Was the Greek government right to call a snap Presidential election?

Open Europe's Raoul Ruparel asks this question over on his Forbes blog, concluding it was probably the correct political choice but that plenty of risks remain in the process. Full post below:

The news out of Greece has been improving slightly in the past few months in a welcome change from the trend of bleak economic and political news out of the struggling Eurozone state. However, the next few months could see the country reverting to trend somewhat.

Eurozone finance ministers agreed yesterday to allow Greece a technical extension of 2 months to its bailout which is due to finish at the end of this year. This is to allow the final quarterly review of the bailout to be completed – a necessary step to ensure the reforms are in place which in turn will allow for release of the final cash payment from the Eurozone.

Following the agreement, the Greek government announced that it will hold the first round of its Presidential election on 17 December, moving it up from February.

Together these announcements have crystallised some long standing economic and political risks for Greece going into the New Year. However, there are some key questions which spawn from these decisions and also some further risks which remain unanswered, I outline them below.

How does the Presidential election work and what is the likely outcome?

• The President (a largely ceremonial role) is elected by the Greek parliament. In the first or second round the candidate must gain 200 out of 300 votes from MPs. If this is not done then he needs 180 in the third round. If no candidate is found after three rounds, snap general elections are called (these would be around the end of January if they did happen).
• Currently the New Democracy and Pasok coalition holds 155 seats, while the opposition Syriza party has refused to back a joint candidate (a compromise often used in the past) since it is leading in the polls and wants snap elections.
• The government today announced former European Commissioner and Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Dimas as its candidate. 
• There is a chance that the government can gain the 180 seats – many of the smaller parties and independent candidates would lose seats to Syriza in a new election and therefore want to avoid having one. Currently, Greek officials put the chance of success at around 50:50 (not exactly inspiring but better than some had expected previously).

What questions still need to be answered?

• It remains unclear exactly how the extension of the bailout will play out. It is assumed the two sides will reach an agreement as before, with Greece eventually pushing through tough reforms. This is probable again but not guaranteed – the room for manoeuvre for the government is limited by the threat of elections. There is only so much they can do without harming their vote share further. Furthermore, the coalition partner Pasok is almost wiped out as a political force and therefore is scrambling for some way to boost its presence. This could lead to radical choices with an election looming.
• There has also been little progress on exactly how Greece will fund itself for next year. The Eurozone has said it is supportive of granting Greece an precautionary credit line – but this is complicated by a number of factors, not least that it is not very precautionary since it seems almost guaranteed that Greece will need to tap it.
• Furthermore, the involvement of the IMF remains unclear. Greece harbours significant resentment towards the IMF and wants to move away from their funding, even though they are still due to pay out another €9bn in 2015 and 2016. If they stay, they will need guarantees that Greece will be able to fund itself for 12 months, and if they leave their funding stream will need to be replaced.

Was the government right to move up the vote?

• It is a risky play, but I think it was probably the correct decision (at least from a political perspective). The key reason is that the uncertainty around what comes after the current bailout (which now ends in February) takes some power away from Syriza. The government has proven it can negotiate with the EU/IMF/ECB Troika and has a track record of managing crises. Syriza does not. As we have seen in Greece over the past few years, fear of uncertainty and possible increasing the chance of Grexit once again can be an important factor in peoples’ voting and thinking.
• Furthermore, the ideal position for Syriza is that a follow on programme would have been negotiated before the vote on the President and potential elections. This would have provided certainty and a platform which Syriza could try to negotiate a new bailout programme and a restructuring of Greece’s debt.
• One key question which remains unanswered is, what would happen if elections take place and Syriza win? While Syriza claim to support euro membership they want a fundamental change in the way Greece approaches European issues. Notably they want a debt restructuring and a complete overhaul of the programme for reforms and consolidation in Greece which accompanies the bailout (or presumably which would tie into a restructuring). This seems very unlikely to materialise, but it is not clear if they would push for a Greek exit from the euro if their demands are not met or if they would temper their position.
• All that being said, if this doesn’t pan out, then Greece will face elections early next year, in a climate of serious uncertainty with no clear plan to exit the bailout. Then again, this was always the risk and may always have materialised.

Overall, risks are coalescing in Greece once again. The fundamental questions over how to fund Greece in the medium term (as it economy tries to recover) or how it will continue to deal with incorrect interest rates and a too strong currency have never been answered. The government’s plan to move up the election is a risky one but politically probably the correct option. Ultimately, the next few months will be a bumpy ride for Greece, but the wider Eurozone should not be too affected since it has plenty of buffers in place to deal with such a crisis.

German parties scramble as third Greek bailout drops into the election campaign

The parties scramble on Greece in the election campaign

As we discussed yesterday, Germany has finally owned up to what everyone already knew – Greece needs more help. Not exactly ground breaking news some might say, but given that the German federal elections are 4 weeks away, the response in Germany has been frantic – providing a bit more insight into how each party views the eurozone crisis.

CDU
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said yesterday:

“I cannot say today what amount would possibly be needed…I cannot put forward a number, or confirm one. I don't know. One cannot know…We can only decide in the middle of next year." 

“I have to say I am a little surprised. Each Member of Parliament has all materials [relating to Greece.] And that, what [German Finance Minister Wolfgang] Schäuble said yesterday about Greece, everyone already knew that.”

Since Schäuble let the cat out of the bag a few days ago, the government, (via numerous politicians and spokespeople) has been tirelessly trying to display the comments as being in line with existing party policy. It has also tried to dispel the discussion altogether, suggesting no decision will be taken until mid-2014.

SPD
As expected in an election campaign, the opposition has jumped on the slip up. In an interview with Osnabrücker Zeitung, SPD Chancellor Candidate Peer Steinbrück said:

“I say clearly that saving Europe and the cohesion of the continent will cost something, also us Germans. It is time that Mrs Merkel tells that honestly to the people.”

