleared in London one might de facto think EMIR is winning). If the ECJ is swayed by the non-discrimination provisions in EMIR, the UK Treasury should be given some credit for pre-empting the ruling - which Open Europe also has recommended.

Does the ECJ actually have anything to rule on? As with the Financial Transaction Tax decision, the ECJ has shown itself reluctant to rule on issues it sees as hypothetical. Given that the rules that the UK are challenging are actually not in place, the ECJ may rule that the challenge is somewhat premature. Obviously, the risk here is that this would be self-fulfilling and act as a catalyst for changes to happen. It would also leave many questions (not least those above) unanswered.

What happens next?
The oral hearing will take place tomorrow. After that the Advocate General will produce an opinion and a ruling will follow, both most likely in a few months’ time.

It’s possible the ECJ could rule on only part of the UK’s claims or support some and dismiss others. It will also be important to see what happens with regards to the primacy of a regulation over the ECB in this particular area which could itself be an important legal precedent (not least because the ECB is becoming increasingly powerful).

It's also still possible that this will be 'settled out of court', given the stakes involved and the risks of unintended consequences.

We'll watch this one closely.

ECJ rules against the UK in landmark short-selling case

The ECJ this morning rejected all the UK’s claims against the EU's short selling regulation. The result was surprising given that the Court's Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen issued an opinion supporting the UK’s position last September – court rulings often, but not always, follow these opinions.

The nub of the UK's complaint was that the new regulation transferred too much discretionary power to ESMA (the European Securities and Markets Authority) to ban short-selling over the heads of national regulators. And that the legal base for doing so in the EU treaties was unsatisfactory. The case could therefore set an important precedent.

The UK’s complaint as described by the court:

The United Kingdom contends, inter alia, that ESMA has been given a very large measure of discretion of a political nature which is at odds with EU principles relating to the delegation of powers. The United Kingdom also submits that Article 114 TFEU is not the correct legal basis for the adoption of the rules laid down in Article 28 of the regulation.

The full regulation and article 28 can be found here.

Here is what Jääskinen had to say about the complaint in September:

"The outcome is not harmonisation but the replacement of national decision-making with EU level decision-making. This goes beyond the limits of Article 114."

While he didn’t side with the UK on all issues, he did recommend changing the legal base of the regulation to Article 352, which would have given the UK a veto.

However, the ECJ took a very different line arguing that the regulation is in line with the treaties since ESMA already has a role to play in this area and because the powers are limited to times when financial market stability is in question - of course when this is, remains to be defined by ESMA itself. The court also suggests that, contrary to the Advocate General's view, the new rules do provide for harmonisation.

As we noted before, this ruling has the potential to be very important for the UK and could set the tone/precedent for future rulings. The court’s decision to reject the UK’s claim could have some important implications:

• Firstly, it potentially sets a precedent for the transfer of powers to an EU agency under the single market article (114). This is decided under qualified majority vote (QMV) meaning the UK does not have a veto. Not only that, but the scope of the powers remains vague and widespread, allowing ESMA quite a significant amount of leeway in deciding where to act in what the UK Government would argue are political decisions.

• More generally, there will be a concern that it could allow the use of Article 114 to be stretched – a question which is raised in some of the UK’s other on-going court challenges against EU financial regulation.

• This will raise concerns in the UK over two issues – financial services regulation and the split between euro and non-euro countries. The first is obvious given that the UK may feel its ability to legally protect itself against burdensome regulation is now diminished. The second stems from the potential abuse of the single market article to further the needs of the eurozone - the short-selling ban was largely conceived following the eurozone/financial crisis to combat 'speculators'.

• One saving grace may be that the ruling is quite specific in terms of financial market oversight, a role which the agency in question (ESMA) already has a part in. However, only time and future legal challenges will tell far-reching the implications of this ruling will be.

What happens now?

Given that the ECJ rejected all aspects of the UK's claim, it is dismissed entirely. There is little more the UK can do from a legal aspect, unless it decides to challenge other parts of the regulation but that seems unlikely.

