EU falling short on implementing bank capital rules

The BIS Basel Committee has today released its assessment of the EU’s (and the USA’s) implementation of the Basel III rules on bank capital and it does not make good reading for the EU. They key findings of the report are (as detailed in the press release and the graphic below, click to enlarge):

• “Eight of the 14 components meet all minimum provisions of the relevant Basel standards and these were therefore graded as "compliant".”

• “Four of the components were assessed as "largely compliant", reflecting the fact that most but not all provisions of the global standard were satisfied.”

• “One component - the Internal Ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk - was assessed "materially non-compliant" and pertained primarily to the treatment of exposures to SMEs, corporates and sovereigns.” In particular, the report notes that exposures to SMEs are given concessionary risk weightings, presumably to try to encourage this specific type of lending, however it is nonetheless not in line with the rules. Furthermore, it finds that banks are given a significant amount of leeway in how to value their sovereign debt holdings, with most across the EU simply applying zero-risk weighting – again this is a deliberate attempt to limit any distortions to the sensitive Eurozone government debt markets.

• “Another component was found to be "non-compliant". This relates to the EU's counterparty credit risk framework, which provides an exemption from the Basel framework's credit valuation adjustment (CVA) capital charge for certain derivatives exposures.” Essentially the current rules allow exemptions for instruments which are not traded on exchanges or the wider market and therefore may be hard to value. Furthermore, this “materially boosts bank capital ratios,” though the report accepts that the EU is considering changes to these specific rules.

• Overall the EU was given the second lowest rating (on a scale of four) of “materially non-compliant”, making it the first jurisdiction to be found on the whole not the be complying with the Basel rules. The assessment is also particularly poor compared to the US, which was found to be “largely compliant” with the rules, in general its failings also seem to be more minor as well as less numerous.

The European Commission’s response can be found here, while there is also a response section following the executive summary in the main report. The EC claims the EU’s approach is “particularly ambitious approach, unique in the world”, which is true to an extent given the diverse nature of national banking systems. The response notes that some changes are already in the pipeline, but largely challenges the interpretation which the Basel Committee makes of the rules. On the whole it is not entirely convincing but then, since the Committee cannot force the EU to change, it seems the Commission is largely happy to ‘agree to disagree’ on a number of areas.

While all of this may seem rather mundane and technical it does have some important implications.

First off, it raises questions about the quality and thoroughness of the recent ECB and European Banking Authority stress tests. We, along with plenty of others, have already raised concerns about this and the report adds further weight to those concerns. Furthermore, the specific problems outlined would certainly have helped present European banks as having higher capital ratios largely by reducing the perceived riskiness of certain assets they hold.

A report by Yalman Onaran for Bloomberg earlier this week highlighted the problems relating to the use of banks internal models to weight risk by contrasting this approach to that of using the pure leverage ratio. As the article notes, under the leverage ratio approach 12 large European banks would need to raise a further €66bn in capital. While neither approach is perfect, the Basel Committee’s indictment of the bank’s internal models and the way a large number of exposures in a number of sectors are valued seems to support such analysis and criticisms.

The second important implication is that is once again clearly highlights that the EU probably remains the more important level of policy making and legislation than international level or international organisations – at least when it comes to how things are structure on the ground.

Despite agreeing to follow the Basel III rules the EU is the one that designs and implements the specific legislation. In this case it has clearly altered the rules significantly to suit its own needs – the gap with the original rules as well as how they are interpreted and implemented in other jurisdictions is clear. Furthermore, while the Basel Committee can issue a damning judgement of the EU’s approach, it cannot force it to change. In this relationship all the hard (legal) power lies with the EU. This also extends beyond just implementation to interpretation. Despite writing the Basel III rules the Basel Committee is not even able to guarantee primacy on how they should be interpreted as the EU’s response to the report clearly shows.

Slovenia dodges bailout as it swallows cost of bank overhaul alone

The Slovenian Central Bank this morning released the long anticipated results of the stress test of Slovenian banks. The full results can be found here, while the press release is available here and a reader-friendly Q&A here.

