Cypriot deposit update - stabilisation but concerns remain

The latest Cypriot deposit data is out and it shows some stabilisation in bank deposits in Cyprus. According to the data total deposits decreased by around €460m in August, although much of this was down to the conversion of 10% of unsecured Bank of Cyprus deposits into equity.

As we have always said, the real test will occur when the capital controls are finally removed, which is due to happen at the start of next year according to the Cypriot government. There is also one other concern (in terms of bank deposits, there are many concerns when it comes to Cyprus generally) – as deposits have fallen the Cypriot banks loan to deposit ratio has jumped (as the graph below from the IMF shows).

This is not unexpected, but does represent a potential risk for the banks and highlights that their reliance on ECB and ELA funding will remain for some time. That is at least until they manage to deleverage significantly and (we’d imagine) write down some of their bad loans.

Is Cyprus eyeing up an exit from its capital controls?

As expected the Cypriot government has finally reached a deal with the EU/IMF/ECB Troika over the final stage of the restructuring of the Bank of Cyprus (BoC).

As we noted in today’s press summary this was not an easy decision to reach, and has dragged on since Spring, for a couple of reasons:

• The Cypriot government was keen to limit the haircut and insisted that the BoC only had to reach a tier one capital ratio of 9% at the current point in time.
• The Troika however insisted that this 9% target applied to the end point of the bailout (2016) and therefore the bank needed a ratio of 12% currently since it will deteriorate overtime.
• As the Cyprus Mail notes the Memorandum of Understanding signed by both sides clearly fits the Troika view. Unsurprisingly it won out (as always) but the Cypriot government is still seemingly bitter about the whole affair (which doesn’t bode well for the many, many interactions between the two sides yet to come).

In the end the two sides settled on a 47.5% haircut for uninsured deposits over €100,000 – although these funds will not be completely lost but converted into shares of the bank. This is above the original target of 37.5% but below the potential limit of 60% (for the most part).

The most interesting part of this whole deal might be the following though:

“Following the recapitalisation, 12% of deposits that were previously blocked will be released (5% in total).

The balance will be split evenly into three separate time deposits of six, nine and twelve months, respectively. BoC will have the option to renew the time deposits once for the same time duration. These deposits will receive a rate of interest which will be higher than the corresponding market rates offered by the BoC.”

Of the remaining frozen deposits 12% will be released then, while the rest will first be converted to time deposits, meaning people may not have access to their money for between 6 and 24 months. There are likely a couple of motivating factors here:

1. Firstly, this eases the funding transition for the bank as it looks to return to normal operations since it locks in part of its deposit base.
2. Secondly, and more importantly, it locks in a large amount of deposits which would be liable to flee the country as soon as the capital controls are removed (not least because they tend to belong to rich and/or foreign depositors who would likely find it easier to shift their funds).

These funds are only likely to be worth around €6bn, so not a huge amount in a country with a deposit base still around €50bn and far from enough to settle the question of capital flight once the controls are removed.

But it suggests that both Cyprus and the Troika are planning for an exit from capital controls and looking for ways to stem the potential outflow. The quicker this can be done in a managed way the better for the Cypriot economy. As we have noted before, as long as the capital controls apply the hope of a recovery is slim to none in Cyprus and the euro continues to look incredibly fragmented.

(Note: the blog has been updated with new calculations. Previously it suggested the total coverted to term deposits would be €2bn, however, it is likely to be closer to €6bn). 

Cypriot deposit leakage continued in June

The latest Cypriot deposit statistics seem to be out and there are some strange goings on.

We say seem to be, since there has been no press release but the July data release (which corresponds to June data) is up on the website in the usual place.

As the graphs below show, the outflow has continued, but there are some questions as to the extent of the outflow.

• Firstly, the headline stock figures show a further outflow of €5.3bn, this is shown in the top left graph. However, all the flow figures suggest an outflow of €1.5bn. This is similar to the amount seen last month (although this data has been updated and there seems to be some mismatch between the exact spread of outflows, which adds to the confusion).

• Tucked away in the chronology of the data packet is the following paragraph which explains the differences in figures:

"July 2013: The data for loans and deposits for June 2013 reflect the provisions of the “Sale of Certain Operations of Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd Decree of 2013”. As from June 2013 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd is not considered a Monetary Financial Institution for statistical purposes and therefore, its remaining balances (which were not transferred to Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd) are excluded from the outstanding amounts. However, according to the statistical guidelines of the European Central Bank this should not be considered a financial transaction and therefore an adjustment to remove its impact is included under “reclassifications adjustments” with a negative sign."

