Podemos gears up for next year's Spanish elections with revamped economic plan

Pablo Iglesias with economists Navarro (right) and Torres López (left)  

With the next general election only one year away, Spain's anti-establishment party Podemos last week unveiled a revamped package of economic proposals written for them by Spanish economists Vicenç Navarro and Juan Torres López (in the picture with Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias), and called, 'An economic project for the people'. We went through the 68-page document and pulled out the most interesting bits.

WHAT'S IN THE PLAN?

The euro: a "mouse trap" in need of an overhaul

The document describes the euro in its current form as "a real mouse trap", arguing that "it is materially impossible to pursue policies that satisfy the national interest" within the existing framework. However, as we previously noted on this blog, Podemos stops short of calling for Spain to leave the single currency. Instead, the document says,

"It is fundamental that the Spanish government promotes and achieves as soon as possible strategic agreements with [the governments] of other European countries to change the current conditions of governance of the euro."

So what are the changes Podemos is looking for? The document lists a few:

• "Flexibilisation" of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (EU fiscal rules) - although no further details are provided as to what this would involve in practice.

• "Change the rules that prevent the ECB from financing governments", while establishing a number of conditions under which this can be done. 

• Amend the ECB's statute to include "full employment" among its policy targets.

• Make the ECB accountable to the European Parliament, which should also be in charge of appointing ECB members.

• "Create mechanisms that guarantee the pooling of debt and the effective supervision of the financial system at the European level".

• Scrap the balanced budget rule from the Spanish Constitution - which is basically tantamount to rejecting the EU's 'fiscal compact' on budgetary discipline.

• Achieve real coordination of economic policies in the Eurozone.

Debt restructuring: a matter of when, not if

The document presents an "orderly restructuring" of Spanish debt as the only real way to revive the country's economy. It reads,

"In Spain as in [the rest of] Europe, there is no way to achieve sufficient [economic] recovery unless debt decreases, and debt cannot decrease unless the recovery materialises. The only way out of this vicious circle is an as orderly as possible restructuring of European and Spanish debt. Therefore, the question is not whether one wishes to implement it or not, but rather in what conditions it will happen, because it is materially inevitable that it is implemented sooner or later." 

Other economic measures 

The document contains a number of other economic measures to be adopted at the national level, some of which could have a significant impact:

• Raise the statutory minimum wage.

• Scrap the labour market reform passed by Mariano Rajoy's centre-right government.

• Legally enshrine a 35-hour working week.

• Bring the legal retirement age back to 65 years - although with some flexibility depending on the nature of the job.

• Increase public spending and challenge "the false idea that in Spain there is an excess of public resources, too many civil servants or public sector employees in the administration, and excessive spending on public goods and services". 

On the revenue side of public finances, Podemos seems to primarily focus its attention on stepping up the fight against tax evasion and increasing wealth taxation - although the document does mention the need to avoid "any type of unnecessary [public] spending", thereby making budget savings.

WHAT'S NOT IN THE PLAN?

Compared to the European election manifesto of Podemos, which we analysed here, there are at least two big changes:

• The idea of a 'basic universal income' for every citizen has been dropped. According to the party's own estimates, the measure would have cost the Spanish government some €145 billion - roughly 14.5% of Spanish GDP. Instead, the new document proposes "emergency plans" to help people at risk of social exclusion.

• The proposal to hold a 'citizens' audit' of Spanish public debt, potentially leading to a selective default, is also no longer there - and has been replaced by the call for debt restructuring.

HOW HAVE THE TWO MAIN TRADITIONAL PARTIES REACTED TO THE PLAN?

The day after Podemos unveiled its new economic plan, Spanish Economy Minister Luis de Guindos was asked about it at a press conference. All he said was, "I don't think anyone wants to go back to the [economic] situation we were in three years ago". 

As regards the Socialist Party, the new leader Pedro Sánchez said, "I'd like [Podemos] to be consistent and not to fall into ideological opportunism", and stressed that Podemos was already "reneging" on some of the proposals included in its European election manifesto (as we noted above). Sánchez also said he's against the 35-hour working week.

OPEN EUROPE'S TAKE

It is very interesting how Podemos has ditched at least two of its most radical economic proposals. With a view to next year's general election, the move is most certainly aimed at winning over undecided/disappointed voters from the centre of the political spectrum, while also preempting criticism from the two mainstream parties - the ruling centre-right Partido Popular and the Socialist Party - that Podemos is telling fairy-tales to the Spanish electorate because it is pursuing unrealistic policies.

For the rest, this revamped economic plan seems to fit perfectly with our description of Podemos as a 'shadow eurosceptic' party: it doesn't openly call for Spain to leave the euro, but many of its proposals are incompatible with Eurozone membership under current terms.

Interestingly, many of the proposals actually involve transferring more power and sovereignty to Europe, even over sensitive fiscal issues. The scrutiny this is put under in Spain will be important. It is also not clear exactly how power would be pooled and managed at the Eurozone level under the proposals of Podemos.

In the meantime, it is undeniable that the extraordinary rise of the party led by Pablo Iglesias has already made an impact on the Spanish political debate. To mention but two examples:

• The Socialist Party has toughened up its anti-austerity rhetoric. The party's new leader, Pedro Sánchez, has himself proposed scrapping the balanced budget rule from the Spanish Constitution - despite voting for it back in 2011.

• Yesterday, for the first time, the deputy leader of Partido Popular María Dolores de Cospedal admitted in a TV interview that her party would "consider" forming an unprecedented grand coalition with the Socialist Party if it failed to win an absolute majority in next year's elections. This may well be a sign of concern that a left-wing coalition between Podemos and the Socialist Party could force Partido Popular out of power.

Everything seems to suggest Spain will be one of the Eurozone countries to watch next year. 

Michael Wohlgemuth: Why the EU cannot bank on Germany’s economy

Open Europe Berlin Director Michael Wohlgemuth has written an interesting piece for World Review, looking at the current status of the German economy. Here it is:

The German economy is showing clear signs of weakening. GDP declined by 0.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2014 and German business sentiment fell for a fifth straight month in September to its lowest level in 17 months. Manufacturing orders dropped during August to the lowest level since May 2013.

Germany’s problems will remain and get worse.

Much of the resilience of the German economy during the last years can be attributed to harsh labour market and social security reforms. These were introduced by the Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (1998-2005) in 2003 with his ‘Agenda 2010’.