The release did not begin well, with the English feed of the conference proving slow and laggy – similarly to the tests themselves, whose results have been delayed a couple of times. Beyond that, though, things went much as expected, with the tests showing a €4.8bn hole which needs to be filled, around the expectations of €4bn to €5bn. Below, we lay out our key thoughts:

The macroeconomic scenarios include some optimistic export numbers. As we have said before for Slovenia, and others, relying on exports alone to prop up GDP can be a risky game.

The tests are based on data from the end of 2012. This is a problem with these tests in general, but has been exacerbated by delays in the case of Slovenia. The data are one year out of date – a year where the Slovenian economy has struggled, and non-performing loans held by banks have increased steadily.

The €4.8bn figure is taken from the adverse scenario, and it's not exactly clear why this is done when the figures shown under the base scenario are normally used in these tests. This could be seen as an attempt to be 'extra conservative', or a sign that the base case is a bit outdated in terms of projections or data.

 

€3bn of the money will come from the government and be injected into the three largest state-owned banks (NLB, NKBM and Abanka). €2bn will be in the form of cash, with the rest in the form of government securities. A further €441m will come from a 100% write-down of subordinated debt.

The largest banks will also transfer €1.7bn in non-performing loans to the country’s bad bank – exactly what price this will be at remains unclear. It is also unclear if the bad bank will require further state support. Overall, this is a huge amount of support for the largest banks in the sector. The remaining small banks will be forced to raise around €1.1bn through private sources before June 2014. If they fail, then the government may step in once again (although this will certainly involve further bail-ins).

As a result of this bank recapitalisation, Slovenia's government debt will rise to 75.6% of GDP. Not massive by standards of the eurozone crisis, but high enough that we could see upward pressure on borrowing costs, especially given the poor growth outlook for the economy. It also means that both the public and private sector in Slovenia is heavily indebted. This risks weighing on the economy, and could potentially create a downward spiral as domestic demand, investment and government spending falls.

One of the more astonishing figures (to us) is that the stress tests cost €21 million (around 0.06% of GDP) to conduct, due to fees for the consulting firms such as Oliver Wyman, Roland Berger, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte.

So far, then, Slovenia has managed to avoid the need for external aid, despite a significant overhaul of its banking sector. However, the economy remains in a fragile state, and any shocks to the system over the next six months, as the overhaul takes place, could push the economy into a wider and deeper crisis.

Spotlight on Slovenia

Back in the spring, we looked at who might be next in the line of eurozone bailout requests. It's now looking increasingly likely that one of our predictions, Portugal, will require some form of further assistance to fully exit its current bailout. Now, suspicions are rising that our other tip, Slovenia, may need external aid in a not-too-distant future.

Today and yesterday, eurozone finance ministers have been meeting in Lithuania with aid for Slovenia (as well as Greece, Portugal and Ireland) top of the eurozone’s agenda.

Recap – What problems is Slovenia facing?

• The banking sector is nursing a possible €7.5bn (21% of GDP) capital shortfall. Although Slovenia’s government debt remains very manageable (at 54% of GDP) it could increase quickly due to a toxic combination of collapsing economic growth and spiralling costs of bailing out banks.

• As we noted back in the spring, provisions against this capital shortfall are far below the levels needed and covered at best half of the problematic loans. Since then, the level of bad loans has increased, while little progress has been made on recapitalising banks. The recent bailout of two small banks cost a combined €900m+, and included a bail-in of subordinated debtors. This could set the tone for the approach to the rest of the sector. Worryingly, this is also around the total amount previously estimated for the capital needs of the whole banking sector.

• The European Commission has pushed the independent bank stress test to be expanded to cover the whole banking sector. The results are expected at the start of next month, and could well reveal deeper holes in Slovenia banks. Filling these without external aid will be tricky.

• Non-financial corporations also continue to struggle under a mountain of debt, with a debt-to-equity ratio of around 200%. This will be a significant drag on the economy for some time as firms shrink and deleverage while many could well shutter for good. This of course has further knock on impacts for the level of bad loans at the banks and the level of unemployment.

• Austerity has been limited so far with the government deficit at around 8% of GDP (and possibly set to increase this year). Significant cuts will still have to happen and, as we have been at pains to point out before, the combination of bank deleveraging, fiscal consolidation and struggling domestic demand can create a very painful downward spiral.

• The privatisation programme has failed to get off the ground, with the only sizeable move so far being the €240m sale of retailer Mercator.

