Juncker's investment plan gets cool reception

This is the name which has been given to the long touted €315bn investment fund which European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has put front and centre of his programme to deliver jobs and growth. The key points of the proposal (EC press release, Juncker speech, Katainen speech) are:

• €315bn investment from 2015 – 2017. This is made up of a €16bn guarantee from the EU budget (a 50% guarantee from €8bn of the budget) and €5bn from the European Investment Bank (EIB). This money will be used as a guarantee to raise the targeted €315bn from private financing on the market.**
• Of the total spend €240bn will go towards long term investments and €75bn to SMEs/mid-cap companies.
• The EFSI will be under the umbrella of the EIB but will have different goals and do a different type of lending.
• In conjunction with the EFSI the Commission will create a “project pipeline” along with technical assistance to help identify viable projects for investment at EU level.
• The investment plan will also contain a road map to remove sector specific regulations that hamper investment, with a focus on the financial sector to tie in with the push towards a Capital Markets Union.

This is the opening salvo of a plan which has long been muted. Judging by the initial reactions, the plan leaves something to be desired. Some thoughts below:

• As an opening salvo, the plan has already been watered down from what many had expected it to be – a real attempt at fiscal stimulus. Whether or not you agree with that prospect, it’s clear this plan does not constitute such an attempt. As it now enters the negotiation phase with approval from the member states and European parliament needed it could still be restricted and fudged further.

• This process seems very similar to previous attempts to create such a fund in 2012 (discussed by us here) and the failed attempt to leverage the European Financial Stability Facility from 2011 (which fell down on the reluctance of the ECB to be involved and the level of public guarantees were not sufficient and too highly correlated with potential risks). History suggests pinning significant hopes on these sorts of plans is not usually a good approach.

• It’s not clear that this buffer will be enough to encourage private investors to take on greater risk. There are numerous factors which are leading to a lack of private investment, risk (at these levels) is only part of it.

• Furthermore, to the point above, reports now suggest that the €21bn will actually be used by the EIB to borrow €63bn in bonds and cash which will then be used as a first loss buffer for the private investors – however, this does not seem to be mentioned in the press release, factsheets or Q&A. Additionally, we’re not sure what rating these bonds issued solely as loss protection would get or who would want to invest in them (seems akin to the lower riskier mezzanine tranches of asset backed securities).

• The promise to review the regulatory issues and create a central system of projects could actually prove to be more important than the funds themselves. That said, we have often heard the first point and the Commission has never followed through. The latter project has potential but the focus will be around “EU value added” and “EU objectives”. We’re not sure why the EU thinks it has a better idea of the returns and benefits on private investment than the market more broadly. Furthermore, these objectives already cloud what should be a simple idea – promote economic growth.

• More generally, questions can be asked about how these funds will be targeted. The focus seems heavily on pan-European infrastructure. While there are sectors where this could be useful – energy and high-tech – such a rigid focus is not needed for a general fund. Many parts of Europe (notably Spain) loaded up on infrastructure in the boom years; they do not really need more of it. What is really needed across Europe is investment in human capital, (re)training and R&D.

• All this once again highlights the huge amount of waste inside the EU budget, which could of course fill some of these roles. It also raises questions about whether the EIB should rethink its investment priorities.

Overall, the response from all sides has been very lukewarm. The plan seems very similar to previous iterations and, for better or worse, does not involve new money. Negotiations are likely to further impact the structure, while questions can be raised about the target and agenda included in the fund. The accompanying proposals for a project pipeline and improving regulation could be useful and tie in with plans for a single market in capital. That said, the EU’s track record on these fronts is not good and will likely take some time for any real impact to be seen.

**Correction: A previous version of this blog post said €294bn would be raised from private finance. However, the aim will actually be to use the €21bn as a guarantee on issuing €315bn worth of bonds on the market, meaning the entire €315bn will be private financing.

Ukraine update – Russian sanctions come to the fore again

We’ve been overdue an update on the situation in Ukraine. Over the past few weeks, as anyone following the news will have seen, the situation on the ground has remained very volatile. The attempted ceasefire was widely disregarded, leading to the Ukrainian government to launch a significant counterattack once it expired.

On the international level though, there seemed to have been some de-escalation: Russia drew back troops from the Ukrainian border, the Russian Parliament removed the government’s right to military intervention in Ukraine (at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s request), Putin welcomed the new Ukrainian President and government and generally softened his tone.

However, in recent days, events seem to be taking a different turn, with several reports suggesting a potential widening of economic sanctions on Russia. Much of this seems down to the fact that many believe Russia has allowed its border with Ukraine to be deliberately permeable and may have directly helped to resupply the pro-Russian separatists both with arms and personnel.

Importantly, Germany has hardened its position on sanctions, earlier this week German Chancellor Angela Merkel said:

“Regarding sanctions against Russia, we have so far reached level two and we cannot rule out having to go further.”

Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU Michael Fuchs added:

“If the Russians were to go further on the road which they have recently taken [towards escalation] then we must thoroughly consider whether there should be other sanctions . . . The best sanction is to take less [Russian] gas . . . You don’t even have to call it sanctions, but just don’t buy so much.”

In the meantime, the EU has also completed much of the technical work behind imposing wider economic sanctions, particularly sector specific ones. While, Russia has previously brushed off such threats the WSJ reports today that, according to a leaked document from the Russian Finance Ministry, it is quite concerned. The document argues:

[While Russia] has adequate reserves to compensate (for) the majority of the economic losses caused by sanctions…[they could still have a] substantial impact.”

“The imposition of sanctions on individual sectors of the Russian economy could lead to a worsening of their financial condition, borrowing terms, a rise in the risk premium and an increase in the capital outflow.”

As we noted in our very first report on all of this, sector specific sanctions would certainly hurt Russia, especially in the longer run which is looking increasingly worrisome from an economic perspective.

But while Russia is right to be concerned, as we noted in our Dove/Hawk scale, the EU is incredibly divided over deeper sanctions. While some countries have hardened their stance – notably Germany and the UK – others remain quite opposed, in particular Italy (which fears a restart of economic uncertainty) and France (which remains keen to conclude its military dealings with Russia before any further talk of sanctions). As such, it seems that any clear EU decision on this remains someway off.

