How does the EU solve a problem like the Ukraine?

Update 13:45 - According to Antonio Delgado, Spanish Public Radio's EU correspondent, "diplomatic sources" have indicated that the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria are all "not keen" on sanctions, although the Italian Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that “In the event of the continuation of violence, we don’t rule out resorting to exceptional restrictive measures”.

Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso on the other hand is optimistic:

Following developments in #Ukraine w/ shock & utter dismay. We expect targeted measures agreed by our #EU MS urgently http://t.co/nsy4JsSKhA
— José Manuel Barroso (@BarrosoEU) February 19, 2014

*****Original Post*****

The escalation in violence in Kiev yesterday and overnight poses a huge challenge to the EU. What, exactly, can it do here to prevent continuing civil disorder on its doorstep?

As ever when it comes to EU foreign policy, the first hurdle is to actually secure an agreement among 28 member states which is difficult in itself. As we've said on a number of occasions, Catherine Ashton's European External Action Service cannot magically replace 28 foreign policy positions - this has been proved time and again over Israel/Palestine, Libya, Syria etc. When it comes to the Ukraine, these differences have been apparent in how to deal with Russia in the first place, how hard it was to push for the EU-Ukraine trade agreement, then over how to deal with the anti-government protests, and now it looks likely they will appear in whether to impose sanctions. Here is a round-up of where the key EU countries stand on potential sanctions:

UK - Europe Minister David Lidington has condemned the violence and urged "all parties to return to the path of compromise and genuine negotiation" - no explicit reference to sanctions.

Poland - As the biggest supporter of Ukraine's eventual integration into the EU, Poland has consistently taken a hard stance on the issue. Speaking in the Polish parliament this morning, Prime Minister Donald Tusk called for targeted sanctions against those individuals "responsible for the Ukraine's misfortune". However, he conceded these tended to have limited effectiveness, but argued they sent a "moral" signal. He also slammed Russian pressure and warned that a civil war was possible. In a rare outbreak of political unity, the sanctions were also backed by the opposition Law and Justice party.

Germany - The German government (and the SPD in particular) has traditionally been very cautious when dealing with Russia so as not to alienate Moscow unnecessarily. For this reason they had opposed sanctions - supported by many in the European Parliament - but Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier yesterday noted that personal sanctions will now "surely be considered". Chancellor Merkel will discuss the situation with President Hollande later today.

France - French President Francois Hollande said that he “agreed with [Polish PM] Tusk on the need for swift European sanctions, targeted at the main responsible for these acts.”

Italy – It is unclear whether Rome's position will change following the recent developments and/or the appointment of Renzi's new cabinet but the existing position was to oppose sanctions, with Foreign Minister Emma Bonino arguing a couple of weeks ago that "it has always been easy to announce [sanctions], but it has never been easy to apply them in a coordinated fashion. To me, this doesn't seem the way to go.”

Sweden - Another strong supporter of Ukraine's EU ambitions and of the anti-government protectors, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bild is as expected shouting the loudest, accusing Ukraine's President Yanukovych of "having blood on his hands".

Of course agreeing on a course of action is one thing - implementing it is another and the EU simply struggles to back up its rhetoric with 'hard power' due to the nature of the EU itself. The key will be how Putin responds if the situation continues to get out of hand - how will the EU respond if Moscow intervenes more directly? As the 2008 Georgian crisis showed - when the EU initially tried to present a common front - the Russians are very adept at exploiting any divisions and they still wield substantial leverage due to the reliance of many EU members on their energy resources.

Notwithstanding the need for a political solution to Ukraine's internal problems, there is surely a wider need for the EU and Russia to come to a sensible compromise over Ukraine's future - as the map below shows, geopolitically, the Ukraine is trapped between two large political and economic blocs (the map shows the respective customs union and potential members), and any closer political and economic integration of the Ukraine into the EU triggers Russia's age-old fears about 'encirclement'.

Syria: Who’s in and who’s out?

Plenty to ponder over Syria

Following the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad’s regime in Syria, the stakes have been raised. But as the calls for international military intervention grows louder, how have Europe’s various players been lining up? Well, the EU is certainly not “speaking with one voice.” Somehow neither the Lisbon Treaty, nor the EEAS nor the arrival of Cathy Ashton has managed to magically replace 28 individual foreign policies with a single EU one. (We remain shocked!)

So when it comes to Syria, there are now three key questions for the member states: whether to take part in military action; whether to back military action without necessarily taking part and, crucially, whether to do either of these two without a UN mandate. The last is obviously key as Russia is liley to veto any UN resolution with teeth, and has already made it clear it would consider any intervention without a UN mandate a "crude violation of international law".  

So far, we count three EU countries that have signalled willingness to participate militarily even if a UN mandate isn't forthcoming – the UK, France and Denmark. France and the UK - that between them account for most of the EU's military spending - are as usual the key players in the EU when matters are moved into the domain of hard power. David Cameron will today present a draft resolution proposing action against Assad's regime in the UN Security Council "authorising necessary measures to protect civilians" in Syria. Writing in the Telegraph today, British Foreign Minister William Hague argues that:

“this is the moment for democratic nations to live up to their values…We cannot allow the use of chemical weapons in the 21st century to go unchallenged. That would send a signal to the Syrian regime that they will never face any consequences for their actions, no matter how barbarous."

Meanwhile, French President Francois Hollande said yesterday that “France is ready to punish those who took the heinous decision to gas innocents," while French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius told Europe 1 radio on Monday: "The only option that I am ruling out is to do nothing." 

Both, it would appear, very much keep the option open to press ahead without the UN. 

Germany is more hesitant. There is virtually zero chance of Berlin playing a major part in any military operation of any sort. The question is - and this is what the German debate is centred around - will it back military action without a UN resolution. Remember, Germany ended up on the same side as Russia and China - against the UK and France - in abstaining on a UN Security Council vote on Libya back in 2011. However, this move was also triggered a domestic and international political backlash, which the Germans haven't forgotten. The country's Foreign Ministry has welcomed the UK's motion at the UN.