• So, this round of data finally includes the merger of the good part of Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank) into the Bank of Cyprus and the hiving off of the bad bit. There is a big drop in the headline stock of deposits since the Laiki depositors which will be written down have been moved to the bad bank. This bad bank no longer exists as a financial institution. Therefore the money has exited the deposit base since it is no longer part of the financial system. This reduces the stock of deposits but doesn’t show up as a flow since it was simply reclassified.

• The total amount which has been moved to the bad bank and disappeared into the ether is €3.8bn (i.e. the difference between the headline €5.3bn change in deposit stock and the €1.5bn in monthly deposit outflows). A move which was expected but has been very poorly explained (we attempted to contact the Central Bank of Cyprus to confirm all of the above but it seems they close at 2.30pm during the summer!).

• All that aside, the outflows are pretty similar to last month in both size and breakdown (split between domestic residents and the rest of the world). Ultimately, money continues to leak out despite the capital controls or people continue to rapidly wind down their savings. Neither presents a pleasant prognosis for the future of the Cypriot economy.

As we have said before the real test will come when the capital controls are finally removed, although that does not seem to be on the horizon in the near future.

Cypriot deposit outflows continue but slow in May

As we reported last month, the outflow of Cypriot deposits has continued apace despite the continuation of capital controls (even once the impact of the bank restructuring is stripped out the outflows have totalled around €3bn for each of the last two months).

Judging from the above graphs (click to enlarge), there seems to have been some improvement in May with the outflow slowing to €1.4bn. This remains a sizeable amount given the continuation of the capital controls.

Of the outflows taking place it seems fairly evenly split between domestic depositors and those from the rest of the world. The outflows also seem to be split fairly evenly across sectors. It’s hard to draw any stark conclusions from this set of data. It seems that both households and firms are continuing to draw down their deposits at a rapid pace and those foreign firms which can withdraw money are still doing so, albeit in small amounts.

The question remains, with Cypriot growth prospects looking so bleak, when and where will this outflow stop?

EU edges towards compromise on bank recovery and resolution plans

Tomorrow and Friday will see the next round of meetings between eurozone and EU finance ministers respectively.

The meetings will focus on a number of issues, but the key ones will arguably be the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the plans for a single eurozone resolution mechanism.

The full agenda is spelled out in detail in this background briefing.

As we have noted before, the proposals for new rules for bank resolution are quite controversial and have caused significant splits both within the eurozone and the EU more generally. See our previous blog here which laid out each EU country's position.

Ahead of the meetings, we have managed to get a look at the latest draft of the Recovery and Resolution Directive. Despite being 300+ pages, it makes for some interesting reading.

From what we can see there are two key changes:

1. A compromise on depositor preference:
The previous draft looked to establish a clear hierarchy for bank bail-ins and put uninsured depositors on level pecking with other senior creditors. This draft moves away from that towards a bit more depositor preference. It says:

“In order to provide a certain level of protection for natural persons and micro, small and medium enterprises holding eligible deposits above the level of covered deposits, such deposits shall have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings.”

So under the current plans, insured depositors are the most senior, as previously. Uninsured (i.e. over €100,000) deposits from individual private citizens and SMEs will also be given preference over other senior creditors. Essentially, large firms' uninsured deposits will rank level with senior creditors (bondholders etc.)

As we noted before, this is similar to an idea put forward by Italy, but is also likely to appease France, Spain and Portugal.

2. A reduction in ex-ante funds
This is another controversial measure, with many (including the UK) disputing the usefulness of ex-ante funds (funds which are collected on an on-going basis and are therefore in place before any crisis). In the latest draft, the level of ex-ante funds has gone from 1% of all deposits to 0.5% of covered deposits – a fairly sizeable cut given that covered deposits are only a proportion of total deposits.

This looks like a concession to the other side of the spectrum, including the UK, Netherlands and Denmark.

Some concessions on key points to both sides then, as may have been expected. That said, there are likely to be plenty who are unsatisfied by the current draft and hopes of a final agreement this week may be premature.

We’ll keep trawling through the mammoth doc, and bring you any important developments.

Cypriot deposit developments

Update 31/05/13 09:40: As we noted below, it seems that the figures do include some of the write-downs of deposits under the bank restructuring (but not all). Apologies for the confusion. As the Central Bank of Cyprus notes the initial write down for Bank of Cyprus depositors is included. This totals around €3.2bn. This means the actual outflow was around €3bn, similar to the previous month.