The UK can continue to work behind the scenes to limit the practical power of ESMA and define strict criteria for when it can act on this issue. Of course, if any decision to limit short-selling by ESMA does happen, it could always challenge that specific move.

Nevertheless, this is clearly a political blow to the UK.  

ECJ legal opinion marks important preliminary victory for UK in short selling dispute

The UK has this morning been set on the path to an important victory at the European Court of Justice, after the Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen supported the UK’s claim that the EU's short selling Regulation transfers too much power to the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA).

The opinion is not binding, but is followed in the majority of cases.

The UK objected to the EU's short selling regulation on a number of levels, but the main concern was that Article 28 of the Regulation - which allows ESMA to impose temporary short selling bans in emergency situations, overruling national financial supervisors - amounted to a significant transfer of power to an EU institution, and therefore Article 114 of the EU treaty (the single market article) was not a valid legal base for the Regulation.

The Advocate General did not side with the UK on all points, but on this key issue, he said:

"The outcome is not harmonisation but the replacement of national decision-making with EU level decision-making. This goes beyond the limits of Article 114."

Jääskinen went on to suggest that an alternative legal base for the regulation could be found and recommended Article 352 of the EU treaties. Although this may seem a technical point, it is extremely important. Article 352 (which sets out the so-called 'flexibility clause') requires unanimity, meaning the UK could veto the proposal.

If the ECJ were to follow the advice of its Advocate General, this could prove to be an important ruling for a number of reasons:

• First, it would halt the transfer of further powers (without national permission) to an EU agency and allow the UK to keep control over an important part of financial services regulation;
• Secondly, it would show that the UK government can have success using the right legal channels effectively. This could bode well for other cases, such as the on-going dispute on UK rules on EU migrants’ access to benefits, or ECB demands that transactions denominated in euros be cleared exclusively within the eurozone;
• It also highlights that the single market article, which, as we noted before, has been stretched significantly, cannot be a ubiquitous catch-all legal base for things the Commission believes fit with its view of the single market. This could become important in future negotiations, particularly over banking union.

The EU wades into the murky world of shadow banking

The European Commission this morning unveiled its initial proposals to regulate ‘shadow banking’ and money market funds (MMFs) – the press release is here and the FAQs are here and here.

We covered this issue back in May when we exclusively released the initial drafts of the proposals – not too much has changed since then. We’ll refrain from recapping the details since the press releases lay them out but below we outline some of our thoughts.

• The key point in the regulation is that MMFs will be required to hold a ‘Net Asset Value’ Buffer, equal to 3% of all assets under management; the Commission predicts this will “result in an increase of the management fees of 0.09% to 0.30% annually”. There will also be harmonisation with UCITS and AIFMD to move towards a uniform set of rules for the shadow banking sector.

• As we noted before, the required buffer has real potential to harm the MMF industry. Given the record low interest rates, and very low returns on liquid short term debt, many funds are struggling to stay afloat (with some already shutting down). Although an outcry against increased costs may be expected from the industry, in this case many of the concerns seem valid given the very small margins involved in these funds.

• There are also some requirements on MMFs holding very liquid assets which can be sold off quickly, while also limiting the level of assets taken from a single issuer to encourage diversification. These rules seem sensible but add further constraints to the returns and flexibility of these funds. There is always a risk in dictating the investment decisions to the market, although its important that the risks in these funds is made clear. It also seems to be doubling up the effort of the buffer mentioned above  - given that losses of such funds rarely exceed 3% (as the Commission itself notes), pushing beyond this level seems slightly redundant.

• The question of ‘sponsors’ – the banks or institutions which own and/or backstop an MMF – is also vital for a couple of reasons. First, its clear that some sponsors have a competitive advantage, larger institutions will have the ability to provide greater financial aid to its MMF if it gets into trouble – this gives large banks a significant advantage over smaller asset managers. Secondly, it also provides another clear link between the shadow and traditional banking sector, this could potentially become an avenue for contagion (as was seen in the financial crisis) if MMFs get into trouble and need to be bailed out.