#Syria #Westerwelle welcomes British initiative to address poison gas attack within UNSecurityCouncil. United stance needed! @foreignoffice
— GermanForeignOffice (@GermanyDiplo) August 28, 2013

And there's no lack of scepticism. Phillipp Missfelder, the foreign affairs spokesman for German Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU party, said that,"The [German] army has, through its current international operations, already reached the breaking point," and that military action without a UN mandate is "hard to imagine." However, interestingly, fellow CDU MP Ruprecht Polenz, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, said that military action against Syria without a UN mandate could be "legitimate", citing Kosovo as a precedence, adding that the use of chemical weapons was a "serious, brutal taboo, which may not remain without consequences”. However, he stopped short of explicitly calling for German involvement. 

The SPD's chairman Sigmar Gabriel has suggested that German involvement should be limited to the diplomatic front, specifically that Chancellor Merkel ought to fly to Moscow to convince Russian President Putin to change his policy.

According to Number 10, Chancellor Merkel and David Cameron discussed the situation and “agreed that such an attack demanded a firm response from the international community.” (Not that this fairly generic statement tells us much.) Germany clearly remains nervous about foreign policy meddling. 

So far Italy is leaning back too. "Italy will not take part in any military solutions without a UN Security Council mandate," according to its Foreign Minister Emma Bonino. "Even the option of a limited intervention risks becoming unlimited," said Bonino, adding that Italy was "already stretched and even over-stretched" militarily in other parts of the world.

Despite Poland's support for the EU developing a stronger and more coherent military presence, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed today that “Poland does not envisage taking part in a military intervention in Syria. In any form.”

Like many others, Spain hasn't yet made up its mind but it is sticking to the hope of a UN resolution. Deputy Secretary General of the Partido Popular, Carlos Floriano, said Wednesday, that the Government will decide its stance “[once it is] aware perfectly of every detail." Meanwhile the Spanish Foreign Ministry said it hoped the UN Security Council “can make decisions that comply with international law.” 

Of the smaller countries, "non-aligned" Sweden is as usual calling  for “the broadest international support possible” but leaving it open how to approach a US/UK/France led operation absent a UN solution. Fellow "non alinged" country Austria is also staying quiet. Portugal says it won’t comment on potential action, with the Ministry of Foreign affairs simply issuing the generic statement that “it is in close coordination with its partners and allies.”

NATO-member Denmark, on the other hand, yesterday signalled that it’s willing to take part in military action even absent a UN-solution, with a series of pretty robust statements from senior Danish politicians. According to an opinion poll published today, 64% of Danes are opposed to such a move, however. 

Greece is likely to come under pressure to open up its strategically important bases to the US but ANSA quotes Greek officials as saying they have themselves “ruled out the possibility of active military involvement”. 

So what about the EU institutions themselves?  We wouldn't want to forget those. They are sticking to the ‘UN Security Council’ line. As Baroness Ashton said on Monday, "Of course the Security Council is extremely important in this. It is the role of the Security Council to look and see how the international community can and should respond."

With Hermann van Rompuy, President of the European Council, also urging similar action on Syria via the UN Security Council, this begs the question, what happens if that isn't forthcoming and the UK/France and US continue to push for military action? This then has the potential to become one of the biggest foreign policy clashes between the UK/France and Brussels since the new EU foreign policy architecture was put into place.

UK report on EU foreign policy: Is it working? Is it accountable?

How diplomatic are diplomats when discussing a rival?

We've already blogged about the Government’s balance of competences report on the EU's impact on the NHS, now time for a quick look at what was said about EU foreign policy and external aid. The EU's External Action Service seems to have attracted some criticism:

“Critics argued that it was unclear about its role; lacked strategic focus and a policy planning division; was less dynamic than previous good rotating Council presidencies; was reactive rather than proactive; was less expert than it should be on important TFEU aspects of external action, such as climate change and energy, because relevant staff had reverted to the Commission upon the EEAS’s creation; was insufficiently joined up with the Commission on external instruments; and had low staff morale.”

But for balance it has some supporters to:

"Many thought it had played a valuable role on a number of issues, such as Iran, Burma, the Horn of Africa, and the development of a comprehensive approach combining a range of instruments"

However beyond the good job / bad job narrative the more important question is to whom are these EU diplomats ultimately responsible? The report talks about the “complex legal and institutional framework for the EU’s foreign policy”. This is a fair observation and one that makes EU diplomacy difficult to hold to account. The report is clear that the European Parliament is not the answer: "If the institutions’ performance does not improve; or if there is an undesirable shift in control away from the Member States, such as a greater role for the European Parliament; how will we alter our approach."


If one problem is accountability the FCO
does not think MEPs are the solution

The report makes some other interesting points as well, noting that “there are now few international organisations where there is not at least some effort to forge a common EU position, and have that position, even if it only amounts to a lowest common denominator, expressed by one participant on behalf of all the Member States.”

The report also notes - correctly in our view - that "the EU lacks the capabilities and the political will to play a major military role.” The EU can never aim and should never aim to be a coherent military/diplomatic actor on the world stage. It cannot do so because it does not have the military capabilities, the wish to pay for them or more importantly the political will to act.

Moving onto the issue of external aid, the report notes that "Although policy making at the EU level is often critically important, it can sometimes result in compromise positions that do not give full effect to UK priorities or that lack impact."

We have argued that EU aid is poorly targeted, with only 46% reaching low income countries, compared with 74% of UK aid, 58% of EU member state governments’ aid and 56% of United States aid - figures first flagged up in our 2011 report on EU external aid. This is largely a result of the large sums of the EU aid budget devoted to the EU's neighbourhood. The UK report largely glosses over this by only focusing on EU "activities that have poverty reduction or humanitarian response as their central purpose," implicitly reinforcing the point that many of the EU's 'aid' activities do not.

