Has the Conservative party dropped its commitment to renegotiate ECJ jurisdiction over crime and policing?

Has Conservative policy towards ECJ 
power over crime and policing changed?

The chaos of yesterday's 'vote' or 'non vote' on the European Arrest Warrant has obscured a number of things. Not only have the 10 actual measures been waved through, without discussion and scrutiny, but the Home Secretary has avoided having to make a statement on future Conservative policy towards renegotiating the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) power over crime and policing.

Firstly, here are some of the measures 'adopted' last night without debate and without much publicity.

• Confiscation Orders 
• Mutual recognition of sentences 
• Trials in absentia 
• Mutual recognition of financial penalties

They are substantial in their own right and on 1 December all will be subject to the ECJ's jurisdiction.

Will a future Conservative Government renegotiate this area?

Removing the UK justice system from the remit of EU judges has been a Conservative policy for a number of years and one we agree with. When it became clear that the Conservatives could not block the Lisbon Treaty David Cameron stated:

“The third area where we will negotiate for a return of powers is criminal justice. We must be sure that the measures included in the Lisbon Treaty will not bring creeping control over our criminal justice system by EU judges. We will want to prevent EU judges gaining steadily greater control over our criminal justice system by negotiating an arrangement which would protect it" [4 November 2009]

This was followed up in the 2010 Conservative Manifesto:

“Conservative government will negotiate for three specific guarantees – on the Charter of fundamental rights, on criminal justice, and on social and employment legislation – with our European partners to return powers that we believe should reside with the UK, not the EU. We seek a mandate to negotiate the return of these powers from the EU to the UK.”

Clearly, the Coalition Agreement overtook these previous texts, but Theresa May and Chris Grayling have both stated during this Parliament that the ECJ's role would likely feature in any future EU renegotiation. On 16 July 2013, as we set out here, Theresa May was quite explicit:

"Undoubtedly the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice will need to be considered when, after the election, a future Conservative Government renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the European Union"

So it was a surprise that Theresa May writing in the Sunday Telegraph on 9 November did not restate this position. The question is whether we should read anything into this, but as the smoke clears it remains to be seen whether a majority Conservative Government would 'let matters rest'.

Martin Schulz's revenge: Will the European Parliament block the UK's EU Commissioner?

If you read our press summary this morning (if not, do sign up!) you would have seen - before anyone else outside Germany incidentally - that Lord Hill, the UK's nominee for EU Commissioner, is already at risk of becoming a victim of an increasingly assertive European Parliament.

Martin Schulz – the ‘European Commission Presidential candidate’ who was re-selected President of the European Parliament after his socialist group in the EP came second in the European elections - was made persona non grata by Labour in the run-up to the European elections.

He was seen as too federalist, and someone who would only give Ed Miliband additional headaches shortly after Labour ruled out an In/Out referendum. He’s had a rough ride in the UK over the Spitzenkandidaten, where he clashed head on with the Tories and most other British people. He may now take his revenge.

Speaking to Deutschlandfunk radio this morning, he said of Lord Hill:

"I cannot imagine that, with his radical anti-European views, provided that he has them, [Lord] Hill can get a majority in the European Parliament…It will become clear if Mr Hill approaches us without prejudice, and that will certainly influence whether or not he gets a majority."

The European Parliament cannot formally reject individual Commissioner-nominees, but can veto the entire European Commission. Therefore, MEPs have de facto 'blackmailing powers' to pick off individual nominees. Interestingly, Schulz added that a rejection of Lord Hill in such a way "cannot be ruled out".

In fairness, Schulz was asked a clearly leading question when making these comments:

"David Cameron has proposed the eurosceptic Jonathan Hill as [the UK's] next EU Commissioner, and [he's] a determined sceptic of the euro and the EU. Can one assume that the next EU Commission  will become significantly more eurosceptic, blocking things from the inside?"

So, is this posturing or is Schulz meaning business? Well, as for now, we should treat the comments with caution. Even if Schulz is serious, he will need to get a majority of MEPs to agree that Hill should be rejected on basis of "radical anti-European views, provided he has them". Hill isn't exactly on record spewing out Farage-type anti-EU slogans. The point about Lord Hill is that he's a very different type of political operator altogether: he's someone who strikes deals, rather than engaging in shouting matches or trading in platitudes.

Schulz will struggle to build a case on this one - not least since Lord Hill seems like exactly the type of pragmatic, deal-maker type person MEPs should like. Still, it's a strong statement from Schulz.

Is this really the best EU leaders can come up with?

The continuing furore over whether Jean-Claude Juncker will this week be crowned European Commission President has diverted attention away from the important issue of what he, or whoever else eventually gets the job, will be expected to do.

Like most others, we have seen a copy of a draft statement from EU leaders, expected to be announced at the conclusion of this week’s summit, setting out a “strategic agenda” for the EU for the next five years.

Safe to say, it is a very mixed bag. The preamble starts off with some reassuring words about subsidiarity:

“In line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Union should only act when together we can achieve more than individual countries on their own. It should show self-restraint in exercising its competences when member states can better achieve the same objectives.”

There is another passage that – presumably as a consequence of the Euro elections results – warns against making promises the EU cannot keep:

“The credibility of the Union depends on its ability to ensure that its institutions follow up on decisions and live up to commitments.”

However, some of the subsequent action points seem to interpret both these points very liberally. For example, EU leaders look set to pledge to “further reduce early school drop outs” and “improve educational outcomes.”

Clearly, the futures of young people in Europe is of huge importance, but surely this is a matter for national governments - what will the 'EU', in the narrow sense, do in terms of policy to help school drop outs?