• Much of the rest of the regulation looks fairly sensible at first glance. It’s clear there needs to be greater transparency within the MMF sector – it can no longer be assumed to be equivalent to bank deposits. There also needs to be significantly less emphasis on external ratings by the credit rating agencies (equally true of the standard banking sector ). Furthermore, investors need to be clearer on the risk taken on when investing in these funds and their approach used to make profit (short term funding of long term assets).

• The broader shadow banking communication remains fairly vague but it is certainly an area which needs to be regulated. The main aim should be to incorporate international regulatory efforts with the existing multitude of EU regulations (many of which cover parts of the shadow banking sector) and avoid duplication. Tackling the issue of ‘collateral chains’ (using a single piece of collateral many times) is also vital, although the importance of the repo market should not be forgotten (see failure of the FTT).

All that said, there is a long way to go in these regulations yet. There is likely to be significant industry opposition (or at least discussion) and approval from both the European Parliament and member states will be tough to gain. It also seems unlikely that this will be completed before next May’s European elections, adding further delays but also raises the question of whether the next Commission will push in the same direction on this issue.

Open Europe publishes Commission regulation which seeks to move Libor oversight to Paris

As the FTT threat wanes (a sizeable victory for the UK we might add) another battle threatens to flare up in the wider debate about financial regulation within the EU – albeit a smaller but still concerning one.

As the FT reported yesterday, there is a regulation in the pipeline in which the Commission proposes significantly stepping up the regulation of benchmark indexes and rates used in financial markets and contracts. In particular though, it proposes moving the supervision of key benchmarks, such as Libor, to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

As we did consistently throughout the FTT debate, we have got our hand on, and have exclusively published these latest plans – see here.

What are the key points of the plans?

• The main focus of the regulation is to move the oversight of thousands of benchmarks used in trillions of dollars’ worth of financial contracts and instruments away from self-regulation (or from being unregulated) to being under direct supervision.
• However, importantly, the proposal sees the most important benchmarks, such as Libor and Euribor, being supervised by ESMA since, in the Commission’s view, fractured oversight harms the single market.
• The plan also looks to step up the legal liability involved in the benchmarks (making any manipulation a criminal offence across the board) but also allowing supervisors more control to compel participation in certain benchmarks and allow for consistent oversight.

Open Europe's take on the plans

• First, let’s make it clear that Libor has patently failed and needs to be reworked. Everyone accepts that. However, the UK is currently in the midst of doing just this, following the recommendations of the Wheatley Review earlier this year (which happen to line up closely with those of IOSCO the international body looking into this issue).

• This makes the proposal particularly badly timed. It is ultimately based on an outdated view of Libor which is already under review and beign changed. In fact, if you look at the substance of the UK review and the international recommendations (upon which the Commission based its proposals) they line up fairly closely with the EU plans other than where the control rests.

• The Commission justification for needing an EU regulation on this issue also seems a bit of a stretch to us. Sure, some of these benchmarks are used in the rest of Europe but they are also used all over the world. However, all those involved in Libor will have a presence in London. As is well known, the large majority of European trades which involve many of these benchmarks will also take place in London. Why the oversight should not be focused there is still not clear.

• There is also rightly a significant concern over the rigidity of the Commission proposal. Firstly, the plan to base all submissions off actual transactions seems unrealistic. This issue came up in the initial debate about reworking Libor – ultimately, there are not nearly enough interbank transactions to actually produce the rates for the ten currencies and the 15 different maturities which Libor currently covers.

• Linked to the above point is the concern about the ability to force banks to comply and take on significant legal and regulatory responsibility for their submissions. Ultimately this is a large liability to take on off the back of what is still an estimate.