In an interview with Handelsblatt, SPD Chairman Sigmar Gabriel said:

“[This] is the difference between the Chancellor and the SPD. Mrs Merkel says Germany will not go into a debt-union. In reality, the Chancellor has already long-organised such debt union secretly via the ECB. Mr Draghi has taken over state financing in the crisis states. But even before the election, the bill is going to arrive, in that Greece will guaranteed apply for another debt haircut.”

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also made his first foray into the election, telling a party rally:

“It is a big lie that Germany will not have to pay for Europe.”

For all the SPD's attempts to push the CDU into admitting that the eurozone will need further aid, it still isn’t entirely clear what the SPD sees as the solution to the eurozone crisis. This has hampered its attempts to take advantage of the situation. It’s also telling that interventions by SPD party 'big beasts' seem to make Chancellor candidate Steinbrück look timid and uninspiring -- rather than helping him.

CSU
The Bavarian sister party of the CDU has been notoriously pessimistic over the eurozone crisis and is, expectedly, none too happy about the timing and the substance of the admission that Greece needs more aid.

CSU leader and President of Barvaria, Horst Seehofer said that a new aid package for Greece "is not in question," and that he is "not very happy," with the current discussion. Meanwhile, Bavarian Finance Minister Markus Soeder warned that:

“It was completely wrong to announce a third programme [for Greece] now.”

ECB
The ECB has offered veiled support to the German government. ECB Executive Board member Jörg Asmussen, who was visiting Athens yesterday, said that the plan remained to assess Greece’s situation once it registers an annual primary budget surplus -- likely at the end of this year.

Meanwhile, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann commented that, “Nobody here [in Germany] longs for the D-Mark…We are fighting for a stable euro,” playing down fears this could revive talk of a eurozone break up.

Other parties have weighed in as well, with Alternative für Deutschland and Die Linke slamming the prospect of any further bailouts as expected. This incident could potentially help increase their share of the vote, although it may well come at the expense of the junior coalition partner, the FDP, which has been fairly quiet throughout this episode – that of course could make creating a governing coalition a bit trickier.

Despite the CDU's attempts then, this issue seems here to stay, although it is unlikely to have a significant bearing on the outcome of the election.

That said, it doesn't paint a rosy picture for the German approach to the eurozone crisis after the election. Those expecting huge change are likely to be dissapointed. Another bailout simply suggests more of the same. Meanwhile, all parties seem short of any real policies for how to change the current approach and/or find a real solution to the eurozone's economic woes.

Germany finally admits to a third Greek bailout, but what form might it take?

It seems the German government has finally publicly accepted what everyone already knew – that Greece will need some kind of further financial assistance after its second bailout programme expires at the end of 2014. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble told a CDU election rally yesterday:

"There will have to be another [bailout] programme in Greece," in order to help the country "get over the hill" of debt repayments it faces.

Despite attempts from both the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and German finance ministry spokesmen to row back from the comments and suggest they are not, in fact, a change in stance, the remarks seem to have stuck.

What form might the third bailout package take?

• According to the IMF, Greece's total funding gap up to the end of 2015 is around €11.1 billion (5.8% of GDP) – so this can be taken as a lower bound of the funding needed. Privatisation receipts (which have notoriously fallen short) are expected to reach €7.7 billion over the next three years. Further shortfalls here could push up funding needs.

• A further extension of maturities and reduction in interest rates on the official sector loans, as suggested by EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn also seems likely. However, interest on loans from the EFSF - the eurozone's temporary bailout fund - are already at cost and payments have been deferred for ten years. The IMF is also unlikely to reduce its interest rate as this would amount to a form of debt restructuring, which the IMF refuses to engage in due to being the most senior creditor. This leaves only the eurozone's bilateral loans from the first Greek bailout, the interest on which has already been reduced to around 1.5% (well below most eurozone states' long-term borrowing costs). Therefore, scope for further reduction is limited, and the benefit it could provide would amount, at most, to a couple of billion spread over a long period, as we have previously noted.

• Another widely touted proposal is to use the leftover funds originally allocated for Greek bank recapitalisation. So far, according to the IMF, Greek banks have received €40.9 billion out of an allocated €50 billion. Although it seems the EFSF expects this to increase to around €48.2 billion. It is likely some additional buffer will be needed, given the pace of increase in bad loans in Greece, meaning the amount available is likely to be between €2bn and €4bn max.

• A final idea, reported by Süddeutsche Zeitung, is that EU structural funds could be able to provide some of this funding. It’s not clear exactly how this would happen and, as we’ve noted before, we're sceptical of the idea that there is lots of excess money floating around to be easily reallocated in the EU's structural fund programme. Given that the new EU budget headlines for 2014-2020 are set, it's not clear how much more money can be squeezed out for Greece. One option would be to adjust the 'co-financing rate' (the amount the Greek government contributes to each project to gain funding) but this has already been adjusted and provided little boost to the take up of funds, which remains well below target.

Lots of questions to be answered then about the size and format of what may be the trickiest Greek bailout to date, given the tough political constraints and the on-going (very tenuous) premise of debt sustainability. An important consideration, as Schäuble suggested, will be to get Greece over its funding hump in the next couple of years (data from Greek debt bulletins):

The final point to note is the continuing German aversion to further debt relief for Greece, something the IMF and nearly all private observers accept is necessary. Within Germany, this seems to be a result of the government 'learning its lesson' from the first Greek debt restructuring, which patently failed. However, the German government seems to be learning the wrong lesson for the wrong reasons – it was not that restructuring was a bad idea in itself, but simply that all such a large amount of debt was held by Greek banks that the ensuing recapitalisation and bailout negated any benefit.

The German government clearly remains loathe to discuss any such details, meaning a clear plan is unlikely to emerge until the end of the year. In the meantime, we can’t help but wonder how the Greek public will react to the prospect of another bailout with another set of conditions attached. Could the big unknown outside the eurozone begin to look attractive once again? Maybe, or maybe not - but it may well start to factor into their thinking at some point.

