Will Anglo-French defence co-operation be a casualty of the UK's decision on Syria?

Syria will not see a rerun of the Anglo-French Cooperation we saw in Libya

Commenting on Conservative Home's special jury on the events in Syria Open Europe's Christopher Howarth argues that Anglo-French co-operation on defence and foreign policy has taken a knock from the UK's decision to pull out of military action in Syria:

David Cameron’s Syrian fiasco will reverberate through many aspects of politics. But how will it affect the UK’s international standing?

The US may now look at the UK in a different light but, ironically, within the EU the UK’s reputation may improve. Europe tends to dislike what it perceives as rushed and unilateral military action (a UK/US-led operation is seen as unilateral). Parliamentary opposition to military action is something most EU states can easily understand and the UK’s break with the US may seem refreshing.

However, there is an important exception - the French Government. France and the UK are the only two EU states with the capability and (until now) the will to act. Recognising this, the FCO have been at pains to improve Anglo-French defence and foreign relations - UK help for France in Mali being a recent example. The FCO realise that if France and the UK cooperate they can be a powerful force within the EU and indeed the world. The most serious ramification of Syria is that these plans for Anglo-French defence cooperation may have taken a knock.

We have been here before. The last time UK foreign policy went spectacularly awry was in Suez. Then as now the UK bailed on France. We remember Suez as a lesson in the need to work with the US, for the French it was a lesson in the folly of trusting Anglo-Saxons. Things are nowhere near as bad this time but the relationship needs to be repaired.

Of course Syria is not Suez and the lessons will be different. Eden was tripped up by opposition from the US and Tory liberal internationalists, appalled by the naked pursuit of British interests. Cameron’s Tory opposition came from the descendants of the traditional wing who backed Eden, but who fail this time to see a British interest. After Suez, liberal policy makers agreed that the UK’s role in the world had shrunk and that it was a mistake to act without the US.

This time it is important to ensure that we do not accept any further shrinkage and that future US action is not spurned by the UK and an already sceptical EU. Like Anthony Eden, David Cameron has come unstuck on an area of policy that seemed to be his primary interest. Unlike Eden, Cameron has the opportunity to move on and repair the damage.


Sorry but UK defence policy is largely untouched by EU membership

Talking about EU military co-operation is always a good way to generate a heated debate, and we expect that the Guardian interview with German Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière will be no exception. Maizière said:

"If Great Britain leaves the EU, it would be a great disappointment to us. It would weaken Nato, it would weaken the British influence within Nato. I think from a military point of view the disadvantages for Great Britain would be bigger than the advantages."

"I am not talking about economic issues or social issues, or whether you drive on the left or the right side of the road, I am talking about security. I am talking about British influence beyond its own borders. I think it is part of the British tradition that Britain has to play a role in the world. Outside the EU it would not lose a role, but it would reduce their own influence and this cannot be in the interests of Great Britain. We in Germany would lose a strong partner for a pro-Atlantic co-operation with America and a pragmatic British way to deal with security issues." 

Now, as we've argued in the past, there are a number of drawbacks from the UK leaving the EU - which eurosceptics of that inclination have failed to properly address - including guaranteed market access, voting rights on laws that govern that market access, "pass-porting" for financial services, extra costs at the border for exporting business (rules of origin) and loss of veto to prevent the EU from doing stupid things. Here, German politicians make good points when they talk about the UK's future position in the EU.

However, the one area that would be largely unaffected - or even completely unaffected - by a possible UK withdrawal from the EU is defence and Britain's military position.The reason is simple: hard power in Europe is simply guided by logic and incentives untouched by the EU institutions. It's a separate dialogue completely.

In other words, Britain would be an absolutely key part of "security Europe" even if it left the EU tomorrow. It wouldn't enjoy either substantial benefits or drawbacks with regards to military cooperation - the EU would be largely irrelevant. Even in the broader field of "foreign policy", the UK would be a key partner.

The UK remains one of Europe's 2 1/2 military powers, being the biggest single spender on defence in Europe - spending as much as Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Poland combined.

Britain would still have its permanent place on the UN's Security Council and its nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile it is telling that France and the UK have chosen to deepen their defence co-operation outside of the EU. When it comes to hard power the EU institutions become invisible; think the Balkans, and more recently Iraq, Libya, Syria and Mali.