• Concerns also remain surrounding the significant amount of cronyism and corruption at play, particularly within state owned firms and within the financial sector. The government has recently moved to crack down on the shadow economy with wider taxes, although whether this will prove successful remains to be seen.

Despite these issues, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaüble struck a positive tone today, saying,

“I think if they stay strictly on course -- and they’ve said that want to do that; they’ve supplied two small banks with capital over the weekend -- then they’ll manage without it…So as long as Slovenia itself says they can manage it, we should encourage them in that.”

EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn voiced similar sentiments. So far then, Slovenia seems to be happy to go it alone and (possibly with other things on their minds) Germany and others are happy to acquiesce. But with the ECB reportedly increasingly concerned about the state of the banking sector, the upcoming stress test results could be a turning point – assuming of course they are judged credible (far from a given). 

If any aid is eventually forthcoming, as we’ve argued before, it seems much more likely to take a similar form to that in Spain than in Cyprus or elsewhere.

Is Cyprus eyeing up an exit from its capital controls?

As expected the Cypriot government has finally reached a deal with the EU/IMF/ECB Troika over the final stage of the restructuring of the Bank of Cyprus (BoC).

As we noted in today’s press summary this was not an easy decision to reach, and has dragged on since Spring, for a couple of reasons:

• The Cypriot government was keen to limit the haircut and insisted that the BoC only had to reach a tier one capital ratio of 9% at the current point in time.
• The Troika however insisted that this 9% target applied to the end point of the bailout (2016) and therefore the bank needed a ratio of 12% currently since it will deteriorate overtime.
• As the Cyprus Mail notes the Memorandum of Understanding signed by both sides clearly fits the Troika view. Unsurprisingly it won out (as always) but the Cypriot government is still seemingly bitter about the whole affair (which doesn’t bode well for the many, many interactions between the two sides yet to come).

In the end the two sides settled on a 47.5% haircut for uninsured deposits over €100,000 – although these funds will not be completely lost but converted into shares of the bank. This is above the original target of 37.5% but below the potential limit of 60% (for the most part).

The most interesting part of this whole deal might be the following though:

“Following the recapitalisation, 12% of deposits that were previously blocked will be released (5% in total).

The balance will be split evenly into three separate time deposits of six, nine and twelve months, respectively. BoC will have the option to renew the time deposits once for the same time duration. These deposits will receive a rate of interest which will be higher than the corresponding market rates offered by the BoC.”

Of the remaining frozen deposits 12% will be released then, while the rest will first be converted to time deposits, meaning people may not have access to their money for between 6 and 24 months. There are likely a couple of motivating factors here:

1. Firstly, this eases the funding transition for the bank as it looks to return to normal operations since it locks in part of its deposit base.
2. Secondly, and more importantly, it locks in a large amount of deposits which would be liable to flee the country as soon as the capital controls are removed (not least because they tend to belong to rich and/or foreign depositors who would likely find it easier to shift their funds).

These funds are only likely to be worth around €6bn, so not a huge amount in a country with a deposit base still around €50bn and far from enough to settle the question of capital flight once the controls are removed.

But it suggests that both Cyprus and the Troika are planning for an exit from capital controls and looking for ways to stem the potential outflow. The quicker this can be done in a managed way the better for the Cypriot economy. As we have noted before, as long as the capital controls apply the hope of a recovery is slim to none in Cyprus and the euro continues to look incredibly fragmented.

(Note: the blog has been updated with new calculations. Previously it suggested the total coverted to term deposits would be €2bn, however, it is likely to be closer to €6bn). 

The Great European Bank Run that never was?

Journalists were descending on banks across Cyprus this morning to monitor whether Cypriot depositors would rush to withdraw their cash as the country’s banks opened after being closed for 10 days. So far, however, there have been virtually no dramatic scenes of desperate people flocking to ATM machines and banks. There’s a feeling of calm. Those who expected Northern Rock style scenes have been left disappointed. However,  a couple of points:

• First, there’s no hard data available yet for deposit withdrawals in March, so everything is based on anecdotal evidence. There have been numerous press reports speculating about withdrawals in the run up to the bailout and even while the banks have been closed. Unfortunately, these are unlikely to be confirmed or disproved for at least a month (when data is expected).
• Remember, there are limits on what people can withdraw and/or transfer electronically. People may not be too bothered about waiting at banks if they are subject to strict limits.
• Obviously, in this day and age, much banking is done electronically so the number of people at the actual bank branches may not reveal the true level of transactions taking place behind the scenes. This is particularly true for Cyprus given the high level of foreign depositors who would have to bank electronically.