IMF takes a more critical line on Greece

The IMF  released its latest review of the Greek bailout on Wednesday. As might be expected it was a bit more critical than the version released by the European Commission and ECB a couple of days ago.

As also might be expected the press has focused on the fact that the report reveals an €11bn funding gap for Greece between 2014 and 2016 (higher than that suggested by the eurozone). The report also calls for the eurozone to consider further debt relief for Greece. Neither of these revelations is brand new, with both having been included in the leaked version of the Troika report a few weeks ago.

There are a couple of other interesting points in the 207 page report, including some concrete forecasts on the shares of Greek debt.

These amounts are pretty much as we predicted back in March 2012, where we forecast that by 2015 around 76% of Greek debt could be held by the IMF and eurozone (NB – it’s not clear how the ECB and national central banks holdings of debt [circa €40bn] are classified in the IMF figures. If they fall under private sector here, then the holdings by official creditors may well be higher in reality).

In any case, these amounts drive home that the real question facing Greece and the eurozone (after the German elections) is whether to write down these ‘official creditors’ or not – known as ‘official sector involvement’ (OSI). There will likely be a push to extend the loans further and cut their interest rates but, as the funding gap highlights, there are immediate liquidity and solvency questions facing Greece.

Other interesting points in the report include:

• The IMF warning of further social unrest: “The risk of political instability remains acute, especially in light of high unemployment and on-going social hardship. Further ambitious fiscal adjustment is needed for public sector debt to decline steadily, which exacerbates the possibility of social stress and political resistance.”

• Arrears clearance seems to be behind schedule with only €1.4bn of the targeted €4.5bn being paid off. However, Kathimerini reports that this has now been increased to €4bn according to Greek government data.

• Greece only just manages to quality for IMF assistance, with the IMF saying, “The program continues to satisfy the substantive criteria for exceptional access but with little to no margin.” The explanation involves a few stretches on the debt sustainability front, with the fund arguing, “The risk of international systemic spill overs in case of a permanent interruption of the program remains high and justifies exceptional access.” This raises an interesting question of whether, with the OMT and talk of a eurozone turnaround, the spill over effects are still significant enough to justify such IMF action?

• The comments by Paulo Nogueira Batista, the Latin American representative on the IMF board, who slammed the overly optimistic assumptions in the debt sustainability analysis and suggested the programme was flawed. He has since backtracked from his comments, while the Brazilian government has issued its support for the bailout programme. Nevertheless, the outburst is a timely reminder of the on-going disputes behind the scenes in the IMF, between the US/Europe and the emerging market countries.

Will the closure of public broadcaster set the scene for a coalition showdown in Greece?

Imagine a Number 10 spokesperson announcing during the afternoon news bulletin that the BBC has become too expensive to run and will be shut down with immediate effect. You would be excused for thinking that the Government and the Corporation have joined efforts to take you for a ride.

Well, this is exactly what happened in Greece - and it wasn't a joke. Greek government spokesman Simos Kedikoglou went on TV yesterday afternoon to say that the country's public broadcaster ERT would go off the air a few hours later, because it had become a "refuge of poor transparency and waste."

As a result, ERT's almost 3,000 employees have been temporarily laid off. The Greek government says that a revamped and slimmed-down broadcaster (NERIT SA) will be up and running by the end of August. Protests were staged outside ERT's headquarters yesterday and are continuing today, while ERT journalists are still putting programmes on air via digital frequencies and the internet.

A couple of points are worth making at this stage:

• The decision to shut down ERT is clearly linked to Greece's commitment to firing 15,000 public sector workers by the end of next year under its EU-IMF bailout deal, although it's up to the Greek government to choose where to cut. Therefore, it's probably not entirely fair to blame the Troika for this (admittedly pretty extraordinary) decision;

• The fact that the Greek government prefers shutting down ERT altogether and then opening a brand-new company, instead of trimming the existing company down, could be seen as further evidence of how difficult it is to fire public sector workers in Greece - even in cases where inefficiency and waste are evident (at least according to what the Greek government spokesman said);

• On the domestic politics front, Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras has decided to go ahead with the closure of ERT despite open opposition from his coalition partners - PASOK and Democratic Left. The latter now want to submit a draft bill to scrap the decision, meaning that there is a risk of a coalition split - unless someone blinks.  

As the Troika has long suggested, it is clear that Greece's bloated public sector needs to be downsized significantly. That said, it is also clear that this situation has been poorly handled, particularly given the wider political and social tensions already at play in the country. The fallout of this story might be worrying - further splits in the governing coalition and wider public backlash against an austerity programme for which there is already very little buy-in.

We will keep monitoring the situation and give further updates on Twitter @OpenEurope.

Aufstand im Bundestag: Who are Germany's most rebellious MPs?

On Thursday, the German Bundestag is expected to vote on the Cypriot bailout. The package is likely to be approved with a clear majority - the opposition SPD and Greens will mostly back it. In addition, the symbolically hugely important "chancellor's majority" - the threshold for the government to get an absolute majority with only the votes of its own MPs - is likely to be reached as well. Only around 12 MPs from the coalition parties (CDU, CSU, FDP) are likely to vote against. This is not particularly surprising. Remember, the bill for this rescue package was largely passed on to Cypriot depositors, and therefore enjoys much greater support in Germany.

Still, with the eurozone bailouts remaining ever-so contentious - and with a new anti-euro party on the German political scene - we thought we'd see how many coalition (CDU, CSU and FDP) MPs have so far rebelled on the various eurozone bailout votes. 

As the table below shows (click to enlarge), according to our calculations, at least 36 MPs have rebelled against Merkel on at least one occasion. Four MPs - Klaus-Pieter Willsch & Manfred Kolbe (CDU), Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Frank Schäffler (FDP) - have a 100% record in rebelling on eurozone votes - for the rest, there's a surprising spread.