This is still fairly significant, although we expect much of this may be domestic and due to people and businesses running down their cash reserves. This also likely reduces some of the concerns over the workings of the capital controls. The data does give some feeling for who might be losing from the bank restructuring - US Dollar depositors and foreign NFCs are probably a large share. The concerns over the bank deleveraging and increasing reliance on central bank financing also remain (since they were already well established).

The real test of the deposit flight will come, firstly once the bank restructuring is complete (by end of July) and secondly once the capital controls are removed (who knows when).

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Yesterday saw the release of the latest data on the state of bank deposits in Cyprus – which always makes for interesting reading.

The headline figures are pretty terrible. Overall deposits declined by €6.346bn (10%) in April, almost double the level seen in March (when the crisis was in full swing) - despite stringent capital controls being in place for the entire month. However, given their importance, these figures deserve delving beyond the headlines.

The charts above (click to enlarge) raise some interesting points:

• First, it’s clear that the deposit flight is continuing despite the strict capital controls. This is concerning, since it shows the Cypriot government’s inability to enforce the rules, particularly on the financial sector. It also means that capital controls continue to hamper the functioning of the Cypriot economy, but are failing to stop an outflow of money (though admittedly it could have been much larger without them).
• Second, the outflows are split between domestic residents and those in the rest of the world (ROW). ROW deposits are unlikely to return for some time. Cyprus could hold out hope that domestic residents are just stashing cash due to concerns over the economy and banks, meaning this money may eventually return. Unfortunately, given the bleak outlook this is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
• Third, a surprisingly large amount of the withdrawal (€3.2bn) has come from deposits held in US dollars. This money might also have moved abroad and is unlikely to return, suggesting both domestic and foreign investors are moving money away from Cyprus.
• Lastly, much of the withdrawal has been by non-financial corporations (NFCs) and households. This was perhaps more predictable, but again raises concerns about the future of investment and consumption in the economy. The underlying data shows especially strong withdrawals from ROW households and NFCs which have been a big source of economic growth for Cyprus in recent years. It could also peak concerns over the impact the capital controls are having, as firms and households are forced to eat into their cash reserves (although they still remain at a decent headline level).

One important point to keep in mind concerns the losses for some uninsured depositors under the bank restructurings. It is not clear from the Central Bank of Cyprus figures whether this has already been accounted for in the data above, although this looks unlikely since the process is still continuing. That said, if it has been, then the actual withdrawals are smaller - though still high. The overall economic impact also remains similar.

What does all this mean for Cyprus and the eurozone?

• Much of it confirms what many people feared in the aftermath of the crisis. In particular, it paints a bleak picture for future growth in Cyprus as money flows out of the economy. It also raises questions over whether such outflows were accounted for in the overly optimistic assumptions about Cypriot growth.
• Another problem will be bank financing. Cypriot banks are locked out of the markets and may well be for some time. With deposits falling they will be forced to access more ECB liquidity and possibly the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). This is something which the ECB has notoriously been trying to avoid in Cyprus, and more generally. Not least because under any future restructuring/default/euro exit scenario the ECB would face larger losses.
• But it’s also important to remember that there is a limit to how much Cypriot banks can access through these facilities since they require assets to be posted as collateral. Even if they are able to, it is clearly possible that this pressure could force them to increase the already rapid pace of deleveraging. This would undoubtedly further hamper lending to the real economy and in turn economic growth.
• As noted above, from a wider perspective it will increase already pressing concerns over the enforcement of the controls and more generally over regulation of the financial sector in Cyprus.

A turbulent Easter in Cyprus

Uncertainty continues to reign in Cyprus. Cypriot Finance Minister Michalis Sarris resigned this afternoon, seemingly confirming the earlier (denied) rumours that he had previously tried to resign and bringing to a close what must be one of the shortest stints as finance minister in recent history (35 days). To add fuel to the fire, initial reports suggest he resigned due to the on-going investigation into people moving funds out of Cyprus ahead of the bailout. Fortunately, unlike other aspects of the crisis, the Cypriot government has wasted no time in appointing a successor with Labour Minister Haris Georgiadis already lined up to fill the role.