• This is a very technical subject. It is almost impossible to lay down all the rules and structures for how various benchmarks should be judged. Surely, the approach varies wildly depending on the benchmark and may even change depending on the wider economic and financial circumstance. This raises two concerns: the rigid framework presented may leave substantial grey areas but more importantly a lot of power for setting the technical details will be left up to the Commission, after the political negotiations have finished. As we saw with the bankers bonus’ regulation this can has a very large impact on the scope and practical implementation of the rules.

• It sets a worrying precedent, especially as the ECB is set to take over as the single eurozone supervisor and the potential for eurozone caucusing on this issue increases. As we saw with the regulation over Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) over the last few years this can be dangerous. The initial drafts of the CRA regulations are quite similar to this one, however, worryingly it has extended and escalated over time. The UK government should look to tackle this issue head on to avoid a similar scenario.

Overall then, although Libor needs to be reworked and better supervised, it’s not clear why this needs to be done at the EU level, particularly when the UK is in the middle of its own reworking. The rigidity of the proposal also raises questions about its practical implementation. At the very most, there could be an EU directive on this issue setting out a broad approach with room for national flexibility. Ideally though, this should be left to individual states where the rules can be drawn by those who are most impacted by them and closer to the stakeholders. This should of course be combined with on-going global cooperation as is already underway.

Thankfully, it seems we are not the only ones with these concerns and some watering down of these rules already looks likely.

Another blow in the bank bonus debate - but there's something far more fundamental at work here

Yesterday saw the opening salvo of what is sure to become a heated debate over the new ‘technical standards’ for the EU’s banker bonus rules.

Why is this so important? Well, these rules will essentially determine how far reaching the EU's already controversial bankers' bonus cap will be. But this decision also encapsulates a range of other issues that will have a defining impact in the way Europe is governed in future - and whether there's a future for the UK in there somewhere.

With that in mind, the first draft produced yesterday to launch a period of public consultation on the standards would have been particularly worrying. The key points are:

Standard quantitative criteria: related to the level of variable or total gross remuneration in absolute or in relative terms. In this respect, staff should be identified as material risk takers if:

 (i) their total remuneration exceeds, in absolute terms,  €500,000 per year, or
 (ii) they are included in the 0.3 % of staff with the highest remuneration in the institution, or
 (iii) their remuneration bracket is equal or greater than the lowest total remuneration of senior management and other risk takers, or
 (iv) their variable remuneration exceeds €75,000 and 75% of the fixed component of remuneration.

As the numerous press reports today have highlighted, these are far more wide ranging than many expected and are likely to further raise concerns that these rules will have a substantial negative impact on the City of London (and therefore the UK economy). (For background on these concerns see here and here). There are several different things going on here:

Are the EU agencies already exceeding their mandate? As we flagged up at the time of their creation, there's a substantial risk of mission creep under the EU's three supervisory agencies - EBA, ESMA, EIOPA - due to the fluid nature of these bodies. Remember, under the ECJ court case which allowed these agencies to be established under the EU single market (via QMV and co-decision), they should be blocked from having any type of decision-making powers. But EBA's standards on remuneration comes worryingly close to legislation.

Politicisation of ‘technical standards’: Related to this, and as we also flagged up at the time, technical standards have a worrying tendency to become politicised - which clearly is the case here. This type of stuff should be decided through political negotiations and defined within the regulation. Any necessary technical background and info should be provided for and incorporated, even is this means delaying the legislation slightly.

Need for non-eurozone safeguards ASAP: Though this isn't strictly a eurozone vs non-eurozone issue, it does illustrate just how vulnerable the UK and other outs could be to eurozone caucusing in banking / financial rule-making. This is also exactly why the UK and other non-eurozone countries need to ensure that the agreement in principle for double majority at the European Banking Authority - that Open Europe first floated - are held up and pushed through.

Trade-off between "single rulebook" and control: The UK says it likes the EBA since it contributes to a single rulebook for the single market, and can, for example, contribute to stamping out protectionist implementation of banking rules in Europe. This is all true. However, it does, of course, assume that the UK itself is writing the single rulebook, which may or may not be the case.