On top of this, the standoff over gas supplies to Ukraine continues. Russia continues to insist that all gas from now on must be pre-paid and is demanding an immediate payment of $1.95bn out of a claimed $4.5bn in unpaid bills. Ukraine is refusing to give in, not least because its worsening economic situation means such upfront costs will be very difficult to stomach and may well have to be funded by European bailouts. So far this has avoided blowing up into a Europe-wide issue since transit of gas to Europe has continued but as Ukraine’s reserves dwindle and it seeks to import gas back from the rest of Europe (something Russia said it would prohibit) it could easily quickly spiral into a very serious continent wide problem.

In other areas there have also been renewed tensions. Ukraine finally signed the long awaited Association Agreement with the EU – the factor which essentially started all of this off. Russia remains concerned by such action and has already retaliated against Moldova, with bans on certain imports, which signed a similar deal. Meanwhile, new Ukrainian Defence Minister Valeriy Heletey stressed that the army would retake Crimea, promising, “There will be a victory parade... in Ukraine's Sevastopol.” Whether or not this has publicly manifested itself yet, you can be sure such comments and actions are antagonising Putin and Russia.

The situation in Ukraine remains very fragile but more worryingly little real progress seems to have been made. Russia, Ukraine and the EU remain at loggerheads over the association agreement and gas supply. Ukraine and Russia continue to disagree over the future for eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Despite these longstanding disputes which intermittently flare up and recede, Europe as a whole seems no closer to finding a clear stance or unified position on how to deal with what is happening. 

What’s wrong with Finland? Part 2

Since our last post on this issue things seem to have only got worse for Finland.

The European Commission’s latest economic forecast (see table below, click to enlarge) made pretty dire reading with Finland expected to be one of the worst performers in terms of economic growth over the next two years.

Furthermore, it seems that the credit rating agency S&P has finally caught up with our analysis of Finland, putting its AAA rating on negative outlook, suggesting that it may lose it in the next couple of years. Similar to our concerns about the rebalancing of the Finnish economy, the demographic problems and a stubborn lack of competitiveness, S&P noted:

“Finland’s persistent subpar growth rate reflects deep structural demographic and economic imbalances that hamper the government’s efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation. We consider that there are downside risks to growth and policy implementation.”

“We believe that the economy remains vulnerable to any slowdown of economic activity in the euro area or among other major trading partners, such as Russia.”

As the second part of the quote suggests, the situation in Ukraine and the potential sanctions on Russia are also likely to worsen the outlook for Finland.

The graphs above (data from Bank of Finland) highlight that Russia accounts for a decent chunk of Finnish trade and given the dwindling sources of growth any hit to this could certainly hamper the rebalancing of the economy and the reform/recovery process.

Furthermore, as we have flagged up before, Finland is one of the many countries heavily reliant on Russia for gas and energy more generally. With Putin’s threat to cut off gas to Ukraine the situation has potentially escalated another step, at least in economic terms, Finland is one (of the many countries, including Russia) which is on the front line.

Once again, all this is not to say that Finland is an economic basket case, far from it, but that even the healthy economies in Europe are undergoing some serious overhauls and reforms, further complicating the crisis response and, now, dealing with issues such as the Ukraine-Russia crisis.

What’s wrong with Finland?

That seems a strange question to ask. The country is a paid-up member of the eurozone core and is one of the few countries in the world to have a triple A credit rating from all three top agencies (S&P, Moody's & Fitch) and a stable outlook from all.

However, as the chart to the left shows (taken from the most recent Finnish Central Bank Macroeconomic bulletin) and today’s GDP data confirm (the Finnish economy contracted by 0.8% in Q4 2013) suggests all might not be well.

GDP growth has stagnated and is now teetering on the edge of slipping into its third recession in six years. But what has been causing this? The chart below on the right provides some insight.

The first point to note is the collapse in the electrical and electronics industry. This has been largely down to the struggles of Nokia. Formerly a dominant player in the telecoms market the firm has failed to adapt to the changing nature of the market, in particular the smart phone phenomenon, and has seen its market share, profits and share value eroded. The sector has also suffered knock on effects of the reduced global demand in the wake of the financial crisis, the threat of low cost emerging markets and the struggling domestic demand due to falling confidence.

Similarly the large metals industry has also been hit by the global downturn and has struggled with price competitiveness. In particular the ship building industry would have been doubly hit by the struggles in global trade and is yet to truly recover.

It was previously said that Finland lived off its forests. This is no longer true, or at least it is no longer able to fully. The forest industry and the related wood, textiles and paper industry have struggled with changing technologies. Demand for paper and related products has fallen substantially as digital replacements grow and environmental concerns take hold. Again cheap emerging market products may also threaten in this area.

The combination of all this has been falling employment and an accompanied fall in domestic demand, keeping downward pressure on the economy. At the same time Finland is also beginning to run into the same demographic problem facing much of the developed world – the decline of the working age population and the increase in the number of dependants.

It’s clear that Finland remains a very strong and healthy economy. However, it is clearly undergoing some serious structural changes and may continue to post low growth figures for some time to come. Fortunately, public debt remains low at around 59% of GDP, while the deficit continues to be under control at 2.4% of GDP, and unemployment remains at just 8.1% despite recent increases. This should give the country plenty of space to conduct the structural changes needed.

That said, the case of Finland provides further evidence (as we have pointed out for Germany) that the peripheral eurozone countries aren’t the only ones undergoing significant changes.

UK government's business taskforce launches push to cut EU red tape

Today sees the release of the Business Taskforce report on cutting EU red tape in an effort to boost competitiveness. As our previous work on EU regulation suggests - the Taskforce is picking up on many of our suggestions - this is a push we are very much in favour of, particularly at a time when squeezing out every bit of economic growth possible is vital for economies across the EU.

The report proposes 30 wide ranging reforms to cut EU red tape.We're still working our way through the detailed suggestions but we've included some initial reaction below, which we'll update as we go.

• The task force backs the full implementation of the EU’s Services Directive. This could deliver up to a €230bn boost to EU GDP, according Open Europe estimates. However, we have suggested the EU should go even further and push for the introduction of the ‘country of origin principle’ which could increase further gains to closer to €300bn (2.3% of EU GDP).

• Open Europe welcomes the push to exempt small businesses from burdensome legislation, although more needs to be done to address existing issues with social and employment law.

• In a report from 2011, Open Europe estimated that EU social policy (i.e. EU social and employment legislation and EU health and safety rules) cost the UK economy £8.6 billion a year. The figure is heavily driven by a few very costly EU Directives – most importantly the Working Time Directive and the Temporary Agency Workers Directive. However, some health and safety laws stemming from the EU also represent a net cost to the UK economy. This is the case, for instance, for the Control of Vibration at Work Regulations 2005 and the Control of Noise at Work Regulations 2005.