At a time when public confidence in overseas development spending is faltering, it is essential that this ‘value for money’ question at the EU level is addressed.

I-spy: EU-US trade talks under threat?

To what extent have the latest leaks harmed the EU-US trade talks?

Fugitive whistleblower Edward Snowden’s leaks just keep giving.

First there was Prism, then Tempora. And now, as reported by online by German magazine Der Spiegel over the weekend:  the US has allegedly been spying on EU missions and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic.

Here's a round-up the European response at the national and EU levels:

National

The leaks have caused the most outrage in Germany, which was allegedly monitored more than other countries, leading the Federal government to respond on Monday.

"If it is confirmed that diplomatic representations of the European Union and individual European countries have been spied upon, we will clearly say that bugging friends is unacceptable...We are no longer in the Cold War", said a government spokesman in Berlin. He added that Chancellor Merkel will soon be speaking to President Obama about the matter.

Other German politicians that had been clamouring for a US explanation include German President Joachim Gauck (who quoted Benjamin Franklin: "Those who give up liberty to gain security will lose both'"), Vice-Chancellor Philipp Roesler and Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger. The SPD, the Greens and Die Linke had also been agitating for Chancellor Merkel to intervene.

France isn't happy either, with French President François Hollande calling for an "immediate" end to the alleged spying if the EU-US trade negotiations are to continue. "We cannot accept this kind of behaviour between partners and allies...There can be no negotiations or transactions in any areas until we have obtained these guarantees, for France but also for all of the European Union, for all partners of the United States."

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius added the reports were "completely unacceptable," if corroborated, while his colleague, Christiane Taubira, the Justice Minister,  called US actions “an act of unqualified hostility.”

Italy’s Defence Minister Mario Mauro weighed in this morning, saying that US-Italian relations would be “compromised," if the reports are true. "If we are allies, if we are friends, [then] it’s not acceptable that someone in this relationship behaves like the Soviet Union used to behave towards its satellite states,” he added.

EU

EU officials, political groups and MEPs are miffed too.

Catherine Ashton, The EU's foreign policy chief said the EU is seeking  “urgent clarification." Meanwhile Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, said he was “deeply worried” by the reports, and warned of a “severe impact” on EU-US relations if they are true (remember, the EP's role in EU trade talks was enhanced under the Lisbon Treaty).

Schulz told French radio station France 2 that the US had crossed a line,"I was always sure that dictatorships, some authoritarian systems, tried to listen ... but that measures like that are now practiced by an ally, by a friend, that is shocking, in the case that it is true."

This was echoed by Viviane Reding,  the EU justice commissioner: “Partners do not spy on each other,” she said. “We cannot negotiate over a big transatlantic market if there is the slightest doubt that our partners are carrying out spying activities on the offices of our negotiators."

“How should we still negotiate [a free trade agreement with the US] if we must fear that our negotiating position is being listened to beforehand?” said Elmar Brok, the chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

In an interview, Czech MEP Libor Roucek, the deputy chairman of the S&D group for Foreign Affairs and Transatlantic Relations, said he "can't exclude the option that [he's] being monitored by the US secret services."
 
Some went further, calling for a suspension of the US-EU trade talks altogether. This included the European Parliament's Green Group, and MEPs like the Dutch social democrat Thijs Berman: "[The] US spies on EU diplomats. That's not how we can negotiate a free trade deal. Suspending is logical step," he tweeted on Sunday.

Press
 
The revelations have caused an uproar in the European press (Le Parisien’s ‘hammy’ front page of Obama ‘listening in' captures the general drift), and most of all in Germany. 

Spiegel Online published a commentary today that not only criticised America, but also the lack of action by the government.“The federal government has failed to protect Germans from America’s spy-attacks. This is unacceptable to citizens," it says, calling for an “independent education”  for the US from the German Constitutional Court and a European Committee.

Meanwhile, Austrian Daily Der Standard published a commentary that diverged from the general thrust of European media feeling. Spying is to be expected says the piece: "It would be surprising indeed if the opposite were the case. Being spied on by an ally is about as normal as the systematic surveillance of political opponents."
  
Perhaps Der Standard is right that much of this skulduggery does go on, even amongst allies. But, still, although this is unlikely to deal a fatal blow to EU-US trade talks, the political consequences could well be that certain European countries dig their heels in a little firmer in the negotiations.

On a more general note, for individuals concerned about their privacy and civil liberties, this type of issue only heightens fears that the increasing amount of personal data shared among EU governments isn’t safe and that the protections are inadequate.

In recent years the EU has been developing more and more data sharing databases, and it is not always clear to the general public what happens to their data – this will only fuel ‘big brother’-type fears that is open to misuse, abuse or simply could be accessed by anyone.

Is Sikorski in with a chance of being the next EU foreign minister?

Europe's next foreign minister?

With the current Commission term due to expire next year speculation is already turning to who will replace the current crop – especially the ‘top jobs’ of Commission President (or will Barroso go for a Roosevelt-esque third term?) and the high representative for foreign affairs, a post currently occupied by Britain’s own Baroness Cathy Ashton.

There has been much speculation that following her widely acknowledged ‘low-key’ performance in the role (in fairness this was not entirely her fault), her successor would be a well-established ‘foreign policy star’, with Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski widely tipped. However, while Sikorski would indeed have a degree of ‘star appeal’ and foreign policy credibility (certainly when compared with Ashton), here are the reasons why we think this is unlikely.