The new centre-right / centre-left coalition led by Chancellor Angela Merkel has rolled back many of these reforms by reintroducing early retirement, granting extra pensions for mothers and installing an unprecedented legal minimum wage - of 8.50 euros per hour - in all sectors and all regions of Germany.

The German government has been forced to admit that the minimum wage will increase labour costs by 10 billion euros. It is still unclear how many jobs will be lost after its introduction in 2015.

The new pension benefits will cost around 200 billion euros until 2030. Early retirement could take up to 250,000 elderly off the job market over the coming years when skilled and experienced labour is becoming increasingly scarce and valuable.

Demographic decline will be Germany’s greatest challenge in the long run: coming decades could see Germany’s workforce shrink by about 200,000 every year. The old age dependency ratio - between those older than 65 and those of working age - could increase from 31 per cent in 2013 to 57 per cent in 2045.

Immigration to boost the workforce would be essential. Experts calculate that net-migration of around 400,000 people a year - preferably young and educated - would be needed to avoid demographic decline.

So where should Germany’s future economic growth, desperately needed to pay for pensions and somehow to rescue the eurozone, come from?

The answer is from productivity and innovation, in short: smart investment. Labour participation rates, labour productivity and entrepreneurial ingenuity would have to increase dramatically.

However, Germany’s productivity growth is lagging behind almost all other economies in the world.

The established German Mittelstand - its economic backbone of small and medium-sized enterprises - and some big exporting firms, are still good at innovation. However, Germany holds a dismal 111th place in the World Bank’s ranking for ‘ease of starting a business’ and its service sector is under-developed and over-regulated, while Germany’s education system fails to produce enough matching skills.

Germany’s capital stock is depreciating faster than new investments are replacing it. A declining capital stock combined with a declining workforce, leaves no hope for a growing economy.

That does not mean Germany’s government must add more public debt to the mix.

Many observers are demanding that the government abandons its ‘austerity obsession’ and take advantage of the historically low interest rates for more debt-financed ‘stimulus’.

But the Merkel government is still in the position to do the right thing and increase investment without abandoning the new constitutional balanced budget rule. German politics should also provide better regulatory and tax environments for private domestic investment and lower barriers to entry for its service sector.

Domestic industrial investment is also increasingly discouraged by the ‘lonely revolution’ to wean Germany off both fossil and nuclear energy.

This policy may cost consumers, taxpayers and business up to one trillion euros over the next two decades, according to Peter Altmaier, the former minister for the environment, who is now chief of the Chancellery and minister for special affairs.

German energy costs are now more than double those in the US, while Germany’s greenhouse emissions have increased.

German entrepreneurs and foreign investors have always had these negative factors on their radar.

Germany’s problem is not austerity, but demography and complacency. The message is you cannot bank on Germany.

ECB preview - Dovish Draghi to double down on easing?

The European Central Bank (ECB) holds its monthly meeting in Frankfurt today - the day after ECB President Mario Draghi's 67th birthday.

As usual, Open Europe's Head of Economic Research Raoul Ruparel has published a preview on his Forbes blog, explaining what we may expect from today's meeting.

Here goes:

Following ECB President Mario Draghi’s dovish speech at Jackson Hole last month this week’s ECB meeting has taken on new importance. This has been further enhanced by the recent Eurozone inflation data which put annual CPI at 0.3% in August. The headline figure hides some of the story with core inflation actually rising to 0.9% (from 0.8%) but the ECB’s previous inflation forecasts have begun to look increasingly out of line with reality.

However, those expecting a big move are likely to be a bit disappointed. As I pointed out last month, it is almost nonsensical for Draghi to unveil new measures before his previous policies have been implemented. I am thinking specifically of the TLTROs (targeted long term lending operations) the first of which will only be conducted on 18 September. Any big announcement now could undermine the predicted take up of these measures – which clearly remain the ECB’s preferred approach for injecting further liquidity.

That being said, these measures are unlikely to make much difference since the conditions for passing liquidity on to the real economy remain very loose. They are also very unlikely to appease investors and markets which have now come to expect some significant new easing. The two key options which are on the table for this meeting are:

1. A further interest rate cut: Many will validly ask, what is the point in a further cut now? Of course it would have little to no economic impact, however, it would once again signal the dovish bias of the ECB. It would also signal a clear shift in the ECB’s position given that Draghi has previously said rates are unlikely to get any lower than current levels. It becomes another mechanism to express his commitment to further easing. There also remains scope to make the negative deposit rate more negative, although there is a cap on this since, at some point, it will be cheaper for banks to simply hold cash than deposits with the ECB.
    
2. Purchases of private sector assets – specifically Asset Backed Securities (ABS): The ECB has long telegraphed such action and it is the next obvious tool at its disposal. Whether or not it will be announced this month or in the coming months is a bit of a toss-up. It seems the ECB is not quite ready to implement it yet and has made a big song and dance about the need to adjust regulations and definitions of ABS, which are yet to fully take place. Whenever it is announced, implementation is likely to be later this year to allow the negative deposit rate and TLTROs to have time to work. I remain sceptical on the effectiveness of this policy, which I have analysed in detail on the Open Europe blog. Ultimately, the market for the transparent ABS related to SME loans remains very small in Europe and focused in the core countries rather than the periphery (where this money really needs to flow to). For example, in Q1 2014, of the €18.5bn in ABS issued, only €1.6bn used SME loans as collateral. The ECB maintains that it can and will help create the market in this area, yet with this measure having been forecast for some time, you would expect there to have been some market response already.

As with many of Draghi’s press conferences, all of this will be weaved into a dovish speech including a few key trigger words for markets – few other central bankers are as adept in their communication. As for full blow Quantitative Easing on sovereign debt, this remains someway off in my mind and hurdles remain high. Its use will ultimately be tied into developments in the fiscal and political sphere, as hinted at in Draghi’s speech (more detail on this coming in a future post). The ECB will be loath to unveil QE, which it fears can only buy time, without further commitment to reforms, a clearer fiscal approach and developments on the structure of the Eurozone which such changes will entail.

Italy claims "great victory" over "looser" eurozone fiscal rules

UPDATE (11:30am) - In a separate interview with Quotidiano Nazionale on Saturday, Mr Del Rio explicitly speaks of a "great victory" for Italy at the EU summit.