• The task force has adopted Open Europe’s recommendation that low-risk firms be exempted from the obligation to regularly update their health and safety risk assessments.

• Looking for ways to improve EU-wide competitiveness and the European business environment, as the report recommends, rather than looking for specific UK opt-outs is likely to increase the chance of support from like-minded EU countries.

• Creation of a digital single market could be vital, particularly from the UK perspective with over 70% of UK citizens having bought products or services online but only around 10% having done so across borders.

• Open Europe recommended adopting a ‘one in, one out’ rule for EU regulation back in 2010 and continues to support such a move as suggested by the task force’s report.

• On-going assessment of the impact of regulation is vital. For example, the benefits of many regulations are based on assumptions or forecasts and while probable or viable at the time, these do not always come to pass. EU regulations on environment and climate change are a prime example of this. With circumstances shifting it is important that regulation is flexible.

• The Taskforce also adopts out proposal that Commission proposals which don't come with a robust Impact Assessment, clearly showing the need for and benefit of the law, should be dropped. We agree that more effective use of Impact Assessments is vital and giving the EU’s so-called Impact Assessment Board (IAB) more teeth (which we has long advocated) and the power to ‘red flag’ harmful EU proposals (e.g. the ban on olive oil jugs) would be a positive start. The focus of the IAB must be to ensure high methodological standards so that approval of a regulation depends on its merits, not political motives (for example, major problems with the Commission’s proposal for a financial transaction tax emerged after it had been tabled and undergone a Commission impact assessment).

These ideas deserve the support of like-minded EU member states at a time when policymakers are desperately seeking ways to improve Europe’s growth and competitiveness. It is essential that these good ideas are followed by concrete action to reduce the existing and future burden of EU law on European and British businesses.

Eurozone private sector growth beats expectations, but hides divergence

This morning saw the release of the latest set of Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) - a set of indicators used to measure the economic health of the manufacturing and service sectors. The figures for the eurozone as a whole once again beat expectations.

Eurozone Composite PMI (Aug A) M/M 51.7 vs. Exp. 50.9 (Prev. 50.5)
Eurozone Services PMI (Aug A) M/M 51.0 vs. Exp. 50.2 (Prev. 49.8)
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (Aug A) M/M 51.3 vs. Exp. 50.8 (Prev. 50.3)

German Flash Composite PMI (Aug A) M/M 53.4 (Prev. 52.8)
German Services PMI (Aug) M/M 52.4 vs. Exp. 51.8 (Prev. 51.3)
German Flash Manufacturing PMI (Aug A) M/M 52.0 vs. Exp. 51.2 (Prev. 50.7)

French Composite PMI (Aug) M/M 47.9 (Prev. 49.1)
French Services PMI (Aug) M/M 47.7 vs. Exp. 49.2 (Prev. 48.6)
French Manufacturing PMI (Aug P) M/M 49.7 vs. Exp. 50.2 (Prev. 49.7)

We covered this issue in detail last month and, needless to say, our thoughts haven’t changed much in such a short space of time, but there are a couple of points to note.

• Again, this is another small positive piece of data for the eurozone, in particular the eurozone services PMI is at its highest point for 2 years while the manufacturing at its highest since June 2011.

• That said, the on-going problem of divergence (which we have discussed before) continues to loom large. As Germany continues to post strong economic data, France looks to be showing signs of struggling, despite its unexpectedly positive GDP growth in the second quarter of this year. This divergence has the potential to become a serious problem for both the ECB (in terms of trying to balance its monetary policy) but also for the Franco-German axis which has long been at the core of the eurozone and vital to its stability.
• This turnaround in economic data for the eurozone has unfortunately coincided with problems/issues elsewhere in the global economy. The Chinese economy (a big source of trade for the eurozone) has shown signs of stumbling, while the US Fed is toying with the prospect of tightening its monetary policy - this could impact global liquidity and sentiment with suitably negative knock-on effects for the eurozone. With Germany leading the way as an export orientated country and many in the periphery  looking to copy this (through choice or Troika programme), the eurozone continues to be reliant on external demand.
• The combination of positive economic data and long term forecasts of loose ECB policy are helping boost sentiment in the eurozone more broadly. However, some significant questions are looming, notably how to fund the likes of Greece, Portugal and Ireland as their bailout funding winds down over the next year. These issues have so far been pushed into the long grass but the time is quickly approaching where answers are needed, unfortunately indicators here are much less positive than the PMIs. More ad-hoc structures seem to be the likely outcome.

German growth leads the eurozone out of recession but can it really lead the eurozone out of its crisis?

As has been widely covered today, the eurozone exited recession in the second quarter of this year, growing by 0.3% (over expectations of 0.2%).

We posted our thoughts on this expected ‘turnaround’ in the eurozone a couple of weeks ago, so we won’t rehash them. Needless to say the figures are a positive but there is still plenty of negative data around (unemployment, bank lending to real economy, consumer confidence), so European leaders should refrain from getting overexcited.

The key point for us remains this issue of divergence. It’s worth noting that Germany and France played a significant role in pulling the eurozone average growth up. There also seems to be a prevailing logic that German growth can play a big role in pulling the eurozone out of its crisis. As we have noted before we’re fairly sceptical of this idea for a couple of reasons.

There are two mechanisms through which German growth could in theory help boost struggling eurozone countries:

• Firstly by boosting German demand for imports from these countries significantly.
• Secondly by moving Germany away from its export model (possibly through decreased competiveness) allow these countries to fill that gap and export more.

1. Boosting imports
 

(Data up to end of 2012, however imports from eurozone countries have continued to decline in 2013)

As we have discussed before, and as the graph above shows (click to enlarge), German imports from peripheral eurozone countries have decreased substantially with only Italy featuring as one of Germany’s top ten trading partners. Furthermore, imports from other EU countries have declined to 56% of total imports – with the eurozone accounting for approximately 38% of this and peripheral eurozone states a small part of this. 

Therefore, even if GDP and consumption are growing quickly in Germany it’s not entirely clear that this would have a significant knock on effect on the countries that need it most.  The Netherlands, France and Italy are the most likely to see some boost. The IMF itself noted recently that using fiscal policy to boost Germany GDP would provide limited help for the eurozone. It ultimately also depends where Germany’s economic growth comes from, if driven by its own exports or government spending the impact would be even further limited.