In the meantime the latest data on deposits in Cyprus in February was released this morning. Total deposits fell from €68.4bn to €67.5bn – a 1.3% fall, but not exactly as disastrous as some may have expected.

At the same time, as we predicted, depositors elsewhere in Europe – in particular Spain and Italy – have so far shown zero inclination to see themselves as next in line. There has been, however, a drop in banks shares in the wake of comments by Eurogroup Chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem.

So not the big collapse of everything that some expected, but, the capital controls are likely to play a role in mitigating this. As we have pointed out, the real challenge comes when the Cypriot government looks to remove capital controls and once the data on electronic transactions out of Cyprus becomes clearer.

Let the guessing game continue: The Eurogroup's mixed messages on capital controls

As we have noted at length, the capital controls are a key part of the Cypriot deal and could have a huge bearing on how and when Cyprus recovers from this crisis. Unfortunately, as with almost all important eurozone decisions, this one lacks clarity.

The body of the Eurogroup statement said:

“The Eurogroup takes note of the authorities' decision to introduce administrative measures, appropriate in view of the present unique and exceptional situation of Cyprus' financial sector and to allow for a swift reopening of the banks. The Eurogroup stresses that these administrative measures will be temporary, proportionate and non-discriminatory, and subject to strict monitoring in terms of scope and duration in line with the Treaty.”

However, the Annex noted:

“Only uninsured deposits in BoC will remain frozen until recapitalisation has been effected, and may subsequently be subject to appropriate conditions.”

EU Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier added earlier today:

“Any measures to restrict or limit freedom of movement may only be enacted exceptionally and temporarily and that is what has been requested by the Cypriot authorities.”

Some pretty mixed messages. The first suggests that “administrative measures” (which is widely being taken as capital controls or related measures) will be generally applied. Bruegel suggests that this may not even need to take the form of full capital controls and could be limited to measures slowing down the movement of capital. This is contradicted by the second point which suggests they will only apply to the Bank of Cyprus uninsured depositors. Barnier’s point is closer to the first point but suggests actual controls will be needed.

FT Alphaville has an interesting run-down of the different type of capital controls and their implications. Paul Krugman makes the valid point that, if the trade-off of the single currency is reduced transaction costs in exchange for an overvalued currency, once capital controls are introduced, what is the motivation to stay inside? As he notes, wider points on the EU and access to ECB liquidity apply but it gets to the crux of the choice facing Cyprus.

As we have suggested, we find it hard to imagine that the banks could survive long without capital controls, while the economy would likely take an even bigger hit. As we have mentioned, it would fall on the ECB to continue to sanction ELA to keep banks afloat during deposit outflows, but this would amount to a large transfer of risk towards the Cypriot Central Bank (and therefore the Cypriot state, and therefore the eurozone). Meanwhile, access to the ELA is limited by the ECB’s view of bank solvency (one they have shown they may not stretch indefinitely) and assets which can be posted as collateral.

One thing that is for sure: this lack of clarity is certainly not helping an already messy situation.

The Cyprus Solidarity Fund and bank restructuring - what's the latest?

Is this Plan B or Plan C? We’ve lost track. Maybe Plan B+.

Anyway, it seems that the Cypriot parliament is currently discussing the proposal for a ‘solidarity fund’ which the cabinet has reportedly unanimously approved. This idea originated yesterday and was rejected by the troika overnight – we assume (hope) that this version of the fund contains some additional proposals to smooth over the previous disagreements.

What is the solidarity fund and what does it include (click to enlarge)?

The solidarity fund is essentially an investment fund or sovereign wealth fund which will pool a series of assets to help provide the €5.8bn in cash required by the Cypriot government to agree the bailout.

This is a broad list (we have assessed many of the measures already) and not all of them are likely to be included.

Now, clearly, some of these assets are liquid and can provide a cash flow, while others are not. It has been suggested that this fund will be used to purchase government debt in order to fully monetise the assets and boost government coffers. This seems strange to us since it would only succeed in worsening Cyprus’ debt level. It is also very likely to be rejected by the Troika for just that reason.