Meanwhile, as we noted in today’s press summary (and have repeatedly suggested) the capital controls look set to last for much more than a week.We also highlighted some interesting comments by the President of the Cypriot Parliament Yiannakis Omirou who said:

“I would like to send a message to the Cyprus people that there is no other way, there is no alternative apart from freeing (the country) from the troika’s and the memorandum’s bonds…by leaving the troika and the EMS behind us, we will ensure our national independence, our national sovereignty, our moral integrity and our economic independence…If we remain bound by the Troika and the memorandum Cyprus’ destiny is already foretold and there will be no future.”

Clearly not one to mince his words.

Furthermore a draft version of the loan agreement between the EU/IMF/ECB Troika and Cyprus (the Memorandum of Understanding) was leaked yesterday. It drove home another point which we have flagged up before. Despite all the talk about depositors and banks, Cyprus is still getting a €10bn bailout, that will mean undergoing the fiscal consolidation and structural reforms (widely referred to as ‘austerity’) witnessed in the other bailout countries. The key points of the agreement confirm this:

• 7.25% of GDP in fiscal consolidation between 2012-2016.
• Freeze in public sector pensions and a two year increase in the retirement age.
• Implement a four-year plan as prepared by the Public Administration and Personnel Department aimed at the abolition of at least 1880 permanent posts over the period 2013-2016.
• Increase the statutory corporate income tax rate to 12.5%.
• Increase the tax rate on interest and dividend income to 30%.

These are but a few of the measures and the document remains incomplete. The impact on GDP is likely to be significant, while youth unemployment is already at 31.8% (total at 14%) – this is likely to rise substantially.

To add to all this, reports continue to abound about outflows of deposits before the bailout, while the banks were closed and people now trying to skirt the capital controls. Significant questions are being asked about the enforcement and implementation of all these rules. With a decision on whether to extend capital controls expected on Wednesday evening or Thursday morning the uncertainty is likely to continue.

The Great European Bank Run that never was?

Journalists were descending on banks across Cyprus this morning to monitor whether Cypriot depositors would rush to withdraw their cash as the country’s banks opened after being closed for 10 days. So far, however, there have been virtually no dramatic scenes of desperate people flocking to ATM machines and banks. There’s a feeling of calm. Those who expected Northern Rock style scenes have been left disappointed. However,  a couple of points:

• First, there’s no hard data available yet for deposit withdrawals in March, so everything is based on anecdotal evidence. There have been numerous press reports speculating about withdrawals in the run up to the bailout and even while the banks have been closed. Unfortunately, these are unlikely to be confirmed or disproved for at least a month (when data is expected).
• Remember, there are limits on what people can withdraw and/or transfer electronically. People may not be too bothered about waiting at banks if they are subject to strict limits.
• Obviously, in this day and age, much banking is done electronically so the number of people at the actual bank branches may not reveal the true level of transactions taking place behind the scenes. This is particularly true for Cyprus given the high level of foreign depositors who would have to bank electronically.

In the meantime the latest data on deposits in Cyprus in February was released this morning. Total deposits fell from €68.4bn to €67.5bn – a 1.3% fall, but not exactly as disastrous as some may have expected.

At the same time, as we predicted, depositors elsewhere in Europe – in particular Spain and Italy – have so far shown zero inclination to see themselves as next in line. There has been, however, a drop in banks shares in the wake of comments by Eurogroup Chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem.

So not the big collapse of everything that some expected, but, the capital controls are likely to play a role in mitigating this. As we have pointed out, the real challenge comes when the Cypriot government looks to remove capital controls and once the data on electronic transactions out of Cyprus becomes clearer.

Cyprus closes the shutters as it announces capital controls

Some more details coming out about the much talked about capital controls in Cyprus (details via @MatinaStevis and RANsquawk):

• Will include limit on cashing cheques (but will be able to deposit cheques).
• Time fixed deposits will not be able to be redeemed during the period of capital controls
• Credit card transactions capped at €5k per month
• Limit to cash transfers outside Cyprus of €3k per person per trip.
• Applies to all bank accounts
• Valid for 7 days from Thursday, will then be re-evaluated.