2. Providing space for the periphery to boost exports

The theory here is that Germany ‘reflates’ allow wages and unit labour costs to grow and focuses its economy more on domestic consumption and investment rather than exports. This allows for the other eurozone economies to step in and export more, not least because they look relatively more competitive.

However, as the graphs above show (via UBS, click to enlarge), in many cases the struggling peripheral countries do not export the same goods as Germany (transport equipment, electrical equipment, chemicals), although there is some overlap on food and financial services. In any case, it’s far from clear that the struggling peripheral countries would be able to step into any breach left by Germany (particularly with heavy competition from emerging markets). Furthermore, many German exports used component parts from elsewhere in the EU, so decreasing them could actually have negative knock-on impact in certain sectors.

Another point worth keeping in mind is that a rapidly growing Germany would put added strain on the one-size-fits-all policy of the ECB. With the ECB now forecasting that interest rates will stay low for some time, if Germany continues along this growth path it may not be too long before the Bundesbank becomes concerned about the monetary policy being too lax.

It almost goes without saying that strong German growth is a good thing for the eurozone generally (breeds confidence and helps encourage investment) and strong economic growth should be the target for all countries. However, as the points above demonstrate, this does not mean it will be enough to drag the eurozone out of its crisis (i.e. it may be necessary but it is far from sufficient) and is certainly no panacea. The key issues to address remain the structural flaws in the eurozone and the lack of competitiveness within many of the peripheral economies.

Let's have a look beyond the (rather encouraging) headline figures on Spanish unemployment

The Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) has this morning published its latest unemployment data. The headline figures look encouraging. In the second quarter of 2013, the number of unemployed people went down by 225,200 - and is now slightly below six million. The total unemployment rate now stands at 26.3%, while youth unemployment rate is 56.1%.

However, a few points are worth keeping in mind when assessing the importance of these figures:

• The figures are not seasonally adjusted, so the decrease is clearly linked to the arrival of the summer - when a lot more seasonal jobs are on offer. The two Spanish regions where the number of employed people increased the most were the Balearic Islands (Ibiza, Formentera, Mallorca and Menorca) and Andalusia - top tourist summer destinations.

• A similar phenomenon took place last summer. The initial, non-seasonally adjusted figures for June 2012 showed a 0.2% drop in unemployment from May 2012. However, once these figures were seasonally adjusted the result was actually a 0.2% increase. The graph below highlights this well, showing that there is a similar dip in unemployment every year when the summer approaches (data are from the EU's statistics office Eurostat, click to enlarge).

• Part of the decrease in the unemployment rate is also due to a reduction in Spain's active population (those working or actively searching for work) - 76,100 people less over the same period. To fully judge the importance of the figures, it is also worth looking at the level of employment which is not impacted by such a change in activity. The figures for June 2013 showed employment increased by only 149,000, much lower than the overall fall in unemployment.

• A final point to keep in mind is the on-going emigration of Spaniards. This has reached record levels with close to 60,000 Spaniards emigrating in 2012 and many immigrants also moving elsewhere. This is obviously linked to people dropping out of the active labour force. We may well see future declines in unemployment but they will be meaningless if they simply arise from less people actively searching for work or moving abroad to find work elsewhere.

Unsurprisingly, the Spanish government had predicted "good" data - and will probably hail the new figures as a success of its policies. But once the summer is over, as happened last year, the figures may ultimately tell a rather different story.  

Turning a corner in the eurozone? Not quite yet...

There has been a lot of chatter this morning about the eurozone recession coming to an end following the release of the latest Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) - a set of indicators used to measure the economic health of the manufacturing and service sectors. The index reached the highest level for 18 months and pushed past the point where it was continuing to decrease (see the relevant graphs below).

These results are clearly positive, but it seems that some commentators have been getting a bit ahead of themselves in declaring the recession and troubles over. Here are a few points to keep in mind:

• The average for the eurozone has only just pushed into the positive territory and remains closer to being flat. This suggests that GDP may have stopped contracting but has flattened out rather than returning sharply to growth.
• Furthermore, this is an aggregate figure. In fact, the PMIs for many countries are still contracting – France included (see right-hand graph above). Given that this crisis is much more about divisions between countries than the aggregate as a whole, such gaps remain important. In fact, with Germany posting strong results, the gap between the strongest and weakest may grow. This could create tensions for future ECB policy.

• As the graph above shows (courtesy of Commerzbank) although some of the peripheral countries are doing better, concerns are now growing about some of the semi-core and even core members, such as France. The economic sentiment and outlook in these countries remains worryingly bleak. For France in particular, questions need to be asked about how useful the PMIs are as an indicator give that they have been contracting for some time but GDP has remained fairly flat – i.e. they have detached from one another. It’s not clear any turnaround in PMI will show up in GDP.
• PMIs represent the private sector. Other components of GDP, in particular public spending and investment generally continue to fall. Even if the private sector is growing, it may not yet be enough to offset this. In many countries the private sector growth is also tied in close with export growth and an external recovery – this remains fragile (see for example the corresponding PMIs for China which fell sharply).
• Other indicators also suggest that the difficult environment will continue for some time. The ECB’s bank lending survey also out today highlighted that credit to the real economy continues to contract, albeit at a slower rate. Consumer confidence released yesterday did show a large jump but remains well below its historical average in depression territory.
• A slight turnaround was widely predicted for the second half of this year and so may be largely priced in when it comes to borrowing costs and stock markets (not least because the latter seems to continue to outstrip the macroeconomic fundamentals). 
• Finally, it's worth remembering that political uncertainty in southern eurozone countries can return at any point in time these days (see our previous blog posts for the latest from Portugal, Italy and Spain).

All that said, it is easy to pick holes in any single piece of data. The positive turnaround is good for the eurozone, but it is only one indicator and time will tell whether it can amount to a sustained improvement. Given the many obstacles which the eurozone has failed to address this still seems a very uncertain prospect to say the least.

The march of eurozone unemployment continues

An unstoppable march? Maybe. The consistent monthly practice of smashing unemployment records in the eurozone continued in April with the overall total reaching 12.2% while youth unemployment hit a whopping 24.4%.

• As the graph highlights (click to enlarge) youth unemployment has risen a staggering amount in some countries since the start of the crisis (for countries where April data is not yet available the latest month available was used).
• The problems in Greece are well documented but some very large economies also have some very serious problems with youth unemployment. In April it stood at 56.4% in Spain, 42.5% in Portugal and 40.5% Italy.
• The longer this goes on the more problems it will cause both economically and socially. It creates a split within society with many young people seeing a very bleak future; traditionally this has also fed populism and the rise of extreme political parties.
• Economically it hurts the long term productive potential of the economy as some of these young people see their productivity reduced by long stints out of work, while many others will look for work abroad potentially creating a 'brain drain' and worsening an already troubling demographic problems.