We also don’t necessarily see the benefit of extending the Russian loan. It helps from a cash flow sense, interest payments are cut by 2.5% and repayment is delayed by five years. But in the end Cyprus will end up paying €160m more. The Troika usually frowns on this type of approach.

CDU MP Hans Michelbach has also raised questions over the fund and specifically suggested it falls around €1bn short of providing the €5.8bn needed.

Laiki bank restructuring

The Cypriot Central Bank just announced that the second largest bank in Cyprus, Laiki Bank (or Cyprus Popular Bank), will be restructured and separated into a good and bad bank. This had been rumoured throughout the afternoon and sparked long queues at cash machines particularly Laiki ones, while the protests outside the Cypriot parliament have swelled with nervous Laiki bank workers and customers. The level of withdrawals has also been restricted to €260, while (somewhat ironically) the Central Bank has confirmed all depositors up to €100,000 will be guaranteed - no word on those above (see below).

This seems a reasonable move and could save between €1bn and €2bn on bank recap costs but problems abound. The cost of financing and winding down the bad bank will be large, who will finance it? Some reports suggest it could be the uninsured depositors – this may work but is likely to cause outcry amongst foreign investors and some Cypriot businesses.

The bill on bank restructuring is in front of the parliament now, along with a bill on the solidarity fund and a bill which includes some form of capital controls. It seems that the restructuring bill and the capital controls bill has support from the eurozone, but it is not clear that the solidarity fund does or the plans to fund the bank recap (as @SpiegelPeter notes).

The eurogroup will hold a call on this proposal at 6pm GMT, with a statement due after.

It is not clear if a vote will take place on it tonight in the Cypriot parliament, but we imagine they will at least need to wait for approval of the eurogroup.

Why is the ECB threatening to pull the plug on Cyprus? And how would it work?

The ECB - which holds the key to Cyprus' future inside the euro by virtue of funding the country's banks - this morning issued a statement which essentially set Monday as the deadline for a Cypriot bailout deal. It said:

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank decided to maintain the current level of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) until Monday, 25 March 2013. Thereafter, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) could only be considered if an EU/IMF programme is in place that would ensure the solvency of the concerned banks.

Short but not sweet. It''s clear that Cypriot banks cannot survive without this liquidity. There either needs to be an EU/IMF bailout deal agreed by Monday or some deal with Russia to prop up Cypriot banks (although the political implications of this would be significant). Remember the four scenarios that we set out on Tuesday night following the No vote in the Cypriot parliament (which now many other analysts are echoing).

 In our flash analysis, we questioned whether the ECB might do this. We noted:

Would the ECB really pull the plug on liquidity to Cypriot banks?  

The key turning point here will be whether the ECB cuts off Cypriot banks...To pull the plug on ELA the ECB needs a 2/3 majority (15 out of 23 votes) at the ECB Governing Council. Although the Bundesbank and maybe the Dutch and Finnish central banks might vote to turn off the ELA a 2/3 majority is not certain. In fact since Mario Draghi took over the ECB it has not been particularly hawkish. Bloomberg reports that the ECB said after the vote: “The ECB reaffirms its commitment to provide liquidity as needed within the existing rules”. The crisis has shown so far that the rules of the ECB are incredibly malleable, so what exactly that statement means is unclear, but the vote could certainly go either way.

But why has the ECB taken such a tough line with Cyprus? Below we outline a few potential reasons behind its thinking (some of which were touched upon by @KarlWhelan on twitter yesterday):