Here's the full quote:

"The green light to flexibility is the great victory [...] One needs to acknowledge that, thanks to Italy, the work of the summit was not focused on names, but on what to do to move from the time of austerity [rigore] to the true implementation of the [EU's] Stability and Growth Pact. We really won a substantial battle."

ORIGINAL BLOG POST (9:50am)

It was bound to happen.

The battle to make EU fiscal rules more 'flexible' was one of the key issues on the table at last week's European Council summit. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and French President François Hollande were seeking to make their support for Jean-Claude Juncker conditional on a de facto loosening of the rules. So what was the outcome? Well, depends on who you ask. If you ask Renzi's people, this weekend saw a watering down of the rules.

Graziano Del Rio, Renzi's top aide (see picture), claims thus in an interview with today's Corriere della Sera:

Q: Italy comes back from Brussels with the rule of the 'best use' of the flexibility already provided for [by the EU Treaties]. Isn't that too little to speak of a Europe that abandons austerity and of a victory of the Renzi government?

A: No, it's not too little because it is precisely the lack of use of flexibility that has caused our most serious problems.

Q: So, during its semester of [rotating] EU Presidency, Italy won’t ask to raise the [EU's] deficit limit, the famous 3% of GDP? 

A: I don’t think that’s a rule set in stone forever, but we don’t want to be the ones who move it onto sand. No, we won’t ask to raise the 3% [deficit/GDP threshold]. That’s also to avoid suspicions and titters in Europe, keeping in mind that there are other countries that glaringly breach that limit – and even Germany has done it during a certain period of time.

Q: Excuse me, but what does this greater flexibility mean then?

A: It means that, when deficit is calculated, part of the spending is not taken into account, or, better, it is considered as flexible. The [EU’s] Stability Pact effectively becomes looser. It can be done for co-financing, that is the money Italy is obliged to spend to use EU funds. We’re talking about a figure around €7 billion a year. But there’s also the investment clause, that would allow [us] to leave out of the calculation spending with a high social impact […] We’re talking about a figure around €3 billion. In total, flexibility could be worth €10 billion a year, although it can’t be taken for granted that these two items can be added together.

Of course, everyone is talking about 'interpretation', and no-one will say the rules have been formally re-written. Still, this looks as if the Italian government is claiming they have managed to loosen EU fiscal rules, via a new interpretation. Spin or otherwise, Berlin and Frankfurt won't be entirely pleased.

Is Bild having second thoughts about Juncker?

If Angela Merkel had privately hoped to quietly ditch Jean-Claude Juncker after the European election, it all started to go wrong when Axel Springer, the media group that owns Bild, Germany's and Europe's biggest selling paper, added its substantial weight to the pro-Juncker/pro-spitzenkandidaten campaign. This severely restricted Merkel's room for manoeuvre.

While Bild's editorial line has not changed explicitly, today's coverage of the issue is notably less enthusiastic. The paper's Brussels correspondent Dirk Hoeren asks "Will the Juncker deal be a dirty one?", with his piece claiming that France and Italy have made their support for Juncker conditional on a relaxation of EU budgetary rules (unlike Cameron who has taken a principled stance).

In a separate op-ed entitled “Merkel’s dilemma”, Bild’s deputy editor in chief Béla Anda argues:

“that the Southern Europeans will make their vote for Juncker dependent on an agreement on their debt policies shows the shabby extent the haggling over the EU’s chief post has reached.”

“If Merkel supports the election of a euro-softener to the post of Commission President, she will have backed the wrong horse.”

“Jean-Claude Juncker should be warned and be made aware that he must not be a chief at the mercy of Southern Europe.”

If you believe in tight observance of budget rules, as most Germans do, the last thing you want is to have a Commission President, appointed on a 'pan-European democratic mandate', who supports relaxing German-inspired rules on budgetary stability and the introduction of eurobonds.

While Juncker might need French and Italian support, ultimately he is the EPP candidate and Merkel is likely to bring her influence to bear. But imagine if 'centre-left' parties with a more avowedly Socialist spitzenkandidat were to win in future. How would Germany respond then, particularly the 'centre-right'? Would it be a case of yes to pan-European democracy, but only if the 'right' candidate wins? It seems like some people are starting to wake up to this prospect.

Der Spiegel not all pro-Juncker: 'He is no friend of the Germans'

Germany's Spiegel (magazine and online news agency), has been vocal in its criticism of David Cameron for
his objection to Jean-Claude Juncker as the next Commission President, on the premise that he is blocking the democractic choice in Europe.

Spiegel's editing director, Nikolaus Blome wrote a piece for today's FT arguing that:

To many member countries, backing Mr Juncker has become a strong symbol for promoting democracy and transparency in Europe. The British government would be ill-advised to laugh at this sentiment.

However, scratch beneath the surface, and you will find that even in Germany, Juncker's is a troublesome prospect. Spiegel columnist and editor, Jan Fleischauer, today argues that, "Juncker is no friend of the Germans".

Fleischauer continues:

Or better said, Juncker is only a friend of the Germans, so long as they continue to pay for the debts of their neighbours without grumbling too loudly about it..[He] is one of those people who dream of making the monetary union a debt union.

Fleischauer points out that at the the height of the eurocrisis, when the German government was hesitating before providing more bailout money, Juncker said:

This is part of the problem, to behave as though Germany is the only virtuous country in the world that has to foot the bill for all other countries. This is highly offensive to the others.

When the German goverment insisted on stricter budgetary discipline in peripheral countries, Juncker's interjection was:

Why exactly does Germany constantly allow itself the luxury of formulating domestic policy in all euro-related questions? Why does Germany treat the eurozone as a subsidiary?

And on eurobonds, which Germans have pretty much ruled out, Juncker said:

This approach, building taboo-zones in Europe, and not engaging with the ideas of others, is a very un-European way of doing European business. Germany is thinking a bit simplistically there.

Fleischauer then challenges the premise that Juncker is the 'democratic' choice, arguing that his bid for Commission President was "fraudulent" from the very start. He adds: 

What one could call a rigged game anywhere else, is called democracy in Brussels: First, one makes citizens believe they can vote on something, that in reality, is in the remit of the heads of [national] governments. When [government heads] subsequently insist on their right to ignore the self-nomination of the candidates, then it is painted as neglecting the vote of people.

Fleischauer concludes that, “The only person who can come between [Juncker and the Commission Presidency] is the German Chancellor…One can only hope that [Merkel] says no to Juncker.”