Cypriot deposit developments

Update 31/05/13 09:40: As we noted below, it seems that the figures do include some of the write-downs of deposits under the bank restructuring (but not all). Apologies for the confusion. As the Central Bank of Cyprus notes the initial write down for Bank of Cyprus depositors is included. This totals around €3.2bn. This means the actual outflow was around €3bn, similar to the previous month.

This is still fairly significant, although we expect much of this may be domestic and due to people and businesses running down their cash reserves. This also likely reduces some of the concerns over the workings of the capital controls. The data does give some feeling for who might be losing from the bank restructuring - US Dollar depositors and foreign NFCs are probably a large share. The concerns over the bank deleveraging and increasing reliance on central bank financing also remain (since they were already well established).

The real test of the deposit flight will come, firstly once the bank restructuring is complete (by end of July) and secondly once the capital controls are removed (who knows when).

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Yesterday saw the release of the latest data on the state of bank deposits in Cyprus – which always makes for interesting reading.

The headline figures are pretty terrible. Overall deposits declined by €6.346bn (10%) in April, almost double the level seen in March (when the crisis was in full swing) - despite stringent capital controls being in place for the entire month. However, given their importance, these figures deserve delving beyond the headlines.

The charts above (click to enlarge) raise some interesting points:

• First, it’s clear that the deposit flight is continuing despite the strict capital controls. This is concerning, since it shows the Cypriot government’s inability to enforce the rules, particularly on the financial sector. It also means that capital controls continue to hamper the functioning of the Cypriot economy, but are failing to stop an outflow of money (though admittedly it could have been much larger without them).
• Second, the outflows are split between domestic residents and those in the rest of the world (ROW). ROW deposits are unlikely to return for some time. Cyprus could hold out hope that domestic residents are just stashing cash due to concerns over the economy and banks, meaning this money may eventually return. Unfortunately, given the bleak outlook this is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
• Third, a surprisingly large amount of the withdrawal (€3.2bn) has come from deposits held in US dollars. This money might also have moved abroad and is unlikely to return, suggesting both domestic and foreign investors are moving money away from Cyprus.
• Lastly, much of the withdrawal has been by non-financial corporations (NFCs) and households. This was perhaps more predictable, but again raises concerns about the future of investment and consumption in the economy. The underlying data shows especially strong withdrawals from ROW households and NFCs which have been a big source of economic growth for Cyprus in recent years. It could also peak concerns over the impact the capital controls are having, as firms and households are forced to eat into their cash reserves (although they still remain at a decent headline level).

One important point to keep in mind concerns the losses for some uninsured depositors under the bank restructurings. It is not clear from the Central Bank of Cyprus figures whether this has already been accounted for in the data above, although this looks unlikely since the process is still continuing. That said, if it has been, then the actual withdrawals are smaller - though still high. The overall economic impact also remains similar.

What does all this mean for Cyprus and the eurozone?

• Much of it confirms what many people feared in the aftermath of the crisis. In particular, it paints a bleak picture for future growth in Cyprus as money flows out of the economy. It also raises questions over whether such outflows were accounted for in the overly optimistic assumptions about Cypriot growth.
• Another problem will be bank financing. Cypriot banks are locked out of the markets and may well be for some time. With deposits falling they will be forced to access more ECB liquidity and possibly the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). This is something which the ECB has notoriously been trying to avoid in Cyprus, and more generally. Not least because under any future restructuring/default/euro exit scenario the ECB would face larger losses.
• But it’s also important to remember that there is a limit to how much Cypriot banks can access through these facilities since they require assets to be posted as collateral. Even if they are able to, it is clearly possible that this pressure could force them to increase the already rapid pace of deleveraging. This would undoubtedly further hamper lending to the real economy and in turn economic growth.
• As noted above, from a wider perspective it will increase already pressing concerns over the enforcement of the controls and more generally over regulation of the financial sector in Cyprus.

Any Commission changes to the eurozone crisis policy are largely semantic as the bloc continues to shy away from the tough choices

Building on our blog from yesterday, Open Europe’s Raoul Ruparel has an article in City AM today discussing the Commission’s country specific recommendations. Raoul argues that, despite protestations to the contrary, this is far from a wholesale change in policy but only a small change in the pace of policy implementation. Raoul also brings in an earlier discussion from this blog regarding the nature of the austerity vs. growth debate in Europe – fundamentally the real choice remains between creating a new eurozone architecture or breaking up.

See below for the full piece:

A REVOLT against austerity. A shift to growth. A new policy for the Eurozone. The supposed new approach, symbolised by yesterday’s European Commission economic recommendations for each Eurozone country, has been called many things. But once the rhetoric is stripped away, any changes that remain are largely semantic. The Eurozone remains on the same policy path; at most, it is just progressing along it at a more leisurely pace.

Let me quickly recap yesterday’s recommendations. Spain, France and the Netherlands were all given more time to meet their deficit targets, albeit in exchange for more open-ended commitments to deep structural reform. Don’t forget that this is far from a new precedent; Greece, Portugal and Spain have all received numerous extensions over the past few years.

Meanwhile, Italy exited the proverbial EU economic dog house known as the “Excessive Deficit Procedure”, a move which in normal times would allow it more economic freedom. Unfortunately, these remain far from normal times, and few doubt that those in charge of the purse strings in stronger Eurozone economies will continue to scrutinise every Italian policy move as if it were their own. Countries like Belgium and Slovenia got some leeway, but were also on the receiving end of a textbook scalding for a lack of structural and financial market reform – the type of which most Commission officials could probably dole out from memory by now.

For all the fanfare over the past months and weeks, this “new path” seems very much par for the course. Yes, there is a tweak here and there, but much in the same way a football manager might bring on a defender when his team is getting thrashed – it’s more about saving face than making a sizeable impact on the course of the game.

The first question to ask is, despite this not being the wholesale change it was cracked up to be, will it have any impact on the crisis?

In a word: unlikely. It’s clear that the current policy approach is not working, and in many cases a slowdown in the pace of cuts will be helpful – at least in political and social terms – as it allows a slower pace of wage and jobs cuts. That said, the amount of additional fiscal spending to be allocated to boosting the real economy remains a pittance in comparison to collapsing domestic demand and falling investment in many of the struggling countries. Further, it’s worth noting that, although some spending cuts have been slowed, the flip side of this will be deeper and faster structural reform. In many cases this falls heavily on the labour market. Unfortunately the short-term impact of such reforms, no matter how necessary, is often increased unemployment.