Greek bond buyback fallout continues

As we noted in this morning’s press summary, there have been some interesting developments with regards to the Greek banking sector.

Kathimerini reported that, according to unnamed bank officials, the bank recapitalisation may now need to be larger than the scheduled €27.5bn. The reason for this is twofold:

• First, the level of non-performing loans in Greek banks topped 24% of all loans at the end of 2012. This is a staggering amount. Keep in mind the Spanish banking sector, which has been the focus of so much uncertainty, still has non-performing loans equal to around 11% of all loans. Greece once again is in another league here.
• Secondly, as we warned at the time, the bond-buyback had a detrimental effect on the Greek banks. Even if they did not take substantial direct losses on the bonds they submitted, they have lost out in terms of future revenue (the interest from the bonds). This is reported to amount to around €1.5bn this year.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this seems a fairly clear-cut case of the negative trade off which we highlighted at length in the run up to buyback.

Needless to say, it is not make or break and the marginal effect of the buyback is still positive, albeit fairly small in the scheme of the Greek crisis. Fortunately, there is an additional €5bn set aside for such ‘unexpected’ increases in the bank bailout, so the additional cost should not disrupt the bailout programme.

We would note as a final point, that this may not be the end of the story (not just because the non-performing loans are likely to increase further) but also because we are yet to find out what impact the bond buyback had on the Greek banks’ ability to access liquidity (an issue we discussed in detail here). Again it may not be make or break, but we suspect it could be a further negative factor for Greece to deal with - something it hardly needs.

Open Europe in 2012: a short summary of our achievements and a review of our eurozone predictions

2012 has been an important and very successful year for Open Europe, with Prospect Magazine judging us “International Affairs” think-tank of the year in recognition of our research and analysis’ increasing influence in the UK, Europe and beyond. This year, many of Open Europe’s research publications and ideas have had a direct influence on policy and decision making regarding the UK’s relationship with the EU.

We also hosted prominent figures from the world of politics, economics and business in our 2012 events programme, discussing a range of topics from the UK’s future role in Europe, Anglo-German relations to the finer points of the eurozone crisis. Perhaps the icing on the cake, in October this year, was the launch of a new independent partner organisation in Germany, Open Europe Berlin gGmbh.

To read the full review of our year, click here. Below we would like to focus on some of the predictions we made about the eurozone over the last 12 months (always a dangerous undertaking). Here is how we fared in predicting some of the key developments:

The bailouts for the Spanish banking sector and Spanish regions: In April, Open Europe’s Head of Economic Research Raoul Ruparel argued that Spanish “banks may be forced to tap the eurozone bailout fund” and highlighted that the build-up of debt by Spain’s regions would mean that they too could require bailouts. In June, Spain announced that it would request €100bn from the eurozone’s bailout funds to recapitalise its banks, while in July, several Spanish regions requested bailouts from the state which sent sovereign borrowing costs to record highs.

Second Greek bailout falling short...: In March, Open Europe predicted that, coming in at just 2% of GDP, the debt write-down of Greek debt under the country’s second bailout would be “far too small to allow Greece any chance of recovery”, with further assistance required in the future. In July, it became apparent that the second bailout had failed and in October, Greece received a two-year extension to its bailout programme, duly confirmed in late November. 

...but with Greece staying in the euro for now: While others put the risk of Greece imminently leaving the euro at 80%, Open Europe’s Mats Persson argued in January 2012 that “I doubt eurozone leaders will have the nerve to force Greece out this year.” 

Credit rating of France and eurozone bailout funds downgraded: In January, we predicted that “France could well be downgraded at least one notch…this would [also] hit the creditworthiness of the euro bailout funds”. On January 16, S&P downgraded France’s triple A rating, with Moody’s following suit on November 19, and on November 30 it also downgraded the eurozone’s two bailout funds.

LTRO would run out quickly: In December 2011, in a briefing looking at the potential impact of the ECB’s programme bank liquidly provision (LTRO), Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel argued that while it may be welcome in the short-term, “hopes, and plans, that this funding will lead to a boost in purchases of sovereign debt look misguided.” By the summer of 2012, both Spain and Italy were seeing their funding costs rise quickly, and eventually the ECB would have to take additional action. 

Monti would struggle to fundamentally reform Italy’s labour market: In March, Open Europe’s Vincenzo Scarpetta warned of the risk that Mario Monti’s lack of a popular mandate could undermine his efforts to reform Italy’s labour market. With Monti set to step down in the coming months, the OECD has recently highlighted that Italy has undertaken limited labour market reforms, with its labour costs now amongst the highest in the eurozone. 

So not a bad record for 2012, click here to check out our predictions for 2013.

What to expect from the EU in 2013

As 2012 draws to a close Open Europe has put out its take on what to expect from 2013. Reviewing our (admittedly milder) effort at this last year, shows that we didn’t do too badly, especially for what turned out to be a very volatile and difficult year for Europe (with plenty of government interventions, which are notoriously hard to predict).

See here for the full report where we lay out our view on three key topics to watch in 2013 – discussions of a ‘Brixit’, the formulation of the new eurozone banking union and, of course, the continuation or otherwise of the eurozone crisis.

Section 1: The eurozone crisis – survival but stagnation

2013 looks likely to be a calmer, but still painful year for the eurozone, with several political flashpoints (notably German, Italian and Austrian elections) that could quickly trigger a fresh flare-up in the crisis – particularly as many of the campaigns could become de factor judgements on the eurozone crisis and the bailouts. The eurozone is unlikely to fully turn the corner, with low growth and high unemployment continuing to plague many countries. Activism from the ECB is likely to help ease concerns, with its new bond buying programme the OMT potentially activated to aid Spain at some point. This will be needed as markets will still be on edge with Italy, Spain and France face funding costs of €332bn, €195bn and €243bn respectively.