Firstly, Sikorski is hugely ambitious and it is difficult to see him agreeing to take-up a position where his ability to seriously influence events will be limited by the well documented limitations of EU foreign policy. In particular Sikorski has ambitions for greater EU military co-operation and will unlikely be satisfied by firing off carefully worded press releases about human rights abuses in developing countries. Yet while many EU countries want to see the EEAS delivering more, many are also reluctant to hand over too much competence in the field of foreign policy decision making to the EU given very real differences of opinion on key issues – most recently Syria. Likewise, EU defence co-operation remains more realistic on paper than on the ground, not least with current spending restrictions, while the recent Cypriot crisis demonstrated Europe’s weakness in that it was willing to gamble Russia gaining greater political and economic influence on the island.

Furthermore, assuming that Sikorski genuinely wants the job, he is somewhat of a marmite character which could cost him support in national capitals. His strong neo-conservative and Atlanticist tendencies are likely to cost him support, not least in Paris, while the Germans may fear that his candidacy would antagonise Russia. Conversely, he has also become a vocal champion for greater EU integration, famously calling on Germany to play an active leading role in Europe, which could also cost him support, especially in the current climate. While his Atlanticism and his strong British links (he was a contemporary of David Cameron and Boris Johnson at Oxford) ought to secure UK support, his rather clumsly recent intervention into UK domestic politics, when he announced that Poland would not help the UK to “wreck or paralyse the EU” and listing a number of tired and clichéd 'EU myths' is not likely to gone down well in Whitehall and Westminster.

Finally, there is also much speculation that current Polish PM Donald Tusk could be being lined up to replace Barroso, in which case Sikorski's candidacy for high representative would be a non-starter.

All in all we would expect the next high representative, while likely to be more heavyweight than Baroness Ashton, will nonetheless not be someone with a personality and profile to challenge national leaders’ primacy in the area of foreign policy.

Will the EU follow France into the Malian desert?

"We are all with you"

Le Monde's cartoonist left a clear image - France's President Hollande rushing off into the Malian desert while the rest of the EU sits behind and pontificates.

France has a history of interventions in Francophone Africa and mostly they are primarily of regional importance. This time though it seems France is trying to fry a bigger fish: the biggest concentration of Islamic fundamentalists in West Africa. So should this be just a French responsibility or should they expect help from the EU? (NATO will always be a second choice for France) Well, evidently the French media feels others in the EU are not pulling their weight.

EU states have a history of under-investment in their own security and failing to help in multilateral actions. In Afghanistan the USA's allies invariably left it with the lion's share of the heavy lifting and in Libya, in the EU's neighbourhood, big states such as Poland and Germany decided to sit it out. 

But the French are clearly beginning to feel Mali should be different. The Economist quotes French conservative opposition leader, Jean-François Copé, saying “for now, our country is alone at the front.” And on Channel 4 News Former French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner said:

"The British people for such a mission are our closest friend. We need them. For the time being we are alone. I beg you don't leave the French alone. This is a common mission, this is a common threat, we are all fighting extremism."

A reasonable enough plea - though he sort of spoiled his case by adding that in his view "part of the reason" Britain was dragging its heels was because of the Conservatives' sceptical attitude to EU membership, when in fact, Anglo-French defence and foreign policy cooperation is widely seen in Conservative circles as exactly the type of issue and network-based approach that European cooperation should be more geared towards. Also, that a former French foreign minister is begging for the UK's assistance only serves to highlight how important the UK's military and clout is in terms of lending the EU geopolitical credibility. It also says something about the perpetual fear in some circles of the UK being "isolated" in Europe...

How long France will take to complete its operations in Mali is unclear, but the longer it drags on, help in the form of training and logistics as promised by the UK, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Denmark may not be enough. So will this end up becoming a European operation? One thing remains clear: as ever, when it comes to defence and security capabilities, co-operation and political will are far more important than politicians grand designs for European "state" building.

Ashton In Hot Water

Update 15:02 - Two additional twists to this story. The Telegraph's Bruno Waterfield has just noted on Twitter that an 'amended' version of Ashton's speech has now been published (see here). The controversial paragraph now reads, "When we see what is happening in Gaza and Sderot [an Israeli town less than one mile from Gaza] and in different parts of the world" - i.e. it explicitly mentions victims on the Israeli side of the Gaza strip. Amending a transcript would seem like a weird exercise had it not been for the fact that Ashton actually does make the reference to the two sides in the speech she delivered yesterday (available here, the reference is 12:30 in).

In other words, a full-scale diplomatic row has been triggered by what looks like a most unfortunate typo in a transcript...

EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton - or 'High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission', as her official title reads - has a difficult job. In fact, its up there with managing the English national football team in terms of 'can't win' positions.

After having been on the receiving end of a barrage of criticism from left, right and centre, not least a letter signed by twelve member states in December - including Germany, France, Italy and Poland – in which they expressed concerns over the functioning of the EU's diplomatic service, the EEAS, Baroness Ashton has landed herself in some fresh controversy.

In a speech to a group of Palestinian youth in Brussels yesterday, she said,

"And the days when we remember young people who have been killed in all sorts of terrible circumstances - the Belgian children having lost their lives in a terrible tragedy and when we think of what happened in Toulouse today, when we remember what happened in Norway a year ago, when we know what is happening in Syria, when we see what is happening in Gaza and in different parts of the world - we remember young people and children who lose their lives."

This didn't go down well with the Israeli government, with a number of ministers coming out to criticise Ashton for what they see as an inappropriate comparison and reference. Defence Minister Ehud Barak said, "I hope that the EU's foreign minister will quickly realise the mistake she made and withdraw her comments." Opposition leader Tzipi Livni added,"There is no similarity between an act of hatred or a leader killing members of his nation and a country fighting terror, even if civilians are harmed."

Interior Minister Eli Yishai went even further and called for Ashton's resignation:

"The statement by Lady Ashton further harms the ability of the European Union to be an honest broker [between Israel and the Palestinians...[Ashton] can no longer serve in her position."