We have already noted that these controls are pretty severe and have the potential to have a substantial impact on the economy. Below we list a few more thoughts:

• The fact that they are focused on limited external flows rather than internal transactions could be positive as it may help avoid a massive liquidity crunch in Cyprus.
• That said there could still be a very quick withdrawal of funds from banks, with people keen to hold cash instead. This could further destabilise the banks.
• Removal in 7 days seems optimistic, for two reasons. Firstly, the bank restructuring and recapitalisation may not be completed by then. But more importantly, the fears which would motivate massive outflows go further than just the banks. People will look to move money out of Cyprus because the financial sector has been massively shrunk and no longer looks an attractive investment. Furthermore, the economy looks consigned to a long period of economic contraction and its debt load may quickly become unsustainable. Lastly political unrest may grow. None of these motivating factors will be gone in a week.
• The lack of limit on cash withdrawals is a positive, although this could quickly change, especially with demand for cash likely to sky rocket.
• Many companies still use cheques in Cyprus, not least to pay employees, so limiting them could hamper the normal functioning of business. That said, since they can be deposited, this is mitigated a bit, although that only holds as long as people trust that they can access deposits - not clear they do at this stage.
• According to this via Zerohedge, any commercial transaction above €500 which sends money abroad will need to be proven to be in line with usual business practice. This will introduce a significant amount of time consuming paper work into the life of many everyday exports and importers. 

We’ll update the blog with more thoughts as more details become clear.

Cyprus update – halfway to a deal, but the biggest obstacle remains

It’s looking as if there will be a deal in Cyprus, although there are some big obstacles to be crossed to get there and it is likely to go down to the wire.

Last night the Cypriot parliament voted to approve a few bills which will make a significant bank restructuring possible and allow the government to install capital controls if it sees necessary, here are the key points of what was approved (and what was not):

• Plan to wind down Laiki bank – good assets and insured deposits below €100,000 will be shifted into a good bank which will be merged with the Bank of Cyprus. Bad assets along with uninsured depositors above €100,000 will be put into a bad bank – these depositors could lose as much as 40% of their money.
• Ability to enforce capital controls – these are wide ranging from limiting non cash transfers to turning standard current account deposits into time fixed ones, and pretty much anything else the government deems as necessary for ‘public order and safety’.
• The creation of a solidarity fund – this will not play a large role in the bailout deal, since it was already rejected by the EU/IMF/ECB Troika as an alternative to the deposit levy.
• No deal on the bank deposit levy – Eurozone finance ministers will meet on Sunday in Brussels with the Cypriot parliament only likely to vote on a deal after it has been cleared at this meeting.
• Bank of Cyprus has survived being ‘resolved’ for now.
• The Greek bank Piraeus will take control of the Greek parts of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus.

These measures are expected to raise just over €2bn (maybe more, we’re waiting on firmed details on the solidarity fund). That still leaves €3.5bn+ to be raised to meet the €5.8bn target set by the Troika – although reports yesterday suggested this may have been raised by €0.9bn due to worsening forecasts for Cyprus. Below we outline our key takeaways from the deal.

The largest obstacle to a deal remains: Clearly, this will once again come down to the deposit levy. With a smaller amount needing to be raised, it is likely to fall only on €100,000+ deposits. As we noted yesterday a levy of between 12% - 15% looks likely, although given the bank bailout plan it could hit some big Laiki depositors especially hard. Kathimerini reports that the levy could be pushed higher and focused on a smaller group of depositors. Ultimately, though, with few alternatives left now a levy on largest depositors seems the least destructive option (but still far from ideal).

This will go down to the wire: The ECB has set a Monday deadline for a bailout deal or it will cut of liquidity to Cypriot banks. The banks are due to open on Tuesday but this could be extended if no deal is found. As long as the banks stay shut (and with use of the capital controls, see below) they may be able to buy a few days to reach a deal, allowing the ECB to reverse its decision. Still, it will be a messy few days with the Cypriot parliament unlikely to vote on the deal until the it is approved by the Eurozone and assured of passing. If the deposit levy is only on large deposits, it should gain support from DIKO (the junior coalition partner), while reports suggest some opposition members could abstain or be absent from the vote to allow it to pass.

Still, this has been left very late and the decision to approve the above measures first seems to be putting the cart before the horse. This is not too surprising though (since clearly these were easier options to push through) and reminds us of other parts of the crisis – such as the decision to approve the ESM before the EFSF was revised to be fit for purpose.

The capital controls are severe: The government has significant leeway to limit the flows of capital. People have rightly been asking questions of whether this, de facto, moves Cyprus out of the single currency. Ultimately, money is no longer fungible between Cyprus and the rest of the Eurozone and, at this point in time, it’s hard to argue that a euro in Cyprus is worth the same as a euro elsewhere. The real problem though may not be imposing the controls but removing them, as WSJ Heard on the Street points out. It is hard to see how the Cypriot economy will be able to function properly with these strict controls on and at some point questions will surely begin to be asked if it would not be better off with a devalued currency outside the euro.