• ECB rules clearly state that ELA must be provided only to solvent but illiquid banks - without recapitalisation (under a bailout deal) Cypriot banks would certainly be insolvent.
• Continuing to provide liquidity to Cypriot banks could also amount to a huge transfer of risk from depositors and investors to the ECB.
• Even if a deal is reached there are likely to be huge deposit outflows particularly from foreign depositors (even more so if the banks open without a clear deal).
• Cypriot bank ELA is currently around €9bn. Russian deposits total between €15bn and €20bn. If Russian depositors are hit hard, much of these deposits could be withdrawn.
• At almost 30% of all deposits, this would bring the solvency of Cypriot banks into question. The ECB would have to extend ELA massively to keep banks afloat – possibly by another €10bn to €15bn.
• This liquidity would therefore indirectly help fund outflows of deposits.
• Even increasing the ELA would not be sufficient if this turns into a full deposit run. This means the banks could still collapse and Cyprus could leave the eurozone. In this scenario, the Cypriot Central bank would default on its Target 2 imbalance with the Eurosystem (currently €7.5bn but it could double if the outflows are significant) leaving the ECB with a loss.
• Financially this loss would be bearable but it would hit ECB credibility hard and break the taboo of the ECB not suffering losses in the eurozone crisis, a No-No for Germany.
• If the banks collapsed but Cyprus stayed within the eurozone, the eurozone would likely have to stump up further funds to keep the country afloat. 
• Any losses from the ELA are the responsibility of the Cypriot Central Bank (and the Cypriot state which backs it), so they would not become a Eurosystem/ECB issue directly. That said, with Cyprus under a bailout programme the burden will likely fall on the eurozone since the Cypriot state would be unable to backstop the central bank alone.

So, extending the ELA without a clear deal could lead to a significant transfer of risk towards the ECB and questions over its credibility. This would be a particularly poisonous debate in Germany, something which neither the ECB nor the German government would want ahead of the German elections in September.

With this in mind, it is possible to see why the ECB has taken such a strict line here. That said, it certainly ramps up the pressure over the next few days.

Lastly, although the ECB is taking the decision based on technical considerations, it's clear the good folks in Frankfurt are now deeply embroiled in a highly political debate - precisely what the ECB wants to avoid at all costs.

EU tightens the noose on bank bonuses

As we noted in today’s press summary, a tentative EU deal was struck last night on bank bonus curbs, as part of the broader agreement on CRD IV (which implements Basel III). We’ve discussed this in detail before, so we refer you to that post for the background.

The deal looks much as expected, although a couple of changes have been added:

• Bonuses should be limited at a 1:1 ratio to salary, which can rise to 2:1 with explicit shareholder approval.
• Up to a quarter of variable pay can be discounted and issued in instruments deferred for more than five years, which could increase the ratio above 2:1.
• Bonuses in the form of long term equity or debt that can be bailed in if a bank fails will also be given more favourable treatment.

Surprisingly, the deal still includes plans to force subsidiaries of foreign banks in the EU to adhere to the bonus rules and, more importantly, forcing all subsidiaries of EU banks in the rest of the world to do so. This could hamper competitiveness and, we suspect, may still be subject to changes. This is also an area where the UK might have expected to receive a concession.

What happens now then? EU finance ministers meet next week and will discuss the proposals. Significant changes seem unlikely, which could mark a loss for the UK, which has vehemently opposed the rules from the start.

The real question for the UK is whether it should try to force a formal vote on the issue at the meeting of finance ministers. This would raise the prospect of voting down the UK on a financial services issue – that this has never happened before is often cited by the EU as a counterargument against UK concerns over EU financial regulation. If the UK is outvoted it would mark a potentially significant precedent for the UK's future relations with the EU.

It should be remembered though that this is only a small part of the large CRD IV package, which has been continuously delayed due to MEPs' demands for bank bonuses to be included. The UK has managed to secure favourable treatment on the key aspect of the legislation – the ability to adjust national capital requirements for banks.

As we have suggested before, the debate on bank bonuses seems slightly tangential in terms of the wider debate over bank capital and broader financial stability (indeed there are valid question about why it has been lumped in with CRD IV at all). For all the talk of needing bank bonuses to limit risk taking and moral hazard in banks, the EU has supported and approved €1.6 trillion in state aid to banks over the course of the financial crisis. Many countries have pushed for limits to capital requirements and supported the easing of the Basel III liquidity controls. The EU, and the eurozone in particular, has also consistently argued for and supported bank bailouts and refused to countenance imposing losses on bank creditors, instead shifting the burden to taxpayers.

Trying to limit moral hazard by tackling excessive bank bonuses is all well and good, but it is a drop in the ocean when it remains clear that states and central banks will continue to bailout banks at any cost.

A vote of confidence? Banks start repaying ECB long term loans

This morning saw the start of the on-going process of repayments of the loans given by the ECB to European banks under the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) (see here for details).