Section 2: Banking union – slow or even slower?
A decision on the second step of the banking union – a joint fiscal backstop – is unlikely to be taken amid continued disagreements and domestic pressures. Even plans to have the ESM recapitalise banks already look to have been pushed back to 2014. During the year it may become increasingly apparent that, as is, the banking union does not represent a solution to the crisis.

Section 3: Britain in the EU – a mid-life crisis or full divorce?

We don’t see any fundamental changes to the relationship, but positioning and political manoeuvring will set the stage for the 2014 (European Parliament) and 2015 (General) elections – that in turn could decide the exact nature of the EU-UK relationship in the future. Two important issues to watch will be the opt out (and back into) EU crime and policing laws as well as the negotiations on the EU budget. The general tone of the debate within the government and Conservative party will be an important test ahead of the elections.

Obviously then, this is far from an exhaustive list but simply represents our thoughts on some key points of interest to watch in 2013. Feel free to share your thoughts for 2013 in the comments below!

The Greek bond buyback: Greek banks are putting up a fight (as we predicted)

As we predicted two weeks ago the Greek bond buyback is turning out to be much trickier than almost everyone else expected, and for exactly the reason we suggested – the Greek banks.

Despite positive declarations throughout last week that the Greek bond buyback would reach its target of €30bn bonds submitted by the Friday deadline, the Greek government has announced that the deadline has now been moved to 12pm Tuesday 11 December.

Throughout the buyback process the Greek banks have made it clear that they want to keep their participation to a minimum and are not keen on the buyback plan generally. The reasons for why have been discussed here and here (potential losses and hit to liquidity). Needless to say, the Greek government has exerted significant political pressure to ensure that the Greek banks do participate fully.

Despite this, Kathimerini reports that the Greek government decided to extend the deal after hedge funds submitted €16bn in bonds (much of which they will make a profit on) while Greek banks submitted around €10bn. This was short of €16bn which the banks were expected to submit, and which they are likely to be pushed into submitting by tomorrow.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this did not go down too well and the press release on the extension contains a (very thinly veiled) threat that those bond holders who do not take part may not end up getting paid back at all. Stelios Papadopoulos, the head of the Public Debt Management Agency, is quoted (in the actual press release) as saying:

“Investors should bear in mind that even if Greece accepts all bonds tendered in the Invitation, it will continue to engage with its official sector creditors in considering further steps to put its debt on a sustainable path. Future measures may not involve an opportunity to exit investments in Designated Securities at the levels offered for this buy back.” 

The buyback still looks likely to be completed, but all of this highlights just how weak Greek banks are - the last thing the Greek economy needs is even weaker domestic banks (and therefore even less lending to the real economy).

Greek banks and the Greek bond buyback

Yesterday we put out a flash analysis looking at the latest Greek deal and the prospect of Greek bond buyback. One of the many issues with the deal (and the buyback in particular) which we raised was that Greek banks will find it difficult to participate without needing extra capital.

However, Greek Finance Mininster Yannis Stournaras also said yesterday (in a timely statement):

The debt buyback "doesn't mean new capital for banks, given that they have recorded these bonds at lower prices than those that will be offered."

His suggestion then, is that the Greek banks have already marked their bonds to market prices on their books, meaning that they can sell them at the low prices involved in the bond buyback without needing new capital. This may make their participation more likely, but there are plenty of other reasons why we still see it as difficult and unpredictable. (We also still question why foreign holders will be involved, particularly previous hold outs and those who are holding to maturity, see our full analysis here).

Firstly, as Kathimerini reported today, the banks themselves are not keen to be involved in the buy back. Many feel that they have already done their part in terms of taking part almost ubiquitously in the first debt restructuring. If they were to take part in the buyback, they could seek adjustments in the terms of the recapitalisation and reform – something which the EU/IMF/ECB troika is unlikely to accept.

Secondly, taking part in such a scheme would need significant approval within the banks and other financial firms. This means board level and possibly wider shareholder approval. As the restructuring earlier this year showed, this takes time, with the process dragging for months. Given the 13 December deadline to have a bond buyback plan in place (i.e. to have a firm idea of who will take part, to make sure it is worthwhile) it is not clear how many bondholders will be in place to participate.

Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, is that the banks need their holdings of bonds (around €22bn) to gain liquidity from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) through the Greek Central Bank (GCB). Looking at the GCB balance sheet, it seems broadly that Greek banks posted €247bn in collateral to gain €123bn in liquidity, an average haircut of 50%. Given that many of these assets will be loans or securities, sovereign debt (even Greek) is unlikely to be judged any more harshly than the average. So, if the banks sold these assets for a 65% write down (as suggested) they could purchase new assets (maybe other sovereign debt) but would be able to buy less of it (as not many other assets priced at a 65% discount) meaning they would not be able to gain as much liquidity under the ELA as with current Greek bonds.

Essentially, this could harm the Greek banks liquidity position which would further constrain their lending ability and possibly prompt further deposit flight – both of which would hurt the fragile Greek economy.

All in all then, this process could still be counterproductive for Greek banks even if they do not book new losses directly and they still could be hesitant to take part voluntarily. However, that is not to say that the political pressure applied behind the scenes will not be enough to force them to voluntarily join. Ultimately, it simply highlights that this policy may deliver a small benefit with some negative side effects but is at best a way of skirting the real issue of whether the eurozone can stomach permanent fiscal transfers to Greece. This will come to the fore again soon.

Buying back Greece: another ad hoc deal or a step towards a solution?

Early on Tuesday morning the eurozone and the IMF reached an agreement which has been widely billed as their most comprehensive package to aid Greece. Now that the dust has settled somewhat, Open Europe has published a new flash analysis assessing the key components of the deal.

For all the talk and all the figures flying around there is still only one that really matters – 124% debt to GDP ratio in 2020, clearly this is not sustainable. Further measures will be needed and the ad hoc nature of this deal, particularly the way it skirts the big decisions, suggests that fears over a ‘Grexit’ will return as soon as Greece begins missing its targets once again.