In a statement today, Ashton's spokesperson sought to clarify the remarks:

We want to make this clear, because her words yesterday...were grossly distorted by one of the news agencies. In her remarks, [Ashton] referred to tragedies taking the lives of children around the world and drew no parallel whatsoever between the circumstances of the Toulouse attack and the situation in Gaza.

Judge for yourselves - Asthon's full speech is available here, with the last paragraph being the key one for the discussion.

As we said, Ashton really does have a difficult job.

A crude agreement

On Monday Brussels announced an EU-wide ban on oil contracts between Iran and member states. The hope is that these sanctions will choke the Islamic republic’s finances, and prevent its nuclear programme from progressing further. However, as with countless other EU foreign policy objectives, the goals look to have been undermined by the lack of consensus between EU member states.

Diplomats admitted that negotiating the embargo had been difficult. Quite an understatement given that the enforcement of the embargo has been delayed six months just to ensure that an agreement could be met. The key dispute comes from the fact that Greece, Italy and Spain are far more dependent on Iranian exports than their Northern neighbours. Greece imports up to a third of its oil from the Islamic state, with which it has negotiated a favourable rate. Italy and Spain buy 10% of their oil from Iran.

Forcing these countries to source such a large percentage of their oil from another producer in such a short time frame will undoubtedly put additional costs on their economies (not to mention the potential for higher prices which we discuss below). This seems slightly counterproductive to say the least when they are already struggling to stay afloat in the storm of the eurozone crisis. Not that you can abandon all policy goals on the basis of economics, but it highlights the breadth of impact which the eurozone crisis will continue to have until a lasting solution is found.

That said, fears of an impending energy crisis are alarmist. For one, Saudi Arabia has assured European governments that it will increase its production capacity to replace Iranian imports, which represent a fairly small share of overall EU oil consumption. Gaps in supply can also be met by Libya, which is set to boost exports after a year in remission.

A massive price hike is also unlikely, with refineries taking the hit more than consumers. Providing it does not switch to other Middle Easter suppliers, China will become the biggest consumer of Iranian oil, creating a monopsony through which it can drive down prices. Iran has shown itself willing to sell oil under the market price during previous embargoes. An interesting side effect then is that China could end up benefitting most from this ban by sucking up the excess Iranian supply at low prices. Not the EU’s fault, but it seems to undermine any prospect of the embargo having a huge financial impact on Iran.

Will Europe’s energy future be unaffected then?

Possibly, if two conditions hold:

- First, Iran must not blockade the Strait of Hormuz, through which Europe accesses Saudi oil. This seems unlikely since doing so would likely cause a full scale military conflict as the US has vowed to defend EU cargoes.
- Second, Iran must not throw a spanner in the works by cutting off oil supply immediately (something which Europe could not cope with as the delayed start of the embargo shows).

Will any of this bring Iran ‘back to the table’?

As EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton outlined, the aim is to “bring Iran back to the table”. It’s not clear this will be the case - Iran has survived previous embargoes, some of which have even hardened support for the regime. Without China and India joining the embargo (highly unlikely) Iran may not feel much of a squeeze. Even if they did, oil prices would skyrocket creating even more problems for the eurozone.

All in all then, this embargo has been a bit of a mess. Whether or not the aims are valid, it has once again highlighted the disparities in foreign policy goals within the EU, and therefore the limits of a combined foreign policy. It also brings home that, despite its size, the EU’s power is to some extent dwarfed by that of China and the US. Ultimately, their decisions will make or break this embargo, not the EU’s.

EU've just been Ashtonised!

An interesting op-ed in Le Monde from Bastien Nivet of the Paris-based IRIS think-tank notes,

"A new notion is beginning to dominate the debate on the international action of the European Union: the Ashtonisation of the EU. Inspired by the surname of [EU Foreign Minister] Catherine Ashton, this notion describes a skillful mix of lack of anticipation, reactivity and diplomatic coherence, of absence of strategic ambitions and leadership by the EU, and of the abandonment of a timid europeanisation of stakes in foreign, security and defence policy to the benefit of the re-appropriation of this process by some member states."

This is certainly an unfortunate neologism, but, as Nivet points out, this "Ashtonisation" is also a result of member states realising that the EU architecture is too unwieldy:

“Paris is about to succeed in the incredible challenge of reducing the ambitions and the interests of the European Security and Defence Policy at a pace and with an effectiveness that not even the most eurosceptic Britons would have dreamed of…Paris now seems to have come to a decision: what is ambitious will be done with the Britons outside of the EU framework, what is not will be done with them as well, within the EU framework.”

Monsieur Nivet concludes his piece with a warning: a number of factors are combining to make the EU an “Ashtonised actor, which doesn’t keep up with the global strategic changes under way.”

Ashtonishing!

EU military HQ always going to be a non-starter for the UK

As if the EU hasn’t got enough on its plate, yesterday saw EU Foreign Minister Baroness Ashton present a proposal, at a meeting between EU foreign ministers, calling for the creation of an EU military headquarters (a so-called ‘Operations Headquarters’ OHQ). This comes despite the fact that the new External Action Service itself is barely even up and running. And despite the increasing number of voices that doubt that a single EU foreign policy is even possible.

According to the Sunday Times, Ashton wants the OHQ to “command and control” future European civilian and military campaigns. The idea has been knocking around since 2003, when it was rebuffed by the UK and the US, among others, but has been revived with the backing of France, Germany and Poland. French support for the measure goes back some time but it has always met with staunch opposition from the UK, which sees it as an unnecessary duplication of existing NATO arrangements.

Given that this is a decision that would require unanimity and that the UK is one of only two major EU military powers (France being the other), yesterday’s proposal seemed an unwise, direct challenge to the UK. The response from William Hague was expectedly unequivocal,

"There is no way we will agree to this, now or in the future...We won't be agreeing to a permanent operational headquarters and therefore we are not able to welcome today's report by Cathy Ashton, the High Representative, on this matter".