The second and more interesting question is, what more could actually be done on this front?

This brings us, inevitably, to the broader question of austerity versus growth. This has become a key debate during the crisis, but it fails to capture the key question in the Eurozone. It is clear to everyone that Greece, Portugal and Ireland were insolvent, and it was market pressure that pushed them into bailouts. Reducing debt levels is a vital part of their reform, while also serving to counter the significant moral hazard that comes with a bailout. Similar constraints apply in Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Slovenia in terms of expanding spending in the short run.

Therefore, asking to end austerity in much of the Eurozone is akin to asking for greater transfers from the stronger countries – whether direct, through fiscal union, or indirect, through banking union or much higher inflation.

This provides us with a clearer picture of the situation. First, the widely mooted change in Eurozone economic policy actually amounts to little more than a small adjustment, slathered in a thick coating of political rhetoric. Secondly, in reality there was little room for adjustment to this policy. This is mostly because many states have little room for further spending, but also because the decisions lie with national governments and parliaments, not the Commission.

This brings us to the conclusion that, rather than discussing whether or not to change austerity, there should be more focus on solutions that can really solve the crisis. The fundamental choice for the Eurozone remains the same as it always has been: the creation of the necessary architecture to deal with a widespread economic crisis, or face a break-up.

Despite much fanfare, the European Commission recommends much of the same for the eurozone

The Commission has today released its country-specific recommendations on economic policy. Below, we highlight the most important suggestions made to some of the key eurozone countries.

SPAIN

• According to the European Commission, Spain should “improve the efficiency and quality of public expenditure at all levels of government”. Clearly, this is easier said than done, given the well-known problems the Spanish government is having in trying to rein in regional spending.
• The European Commission also seems to suggest that the 2012 labour market reform – one of the flagship measures adopted by Mariano Rajoy’s government – may need tweaks. In particular, Spain should reform its active labour market policies.
• Spain should also push ahead with the liberalisation of closed professions and improve the business environment in general – for instance by cutting the amount of paperwork, a notorious issue in the country.
• Spain should “further limit the application of VAT rates”. This might be controversial, as the Spanish government has said several times it is opposed to further VAT hikes.
• According to the Commission, the reform of Spain’s pension system should be finalised by the end of the year.

FRANCE

The recommendations for France include quite a few suggestions which may be hard to digest for François Hollande’s socialist government.

• France should do more to cut labour costs, in particular by reducing social security contributions for employers.
• The European Commission says France should adopt new measures by the end of the year to “bring its pension system into balance in a sustainable manner no later than 2020.” The Commission suggests various ways of doing this, including “adapting indexation rules” (remove/reform the link between inflation and pensions increases, in plain English) and raise the retirement age. This is unlikely to go down well in Paris.
• France should improve the business environment and help its firms become more competitive;
• France’s unemployment benefit system should be “urgently” reformed, so that it is sustainable but also “provides adequate incentives to return to work”.
• France should do more to tackle labour market segmentation, and remove “unjustified restrictions in the access to and exercise of professional services.”

ITALY

As we noted several times, Mario Monti’s technocratic government did a good job in cutting Italy’s deficit – less so in implementing structural reforms. Here is what the European Commission would like Italy to do:

• Make sure that the reforms initiated by Monti's government are properly implemented (some of them require enacting legislation).
• Push ahead with labour market reform. Wages should be better aligned to productivity, and more should be done to bring young people and women into work.
• The tax burden should move from labour and capital to consumption, property and the environment. Sure enough, this is going to be controversial, given that the new Italian government is trying to avoid a VAT increase scheduled by its predecessor for 1 July 2013 and is also considering scrapping a property tax on first homes.
• Continue with liberalisation of the services market and opening up of closed professions – which seems to be an issue affecting all the Mediterranean eurozone countries.
• Needless to say, all this has to happen without breaching the EU’s deficit limit of 3% of GDP and in parallel to a reduction of Italy’s gigantic public debt (forecast to be over 132% of GDP in 2014).

SLOVENIA

• As we have previously warned, the Commission flags up the risk of the heavily indebted corporate sector and how this in closely intertwined with the fate of shaky banks.
• Of the largest domestic banks the Commission warns, “Their dependence on the state for capital is a substantial threat to the economy” and that “Further recapitalisations are foreseen in the stability programme”. The Commission does not give an estimate of the recap needs but it’s clear there is concern that it could impact the Slovenian economic situation. To this end it also called for an independent review of the Slovenian banking sector.
• Government growth forecasts are seen to be overly optimistic, particularly next year's, this could be further hampered by the banking sector.
• Significant push needed on cutting wages and increasing productivity, true in most places but especially on Slovenia when costs have been on a rapid rise in recent years.
• Need to push on with privatisations and come up with a clear policy framework to do so. More structure needed, particularly if investors are to be convinced.
• “Further reform efforts are required to improve the sustainability of pension expenditure in the long-term, including through aligning the statutory retirement age with gains in life expectancy and by further restricting early retirement.” – numerous concerns expressed about long term liabilities of the state.

GERMANY

• “Germany should do more to open up their services sector by removing unjustified restrictions and barriers to entry, thereby leading to lower price levels, making services more affordable for lower income groups.” – particularly calls for the opening up of public procurement, professional services and retail services.
• “Sustain conditions that enable wage growth to support domestic demand.” – although it sounds innocuous this could be very controversial in Germany. It essentially seems to endorse the calls for Germany to spend more and allow inflation to help rebalance the eurozone. Germans fear of inflation is well known but they also fear a decrease in the competitiveness.

BELGIUM

Some press reports were (perhaps a bit hurriedly, given how the EU works) suggesting that Belgium could today become the first eurozone country to face sanctions for missing its deficit targets. But EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn just told journalists in Brussels that “it would be neither fair or legally sound to apply fines retroactively”, so Elio Di Rupo & co. have been let off the hook for now. These are the key recommendations:

• Transpose the ‘balanced budget rule’ enshrined in the fiscal treaty into national law; 
•  Step up efforts to “close the gap between the effective and statutory retirement age”. In other words, the European Commission thinks there are too many early retirements in Belgium at the moment. On pensions, Belgium should also “accelerate the adoption of a decision to link the statutory retirement age to life expectancy” – which could mean further retirement age increases in future; 
•  Less taxes on labour and better alignment of wages to productivity to restore competitiveness; 
• Remove barriers in the services sector. 