Democratic accountability: As the Times noted today, with central banks such as the Bank of England (BoE) and the ECB taking over financial supervision they must become more transparent and accountable. In this case it is unclear what role the BoE played in drafting the rules or whether they raised the concerns pushed by the government and firms in the UK.

What next?

Again, this is only a first draft. The public consultation is open until August, after which the EBA will review the evidence and provide a new draft - so a lot of the issues we highlight below should be considered with this in mind. There will then be a vote in the EBA with the final standards needing to be submitted to the Commission (which will approve or reject them) in March. One final interesting point here is that any vote in the EBA could come close to coinciding with the introduction of any double majority rules, although there are a lot of hurdles to overcome before then.

Expect a summer of furious lobbying and behind the scenes discussions as the UK and others make a final push to water down these proposals.

Exclusive: Internal docs give first look at EU plans to regulate 'shadow banking'

The Times reports today on another round of exclusive documents leaked by Open Europe, this time regarding European Commission plans to regulate the ‘shadow banking sector’. See here and here for the docs.

A rather niche story you might think but it could have important implications for the way money is lent throughout the economy. Below we provide some background and our thoughts on the proposals.

What is the shadow banking sector?

“The FSB defined the shadow banking system as "the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system". This definition implies the shadow banking system is based on two intertwined pillars.

First, entities operating outside the regular banking system engaged in one of the following activities:

• accepting funding with deposit-like characteristics;
• performing maturity and/or liquidity transformation;
• undergoing credit risk transfer; and,
• using direct or indirect financial leverage.

Second, activities that could act as important sources of funding of non-bank entities. These activities include securitisation, securities lending and repurchase transactions ("repo").”

Essentially, it is made up of institutions outside the banking sector but which provide paths for borrowing and lending as well as significant financial investments. According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2011 it totalled €51 trillion worldwide.

Why are there concerns regarding it and are they valid?

• Shadow banking came to light in the aftermath of the financial crisis where it is thought to have played an important role in allowing the financial sector to hide the true level of risk in the system.
• There are some valid concerns over shadow banking. It operates outside but closely related to and interlinked with the regular banking system. This means it falls outside of scope of regular supervision and regulation.
• Often pursue highly leveraged activities, search for high yields and transform maturities from short to long (can cause a mismatch in funding if a crisis hits). There is significant use of opaque securitisation, hard to judge real value.
• Often have very low levels of capital, funded in the short term by lending and investments which needs to be regularly rolled over. This is used to fund long term assets. Helps boost profits but also magnifies losses. Due to this set up, the system very exposed to liquidity crises which can hit hard and fast.
• IMF recommended recently that key aims should be to reduce spill over from shadow banking to regular banking system (reduce prospects for rapid contagion in a crisis) and to reduce the procyclicatlity of the shadow system.
• All that said, it does provide a valuable service in many cases, particularly as an alternative method for distributing credit to the real economy when the banking sector is failing to do so sufficiently.