The UK may benefit from EU membership in the broad area of foreign policy (for example the recent EU-brokered peace deal between Serbia and Kosovo) but if the UK left the EU tomorrow, it would have no impact on its security capabilities.

Conversely, EU partners may find it easier to press ahead with a "European Army" (though not really given political realities). It might be European, but it sure as hell won't be much of an army.

Let's pick the right targets when arguing for continued UK EU membership.

Is Sikorski in with a chance of being the next EU foreign minister?

Europe's next foreign minister?

With the current Commission term due to expire next year speculation is already turning to who will replace the current crop – especially the ‘top jobs’ of Commission President (or will Barroso go for a Roosevelt-esque third term?) and the high representative for foreign affairs, a post currently occupied by Britain’s own Baroness Cathy Ashton.

There has been much speculation that following her widely acknowledged ‘low-key’ performance in the role (in fairness this was not entirely her fault), her successor would be a well-established ‘foreign policy star’, with Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski widely tipped. However, while Sikorski would indeed have a degree of ‘star appeal’ and foreign policy credibility (certainly when compared with Ashton), here are the reasons why we think this is unlikely.

Firstly, Sikorski is hugely ambitious and it is difficult to see him agreeing to take-up a position where his ability to seriously influence events will be limited by the well documented limitations of EU foreign policy. In particular Sikorski has ambitions for greater EU military co-operation and will unlikely be satisfied by firing off carefully worded press releases about human rights abuses in developing countries. Yet while many EU countries want to see the EEAS delivering more, many are also reluctant to hand over too much competence in the field of foreign policy decision making to the EU given very real differences of opinion on key issues – most recently Syria. Likewise, EU defence co-operation remains more realistic on paper than on the ground, not least with current spending restrictions, while the recent Cypriot crisis demonstrated Europe’s weakness in that it was willing to gamble Russia gaining greater political and economic influence on the island.

Furthermore, assuming that Sikorski genuinely wants the job, he is somewhat of a marmite character which could cost him support in national capitals. His strong neo-conservative and Atlanticist tendencies are likely to cost him support, not least in Paris, while the Germans may fear that his candidacy would antagonise Russia. Conversely, he has also become a vocal champion for greater EU integration, famously calling on Germany to play an active leading role in Europe, which could also cost him support, especially in the current climate. While his Atlanticism and his strong British links (he was a contemporary of David Cameron and Boris Johnson at Oxford) ought to secure UK support, his rather clumsly recent intervention into UK domestic politics, when he announced that Poland would not help the UK to “wreck or paralyse the EU” and listing a number of tired and clichéd 'EU myths' is not likely to gone down well in Whitehall and Westminster.

Finally, there is also much speculation that current Polish PM Donald Tusk could be being lined up to replace Barroso, in which case Sikorski's candidacy for high representative would be a non-starter.

All in all we would expect the next high representative, while likely to be more heavyweight than Baroness Ashton, will nonetheless not be someone with a personality and profile to challenge national leaders’ primacy in the area of foreign policy.

Will the EU follow France into the Malian desert?

"We are all with you"

Le Monde's cartoonist left a clear image - France's President Hollande rushing off into the Malian desert while the rest of the EU sits behind and pontificates.

France has a history of interventions in Francophone Africa and mostly they are primarily of regional importance. This time though it seems France is trying to fry a bigger fish: the biggest concentration of Islamic fundamentalists in West Africa. So should this be just a French responsibility or should they expect help from the EU? (NATO will always be a second choice for France) Well, evidently the French media feels others in the EU are not pulling their weight.

EU states have a history of under-investment in their own security and failing to help in multilateral actions. In Afghanistan the USA's allies invariably left it with the lion's share of the heavy lifting and in Libya, in the EU's neighbourhood, big states such as Poland and Germany decided to sit it out. 

But the French are clearly beginning to feel Mali should be different. The Economist quotes French conservative opposition leader, Jean-François Copé, saying “for now, our country is alone at the front.” And on Channel 4 News Former French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner said:

"The British people for such a mission are our closest friend. We need them. For the time being we are alone. I beg you don't leave the French alone. This is a common mission, this is a common threat, we are all fighting extremism."

A reasonable enough plea - though he sort of spoiled his case by adding that in his view "part of the reason" Britain was dragging its heels was because of the Conservatives' sceptical attitude to EU membership, when in fact, Anglo-French defence and foreign policy cooperation is widely seen in Conservative circles as exactly the type of issue and network-based approach that European cooperation should be more geared towards. Also, that a former French foreign minister is begging for the UK's assistance only serves to highlight how important the UK's military and clout is in terms of lending the EU geopolitical credibility. It also says something about the perpetual fear in some circles of the UK being "isolated" in Europe...