So, for all the talk of this being the ‘end of austerity’ or ‘austerity in retreat’, is much really changing? Sure, there is some tinkering with timelines for deficit reduction (Spain, France and others have been given more time to cut public deficit), but ultimately the eurozone is still going along the same policy path - just slightly more slowly. Cases in point are the countries above, since the clear themes running through all of them are the need for structural reform, welfare reform, fiscal consolidation and liberalising the economy. These are things which have long been advocated and are clearly necessary. The question remains whether they can all be done at the same time by a group of countries which are closely interlinked, and many of which are currently in recession.

The real Europe question: how to kick-start growth

We appreciate that Westminster and the media are occupied with the Queen's speech and internal tory divisions over Europe (be them real or overblown), but real story in Europe lies elsewhere: where will the EU's and UK's growth come from?

Well, we know it's not fashionable, but here's a constructive idea.

Open Europe has today released a new report calling for the liberalisation of the services sector across Europe, both through the implementation of the current services directive but also by widening its scope. The report argues that this could boost EU GDP by €300bn and if it cannot be done with all 27 members, the UK and its allies should look to pursue it under ‘enhanced cooperation’ - allowing a smaller group of countries pressing ahead with more integration if not possible at the level of all 27 member states.

See here for the full report and here for a video with British Chambers of Commerce’s Director of Policy and External Affairs, Dr Adam Marshall, discussing the issue and OE’s proposal. That organisation represents thousands of businesses and knows a thing or two what's needed for economic growth, beyond the navel-gazing of the Westminster village and the platitudes of some politicians.

Key points of the report:

- Fully implementing the existing Services Directive and implementing a new “country of origin” principle, a trade-boosting measure that was removed when the Directive was originally negotiated, would boost EU cross-border trade and produce a permanent increase to EU-wide GDP of up to 2.3% or €294bn, in addition to the €101bn already gained under the Services Directive (0.8% of EU GDP).

- If agreement among all 27 member states isn’t possible, a smaller group of EU countries should now press ahead with greater integration in services under the EU’s so-called ‘enhanced cooperation’ procedure, which is being used to pursue the financial transaction tax. This was an idea first floated by Mark Rutte, the Dutch Prime Minister, in 2011.

- In a “pro-growth” letter in February 2012, twelve member states – the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Ireland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Poland – all committed themselves to “open up services markets”.

- We estimate that if only this group of countries were to fully liberalise their services markets, it would still produce a lasting boost to EU GDP of up to 1.17% or €147.8bn. If other countries, such as Germany, were persuaded to join, the economic benefits would be increased further. Ultimately, this measure should serve as a springboard to achieve services liberalisation for the entire EU.

- The political benefits of further services liberalisation are threefold:

1) It would be a positive, constructive, and pro-European means by which to secure continued engagement in the EU from non-euro countries, particularly the UK.

2) It would provide a new legally enforceable framework to improve competitiveness and growth in the Southern euro member states and therefore boost the economic prospects of the eurozone, but without costing an extra cent of Northern countries’ taxpayers’ money.

3) It would improve EU-wide growth, competitiveness and employment at a time when Europe is at risk of global economic decline.

Is the academic premise for austerity in the eurozone crumbling? Not quite…

A mini-storm has been whipped up in the economic community overnight after a paper was published highlighting some flaws in the widely cited Reinhart & Rogoff paper ‘Growth in a time of debt’.

A quick recap for those of you not familiar with the paper. It essentially argues that high debt levels are associated with low economic growth. It bases its analysis on data from 44 countries over the past 200 years. It also notes that this relationship gets stronger once debt exceeds 90% of GDP. The paper has been widely cited in defence of and in support for ‘austerity’ – by politicians in both the US and Europe (notably Olli Rehn in respect to the eurozone crisis).

The new research released challenged Reinhart & Rogoff’s (R&R) findings, on the basis of an excel error (oops), data omissions and incorrectly weighting of data. There has been plenty written about which side is correct – you can see a summary of criticisms here and R&R’s responses here and here.

The question that interests us is not necessarily the intricacies of this academic back and forth. To be honest, it is obvious that there is no clear single threshold above which debt begins to impact growth in all countries and that often specific historical experiences in certain countries may not mean much for policies in different times and places (see this Ed Hugh post for a good summary). This is particularly true given some of the unique constraints of the eurozone crisis.

But given that some people are seeing this as a damning indictment of the backing for ‘austerity’, will this have any impact on the approach to the eurozone crisis?

In a word, no. Here are a few reasons why:

• R&R research aside it is clear to everyone that Greece, Portugal and Ireland were insolvent, it was market pressure that pushed them into a bailout. Reducing the debt level is a vital part of their reform, while it also serve to counter the significant moral hazard that comes with a bailout.
• Similar constraints apply in Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Slovenia. With elevated borrowing costs they cannot expand fiscal policy without coming up against greater market pressure and pushing their average interest costs well above their growth rates (especially in the short run).
• Therefore, arguing for the end of austerity in these countries is actually arguing for fiscal transfers from the rest of the eurozone, since they do not have much, if any, room to expand spending. This is ultimately where the debate is at, it is not about austerity or spending, it is about whether the stronger countries are willing to provide the transfers – be it through banking union or fiscal union – to keep the eurozone together in the longer run and create the architecture necessary so that it can withstand future shocks. If they are not then they have to face the prospect of breaking up or decreasing the size of the eurozone.
• The constraints which apply also extend much further than just public debt. As we have seen in Spain, Ireland and Cyprus (and are seeing in Slovenia) the levels of private sector and banking sector debt are equally important. The macro picture is much more complex than just the level of public debt and economic growth. The problems in the crisis are a mix of fiscal, banking and structural.
• Austerity is more than just cutting spending. It has become a catch-all term for some very necessary reforms to improve competitiveness and productivity in the eurozone. Even if spending could be increased, these reforms would be needed, although admittedly the fallout (increased unemployment in many cases and massive political backlash) might be more bearable – but as noted above, this isn’t really possible in many of the worst cases.
• The logic behind the current approach is also strongly driven by Germany’s own economic experience in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which proved very effective in turning the country around. The main issue here is not whether the approach itself is correct or not (since it clearly did work there), but the scope in which it is applied. It is clear that you cannot have 17 Germanys with economies driven by exports in a single currency bloc where the countries predominantly trade with each other (it might help in the short term but its not clear it is a sustainable long term economic model for the bloc).