Meanwhile, Bild, Europe's largest tabloid that actively came out in favour of Juncker's presidency, strikes a more nuanced tone today, writing that Merkel didn’t agree on the concept of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ “from the start,” because she knew “there would be “no agreement” in the Council. The piece adds that Merkel could ultimately “live” with Juncker in the post, because:

 The head of the Commission dances to the tune of the heads of the member states: not vice versa.

Interesting stuff then, showing that even in Germany, neither Juncker nor the process of his selection are universally endorsed.

Is the eurozone crisis over? The Germans think not…

There was an interesting poll in today’s FAZ conducted by INSA for Bild on whether Germans believe that eurozone crisis is over or not.

The results were pretty comprehensive with 81% saying that they do not believe the crisis is over compared to 7% who do.

Furthermore, 34% of Germans believe that Greece is on the road to recovery compared with 39% who believe the country has not done enough to reform its economy. Clearly they remain very unconvinced by the efforts of the Greeks.

In the same vein, Eurostat this morning put out its first estimate of the debt and deficit figures for the end of 2013. As might be expected they don’t make particularly pretty reading. As the graph below highlights, the debt levels in many EU countries have continued to increase and by substantial amounts in Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia – all due to bank bailouts/recapitalisations.

With debt levels continuing to rise and the long term structure of the eurozone still developing it remains premature to cast the crisis as over - at least the Germans seem to think so.

A new eurozone economic policy "made in France"?

The appointment of Arnaud Montebourg - an outspoken critic of German and EU-mandated austerity and pro-competitivenesses policies - as the new French Economy Minister has not gone down well in Germany.

In a feature piece headlined, "He insults Germany and is promoted", Die Welt claims that "his appointment is controversial – he is known for his failures". The paper goes on to argue:

"He sees himself as the legitimate successor of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the finance minister of the legendary French Sun King Louis XIV... In his previous post of Minister for Re-industrialisation, he above all others terrified foreign investors with class warfare slogans, and now has acquired even more powers in the government of President Francois Hollande".

The paper also claims that Montebourg secured his new position by threatening Hollande that, unless given the Economic Ministry, he would resign from the government - a move which would have been hugely destabilising given his position as a figurehead on the left of the Socialist Party. The paper has a round-up of some of Montebourg's more memorable quotes:

On globalisation, free trade and protectionism:

“The EU is the only one that does not protect itself against unfair competition. We have become the idiots of the global village...For 30 years, consumers have made the law in Europe and the result has been a disaster. Me, I defend the producers."

On the European Commission's application of competition and state aid laws:

"[These people] exercise law in the manner of the taliban, [they are] fundamentalists who apply the [legislative] texts blindly to the detriment of European interests".

On Angela Merkel and Germany's actions during the eurozone crisis (back when the French Socialist Party was still in opposition):

"The issue of German nationalism is resurfacing through the policy à la Bismarck [of Angela Merkel]."

And:

"Mrs Merkel is killing the euro, and it would be time to show the failure of the German model, rather than singing its praises."

Even allowing for the fact that Montebourg is playing to the gallery a fair bit, and that the new government's economic policy will remain more pragmatic overall, it is clear why his appointment will raise concerns in Berlin and beyond about France's already fragile economic situation. In the meantime, we're looking forward to new additions to his already impressive repertoire of memorable quotes.

Second Clegg/Farage debate highlights that the EU status quo is indefensible

The majority of the UK public was not represented at last night's debate

The second EU debate between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage was an altogether more scrappy and bad-tempered affair with more personal attacks and fewer statbombs being thrown about. 

The polls hand Farage a clear victory - 68%/27% in the Sun/YouGov poll and 69%/31% in the Guardian/ICM poll - a more comprehensive margin than last week.

So clearly a bad evening for Nick Clegg, although the calculations of the Lib Dem strategists seems to be that the combination of the additional exposure and full-throated defence of the EU will allow the party to pick up some extra votes in May's European elections.

However, it remains to be seen what the longer term repercussions of the debates will be. It was striking that, over the course of two hours, Clegg had virtually nothing to say about the EU's flaws and failings and what reforms he'd like to see. Indeed, in response to a question from the audience about how the EU would look in 10 years' time, he said that it would look "quite similar to what it is now". Given what is happening in the eurozone, which will indirectly also affect the UK's position in the EU (something Clegg has himself mentioned on previous occasions), this is simply not credible. It also completely dismisses the public appetite for EU reform.

What is interesting is that, despite Farage's overwhelming victory in the debate, the Sun/YouGov before/after poll showed that public opinion on the In/Out question remained pretty finely balanced. Before the debate there was a small majority in favour of staying in the EU - 48% compared with 42% in favour of leaving - after the debate this was reversed slightly with 45% in favour of staying in and 48% in favour of leaving.

Polling has consistently shown that when the public are offered options that go beyond the binary in/out question, the majority of the public fall between the Clegg and Farage positions, with a far larger constituency in favour of staying in a reformed/slimmed down EU.

People hold different views about how they would like to see the European Union develop. Which of these statements comes closest to your view? (click to enlarge)

Source: YouGov poll for Open Europe, February 2014

Clegg's decision to talk only to the limited number of 'in no matter what' voters might be a clever Lib Dem 'core vote' strategy but it will turn off many swing voters in any future In campaign. All the more reason for politicians to represent the view held by the majority of voters and to test the limits of EU reform before forcing them to choose between In or Out.

Hollande expected to announce cabinet reshuffle after local election 'punishment'

If you want to get a sense of how badly the latest French local elections went for President François Hollande, have a look at today's front page of left-leaning French daily Libération:

 

The headline means 'The punishment', and it summarises the outcome of the local vote pretty well. According to data from the French Interior Ministry, the centre-right (that is, the opposition UMP and its allies) gained 139 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants compared to the 2008 local elections. The centre-left (Hollande's Socialist Party and its allies) lost 160. The fact that the Socialist Party managed to retain Paris - where Anne Hidalgo was elected as the city's first female mayor - cannot compensate for what was an unequivocal defeat nationwide.

Marine Le Pen's anti-EU Front National took control of eleven towns - in addition to Hénin-Beaumont, where the party won an outright victory in the first round. Though not impressive in absolute terms (see this blog post from last week for some more background information), the score is nonetheless politically significant. It shows how French voters increasingly see Front National not just as a mere 'protest party', but as a credible alternative for power - albeit so far only at the local level and in a very limited number of towns.