"We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning”

"Secondly, it's likely to be a much more costly solution than existing structures; and thirdly, a lot can be done by improving the structures that already exist"

This isn't simply a case of the UK 'not seeing the need' for a permanent EU military HQ, it is that it sees it as a potential threat to the UK's national interests. Britain will veto anything that looks like it might threaten NATO because, when it comes to defence, the transatlantic alliance remains paramount (and probably always will).

It is often said that the UK doesn't 'understand Europe' but this example illustrates that this also works the other way.

The Libyan conflict has shown that European countries can and need to work together when there is the political will to do so. However, like over Iraq, it has also shown that there are often fundamental disagreements on the use of military force among EU member states, this time with France and Britain on the one side and Germany on the other. If they are serious about defence, European governments need to boost their individual capabilities and improve interoperability on an ad hoc basis. EU mission creep is simply an unnecessary and potentially damaging distraction.

ENP Reform: Better But Still Not Looking At The Bigger Picture

EU Foreign Minister Baroness Catherine Ashton yesterday presented the Commission’s proposals for a revamp of EU aid to post-Communist countries, North Africa and the Middle East under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This review was certainly due: the recent upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria have unmasked several failures in the EU’s current approach, which we looked at in detail in a recent report.

To be fair, the Commission has some sensible ideas for ENP reform (some of which we also recommended), although it steers well clear of several “sensitive” big-picture issues that we think should be addressed as a matter of priority. But let’s start with the encouraging parts of the Commission’s proposals.

As we pointed out, the EU should put greater emphasis on “negative” conditionality when making decisions about funding. Aid must not only be frozen when a major crisis breaks out, such as in Libya. On the contrary, the Commission must make clear that it stands ready to pull the plug if a country fails to make progress on agreed democratic reform and human rights. The Commission states that, from now on, “for countries where reform has not taken place, the EU will reconsider or even reduce funding.” The question remains how this would operate in practice, as it will almost certainly face opposition from member states with vested interests in North Africa and the Middle East, notably France, Italy and Spain.

The Commission also says that “a stronger link” will be established between its annual “Progress Reports” and the amount of money these countries are granted. Again, this looks like a sensible suggestion. We show in our report that, previously, the Commission consistently increased its aid to countries like Egypt and Tunisia despite noting limited or no progress on human rights or democratic reform.

The EU will "suggest to partners that they focus on a limited number of short and medium-term priorities." We noted that the effectiveness of several ENP projects is undermined by the EU’s tendency to "attempt too much." Concentrating on a smaller number of priorities offers a far greater chance of success and, just as importantly, European citizens will find it easier to gauge the EU’s performance.

From our point of view, the most interesting part of yesterday’s communication is the Commission’s commitment to more closely monitoring its use of budget support. It is now pledging to take into account the "overall country situation regarding democracy, accountability, the rule of law and sound financial management." The fact this needed to be spelled out is of course rather shocking but better late than never.

The inappropriate use of budget support is a point we have consistently stressed: providing funding directly to the coffers of regimes, such as those in Tunisia and Egypt, which were clearly corrupt is no way to spend European taxpayers’ money.

However, despite some steps forward, the Commission has once again chosen to remain silent with regard to our suggestion of making EU member states’ contributions to the ENP voluntary. We have consistently argued that voluntary contributions would give an instant boost to the transparency and accountability of EU aid funding.

The Commission’s proposals on trade are also disappointing. Along with the over-used reference to the creation of a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” with its neighbours, the Commission also says that “the EU will step up efforts” to conclude ongoing negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. This sounds way too vague and neglects the fact that much of this has to do with EU policies beyond the confines of the ENP. To truly honour this commitment would require a far greater openness to trade and an end to the distorting effects that the Common Agricultural Policy has on developing countries.

And, with their new powers gained under the Lisbon Treaty, MEPs are likely to continue prioritising the interests of European farmers – as they’re currently doing by withholding a free trade agreement on agricultural products with Morocco.

Finally, there's the question of migration. On this point, the Commission looks more than a bit confused. Ashton's report says that the EU will "pursue the process of visa facilitation for selected ENP partners and visa liberalisation for those most advanced." However, only a day earlier, EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström put forward proposals for a "safeguard clause" allowing for the temporary suspension of the visa-free travel arrangements that the EU has in place with a number of third countries. Added to the current row over the border-free Schengen zone, the EU cannot credibly claim to have a coherent migration policy, which makes Ashton's proposals look like they will only create false hope.

Ultimately, until the EU comes up with a comprehensive strategy, which includes immigration, trade and reforming the CAP, reform of the ENP will remain a detail.

Hague and Lidington raising the stakes?

The last few days have seen some tough talk from the UK's Foreign Office on the size and role of Catherine Ashton's External Action Service. Following a meeting of EU foreign ministers yesterday, Europe Minister David Lidington used uncharacteristically undiplomatic - albeit justified - language, describing Ashton's demands for a 5.8% increase to the EEAS' budget next year as "somewhat ludicrous", adding “They’ve got to get real as far as the budget is concerned.” (indeed)

He also made a point of underlining how the FCO is now keeping a watchful eye on the EU's 136 embassies around the world, saying that “William [Hague] has sent out instructions to all our posts around the world to be vigilant about any risk of competence creep,” referring to the ever-present risk of the EEAS taking on an increasing number of responsibilities that should belong to member states.

And, in case anyone in Ashton's bureaucratic machine hadn't quite got the message, the man himself (Hague, that is) used an interview on the Today Programme this morning to fire a couple of warning shots of his own. On the proposed budget increase for the EEAS, he said,

"I don't think it is necessary to have such an increase at a time where diplomatic services across the world, certainly across Europe, are tightening their belts, becoming more efficient. We are expanding our diplomatic network in the world but we are doing that by saving GBP100 million of administrative costs."