So what academics (and policymakers) really should debate is whether fiscal transfers are possible and/or desirable.  Proving or disproving R&R is neither here nor there when it comes to dealing with the eurozone crisis.

Who’s next in line in the eurozone crisis? Portugal and Slovenia are the prime candidates

In anticipation of tomorrow's eurozone finance ministers meeting (which will discuss finalising the Cypriot bailout and potentially extending the bailout loans given to Portugal and Ireland) Open Europe has published a new briefing looking at who might be next in the eurozone - our prime candidates are Portugal (for the second time) and Slovenia.

Key points

Both Portugal and Slovenia could need external assistance of some sort.

Portugal 

• Domestic demand, government spending and investment are contracting sharply, leaving the country heavily reliant on uncertain export growth to drive the economy. 
• By cutting wages and costs at home (internal devaluation), Portugal has in recent years improved its level of competitiveness in the eurozone relative to Germany. However, this trend actually started to reverse sharply in 2012, meaning that the divergence between countries such as Portugal and Germany has begun growing again – exactly the sort of imbalance the eurozone is seeking to close. 

• In its austerity efforts, Portugal is now coming up against serious political and constitutional limits. For the second time, the country’s constitutional court has ruled against public sector wage cuts – a key plank in the country’s EU-mandated austerity plan – while the previous political consensus in the parliament for austerity has evaporated.
• In combination, it will be increasingly difficult for Portugal to sell austerity at home and consequently to negotiate its bailout terms with creditor countries abroad.
• Portugal may well need some further financial assistance before long. It is unlikely to take the form of a full second bailout, but could involve use of the ECB’s OMT bond-buying programme, assuming Portugal can return to the markets fully beforehand (even briefly). 

Slovenia

• Slovenia is not Cyprus – in fact it is much more like Spain. Its banks are significantly undercapitalised with toxic loans now standing at 18% of GDP. Banks only have provisions to cover less than half the potential losses resulting from these loans.

• At the same time, a heavily indebted private sector is now desperately trying to get debt off its books, which alongside continued austerity and lack of investment, have caused growth to plummet.
• Though a full bailout is unlikely, the country could soon need an EU rescue package worth between €1 billion and €4 billion (between 3% and 11% of GDP) to help restructure the country’s bust and mismanaged banks.
• Such a plan is likely to include losses for shareholder (bail-ins) but, unlike in Cyprus, it may not hit large (uninsured) depositors and there will be no attempt whatsoever at taxing smaller (insured) depositors.

To read the full briefing, click here.

Where will Cypriot growth come from?

This is now emerging as the key question for Cyprus following the severe mishandling of its bailout. The financial services sector, along with real estate and related businesses, which accounted for around 30% of Gross Value Added in the economy is now essentially gone as a source of growth.

Cyprus’ main trading partners, Greece in particular, remain mired in recession. Its two largest banks – key employers – will be restructured and unemployment will undoubtedly rise. Meanwhile, the government will be cutting spending and raising taxes, laying off public sector workers and embarking on some strict labour and product market reforms – as part of the standard Troika bailout package. Many of these reforms are needed but as we have seen across Europe, when combined with other impacts mentioned above, a downward spiral can be created.

The key hope for growth remains tourism. However, with the euro remaining strong and the prospect for political and social unrest in Cyprus still high, it is difficult to see a huge boost in this area. It will continue to truck along but is unlikely to fill the gap left by other areas of the economy shrinking. As we have discussed before, the prospect of growth from large gas revenues remains a pipe dream for now.

With all of this in mind we have put together a comparison of some of the previous growth estimates, along with the implicit ones included in the latest troika report and some of OE’s initial (optimistic) projections (click to enlarge).

All of this remains uncertain, depending on when capital controls are removed and how investors respond but it does not make pretty reading. All previous hopes for the economy are off the table and expectations need to be severely adjusted. The Troika's estimates are very optimistic, particularly in terms of returning to rapid growth in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, if the growth estimates included in the bailout prove to be overly optimistic it means Cyprus will, just as Greece did, require further financial assistance.

Another tricky morning for the eurozone

It’s been a somewhat less than pleasant morning for the eurozone. Firstly, the European Commission put out its latest economic growth forecasts, which do not make great reading for many countries. Here is a comparison between the EC's forecasts and the latest national government forecasts for growth:

As the table shows, there is a long list of countries which seem to be overestimating their growth for this year including: Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland.

We expect to see a series of growth revisions throughout the year on the part of national governments – in some cases such as Greece, we expect that the Commission forecasts will also prove overly optimistic (notably the figures used in the Greek budget are actually below the Commission forecasts). The figures also highlight the growing cracks in the Franco-German axis as the two countries diverge economically; this was reinforced by the starkly different PMI (business activity) figures yesterday.

The implications of these inflated growth projections are also becoming apparent. Nowhere is this clearer than in Spain, where the Commission highlights that, without additional measures, the Spanish government deficit in 2013 and 2014 will be 6.7% and 7.2% of GDP respectively. This compares to targets laid down by the eurozone of 4.5% and 2.8% respectively.

The Commission’s estimates of Greek unemployment also still seem unrealistic, at 27% and 25.7% in 2013 and 2014. In November 2012 unemployment reached 27% in Greece, according to the Greek statistics agency. With plenty of structural reforms still to go we expect this figure to increase further.

Secondly, the announcement of the repayment of the ECB’s second Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) came in significantly lower than expected – 356 banks repaid €61.1bn compared to average expectations of €122.5bn. The steep slide in the euro exemplified the market response.

This highlights that underneath the recent optimism there is still significant fragmentation in financial markets and concerns over liquidity (as we have noted previously). Although impossible to tell conclusively, since these are just aggregate figures, we expect that many of the banks that have repaid were from ‘core’ eurozone countries, further exacerbating the differences between eurozone countries.

If you are looking for a silver lining, it could be that the rise in the euro has been halted for now, which may aid the competitiveness of the weaker countries, and that a potential de facto tightening of monetary policy has been avoided - this could have been a concern if banks repaid the LTRO and deleveraged rather than investing the collateral elsewhere.

The picture emerging from this morning’s data, then, continues to be a bleak one for the eurozone thanks to stalling growth across the bloc and banks hanging onto ECB liquidity. Beyond the headlines though, there is evidence of growing divisions as some of the core countries post growth and their banks repay ECB funding while peripheral countries find themselves in economic decline with banks surviving on ECB money but lending little.