Meanwhile, the immediate consequence of yesterday's local election fiasco is that Hollande is expected to announce a cabinet reshuffle any moment. The French President has just come out of a two-hour meeting with Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, whose departure looks very likely, judging by the headlines in the French press over the past few days.

Interior Minister Manuel Valls, who enjoys a pretty high approval rating compared to his fellow cabinet members (in part thanks to his tough stance on certain crime and migration issues), is broadly seen as the favourite to replace Ayrault as Prime Minister. Laurent Fabius, currently serving as Foreign Minister, is another name being mentioned by the French media. 

However, in light of the latest macroeconomic indicators, the impression remains that moving a few ministers around will not be enough to restore the French government's credibility vis-à-vis the electorate - unless the policies also change and France makes some real progress in pushing ahead with the reforms needed to restore its competitiveness within the eurozone.

UK and Germany present united front in favour of EU reform

In a major coup for David Cameron, Chancellor George Osborne has penned a joint op-ed in the FT with his German opposite number Wolfgang Schäuble. Both argue for the need for EU reform (including services liberalisation) and for safeguards for non-eurozone states in the face of further eurozone integration - all areas of potential consensus we flagged up in our recent 'Anglo-German bargain' briefing.

On the acceptance of the different needs of non-euro and euro members, and therefore the need for safeguards, they say:

“As the euro area continues to integrate, it is important that countries outside the euro area are not at a systematic disadvantage in the EU. So future EU reform and treaty change must include reform of the governance framework to put euro area integration on a sound legal basis, and guarantee fairness for those EU countries inside the single market but outside the single currency.”

Getting explicit German support for this view and providing a united front on this issue is an important step forward for the UK and for Cameron's EU reform agenda. While Germany has previously hinted at willingness to support the UK on this issue, this is certainly a step up. It also brings Cameron closer to ticking off one of the key targets he recently put forward in what was probably the most important article nobody spotted. Open Europe has long argued that safeguards against further eurozone integration are crucial and that they will play a key role in determining the new set up and balance of the EU.

That being said, the UK government should not be complacent about where it now stands in terms of its reform agenda. While this represents progress, there is some way to go. This provides an important opportunity and a good base for the UK to begin testing specific reform proposals on other EU governments and electorates. After all, while Germany is the largest and possibly the most important partner to get on board, the UK also needs to convince the rest of the EU. While teaming up with Germany should broadly help on this front there is one constraint - not everyone buys into Germany's vision of the new eurozone with significant central oversight and limited share of liabilities. However, as the banking union shows, Germany has so far been adept at influencing the construction of new eurozone structures in its own image.

Possibly a more surprising inclusion is the joint support for services liberalisation, of which they say:

“We must complete the EU’s single market, especially in services, open up to international markets and conclude reforms to the euro area.”

Again, we've been advocating this for some time - we estimate that it could be worth up to €294bn for the EU's economy. Traditionally, Germany has been one of the staunchest obstacles to such service liberalisation, due to its many protected professions. As such gaining its public support is another big coup for Cameron and a positive step for the EU economy.

One final interesting point is noted by the FT:

"Mr Schäuble told Bruges’s College of Europe on Thursday that he wanted negotiations on a revised treaty to start straight after the European Parliament elections in May."

This is equally as important as all of the above for Cameron given that some of the biggest doubts around his push for EU reform and referendum have been on the time-frame of the negotiations. There is clear hope that discussions around treaty changes will begin in earnest after the elections (although in an ideal world they would have been part of an open and transparent debate within the elections). 

Overall the approach isn't perfect - it still speaks of a two-speed Europe, suggesting all member states are heading in the same direction, which is not the case - but it is a big step and an important one for Cameron. It is now vital that he seizes this opportunity to push a wider EU reform agenda.

Book review - George Soros 'The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?'

Over on his Forbes blog, Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel provides a review of George Soros’ latest book ‘The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?’ off the back of the event we hosted with him last night (the full write up of which can be found here).

The abstract of the book notes:

“The euro crisis was not an inevitable consequence of integration, but a result of avoidable mistakes in politics, economics and finance; the excessive faith in the self-regulating financial markets that Soros calls market fundamentalism inspired flawed institutional structures that call out for reform. Despite the considerable perils of this period, George Soros maintains his faith in the European Union as a model of open society.”

In his interviews Soros focuses on the failings of Europe during the eurozone crisis – specifically looking at the structural flaws in the euro and the role of Germany. Soros posits that the crisis could have been averted, or at least ended earlier, if Germany had taken the lead in the eurozone and allowed for greater solidarity through fiscal union. He also suggests the future of Europe could be marred by on-going political crises and economic stagnation if these flaws are not corrected.

Raoul argues that:

“His comments in general are interesting and for the most part accurate. However, he remained overly optimistic on the prospects for the euro despite these flaws and even called on the UK to join the single currency.”

“In particular there seems to be an inconsistency between his desire for greater centralisation and a firm grounding in democracy and an “open society” (which is transparent and responsive). It seems that behind Soros’ approach is the assumption of a European demos. However, I fundamentally believe that this is simply not the case.”

“While I do not believe the goals Soros outlines are readily achievable at this point in Europe, the one thing that comes through during the book is that this is not a policy proposal but a pitch to try to bring the reader round to his ambitious goals for Europe despite the current problems.”

One part which isn’t discussed on the blog is Soros’ view of the UK’s position in the EU. At our event he described the UK’s current position as “the best of both worlds” and called on it to rediscover its “European identity”. This comes through in the book as well, where he warns against a Brexit and accuses the UK of “blackmailing” the rest of the EU with the threat of an exit.

However, it doesn’t entirely fit with his broader view of the EU and the eurozone, which he believes needs much deeper integration. If that were to happen (and it is to some extent albeit more slowly than Soros would like) it would fundamentally change the UK’s position in the EU and the makeup of the EU itself. He seems to review the UK’s position in a much more static way than he does the EU and euro which he views as largely fluid.

This context also makes his “blackmail” comments a bit strange since part of the UK’s move is in response to the crisis. It also does not fit with his idea of an open society and democracy, given that many in the UK are keen to see a reformed EU and a referendum.

Nevertheless, it’s an interesting book and certainly worth a read if you’re looking for an overview of the current crisis and some historical factors around it as well as thoughts on the future.