Thoughts on the EU proposals so far

• The proposals are still at an early stage and subject to change. A key issue is how any shadow banking regulation will fit with the raft of other financial regulation in the pipeline or already in force – AIFMD, CRD IV, EMIR, UCITS, and Solvency II to name but a few.
• Importantly, many of these other regulations already cover many of the institutions involved in the shadow banking sector. Avoiding double regulation and inefficiency is vital, therefore judging and implementing the current regulations is important before a shadow bank regulation is brought in.
• Shadow banking is not part of regular market and those involved do not have deposits so there is no question of a government backstop or bailout scenario. Can and should go bust. The main point is that any shadow banking crisis should not transform into a ‘systemic crisis’. The approach should therefore be ‘macroprudential’, taking an overview of the market and ensuring it is not overly risky and/or that it is not too heavily intertwined with regular banking sector.
• This may be more effectively done by setting out guidelines for supervision and cross border data collection that a strict regulation.
• The EU must also be wary of regulating against specific financial instruments, which could have perverse effects. For example, ‘securitisation’ has become a hot topic. This tool was misused during the financial crisis but is not an inherently bad thing. As ECB President Mario Draghi pointed out recently, effective securitisation of SME loans could help boost lending to SMEs and increase level of quality assets in Europe.
• Money Market Funds are different to many other parts of this sector. They are essentially pools of deposits or excess funds from finanical firms which are invested in the short term to gain small gains above what standard deposits would reap. They invest heavily in short term government, corporate and finanical debt and play a key role in providing liquidity to the market. The Commission looks to be regulating these separately, which is the right way to go. However, any small increase in costs could hamper the whole industry since their margins are so low - in fact some have already been closed due to the record low interest rates. 

As we said the proposals are just getting going so all this is still open. Regulation of the shadow banking sector is necessary but its also vital to note that it plays an important role in providing credit to the real economy (despite its rather ominous sounding name). At this point in time its not clear that a regulation is needed immediately and it may be more effective to improve and work with what is currently on the table. Furthermore, in an ideal world, any attempt to tackle it would be done on a global level in the form of a set of guidelines and plans for data sharing and increased transparency.

Has Germany really gone off the idea of an EU treaty change?

Usually technical meetings behind closed doors in Brussels are pretty dull. However, judging by some of the reports floating around, yesterday’s meeting of the EU Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) may have bucked the trend somewhat. This is the negotiation forum for member states' EU ambassadors - the key guys involved in talks over EU policy. This is where a lot of decisions, de facto, are being made.

As we noted in today’s press summary the UK was outright outvoted on the plans for capital requirements for banks (CRD IV), which entail the controversial caps on bankers' bonuses. 

However, though it was already clear that the UK had lost that particular battle, it was the talks over the EU's proposed, and in part agreed, banking union which caught our eye. EU ambassadors failed to reach agreement amid continued North-South divisions, but the reason why is interesting.

Most media failed to pick up on this, but the WSJ Real Time Brussels blog rightly notes that Germany was strongly pushing for a clearer separation between the ECB's monetary duties and supervisory responsibilities, to avoid a running conflict of interest (see here). The only way this can really happen is to give the supervisory board the final say over supervisory decisions (as opposed to now when it rests with the ECB's Governing Council). This, in turn, requires EU treaty change. The Germans wanted a clear commitment from other member states that this would happen.

According to the WSJ, Berlin also insisted on giving national parliaments (not just the European Parliament) the right to ask questions and get answers on supervisory policy, and giving states under the single supervisor along with the EP the power to remove the Vice Chairman of the supervisory body.

A couple of interesting points there. This is an incredibly fluid target but those who say that Germany has 'gone off the idea' of Treaty change - in light of David Cameron's speech where he mentioned EU treaty change as an avenue for reform - clearly haven't quite appreciated the nature of the proposals floating around. Of course, Berlin won't be shouting it from the rooftops ahead of a national elections and with the relationship with France at an all time low (well almost), but in many of the Germans demand on eurozone governance is an implicit acknowledgement that something has to change in the EU's institutional framework (see our table here of the broad proposals being discussed [p.9]).

The scope (limited or full treaty change), nature (EU treaty or inter-governmental) and timing will be discussed, but it will likely happen sooner or later.

EU caps on bankers' bonuses: the perfect regulatory storm?

The discussion over bank bonuses has been heating up inrecent days. Discussions between EU ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission (so-called trialogues) are restarting today as the three try to reach an agreement on the rules for bank bonuses to be included in CRD IV (the EU’s legislation implementing the Basel III rules and more).

The parliament is pushing for a stringent cap on bank bonuses of 1:1 ratio with fixed salaries, which could be increased to 2:1 with approval from a majority of shareholders.