Why is Bank of Cyprus not being ‘resolved’? Reports suggest the Cypriot government has fought hard to stop the bank having the same fate as Laiki. This may be because it is the largest bank and a large employer in Cyprus, but it is could also be because it remains very close to the government and is the home for some of the largest Russian depositors. In any case, avoiding the tough decision to fully restructure the banking sector is likely to make things more difficult in the future.

Greek banks are getting a very good deal: The branches of Cypriot banks in Greece have around €22bn in assets and account for 8% of all deposits in Greece and 10% of loans. Clearly they are sizeable and hiving them off helps reduce the size of the Cypriot banking sector relative to GDP and reduces the cost of the bailout. It also protects the rest of Greece from contagion. That said, Piraeus is picking up a very good deal, not least because Cypriot exposure to the Greek crisis was a key driver of the current problems Cyprus faces. The purchase was done at a symbolic €1 but the cost of recap is €1.5bn. Funding will come from the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (the Greek bank recap fund) and the Cypriot bailout programme – €950m from the former and €550m from the latter. So these banks, investors and depositors avoid any losses despite many being entangled in the Greek crisis. The fact that Piraeus bank shares were rocketing yesterday is a clear enough sign of who did better out of this deal.

The deal has come full circle and has been very poorly managed: as we noted yesterday, we are basically back to a mix of the deal proposed by the IMF (bank restructuring) and the Eurozone (deposit levy) last Friday. The impact the events of this week will have on Cyprus should not be underestimated – there will be a huge outflow of capital (or will be whenever the controls are removed) and significant political upheaval. This has been poorly handled by both sides – the Eurozone failed to listen to the Cypriot government and was complacent about the impact of Cyprus on the wider Eurozone economy. The Cypriot government has fought to hang onto an impossible business model, focused on big finance funded by foreign deposits, and has looked to play a risky geopolitical game. Unfortunately, the ones that lose from all this are the 800,000 people who live in Cyprus.

Full circle in Cyprus

Update 13:15 22/03/2013:

Thinking about the plan in more detail, it occurred to us that this may amount to trying to burn the larger depositors twice. As we noted in today's press summary, the plan essentially is to move all the bad assets to a bad bank, along with the large uninsured depositors (€100,000+). These assets would then be wound down or sold off at a large discount with the depositors footing the bill (and taking losses of 20% - 40%). This, along with the merging of Bank of Cyprus and the good bank, is how the recapitalisation costs will be reduced by €2.3bn.

So, the large depositors will take significant losses here and yet may still face a large deposit tax as well? That seems to be pushing the boundaries to us, although it is not impossible. Cyprus would not recover as destination for foreign investment for some time. One way to structure this could be for the tax only to be applied to depositors above €500,000 (as we suggest below) and the bad bank to apply to all uninsured deposits. Obviously, the bad bank scheme also only applies to Laiki bank, but as the second largest Cypriot bank it is still likely to account for a large amount of big deposits.

Still this could see larger depositors taking up to 50% hits in some cases. We can't imagine Moscow would take that one lying down, especially given comments earlier in the week...

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It now seems we have come all the way back round to the deposit levy as a solution in Cyprus. Overnight, the EU/IMF/ECB Troika rejected the plans for a Cypriot solidarity fund, particularly one based on pension assets and gas reserve revenues (which German Chancellor Angela Merkel specifically spoke out against).

The bank restructuring plan does seem to be holding water for now, so this has at least reduced the money Cyprus needs to raise by €2.3bn. Unfortunately, though, that still leaves €3.5bn to be found. As we noted a week ago, there are few options for doing it – and it slightly worries us that Cyprus and the eurozone are only just realising this.

Inevitably, that has led us back to a deposit levy. Fortunately, with the amount of money needed reduced, a new version can focus on larger depositors – which is reportedly what was originally proposed by the Troika last week. Barclays has a useful table on the breakdown of deposits (via @FGoria):

Going from these figures, a 12.2% tax on deposits above €500,000 would yield the €3.5bn necessary. A 9.46% tax would also be sufficient if applied to all depositors over €100,000.

Either of these options would probably be acceptable to the Cypriot parliament. Sources suggest that the Democratic Party (DIKO, Cypriot President Anastasiades's junior coalition partner) has indicated its support for such proposals, which would bring the government up to 28 votes – so potentially needing only one more.

There are plenty of pitfalls left, but we may get a vote this evening. That said, noises from the Troika earlier suggested they could take the weekend to review the bank restructuring deal.