On the risk of the EEAS' incrementally increasing its power, he noted,

"We will always guard against mission creep. We are very clear about what's a UK responsibility and what is an External Action Service responsibility. I am certainly giving a pre-emptive warning. Where we have seen one or two instances of it, we have dealt with that but we will always be vigilant about that."

Then he went on to make, possibly, the most important point of all - which we highlighted in our recent paper looking at the need to overhaul the EU's North Africa and Middle East policy (which to be fair, is a view that the Commission/the EEAS is coming around to as well):

“Where more money is needed…is the much bigger project, and it’s one much in line with what the United States is seeking, of a bold and ambitious approach to change in the Middle East and North Africa - Europe providing a magnet for positive change; the resources that will help small and medium sized enterprises to grow in these countries and bring economic stability. And that is the big issue rather than the administrative budget of the External Action Service."

This is a pretty robust - but more importantly a sensible - line from the Foreign Office. More please.

What's the point then?

This is a pretty interesting comment from the Chief Operating Officer of the EU's diplomatic service (the EEAS), David O'Sullivan. In an interview with EUobserver, he said:

"At the end of the day, it's the member states that decide whether they want to speak with one voice, and there are moments when there are divergences. The High Representative [Baroness Catherine Ashton] has difficulty expressing a common European view if one doesn't exist...It is our hope that [the EEAS] will facilitate this process...We cannot at the end of the day change fundamental disagreements between member states."

Well put. As we've consistently argued, institutions cannot replace real policies - particularly in foreign affairs where it's clear that the EU remains a bloc of 27 national policies, which occassionally find common ground.

But his begs the question: what's the added value of the EEAS in the first place? If Ashton and the EEAS don't have the power to act in the absence of a common position shared by all 27 member states - a rare occurence indeed - is it then really worth spending hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money every year (€464 million only in 2011) to run a giant "facilitator"?

Given the criticism Ashton is facing (Only two weeks ago, Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere openly criticised her inability to get EU governments to agree on any of the most sensitive issues - not least the upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East - during her first year in the job), we wonder if the good Baroness isn't starting to ask herself that question as well, despite some good talk.

EU common position on Libya blown apart

Attempts to create a common EU foreign policy rest on the notion that a single, clear voice emanating from Europe would carry more weight than a shrill, discordant cacophony of individual voices from member states. This is appealing in principle, but as we've argued again and again - it cannot be achoeved artificially.

During the unrest in Egypt, we noted that when Europe does indeed “speak with one voice”, it takes a painfully long time to co-ordinate, and usually results in a bland, anodyne statement. This is because the national interests of 27 member states have to be amalgamated, so as not to prejudice any of their divergent interests in wider international affairs.

Yesterday’s unilateral decision by France to recognise the Libyan rebels in Benghazi as the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people made for some lively discussions between the EU’s foreign ministers and some enlightening press briefings.

During “an unusually candid” press briefing, German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle said he had been sitting next to his French counterpart Alain Juppe when the news broke, and that Mr. Juppe later complained that he had not been pre-notified, and that Mr Sarkozy appears to have acted "on a whim".

Italy distanced itself from the French position, with foreign minister Franco Frattini saying the UN and EU should send new fact-finding missions to Benghazi before making any decisions, while Belgian foreign minister Steven Vanackere said there is a “difference between engagement and recognition”. Sweden’s foreign minister chose a direct route of registering his bemusement at France’s circumvention of diplomatic norms by tweeting:

“Sweden recognizes states - not regimes. And most other EU countries are the same. Somewhat unclear on what France does.”

The confused state of affairs is further exacerbated by the fact the EU is trying to decide what line to take on a possible no-fly zone which might involve air strikes against Libyan military targets, which the European Parliament has urged them to do yesterday, with Labour MEP Richard Howitt warning that that EU states must “be prepared to change the current rules of engagement on whether military measures are required against colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime”. Today, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy sent a letter to EU Council President Herman van Rompuy which took a decisive position on the Libyan position, arguing:

“the deliberate use of military force against civilians is utterly unacceptable… when the Libyan people win their fundamental rights, we should be ready to support them with the necessary assistance and cooperation”.

Meanwhile, Euobserver has reported Baroness Ashton's people are not keen to visit Libya due to the volatile security situation in the region, prompting the question “what is exactly is it that they are paid so well to do?”

The confusion over Sarkozy’s decision to recognise the Libyan opposition unilaterally, and the lead taken on the Libyan crisis by France and the UK in general have yet again highlighted the difficulty, some would say futility, of assembling a common EU foreign policy.

Let's hope that EU leaders can come up with something more coherent at today's summit.

Ashton's bureaucratic empire

This is the complex spider's web that constitutes Catherine Ashton's new EU Foreign Office. A larger version of the organisation chart is available here. Make what sense of it you can.

Hat-tip "Migrants at sea"

In need of an ice-breaker

The traditional 'family photo' from today's EU summit...



Is it just us, or does it seem as if the couple at the end, Ashton and Berlusconi, don't quite know what to talk about...?

(Which could have something to do with the fact that one is your typical monolingual Brit and the other doesn't speak a word of English. Though, in truth, we suspect that's not the only reason)

Egypt: Europe speaks but very slowly

"Speaking with one voice" has consistently been the mantra or motto of those in favour of a single EU foreign policy. The EU Foreign Minister post, occupied by Catherine Ashton since it was created by the Lisbon Treaty, is supposed to be the mouthpiece.

So far Ashton's statements have been frequent (nothing seems to occur without some comment, however anodyne). But with events continually unfolding in Egypt, the EU has been called on to say something meaningful.

Compare and contrast:

The Franco-British-German joint letter released on Saturday regarding the ongoing events in Egypt:

The Egyptian people have legitimate grievances and a longing for a just and better future. We urge President Mubarak to embark on a process of transformation which should be reflected in a broad-based government and in free and fair elections.