Although reaching some deal was better than nothing, there are still significant doubts over the deal. The mixture of measures do provide some short term relief but in most cases fail to solve any of Greece's real solvency problems. The policy with the most unanswered questions is probably the most important one - the debt buy back.  A key question is: who actually owns Greek debt now? Below we break down the shares of Greek debt (click to enlarge):

We expect that the only bonds actually eligible for the buyback would be those held by foreign financial institutions (€30bn). However many of these bondholders may be reluctant to take part for a multitude of reasons.

See here for the full analysis.

Trying to find two more years for Greece

Ahead of today’s meeting of eurozone finance ministers we thought we’d (finally) get round to posting some of our thoughts on the last week’s leaked Troika report on Greece. The report, as may be expected, left much to be desired – and we’re not just talking about the copious glaring gaps where the eurozone and the IMF could not agree (the missing new debt sustainability analysis being the more prominent). The firefighters are fighting amongst themselves as one paper put it.

The report suggests that the cost of providing Greece with a two year bailout extension will be €32.6bn – very much in line with our estimates of between €28.5bn and €39bn. Interestingly, up to €20.3bn of this total is due broader problems with the original bailout programme, with the troika suggesting only €12.4bn will specifically be for the fiscal adjustment. This may not seem like it matters much but it highlights that the financing issues don’t just come from fiscal issues but also low growth, increasing arrears, banking sector problems and more.

Below we list a few other concerns from the report:

- The unemployment figures, as in the recent Greek budget, seem to be hopeless optimistic – potentially more so than before, since the Troika see unemployment in 2014-2016 being 0.4% below where the Greek government does. Elstat (Greek Statistics Agency) put unemployment at 25.4% at the end of August, while the Troika expects it to be 22.4% by the end of the year. A 3% drop in unemployment in a few months? That seems impossible anywhere but particularly in the current Greek economy.

- The report expresses some deep concerns over the banking sector not least the “plummeting” deposits and the likely need to run down capital buffers due to significant levels of bad loans. However, it still concludes current levels of recapitalisation should be sufficient – we’re sceptical.

- Despite, finally cutting defence spending, Greece still spends the third most (as % of GDP) in the EU. This continues to seem an obvious place to make savings, particular with NATO still going strong.

- The collapse in real investment of 40% since 2009 is staggering if not surprising, yet the forecasts for investment both in the troika and budget reports only looks ever more optimistic because of it.

- Government arrears continue to mount up, topping €8bn now. Despite presenting a significant challenge to wind down in the near future, these could also represent a drag on the domestic economy since most of the money is owned to domestic firms. 

That is to name but a few from an incomplete report – i.e. there are plenty more to come.

As for the outcome of today’s meeting, we have low expectations as usual. The target is for a political agreement on the releasing the next two tranches of Greek funds (worth €44bn). This doesn’t sound much of a stretch but it will require confirming Greece has completed the necessary ‘prior actions’, as it claims, while the IMF is hesitant to release any more funds until it has settled on a plan which sticks to its view of Greek debt sustainability. The final part will be tricky with the IMF and the eurozone still seemingly someway apart on what they see as sustainable (despite the two of them also being someway apart from the rest of the economic and financial professions).

A deal on how to fund the two year extension in the Greek bailout will likely need another meeting, while the release of funds still has to withstand the hazardous approval process of the German, Dutch and Finnish parliaments.

Expect the debate over the issues above and more to dominate for another few weeks.

Economic realities push Europe closer to a Greek decision

We have a piece in City AM today, which look's  at the impact of this week's crucial votes in Greece, see below for the piece in full:

One down, one to go. The Greek government has got through one crucial vote this week and looks likely to ride out the budget vote on Sunday. Although markets and eurozone leaders will breathe a sigh of relief as Greece makes it through another crucial week in its economic crisis, the government has not been left unscathed.

Pushing through the latest, and supposedly last, package of stringent economic reforms and budget cuts has exposed deep cracks within the governing coalition, as the Democratic Left and Pasok parties put up a fight to slow the process of public sector cuts led by Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’ New Democracy party. It took two days to push the package through parliament, while a reported 100,000 Greeks took to the streets in Athens to protest against austerity, once more leading to violent clashes with police.

However, a bigger problem for the government is the flurry of economic figures which have again exposed deeper flaws in the Greek economy, propelling talk of a Greek exit from the eurozone back into the headlines. The new budget projects Greek debt peaking at 192% of GDP, rather than the 167% estimated previously, but even this revision seems to be built on optimistic assumptions. Unemployment, investment and exports are all projected to stabilise, despite most indicators predicting the opposite. In fact it is now abundantly clear that Greece will need an extension to its current bailout.

The questions to ask then are: how much would such an extension cost and how could it be funded? We estimate that slowing the Greek fiscal consolidation programme by two years could cost an extra €28.5bn (rising to €39bn if Greece fails to borrow from the markets – something which looks increasingly likely). The main options being proposed include: reducing the interest rates which Greece pays on its current bailout loans (which could raise around €3bn over two years) or putting a hold on interest payments for a few years (which could raise €10bn+, but would be much trickier legally). These options would likely be combined with some further austerity and increased short term debt issuance by Greece – both of which could actually increase Greek debt levels, not exactly what is needed. The kicker is that even this is unlikely to be enough.

The question of an extension then, drives home that a larger decision on Greece’s position in the eurozone is closing in on EU leaders. Even talk of using bailout loans to buy back Greek debt at a discount and then retire it, to provide extra funding, would require a big political decision on further loans to Greece. However the funding is found, it will likely involve breaking a taboo – either by the ECB (in terms of helping to fund states) or more likely by eurozone countries in allowing permanent transfers to a country whose future funding is far from assured.

The Greek government and the eurozone will make it through this week but this short-term success is likely to belie the massive decisions ahead.

A big week for Greece - but still few answers

As we noted in our press summary today, this week is lining up to be another big one for Greece.