As has been the case for the whole of this week, uncertainty seems to be the order of the day. One thing we can take away is that a deal may be inching closer…

All at sea – What does the 'No' vote mean for Cyprus and the eurozone?

Following the dramatic vote by the Cypriot parliament tonight to reject the bailout deal, here is our flash analysis of the situation:

The Cypriot parliament tonight voted against a bill to introduce a tax on bank deposits, in return for a €10bn bailout offered to the country by Germany and other eurozone governments. Not a single Cypriot MP voted for the deal. The structure of the tax in the bill is shown in the table below. The vote leaves Cyprus’ place in the eurozone hanging in the balance and threatens the escalation of the crisis to a new level, though the most likely outcome is that the Cypriot parliament votes a second time, on a revised deal.

Results of the vote (click to enlarge)

The governing party (DISY) abstained (with one member absent), while the junior coalition partner (DIKO) voted against – this signifies the huge political divisions at work in Cyprus. Even if a bailout deal is eventually approved the government’s position continues to look untenable.

What does the vote against the deposit levy mean?

As we have noted before, this has the potential to be a very serious twist in the eurozone crisis. Previously, Germany and the eurozone have stressed that Cyprus has no alternatives to the deposit levy. Now, all eurozone partners are forced back into difficult negotiations.

What timeline are Cyprus and the eurozone working on?

Cyprus will run out of cash on 3 June, when it has to repay a €1.4bn international bond. However, the decision will need to be taken long before that. Cypriot banks cannot stay closed for long but they cannot be reopened until a decision is taken, otherwise there will almost certainly be a deposit run. While people can reportedly withdraw up to €700 per day from ATMs, businesses, large and small, cannot function without banks being open. We would expect some decision would need to be taken by early next week before the lack of liquidity and lack of economic activity begins to severely harm the Cypriot economy.

Would the ECB really pull the plug on liquidity to Cypriot banks?

The key turning point here will be whether the ECB cuts off Cypriot banks. It is to some extent the vital difference between option 2 and 4, while keeping liquidity on could help facilitate option 1. To pull the plug on ELA the ECB needs a 2/3 majority (15 out of 23 votes) at the ECB Governing Council. Although the Bundesbank and maybe the Dutch and Finnish central banks might vote to turn off the ELA a 2/3 majority is not certain. In fact since Mario Draghi took over the ECB it has not been particularly hawkish. Bloomberg reports that the ECB said after the vote: “The ECB reaffirms its commitment to provide liquidity as needed within the existing rules”. The crisis has shown so far that the rules of the ECB are incredibly malleable, so what exactly that statement means is unclear, but the vote could certainly go either way.

Click here to read our analysis in full, including four potential scenarios.

What if the Cypriot parliament votes against the deposit levy?

This is the question which is now holding global financial markets on the edge - could it really happen and what would it mean, we assess the possible scenarios below.

Could the Cypriot parliament vote against the levy?

According to Reuters, Cypriot government spokesman Christos Stylianides told state radio that the vote “looks like it won’t pass”. Meanwhile, via Zerohedge:

• CYPRUS PRESIDENT: PARLIAMENT BELIEVES BAILOUT PLAN UNJUST, GOVERNMENT MAKING OTHER PLANS.
• CYPRUS PRESIDENT: PARLIAMENT WILL REJECT BAILOUT PLAN

As we were tweeting yesterday, the DIKO party (junior coalition member with 8 MPs) had said it would not vote for the deal without some improvements, although we suspect reducing the burden on small depositors could help convince them. The European Party (2 MPs) had previously said it would not support he levy, however, according to CYBC, it has now said it would support the levy if depositors are compensated with interest bearing government bonds (we assume linked to gas revenues, something which the government has already offered).

That said, according to the Cypriot press, the latest proposal sees deposits below €20,000 exempt, deposits between €20,000 and €100,000 taxed at 6.75% and deposits over €100,000 taxed at 9.9% - this is unlikely to satisfy demands to exempt smaller depositors. It also seems unlikely to raise the required €5.8bn, not least because it applies the same rate as the original to a smaller pool of deposits.

Separately, there are conflicting reports this morning on whether the vote will be delayed again. The government is unlikely to put this to a vote until it is almost near certain of getting it through.

What would the fallout be?

The fallout of voting down the package could be explosive and we can only speculate about what could happen next, but its eurozone membership would likely be brought into doubt. As we noted in our flash analysis, there are few other alternatives for Cyprus to raise the necessary cash, while the eurozone has made it clear it cannot foot the entire bill (such an option would make Cypriot debt unsustainable anyway).