ECB stands firm but looks to wider measures

Over on his new Forbes blog, Open Europe’s Head of Economic Research Raoul Ruparel lays out his take on why the ECB decided to stand firm despite the apparent deflation threat,

“My feeling is that there are two broad reasons. The first being that the flow of data is mostly positive, and the second, more important factor, being that none of its tools are economically, politically or legally suited to tackling the low inflation environment in the eurozone.”

He concludes,

“All in all then, the tools at the ECB’s disposal are far from suited to helping push up inflation in the struggling countries and boosting lending to the real economy to help economic growth. This is not to say the ECB would never use them, but that are better suited to a deeper more acute crisis (such as a break-up threat) than the chronic long term malaise which the eurozone currently finds itself in.”

These are themes we’ve explored plenty of times on this blog so won’t rehash here.

But there were a couple of other interesting points to come out of ECB President Mario Draghi’s press conference though.

The first being his mention of a new dataset which the ECB is looking at, specifically the “the high degree of unutilised capacity” in the eurozone economy. This refers to the ‘output gap’, i.e. the amount by which GDP in the eurozone has fallen below potential GDP. As you might imagine, estimating such a gap is fraught with difficulty and estimates are notoriously revised retrospectively (for example before the crisis few economies were seen performing above potential despite huge financial, real estate and debt bubbles).

Why is this important? Well, it could be the first step towards a more firm GDP target on the part of the ECB. Admittedly, it’s a small step and a full GDP target is unlikely but it could be an interesting shift for the ECB which has traditionally focused more on inflation, money market and private sector survey data (such as the PMIs). As Draghi himself said, it also shows that monetary policy will stay looser for longer, even if the data improves, due to the large gap between actual and potential GDP. It will be interesting to watch how this one develops over the next few meetings and whether the ECB decides to put any more emphasis on this measure.

Italian government on the brink (again): Has Renzi's hour come?

‘Staffetta’ is the most used word in the Italian media these days. It literally means ‘relay’, and it refers to the

possibility of Prime Minister Enrico Letta handing over power to a new coalition government led by Matteo Renzi – the Mayor of Florence who was elected as the new leader of Mr Letta’s centre-left Democratic Party in December.

The two are holding talks in Rome as we write this blog post, ahead of a key party meeting scheduled for tomorrow. Speculation is growing in some Italian papers that Mr Renzi already has a list of ministers in mind.

If the takeover does materialise, as looks increasingly likely if you scan the Italian press, a few points are worth keeping in mind:

• The change of government would not change the numbers in the Italian parliament, where no party holds a majority in the Senate, the upper chamber. Renzi may be able to muster wider parliamentary support than Letta, but he would still be stuck with a diverse coalition with smaller centrist and centre-right parties – meaning that the difficulties in pushing ahead any significant political and/or economic reform would not evaporate. 

• The handover of power would happen without an election, something which could backfire in terms of Renzi’s image vis-à-vis the electorate – not least because the Mayor of Florence has been clearly saying that he wasn’t keen on replacing Letta without a vote. 

• Therefore, a better option at this point might be to pass a new electoral law quickly and call snap elections. The electoral law currently being discussed is not perfect, but it would make sure that the winning party/coalition would secure a solid majority in both houses of the Italian parliament. It could be done in time for the beginning of Italy’s rotating EU Presidency on 1 July. Indeed, this would mean two months of political paralysis because of the electoral campaign. But despite all the good intentions, Mr Letta’s government has so far hardly delivered on the big reforms it was supposed to implement. Most importantly, at the end of the process Italy would have a government which has actually come out of the polls – rather than negotiations among party leaders.

Rien à voir ici? Hollande says treaty change is "not the priority" for France, but...

David Cameron and François Hollande have just held their joint press conference following the Anglo-French defence summit in Oxfordshire. Predictably, though, most of the questions focused instead on Cameron's EU renegotiation strategy and the prospects of it being achieved by changes to the EU treaties.

Here's what stood out for us:

• Significantly, Cameron explicitly said that renegotiation of the UK's EU membership "will involve elements of treaty change". This is quite a rare admission, and is the most explicit he's been so far on the need to change the EU treaties. As The Times's Sam Coates flagged up, the Prime Minister has been categorical about EU treaty change once before, speaking of "the treaty change that I’ll be putting in place before the referendum", on the Andrew Marr Show earlier this year - although the question was specifically on EU migrants' access to benefits. 

• The Prime Minister also reiterated that "the eurozone needs change...It needs greater co-ordination, it needs those elements that make a single currency succeed. That's why in recent years we've already seen treaty changes."

• Hollande said that "France wants more coordination and integration in the eurozone", but treaty change "is not the priority" for the time being. Though this is what the headlines are likely to focus on, this is nothing new, nor surprising. It's been the French position for ages. However, Hollande didn't rule treaty change out. He said it wasn't "urgent" or "the priority". As we have argued from the beginning (see here, for instance), the timetable remains a weakness in Cameron's plan - not least because discussions on changing the EU treaties can drag on for years and the eurozone remains on an uncertain development path.

• The French President also stressed that major treaty changes (he mentioned the Maastricht Treaty as an example) would have to be put to a referendum in France - while for smaller ones parliamentary approval would be enough.

A couple of points are worth making. It is no secret that one of the reasons France is wary of changing the EU treaties is that referenda are not exactly easy to win (think of the one on the EU Constitution in 2005, but also the one on the Maastricht Treaty, both of which split the country and the political establishment).

This is true assuming that the new Treaty gives the EU more powers. But this is not what Cameron is aiming for. So it is not entirely clear that any UK-led changes would necessarily have to be put to a vote in France.

That said, though, the common wisdom on this point is that an EU treaty change would be part of a 'grand bargain' to strengthen economic coordination in the eurozone - meaning that the UK's new relationship with the EU would be negotiated alongside greater central controls in the euro area. This type of treaty change could clearly trigger a referendum in France (and elsewhere).

The question remains open. With Germany likely to keep pushing for an EU treaty change to complete the overhaul of the eurozone structures, we still think Hollande may have to face the issue sooner rather than later - with the question being what deal Berlin can broker.

And yet again, that brings us back to Angela Merkel.

From the archives: The story of the 3% deficit limit

Okay, we know this is not exactly breaking news (the original story is from September 2012), but it came to our attention again and we felt compelled to post on it.

Back in the heyday of the eurozone crisis, Le Parisien interviewed Guy Abeille (see picture), a senior official at the French Finance Ministry who is thought to have 'invented' the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit later enshrined in the EU treaties and the cornerstone of the famed Stability and Growth Pact.