The ECB announced that 278 banks have already pledged to repay €137.2bn. This compared to the 523 banks in total that borrowed around €190bn in net liquidity from the first LTRO at the end of 2011. The amount repaid was above expectations – below we assess why this may have been and what it could mean for the eurozone.

Why have banks decided to repay so much so early?

- A big motivating factor is reputation. It is clear that banks which repay early can highlight that they have access to market funding at low levels and have a sustainable business model.

- Although the loans seem cheap with the low ECB rate they require lots of collateral (to which haircuts are applied). This cost mounts up and some banks (particularly in northern countries) can now borrow on the markets more cheaply. ECB funding is also secured (against the aforementioned collateral) this ties up lots of banks assets, many may prefer to seek unsecured market funding, even if it is a bit more costly.

- Having huge amounts of excess liquidity just parked at the ECB is not efficient or effective. It also distorts bank balance sheets and may detract from other goals such as deleveraging or recapitalisation (more on this in a minute).

What does this mean, if anything, for the eurozone?

- There are fears over a two-tier banking system between those stronger banks funding themselves on the market and those reliant on the ECB. We would add that this furthers the divergence in the eurozone since the split is broadly along the existing strong/weak country divides.

- If the move is to aid banks in deleveraging this could perversely have a negative effect on the eurozone, with banks decreasing lending and reducing demand for euro (particularly peripheral) assets.

- That said the net impact on liquidity is limited, with excess liquidity in the system still at almost €700bn. It may need a further €200bn to be removed before the impact is substantially felt in terms of borrowing costs and demand for assets in the eurozone.

- There could well be a confidence boost from the higher than expected repayment. However, if this furthers a strengthening in the euro there could be growing concerns that it could begin to hamper exports in the weaker economies (a key driver of growth when both public and private sector are limited spending). This also furthers tensions within the one-size-fits-all monetary policy.

So, there are some clear reasons for repaying the loans early, although what it means for the eurozone and the impact it could have is far from clear (this is partly because the actual impact of the LTRO beyond helping banks fund themselves is far from clear). 

One more thing: many analysts are now making a song and dance about the reduction in the size of the ECB balance sheet - seeing it as a great positive. Which it is of course. But strangely, the same people always made the point that the ECB's expanding balance sheet, really wasn't that importance. So which is it?

In any case, as we said at the start, this is a rolling process and the full impact will not be clear for some time. The most important point to watch now is the location of the banks which announce that they have repaid. If it turns out to be solely northern banks, we could see some divergence emerging in the banking system, at just a time when eurozone 'bank union' plans are trying to unify it.

Greek bond buyback fallout continues

As we noted in this morning’s press summary, there have been some interesting developments with regards to the Greek banking sector.

Kathimerini reported that, according to unnamed bank officials, the bank recapitalisation may now need to be larger than the scheduled €27.5bn. The reason for this is twofold:

• First, the level of non-performing loans in Greek banks topped 24% of all loans at the end of 2012. This is a staggering amount. Keep in mind the Spanish banking sector, which has been the focus of so much uncertainty, still has non-performing loans equal to around 11% of all loans. Greece once again is in another league here.
• Secondly, as we warned at the time, the bond-buyback had a detrimental effect on the Greek banks. Even if they did not take substantial direct losses on the bonds they submitted, they have lost out in terms of future revenue (the interest from the bonds). This is reported to amount to around €1.5bn this year.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this seems a fairly clear-cut case of the negative trade off which we highlighted at length in the run up to buyback.

Needless to say, it is not make or break and the marginal effect of the buyback is still positive, albeit fairly small in the scheme of the Greek crisis. Fortunately, there is an additional €5bn set aside for such ‘unexpected’ increases in the bank bailout, so the additional cost should not disrupt the bailout programme.

We would note as a final point, that this may not be the end of the story (not just because the non-performing loans are likely to increase further) but also because we are yet to find out what impact the bond buyback had on the Greek banks’ ability to access liquidity (an issue we discussed in detail here). Again it may not be make or break, but we suspect it could be a further negative factor for Greece to deal with - something it hardly needs.

The Greek bond buyback: Greek banks are putting up a fight (as we predicted)

As we predicted two weeks ago the Greek bond buyback is turning out to be much trickier than almost everyone else expected, and for exactly the reason we suggested – the Greek banks.