The Greek government faces two crucial votes in parliament – first on Wednesday to push through the latest package of structural reforms (as demanded by the EU/IMF/ECB) troika and second on Sunday to approve the latest and, according to Greek PM Antonis Samaras, the last austerity budget for next year.

Since the governing coalition was formed after the second summer elections, such votes have usually passed without much fanfare. However, this time around the Democratic Left (which holds 16 seats in parliament) has said it will not vote with the its coalition partners. Pasok (which holds 31 seats) is also facing a period of internal strife with one MP already leaving and up to five others threatening to at least vote against the government. New Democracy (127 seats) should have an easier job pulling its MPs together.

The votes should pass but the margin for error is tiny, possibly only two or three votes, notably provoking unrest amongst financial markets and other eurozone leaders. In the end, given that the end of the government would very possibly signal the end of Greece as eurozone member, the (perceived) fear factor is likely to be enough to once again push the vote through.

This clears the way for the release of the next €31.5bn tranche of bailout funds and a potential two year extension to the Greek bailout. Today’s FT notes that the extra funding for the extension is likely to come from an increase in short term debt issuance by Greece and possibly a reduction in interest rates on eurozone loans to Greece – exactly as Open Europe predicted in its recent flash analysis on the issue.

The FT article also includes a potential plan for the ECB to return profits from its purchases of Greek bonds to Greece via eurozone governments to avoid the thorny issue of the central bank directly financing a state. This sounds plausible on the surface since the returning of profits to national governments should happen naturally anyway under the ECB rules. The only issue being that this can only happen overtime as the profits accrue as the bonds are paid off, so its unlikely to be paid out in a single chunk at one time (as is needed here).

One final point on the cost of the extension. We put it at around €28.5bn, although estimates range from €15bn to €40bn. We didn’t include a delay in Greece’s return to borrowing from the markets, which is looking increasingly likely. If Greece doesn’t return to borrowing until after 2016 it could add a further €10.6bn to the cost of an extension.

So although this is a big week for Greece, even a clear government win in both votes will do little to answer questions over Greece’s future in the eurozone.

EU ironies: The Troika meets the Working Time Directive?

Oh the irony. The EU/ECB/IMF troika are now working their ever living tails off to push the Greeks and Portuguese towards more flexible labour markets, and less top-down regulation – and the European Commission is, in parallel, putting pressure on Italy and Spain to do the same. Simultaneously, however, the same European Commission is clinging on like a leech to the most top-down piece of labour market law imaginable (well almost): the EU’s Working Time Directive (WTD).

Well, these twin efforts might now be heading for a clash. Reports floating around yesterday suggested that the EU/IMF/ECB troika wants Greece to do more to flush out its rigid labour market by, amongst other things, raising the maximum number of working days per week to six. The reports are still sketchy - supposedly from leaked emails – so should be taken with a pinch of salt. Still, it paves the way for a pretty weird situation.

The leaked plans suggested the troika would demand the following to boost flexibility of labour arrangements:

• Increase the number of maximum workdays to 6 days per week for all sectors.
• Set the minimum daily rest to 11 hours.
• Delink the working hours of employees from the opening hours of the establishment.
• Eliminate restrictions on minimum/maximum time between morning and afternoon shifts.
• Allow the consecutive two week leave to be taken anytime during the year in seasonal sectors. 

Now the Working Time Directive:

• A maximum working week of 48 hours
• A rest period of 11 consecutive hours a day
• A rest break when the day is longer than six hours
• A minimum of one rest day per week 

In addition, a range of ECJ cases have extended the scope of the WTD even further (sick days spent on holiday can be reclaimed, doctors who sleep on-call are actively working etc).

The latest Troika plans, if true, would not break the WTD it seems, but they’re clearly taking Greece to the limits of what is permissible under EU law – lest they want to push Greece to seek a UK-style opt-out from the WTD (leading to a bizarre scenario, whereby the Commission urges an opt-out from its own rules). One step further and the acquis communautaire would get in the way. In addition, a hardworking Greek who wants to follow the Troika’s recommendations by putting in a six day working week, better be sure to clock out right on time, after eight hours have gone by, or he would be engaging in activities illegal under EU law.

This raises a second question: if the Troika was tasked with working out a competitiveness plan for the entire EU, would the WTD – and many other onerous EU regulations, and the EU budget for that matter – survive?

We suspect not.

'Communication problems' between Angela and François?

A bit of mystery ahead of this evening's meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande. A French diplomatic source told AFP yesterday that, before their working dinner, the two leaders will make a short statement to the press, but will take no questions from journalists.

However, the source went on to suggest that Hollande was quite keen to hold a proper press conference, since he "has not talked about Greece for a long time and wants to communicate." But apparently his request fell on (Merkel's) deaf ears.

Needless to say, the diligent Steffen Seibert - the German Chancellor's spokesman - moved swiftly to clarify that the decision not to open the floor for questions had been made "by mutual agreement". Hollande's office also stressed that the chosen format mirrors the one used during Merkel's previous visit to Paris at the end of June.

Mystery solved? Maybe, but the fact remains that Hollande has reportedly planned a separate press conference at the French Embassy in Berlin after his dinner with Merkel. 

Will a common position on Greece be easier to agree on than the format of a press conference?

The Greek government and the Troika - not quite the stand of the 300

How would you feel right now if you were a government ‘swing’ voter in Greece?

Following its very first meeting with the EU/IMF/ECB troika the new Greek government looks to have abandoned its hope for renegotiation, at least in the short term. Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras announced:

“The [Greek reform] programme is off-track and we can’t ask for anything from our creditors before we get it back on course.” 

In May we predicted that "given the huge stakes, it may well be the Greek parties that blink first".Well, they may just have done precisely that.

We’re not disputing that the Greek programme is off track – following months of delays from the elections and the near impossibility of achieving the cuts in the first place, even imagining it would be anywhere near on target would have been frankly living in a dream world.