And Monsieur Abeille made some rather extraordinary revelations:

We came up with this number in less than an hour. It was born on the corner of a table, without any theoretical reflection.

It was a night of May 1981. Pierre Bilger, the Budget Director at the time, summoned us. He told us: [French President François] Mitterrand want us to provide him quickly with an easy rule, that sounds as coming from an economist, and can be opposed to the ministers that walk into his office asking for money.

We needed something simple...We were going towards FF 100bn deficit. That represented a deficit of over 2% [of GDP]. 1%? We dropped that number, impossible to achieve. 2%? That put us under too much pressure. 3%? It's a good number, a number that has gone through the ages, it made one think of the Trinity.

Mitterrand wanted a rule, we gave him one. 

In other words, it seems the deficit rule that has made so many politicians lose sleep, especially in the eurozone periphery, was cooked up in less time than it takes to roast a chicken and wasn't based on any economic theory or even best practice.

We also can't help but be reminded of the famed response of  a senior Anglo Irish Bank member when asked how he came up with the original bailout figure for the bank (which proved far too low) - I "picked it out of my a*se". Quite. And it seems he wasn't the first either.

Summer is over as Spain adapts to life outside its bank bailout programme

Spain's first day outside its EU-IMF bank bailout programme started with the publication of the new data on unemployment from the country's national statistics institute (INE). As we predicted on this blog last year (see here and here), the figures after the end of the summer - when a lot more seasonal jobs are on offer - look less encouraging than in the previous two quarters.

Let's start with the headline figures. In the last quarter of 2013, the general unemployment rate increased slightly from the previous quarter - from 25.98% to 26.03%. This means that, at the end of last year, 5,896,300 people in Spain were out of work.

It's worth looking at the figures a bit more in detail:

• The number of unemployed people went down by 8,400 in the fourth quarter of 2013, and by 69,000 in the year as a whole. This is positive, but has to be weighed against a significant fall in the economically active population - those working or actively looking for a job.

• Spain's active population decreased by 73,400 in the last quarter of 2013 alone, and by 267,900 in the year as a whole. As a result, the active population is now 59.43% of the total - the lowest level since the first quarter of 2008. The upshot of this is that, while the number of unemployed people may fall, a lot are simply switching to being economically inactive.

• The number of employed people went down, both in the fourth quarter of 2013 (-65,000 from Q3) and in the year as a whole (-198,900). However, it has to be said that the decline is less sharp than in the previous years.

• On a more positive note, the seasonally adjusted employment rate went up slightly (0.29%) in the fourth quarter of 2013, and it's the first time it happens since the first quarter of 2008. Similarly, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate decreased by 1.22% from Q3. Again, though, this has to be put into perspective - notably with the reduction in the economically active population.

• One of the most concerning points comes with the level of long-term unemployment, which towards the end of last year reached new record highs. Over 13% of the active population have now been unemployed for twelve months or more (click on the graph below to enlarge). The knock-on effects of this are significant. It is well proven that the longer people are unemployed for, the harder it is for them to find work. It also diminishes their skill level and hampers future earning potential. This is worsened by the fact that, in Spain, many of these are likely to be younger workers.

The latest unemployment figures show that, despite some encouraging signals, it will still take time before Spanish citizens feel the recovery has started. It also means the Spanish government may consider a second round of reforms - perhaps more targeted at closing the gap between the education system and the needs of the labour market.   

Why did Latvia join the euro?

Following on from our #EUReform Conference, we will now begin to shift back to normal blogging which was slightly disrupted by the undertaking of organising such a huge event.

One topic which was discussed at the Conference – specifically in the panel on Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe – is whether Latvia has made the correct decision to join the euro at the start of this year.

Many people were understandably surprised that a country would even countenance joining the euro, given that it is still in the midst of a severe crisis. We laid out some of our thoughts in a recent interview with CNN Marketplace Europe, but will develop them further below.

Why did Latvia join the euro?

Political reasons

• The key reason here is to cement ties with the EU and to protect itself further against influence from Russia. The Latvian Finance Minister, Andris Vilks, recently cited the example of the problems in Ukraine as a key reason why they chose to align closely with the EU through the euro. With the euro, the economic influence of Russia is reduced, while any uncertainty is backstopped by the security of the currency. With its own free-floating currency, any clash with Russia would likely cause fluctuations.
• There is also a view that being within the euro may entitle a country to greater levels of support and ‘solidarity’, be this against political or economic uncertainty.

Economic reasons

• As a small country in a world increasingly dominated by large central banks, many believe the euro still offers Latvia a level of protection and certainty. Many small countries in this area would have pegged currencies or de facto use other currencies in any case, so joining the euro may not be as big a choice as it first seems. It can also be very hard to realistically manage a free-floating currency for a small country these days, open to sharp flows of hot money or speculation.
• With this in mind, Latvia has maintained its peg with the euro and endured significant pain to do so. This is an issue we looked at in our internal devaluation paper. In any case, after having endured the worst of having a pegged currency, Latvia may see now as the time to reap the benefits.
• There are also the usual touted benefits of the single currency – notably reduced transaction costs. This is important for Latvia which sees around 30% of its exports go to eurozone countries. It is also likely to increase foreign direct investment and access to financing given the use of the much more liquid euro markets.

What are the potential downsides?

• The biggest risk facing Latvia is that it will repeat the mistakes it made when it joined the EU and which countries such as Ireland, Spain and Greece made when they joined the euro. This would be huge inflows of money prompting significant rises in prices and wages, as well as being funnelled into industry bubbles rather than productive investment. It is hoped Latvia has learnt from its own mistakes and those of others but that remains to be seen.
• The loss of tools to manage the national economy is also well known. Not only will Latvia lose control of its own specific monetary policy (something which we have seen can have perverse effects and potentially worsen he problem mentioned above), but it will also be subject to significantly more oversight and will have to sign up to the fiscal targets and structures set in the eurozone.
• Another big downside is that it seems to be going against the will of the people. All the polls in the run up to the Latvian accession to the euro showed that the public did not want to join. Not only is this undemocratic, particularly given the importance of the issue, but it risks stoking uncertainty. This is especially true since Latvia's previous government, which was a key proponent of the move, resigned.
• The final risk is one which all euro countries share. Latvia has now tied itself more deeply to a group of countries which continue to struggle, and for which the economic outlook remains mixed. It has also joined at a time when the exact structure of the eurozone remains in flux. Further integration seems likely, but what this will mean and cost is unclear.