Despite positive declarations throughout last week that the Greek bond buyback would reach its target of €30bn bonds submitted by the Friday deadline, the Greek government has announced that the deadline has now been moved to 12pm Tuesday 11 December.

Throughout the buyback process the Greek banks have made it clear that they want to keep their participation to a minimum and are not keen on the buyback plan generally. The reasons for why have been discussed here and here (potential losses and hit to liquidity). Needless to say, the Greek government has exerted significant political pressure to ensure that the Greek banks do participate fully.

Despite this, Kathimerini reports that the Greek government decided to extend the deal after hedge funds submitted €16bn in bonds (much of which they will make a profit on) while Greek banks submitted around €10bn. This was short of €16bn which the banks were expected to submit, and which they are likely to be pushed into submitting by tomorrow.

As FT Alphaville highlights, this did not go down too well and the press release on the extension contains a (very thinly veiled) threat that those bond holders who do not take part may not end up getting paid back at all. Stelios Papadopoulos, the head of the Public Debt Management Agency, is quoted (in the actual press release) as saying:

“Investors should bear in mind that even if Greece accepts all bonds tendered in the Invitation, it will continue to engage with its official sector creditors in considering further steps to put its debt on a sustainable path. Future measures may not involve an opportunity to exit investments in Designated Securities at the levels offered for this buy back.” 

The buyback still looks likely to be completed, but all of this highlights just how weak Greek banks are - the last thing the Greek economy needs is even weaker domestic banks (and therefore even less lending to the real economy).

Greek banks and the Greek bond buyback

Yesterday we put out a flash analysis looking at the latest Greek deal and the prospect of Greek bond buyback. One of the many issues with the deal (and the buyback in particular) which we raised was that Greek banks will find it difficult to participate without needing extra capital.

However, Greek Finance Mininster Yannis Stournaras also said yesterday (in a timely statement):

The debt buyback "doesn't mean new capital for banks, given that they have recorded these bonds at lower prices than those that will be offered."

His suggestion then, is that the Greek banks have already marked their bonds to market prices on their books, meaning that they can sell them at the low prices involved in the bond buyback without needing new capital. This may make their participation more likely, but there are plenty of other reasons why we still see it as difficult and unpredictable. (We also still question why foreign holders will be involved, particularly previous hold outs and those who are holding to maturity, see our full analysis here).

Firstly, as Kathimerini reported today, the banks themselves are not keen to be involved in the buy back. Many feel that they have already done their part in terms of taking part almost ubiquitously in the first debt restructuring. If they were to take part in the buyback, they could seek adjustments in the terms of the recapitalisation and reform – something which the EU/IMF/ECB troika is unlikely to accept.

Secondly, taking part in such a scheme would need significant approval within the banks and other financial firms. This means board level and possibly wider shareholder approval. As the restructuring earlier this year showed, this takes time, with the process dragging for months. Given the 13 December deadline to have a bond buyback plan in place (i.e. to have a firm idea of who will take part, to make sure it is worthwhile) it is not clear how many bondholders will be in place to participate.

Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, is that the banks need their holdings of bonds (around €22bn) to gain liquidity from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) through the Greek Central Bank (GCB). Looking at the GCB balance sheet, it seems broadly that Greek banks posted €247bn in collateral to gain €123bn in liquidity, an average haircut of 50%. Given that many of these assets will be loans or securities, sovereign debt (even Greek) is unlikely to be judged any more harshly than the average. So, if the banks sold these assets for a 65% write down (as suggested) they could purchase new assets (maybe other sovereign debt) but would be able to buy less of it (as not many other assets priced at a 65% discount) meaning they would not be able to gain as much liquidity under the ELA as with current Greek bonds.

Essentially, this could harm the Greek banks liquidity position which would further constrain their lending ability and possibly prompt further deposit flight – both of which would hurt the fragile Greek economy.

All in all then, this process could still be counterproductive for Greek banks even if they do not book new losses directly and they still could be hesitant to take part voluntarily. However, that is not to say that the political pressure applied behind the scenes will not be enough to force them to voluntarily join. Ultimately, it simply highlights that this policy may deliver a small benefit with some negative side effects but is at best a way of skirting the real issue of whether the eurozone can stomach permanent fiscal transfers to Greece. This will come to the fore again soon.