The eurozone would likely give Cyprus a few days either to change its mind or come up with an alternative way of financing the €5.8bn. Another parliamentary vote could be held (the EU of course has form when it comes to demanding the 'correct' vote).

The ECB has already reportedly warned that rejecting a levy would have dire consequences. Specifically, the two largest Cypriot banks would go without recapitalisation and could see their liquidity from the ELA (sanctioned by the ECB via the Bank of Cyprus) cut off, leading to them becoming insolvent and collapsing – putting their €30bn of deposits at risk, since the government obviously cannot guarantee them. This would likely bring down most if not the entire Cypriot financial system.

With the financial sector close to or in the process of collapsing and no support forthcoming from the eurozone or ECB, since Cyprus rejected their terms, Cyprus could even be forced to leave the eurozone and begin printing its own new currency, one that would have little international trust and could lead to a spiral of hyperinflation, etc, etc (i.e. a very nasty scenario).

There is, of course, a chance that if faced with the prospect of Cyprus leaving the euro, the rest of the eurozone could blink and find an alternative way to bailout Cyprus but the politics of such a scenario would get very ugly indeed. The ECB may not follow through on its threat to withdraw liquidity for Cypriot banks but this would only be a temporary reprieve. The Cypriot government will run out of cash at the start of June when it needs to pay off a €1.4bn bond, while the banks' position could be worsened by the likely deposit outflows once banks open, even if the tax is not applied.

What are these “other plans”?

It’s not clear exactly what Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades meant when he suggested the government is making 'other plans'. We have long noted that deeper connections to Russia remain a viable option for Cyprus. With Russia angry at the eurozone for trying to burn some of its depositors, some more financial support could be forthcoming (but maybe only for Cyprus outside the eurozone) – with significant geopolitical implications as we noted here.

Other options which have been bandied around include: a financial transaction tax and the recent proposal from Lee C. Buchheit and Mitu Gulati (the men partly behind the Greek restructuring) to convert deposits into deposit certificates with fixed long term maturities. However, the former has been widely rejected by Cyprus and may not yield sufficient funding. The latter is an interesting proposal but may only offer liquidity support rather than solvency, while the banks would still remain under-capitalised. Such a proposal would still require significant backing from the eurozone and Russia – both of which are likely to come with onerous terms – and present similar obstacles to a deal.

So, all in all a 'No' vote, however tempting to Cypriot MPs, only leaves more drastic alternatives, hence it remains a possible but not probable outcome.

Eurogroup distances itself from decision to tax small depositors in Cyprus

At some point yesterday, it became clear that Cypriot President Nicos Anastastasiades would not have sufficient support to push the deal on the deposit tax through parliament – at least not in its current form.

That led to an extension of the bank holiday to at least Thursday, the parliamentary vote being moved to 4pm GMT today (from yesterday) and the Eurogroup holding a teleconference yesterday evening.

The result of the conference was this statement, the key part being:

The Eurogroup continues to be of the view that small depositors should be treated differently from large depositors and reaffirms the importance of fully guaranteeing deposits below EUR 100.000. The Cypriot authorities will introduce more progressivity in the one-off levy compared to what was agreed on 16 March, provided that it continues yielding the targeted reduction of the financing envelope and, hence, not impact the overall amount of financial assistance up to EUR 10bn.

The statement seems to be more of a hand washing exercise than a definitive end to the issues plaguing the Cypriot bailout – i.e. do whatever you need to in order to raise the €5.8bn but don’t blame us for your political troubles.

Ultimately, it is not clear that deposits below €100,000 will not be taxed. The two options on the table remain:

-          Depositors with up to €100,000, taxed at 3%; those with €100,000 to €500,000 taxed at 10%; and those with over €500,000 taxed at 15%. (This could also include an exemption of deposits below €20,000).

-          Tax deposits over €100,000 at 15.2% and exempt deposits below €100,000.

How much difference will this move make?

Well, removing the burden on smaller depositors would be a positive one, as we have suggested. That said, with the cat out of the bag as it were, this is unlikely to dial down frustrations or concerns significantly. This option is now on the table and the political divisions it has exposed are unlikely to be easily papered over.

Despite the fact that it seems the Cypriot government played a large role in the decision to structure the tax to hit smaller depositors in the first place, the anti-German feeling seems to be rising. Meanwhile, we still believe that the position of the government – which was elected on the basis of ruling out losses for any (large or small, foreign or domestic) depositors – remains precarious.