In the end, only time will tell if this is the correct decision for Latvia. We are not going to pass judgement either way, although it is clear a more democratic approach would have been preferable. The most important point, though, is that Latvia does not repeat the same mistakes as before.

Slovenia dodges bailout as it swallows cost of bank overhaul alone

The Slovenian Central Bank this morning released the long anticipated results of the stress test of Slovenian banks. The full results can be found here, while the press release is available here and a reader-friendly Q&A here.

The release did not begin well, with the English feed of the conference proving slow and laggy – similarly to the tests themselves, whose results have been delayed a couple of times. Beyond that, though, things went much as expected, with the tests showing a €4.8bn hole which needs to be filled, around the expectations of €4bn to €5bn. Below, we lay out our key thoughts:

The macroeconomic scenarios include some optimistic export numbers. As we have said before for Slovenia, and others, relying on exports alone to prop up GDP can be a risky game.

The tests are based on data from the end of 2012. This is a problem with these tests in general, but has been exacerbated by delays in the case of Slovenia. The data are one year out of date – a year where the Slovenian economy has struggled, and non-performing loans held by banks have increased steadily.

The €4.8bn figure is taken from the adverse scenario, and it's not exactly clear why this is done when the figures shown under the base scenario are normally used in these tests. This could be seen as an attempt to be 'extra conservative', or a sign that the base case is a bit outdated in terms of projections or data.

 

€3bn of the money will come from the government and be injected into the three largest state-owned banks (NLB, NKBM and Abanka). €2bn will be in the form of cash, with the rest in the form of government securities. A further €441m will come from a 100% write-down of subordinated debt.

The largest banks will also transfer €1.7bn in non-performing loans to the country’s bad bank – exactly what price this will be at remains unclear. It is also unclear if the bad bank will require further state support. Overall, this is a huge amount of support for the largest banks in the sector. The remaining small banks will be forced to raise around €1.1bn through private sources before June 2014. If they fail, then the government may step in once again (although this will certainly involve further bail-ins).

As a result of this bank recapitalisation, Slovenia's government debt will rise to 75.6% of GDP. Not massive by standards of the eurozone crisis, but high enough that we could see upward pressure on borrowing costs, especially given the poor growth outlook for the economy. It also means that both the public and private sector in Slovenia is heavily indebted. This risks weighing on the economy, and could potentially create a downward spiral as domestic demand, investment and government spending falls.

One of the more astonishing figures (to us) is that the stress tests cost €21 million (around 0.06% of GDP) to conduct, due to fees for the consulting firms such as Oliver Wyman, Roland Berger, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte.

So far, then, Slovenia has managed to avoid the need for external aid, despite a significant overhaul of its banking sector. However, the economy remains in a fragile state, and any shocks to the system over the next six months, as the overhaul takes place, could push the economy into a wider and deeper crisis.

EXCLUSIVE: First translation of draft German Grand Coalition agreement

We have seen a first draft of the German coalition government agreement (the final agreement is expected tomorrow), courtesy of Green politician Malte Spitz who published the draft on his blog late yesterday evening.

The German media has begun delving into the document while the English speaking press continues to lag behind.

The document contains some key insights about how the new government will view Europe and conduct its EU policy, below we pick out the most important parts:

Overall vision of the EU
The agreement stresses that German must become an official working language of the EU alongside French and English – not entirely surprising given that it was a CDU/CSU electoral pledge, but it highlights that Germany is slowly becoming more comfortable with its role in Europe.

There is also a strong emphasis on “subsidiarity” and that the EU must only act where action on other levels is not sufficient. It also highlights that Germany is keen to deepen ties with Poland and maintain the “unique” Franco-German partnership. This may not mean much, but it definitely isn't a nod to David Cameron.

In terms of democratic legitimacy, the agreement calls for a "strong role" for the European Parliament and "close involvement" of national parliaments  in the decision making process. It also calls for a standard minimum threshold for the allocation of seats under European elections and a "single European suffrage" to add to stable majorities at the European Parliament. The final point here is the call for a "stringent and efficient" set of Commissioners - possibly a hint towards reducing the number of Commissioners and focusing them on policy areas rather than allowing one for each member.  

Eurozone crisis
The agreement contains few details on the new government’s approach to the banking union and specifically the resolution funds – given that this is known to be a part of the negotiations it is surprising nothing has been included, maybe a sign that an agreement has been hard to come by.

The document also contains a rare admission from Germany that the causes of the crisis are "varied" and extend well beyond fiscal profligacy. Specifically to "competitiveness", "imbalances" and "design defects" in the EMU which led to problems in the financial markets.

As for the way out of the crisis - as we predicted - much more of the same can be expected:

“[The eurozone must] combine structural reforms to increase competitiveness, and a strict, sustained continuation of budget consolidation for increased competitiveness with future investment in growth that combines employment in socially-balanced way.”

Again as we pointed out in our pre-election briefing, the widely mooted ‘Reform Contracts’ are likely to be a key tool in enforcing these changes. In particular, the contracts will be democratically grounded and enforceable (although the exact mechanism for this is still unclear):

“We are committed to ensuring that the euro countries agree on democratically- legitimised binding and enforceable contractual reform agreements on the European level. [These reform contracts] will be directed to achieving the goals of competitiveness, sound and sustainable finances, growth and employment.”

Any form of debt pooling is strictly ruled out, as we predicted in our pre-election briefing:

“The principle that each Member State is liable for its own obligations must be upheld. Any form of pooling of sovereign debt would jeopardise the necessary national policies in each Member State. National budget responsibility and supranational, joint liability are not compatible.”

The new coalition will not rule out further bailouts and will consider them but “only as a last resort” when the “stability of the eurozone as a whole is at risk”. Importantly, the agreement reiterates that any use of the ESM, the eurozone bailout fund, needs “approval of the Bundestag”.

The City of London may also have some grounds for concern, given that the document hints at more action on financial sector regulation, saying:

 “The financial markets must be involved in the costs of the crisis, and must be guided back to their function as serving the Real-economy.”

Remember, this is only a draft. Nonetheless, the agreement looks to be very much as expected – no change of course on the eurozone, some mention of limiting EU power but a continued commitment to the EU and Europe. The draft however, remains vague on some key details. With important negotiations coming up on the eurozone banking union as well as in terms of the future of the EU, the new German government will have to flesh out its position significantly.