EU Foreign Minister Baroness Ashton, ahead of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council yesterday:

...The legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people should be responded to – their aspirations for a just, for a better future should be met with urgent, concrete and decisive answers and with real steps. There needs to be a peaceful way forward based on an open and serious dialogue with the opposition parties and all parts of civil society, and we believe it needs to happen now.

Still no mention of "free and fair elections" from Ashton, two days after the initial joint letter.

The conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting:

The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to embark on an orderly transition through a broadbased government leading to a genuine process of substantial democratic reform with full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, paving the way for free and fair elections.

And there we have it, the EU is in favour of "free and fair elections".

Is there a better illustration as to why the EU's fledgling foreign policy apparatus can only ever be a decorative bureaucratic exercise in finding the lowest common denominator?

Today's El Pais reads:

The EU popped into the Egyptian crisis yesterday, almost one week after the popular outbreak, to release a communiqué of predictable inanity...Being how the EU always is, it pushed the principle of precaution. There was no reference to Mubarak or his future.

As we noted yesterday, Le Figaro didn't exactly describe the EU's joint-response to the crisis in a flattering way either and Charlemagne notes that the French press is becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of Ashton and her foreign policy machine.

It seems Europeans are increasingly speaking with one voice, but it's not quite what the people at the top had in mind.

Policy before institution, please

In regards to Egypt, institutional Europe was lacking a clear line until [French President] Nicolas Sarkozy, [German Chancellor] Angela Merkel and David Cameron decided to put pressure on [Egyptian leader] Hosni Mubarak to implement the ‘political, economic and social reforms’ he had pledged. Until then, Catherine Ashton, the voice of [the EU’s] diplomacy, and Herman Van Rompuy, President of the [European] Council, had been grinding topical phrases about the rejection of violence and the necessity of dialogue.

- An article in today's Le Figaro criticises the EU’s response to the recent crises in the Arab world and summarises the problems inherent in the EU's confused foreign policy set-up, i.e. institutions without real policies.

Caught between Ukraine and Majorca

EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton is absent from the meeting of EU defence ministers in Majorca today - the first to be held since the Lisbon Treaty came into force.

AFP reports that the defence ministers will be considering increased permanent structured co-operation, where several member states can move cooperation on common security and defence policy forward on their own under the terms of the Treaty, with the say-so of only a qualified majority of member states.

However, Lady Ashton has been double booked, and will instead attend the investiture ceremony of the new Ukranian President, missing discussions on how Lisbon will impact on defence cooperation. One EU diplomat said they has been really looking forward to hearing Ashton's views, "Especially as, thanks to the treaty, the opportunity is there to reinforce Europe's defence, to give it more visibility".

Another rather snippy EU diplomat also said, "Her predecessor Javier Solana didn't miss a single meeting of this type with the defence ministers. Something has changed in the order of priorities." Jean Quatremer describes Ashton's "empty-chair policy" as "all the more infuriating" because NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is to attend.

Spain, current holder of the EU Presidency, has made relaunching EU defence strategy one of its priorities of its six month term. The Spanish Defence Minister Carme Chacon has said that one of the issues defence ministers are working towards is "progress towards a European armed force; step by step, but that is our objective." She has that objective in common with Germany, whose Foreign Minister said earlier in the month that the creation of a European army should be the long term goal of common security and defence policy.

With various EU defence ministers dreaming of a European army, the US yesterday made more noises about Europe's unwillingness to contribute to NATO, with Defence Secretary Robert Gates saying that the "pacification of Europe" has gone too far and is "an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st [century]", and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for an "honest discussion" of European defence spending.

Ashton's decision to make a ceremonial visit to the Ukraine rather than discuss co-ordinated EU defence policy will not doubt be frustrating for the French and Germans, who have been talking about a Franco-German security policy driving EU defence, but is a telling reminder to the outside world of the EU's preference for pomp and ceremony over dealing with the challenges of the here and now. For one, the US' patience is clearly running out.

Jobs for the boys

EUobserver today reports that Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has written an angry letter to EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton demanding to know why Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has appointed 'his man' as the EU's new ambassador to Washington when, under the Lisbon Treaty, Ashton is meant to be overseeing such appointments.

Ashton is currently in talks with the member states about establishing the EU's new diplomatic corps, the External Action Service (EAS), and Barroso spotted this "transitional" phase as an opportunity to install Joao Vale de Almeida, his former chief of staff, as his eyes and ears in Washington. As one EU diplomat said, "In the future, if the US wants to send a message to the EU, it will go through Almeida because it knows he has a special relationship with Barroso. Ashton will be left out."

As Charlemagne points out, Ashton, who is supposed to serve both national governments and the Commission, has consistently been criticised by member states for being in bed with the Commission and allowing it too much sway over the EU's new foreign policy apparatus. No one can argue that this isn't a significant and symbolic move by Barroso. After all, he didn't send his mate off to one of the EU's various new embassies in Kabul or Addis Ababa but to Washington!

Many have argued that the appointment of the low-profile Ashton as EU Foreign Minister was an attempt by member states to limit the influence that the post would have over national governments. This of course begs the question why create the post in the first place? However, the 'play it safe' appointment of Ashton appears to be backfiring entirely as the Commission sees her weakness as a golden opportunity to increase its influence over the EU's foreign policy - a far greater threat to the institutional balance.

It is tempting to admire Barroso's cunning but it’s also a bit worrying that national governments were powerless to stop him appointing an old mate to such a key position, given the clear conflict of interest.

Incidentally, Carl Bildt is all over the place at the moment. Having been one of the strongest supporters of the Lisbon Treaty he now claims to have always predicted (like some others) that the institutional set-up that it created was destined to fail. "I’ve always questioned whether the construction would work... the post [EU foreign minister] is set up in a way that makes it virtually impossible", he told Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter.

Just goes to show that there's nothing quite like the cold shower of reality to make people come to their senses.