There is a lot going on here, beyond the actual proposal, including:

• The UK is in a clear minority in categorically rejecting a cap, but unable to block a rule with disproportionate impact on the UK - courtesy of QMV and co-decision.
• Germany being the swing state - no surprises there - having first supported the UK's position, it has shifted as part of a wider political push to get tough on bankers, which strikes a chord with German voters. The revelation in December that Deutsche Bank hid $12bn worth of losses during the crisis and the growing Libor and Euribor rates scandals, haven't exactly helped...
• The European Parliament flexing its muscles, successfully managing to tap into the public mood, breaking the Council common position, which is unusual. (Don't worry, any favour EP thinks it wins with the electorate, would be ruined if it voted down Ministers' proposal for a reduced long-term EU budget).
• "Anglo-Saxon capitalism" in the docks - perception is one of a continental attack on British bankers (ironic since a large part of the talks have focused on making CRD4 more flexible to allow the UK and others pursuing tougher capital rules for banks). This will not make the City any more EU-enthusiastic.
• No one wants to be publicly seen to back bankers - even the UK government itself is keeping a low profile.
• Changing incentives as part of the eurozone banking union, with the club within a club dynamic again coming to the fore (see our December 2011 report to see what we mean). Looking forward, the question is, if a country decides to remain outside the banking union - therefore signalling that it will stand behind its own banks, come what may - should it not also have more discretion in getting the incentive structure in the banking sector right?

So what does the UK want?

On Friday the UK submitted a paper to its EU partners to put forward it’s case. We've seen the paper, and here are some thoughts / points - which also have been largely reported in the media:

• The UK argues against a firm cap. Any extended remuneration should be determined by shareholders (although the UK proposal does water down the size of the majority needed to approve remuneration slightly).
• The UK is pushing for a focus on non-cash deferred bonuses. This is included in the current proposal to some extent but the UK fears (with some grounding) that the current proposal will encourage an increase in fixed salaries and a focus on upfront cash bonuses - and reduce firms' ability to cut costs during a downturn, potentially leading to more lay-offs and less lending (on a bit less solid ground here, we think).
• It also argues that deferred non-cash bonuses (over three years) should not fall under any cap, while also rejecting the proposal that all employee benefits, above those mandated by law, should be categorised as a ‘bonus’.
• The government is also keen to see that subsidiaries of EU banks located in the rest of the world should not have to adhere to the rules. Furthermore, EU subsidiaries of banks headquartered outside the EU should not have to implement the rules (although their bonus plans will still need to be judged ‘prudential’ by the relevant financial supervisor).

So is this special pleading? Well, to some people in the City, the world will end if this comes into force - which is not quite the case. In fact, there's no surprise that politicians seize the opportunity to strike down on bankers' pay, given that many banks have been forced to seek taxpayer-backed bailouts and the rest of it. So the first message to the financial sector is: if you don't want to be subject to tougher regulations, stop screwing up.

But it could still be damaging and there are questions over how much difference a cap would really make on incentives and the distorting effects this could have across the board. Ultimately, the risk taken on and the decisions made by banks are dictated by much more than just bonuses - it is just a small part of a wider culture which needs to be reassessed. Targeting and correcting perverse behaviour still seems to be better done through more effective supervision and tighter regulation - the irony should not be lost that many of those pushing for a cap are also the ones advocating a maximum limit to capital levels and supporting watering down the Basel III liquidity requirements (see here for details). And there should be no doubt that this could make talent less likely to choose the EU over other part of the world, which clearly isn't in anyone's interest.

In the end, bank bonuses are also only a small part of the much larger CRD IV legislation. There is unlikely to be a formal vote on bank bonuses itself - and Ministers rarely vote in the Council - but the UK seems to be heading for a defeat on a pretty symbolic issue at a sensitive time.

On the other hand, if the UK government can pull this one off, it should be given a lot of credit. Ultimately, the final outcome of CRD IV as a whole will be the more important bellwether by which to judge UK success or failure.