However, there are swathes of voters who switched from anti-bailout parties and smaller groups to support this new coalition on the back of promises of 'responsible' renegotiation. The fact that after the first meeting and only a few weeks in office the government looks to have already folded may be a slap in the face for many. The nature of the U-turn may also be difficult to swallow. Press reports suggest that Prime Minister Antonis Samaras was hesitant to make any requests (following some frosty comments by IMF Director Christine Lagarde) and looked more to highlight the increase in privatisations – a significant change in tact even if it is a good if difficult to achieve aim.

As we always suggested, renegotiating will be tricky and the prospects for Greece in the euro look increasingly unsustainable. But this could also add another layer of political and social problems. Firstly, it is an open goal from opposition leader Alexis Tsipras who has railed against the bailout and the nature of the government politicians (part of the failed ruling elite according to him). He even made the direct accusation that they would not stick to their promises for renegotiation – clearly this will only put wind in his sails. Secondly, those voters who supported the government in good faith, trying to balance their support for the EU and the euro with the economic troubles they face, may find themselves increasingly disillusioned.

It’s early days but if the government continues along this line we wouldn’t be surprised to see an increasing number of protests and even more rioting. The next polls should be revealing and again we would hazard a guess that Tsipras may turn out to be the big winner from all this. In the meantime it seems that the Greek economy and people will continue to struggle along with little light at the end of the tunnel.

A summit plus for Greece?

Given that Greece lacked any real political presence at last week’s EU summit, discussions on the crisis in Athens were fairly minimal and it was largely overlooked during the ensuing press coverage.

However, Kathimerini has an interesting report today suggesting that Greece could attempt to get the cost of its bank recapitalisation removed from its sovereign debt levels – in the same way that Spain is hoping to do. This could well be seen by eurozone leaders as a way to quickly reduce Greece’s debt burden – although we don’t think it will change any of the fundamental problems which it faces.

A large amount of the second Greek bailout – around €50bn – is actually going to Greek banks to help them absorb the large losses they faced from the Greek debt restructuring. With Greek debt currently standing at around €327bn or 160% of GDP, removing €50bn from this figure could provide a significant boost to Greek debt sustainability – bringing the figure down to 136% of GDP.

There are, however, a few important caveats to note here:

• Firstly, 136% is still an unsustainable debt level, even with this reduction the Greek debt burden is still huge and the need and demands for austerity are not likely to waiver . 
• Secondly, and possibly more importantly, is that this will only be an adjustment on paper for all intents and purposes. Greek banks are dead on their feet, living off liquidity from the ECB and the Greek Central Bank. They will never be able to repay this money and it will still ultimately be underwritten by the Greek state. So, even if this debt is shifted off the official figures it will still be a burden of the state – in reality little will have changed. 
• Lastly, this process will not happen anytime soon. The bailout funds cannot lend directly to banks until the ECB is in place as the eurozone’s financial supervisor, and as we have noted, this will be at the earliest the start of next year. This also happens to be the period by which we have suggested that leaving the euro may become more attractive from a Greek perspective. 

An interesting development which seems to have mostly slipped under the radar then. We wouldn’t be surprised to see the eurozone and Greek leaders take advantage of this opportunity to gain a large reduction in the superficial figures on Greek debt – it would make for an effective headline figure and would likely buy them some more time in terms of making Greek debt look sustainable in their and the IMF's models. Ultimately, though, it would only be window dressing, further shifting of funds around to try to make the situation seem better than it is. In the end, as we have always said, there are no easy answers to the Greek or eurozone crisis.

And on the second day...

The second day of talks on the formation of the new Greek government has so far seen no major surprises. As we predicted in our response to the election results that we put out yesterday, PASOK leader Evangelos Venizelos' refusal to join a 'national unity government'. unless left-wing SYRIZA were on board, for most part turned out to be political posturing. Things now seem to be heading towards a three-party coalition with election winner New Democracy, PASOK and Democratic Left.

The latest developments:

• As widely expected, both SYRIZA and right-wing populist Independent Greeks have said "Thanks, but no thanks" to New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras' offer to take part in the new coalition;

• Samaras also met Venizelos and Democratic Left leader Fotis Kouvelis yesterday. After the meeting, Venizelos insisted that the best solution would be to have a four-party coalition with SYRIZA in, although he stressed that "the country must have a government by tomorrow [i.e. today]";

• Kouvelis suggested that his party was willing to form part of the new government, although he added that he would sign "no blank cheques" to Samaras;

• Venizelos and Kouvelis (in the picture) met this morning. After the meeting, Kouvelis said an agreement is in sight and could be reached "within hours". A tripartite coalition with New Democracy, PASOK and Democratic Left would hold 179 of the 300 seats in the Greek Vouli - which the European Commission and other eurozone countries could see as sufficient to start talking of minor revisions of the Greek bailout programme; 

• Venizelos suggested that, in parallel to the new government, Greece should also set up a negotiating team to discuss the revision of the bailout terms in Brussels. This group, he said, should clearly include SYRIZA - now the second-largest party of the country. However, SYRIZA has dismissed Venizelos' plan as a "publicity stunt"; 

• Meanwhile, there seems to be a bit of confusion on what Greece could actually achieve from the re-negotiation of its bailout terms - which, according to us, will be a couple of minor adjustments but no changes to the thrust of the agreement. A senior European official is quoted as saying, "If we were not to change the [EU-IMF] Memorandum of Understanding we would be signing off on an illusion. There is scope for revision." He added that a new MoU would be signed "during the summer." However, the prompt reply from European Commission spokesman Amadeu Altafaj Tardio is that "nobody is talking about a new MoU". 

• On a slightly separate note, Die Welt notes that PASOK - the party - is actually proportionally in more debt that Greece itself. It owes banks some €130 million - i.e. 18 times its annual income. Election winner New Democracy is also reported to be heavily indebted. This is partly due to the fact that Greek political parties get state funding based on their share of votes in the general elections, and support for PASOK has been shrinking since its last victory in 2009.