How long France will take to complete its operations in Mali is unclear, but the longer it drags on, help in the form of training and logistics as promised by the UK, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Denmark may not be enough. So will this end up becoming a European operation? One thing remains clear: as ever, when it comes to defence and security capabilities, co-operation and political will are far more important than politicians grand designs for European "state" building.

Westerwelle's Future of Europe report - worth getting excited over?

The so-called ‘Future of Europe’ reflexion group of eleven European foreign ministers, set up by Germany's Guido Westerwelle, to discuss and propose ideas on organisational and structural change in the EU held its closing meeting on Monday. Yesterday it released its final report and conclusions, the broad thrust of which is that, to emerge from the crisis, Europe needs more economic and political integration.

In terms of the economic and fiscal side, the majority of the proposals in the document have already been agreed or proposed, such as the “reinforced economic governance framework” – i.e. the fiscal treaty and a single supervisory mechanism for eurozone banks. Even the possibility of making the ESM into a fully-fledged European Monetary Fund has already been voiced. Furthermore, these proposals will only apply to eurozone members and any non-euro members who participate voluntarily.

It is therefore the political/institutional side that is the most interesting and here are the key points that we’ve picked out:

• More powers for Baroness Ashton and the EU’s External Action Service;
• More majority decisions in the Common Security and Defence Policy sphere including joint representation in international organizations where possible, and in the longer-term a European defence policy which for some members could eventually involve a European army;
• Strengthening the Commission should be strengthened so it can fully and effectively fulfil its role as the engine of the Community method;
• Moving to a super-qualified majority for future EU Treaty revisions (with the exception of enlargement) which would be binding for those Member States that have ratified them;
• A more “streamlined and efficient system” of EU governance which could include a directly elected Commission President, a European Parliament with the powers to initiate legislation and a second chamber for the member states.

Most of these proposals have been around the block once before but some journalists have gotten very excited about this, with the Guardian splashing the story on its front page. Running with a "Britain is isolated" theme it also noted that:

"The likelihood is that the 11-country consensus will swell into a majority among the EU's 27. Britain also stands apart from this. The 11 include Germany and France, the big ones, plus Italy, Spain and Poland – after Britain the biggest EU countries.”

Well, not quite.

Sure, some of these proposals are conspicuous, and certainly they pose a challenge for Britain. However, many of them have almost no chance of going ahead, certainly not in the immediate future. Firstly, the report represents less of a consensus amongst the relevent states and more of a brainstorming session with lots of dissenting views. As the note itself states:

“The report reflects our personal thoughts. We wish to underline that not all participating Ministers agree with all proposals that have been put forward in the course of our discussions, and that the Member States’ individual treaty obligations and rights within the various policy areas have to be taken into account.”

As stated above, there is significant momentum for more integration in economic, fiscal and banking affairs, but its hugely unlikely to spill over into foreign policy which exists in a parallel political sphere. This is simply a way to re-state the long-standing German desire for a Europeanised foreign policy (the practical difficulties of which have been made clear many times, most recently over Libya).

Super-QMV for treaty change won't happen either - not least since Berlin itself would block it if push comes to shove, as would Paris - unless they would be willing to risk - for example - QMV on the European Parliament's second seat in Strasbourg. 

Banking union, and calls for EU treaty negotiations to be opened by 2014 - as called for by Barroso in his 'state of the union' speech last week - is where the story is at.

The context for this whole initiative is effectively German domestic politics. While no one can question Guido Westerwelle’s European credentials, he is arguably one of the most side-lined Foreign Ministers in the whole EU, and the Future of Europe group is a way for him to show he's still a player.  For Merkel this serves as a useful exercise at a time when the German government is über-sensitive to accusations that it is not sufficiently ‘pro-European’ - but without actually having to do anything. 

Finally, it is worth contrasting the lofty idealism of such - and similar - proposals with the cold, harsh realities of public opinion. As we reported on Monday, support for the EU and the euro has hit an all-time low in Germany, in France a majority of those surveyed said that given the opportunity now, they would vote against ratifying the Maastricht treaty, while the EU debate in the Netherlands is also become more complex.