Similarly, the document talks of making “our social protection systems fit for the future”, an area of public policy explicitly reserved for national governments. What happened to the Dutch mantra “Europe where necessary, national where possible”? The next five years risk starting off with the same hollow commitments and lack of focus – responsibilities should be clearly divided and it should be clear where member states and/or the EU will take the lead.

Meanwhile, as Bruno Waterfield notes, there is limited reference to the reforms David Cameron has been arguing for. On national parliaments, the language is pretty vague:

“A greater place should be given to national parliaments, including by strengthening their means of participating in the debate and making their voice heard in the decision-making process.”

There are some more positive elements for Cameron, such as a commitment to “complete negotiations on international trade agreements, including TTIP, by 2015” and tackling “at all levels” the abuse of labour mobility.

One important inclusion is that the document follows the lead set out by UK Chancellor George Osborne and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaueble in the FT recently, by calling for:

"The integrity of the single market and openness towards non-euro EU countries should be preserved."

How exactly this will be done is unclear but the formal acceptance of the euro vs. non-euro split as an issue is at least a start.

That said, there is also an extended list of foreign policy commitments, such as "promoting stability", strengthening a common defence policy, etc, which could have been copied and pasted from any such document from the last 15 years.

All in all then, this is not an inspiring first draft. Much work needs to be done to improve it.

Schäuble comes out strong for #EUReform

The latest intervention by one of Europe's most important politicians shows that, in the wake of the shock European elections result over the weekend, Europe’s leaders are waking up to smell the coffee.

Writing a guest piece for Die Welt, Germany's Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble argues:

What are the lessons of the European elections? Surely not a mindless pursuit of 'More Europe'. We need a more intelligent union.

He continues:

The question 'More or less Europe' - as one alternative or the other- has been posed falsely. On one hand we need a stronger Europe, particularly for the big and overarching questions, that no [one] state can solve alone. And, on the other, we also need a greater willingness to consistently apply the subsidiarity principle.

Setting out what he thinks Europe should be for, Schäuble says:

An intelligently integrated Europe, can in the end, even mean 'less Europe' - if after a critical appraisal, tasks and responsibilities are unbundled and clearly assigned. The EU could concentrate its tasks to the Single Market; trade; financial markets and currency; climate; environment and energy; as well as foreign- and security- policy. In the areas, therefore, where long-term success can only be negotiated on the European level.

He again laid out his view on treaty change, arguing that in order to strengthen the eurozone, it is "unavoidable in the medium term."

However, on the EU's 'democratic deficit', it is less clear exactly what Schäuble has in mind. He argues that:

A cleverly integrated Europe would then, look something like a "multi-level democracy" - a complementary, interlocking system of democracies with a different range and scope of competences: a National-European double democracy. Then the citizens of our national democracies and European democracy would be level.

Fine, but it is the exact balance between the two that is so politically controversial - and it remains unclear how German policymakers intend to square the inbuilt tension between national democracy and European integration, particularly in the eurozone where this tension is greatest.

Sarko drops a bomb: At least half of EU powers should return to member states

Three days ahead of the European Parliament elections in France, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has written a bombshell piece on Europe for French weekly Le Point and German daily Die Welt - calling for "at least half" of current EU powers to be handed back to member states.

Here are the key bits:

We need to look at today's European Union with lucidity. It can't work at 28 as it did at six, nine, or even twelve [member states]. I sincerely believe that there will be no alternative to a drastic reduction of the extent of [the EU's] competences. The situation today borders on the ridiculous and condemns us to powerlessness. 

[...]

Europe has ended up creating an administrative labyrinth, with the Commission and its departments, which indeed need to keep themselves busy. The result: hundreds of directives about the most various and often the most pointless issues. 

Today, we need to scrap at least half of [the EU's] current competences - which will have to be taken on by member states tomorrow. We need to regroup Europe's competences into less than ten basic priority policy areas: industry, agriculture, competition, trade negotiations, energy, research...

It would be unfair to use the Commission and its President as convenient scapegoats for our difficulties...That said, the [European] Commission should no longer have legislative competences because there’s a European Parliament, and it is only for it to legislate. 

On the eurozone vs EU-28 issue, Sarko writes:

Let's have the frankness to say that the myth of one Europe fell to pieces after the adoption of the euro by 18 of 28 [EU] countries. There's not one Europe anymore, but two. Furthermore, these two Europes today need to revise their strategies in different directions. More integration for the 18 [member states] that share their monetary sovereignty. 

[...]

At the same time, we need to stop believing the myth of equality of rights and responsibilities among all member states.

That means Sarkozy envisages a eurozone where bigger countries (especially France and Germany, ça va sans dire) have greater decision-making powers.

Finally, on immigration:

It is evident that we need to immediately suspend Schengen I [the EU's passport-free travel area] and replace it with a Schengen II, which member states could only join after they have previously adopted the same immigration policy.

On this blog, we've argued several times (see here and here) that the rise of Front National has pushed part of France's UMP, the main centre-right party, towards a more critical stance on the 'Europe' issue. It should be clear by now that David Cameron could find allies in France who could back his plan for an EU that does less, but does it better. 

However, the French presidential election is still three years away and, as we have said before, Cameron's biggest potential weakness is his 2017 deadline, which means some of his natural allies will not be in power to help him.

Dutch PM Rutte talking a lot of sense

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte talks a lot of sense in this interview with Dutch news site Nu.nl - and sets the scene for the inevitable bust-up with the European Parliament over the appointment of the next European Commission President. Rutte says:

The European Council has never committed itself to these candidates [the Spitzenkandidaten appointed by the various political families]. The whole election has been invented by European political groups.

The European Parliament does not nominate [the European Commission President], the Council does. The Parliament can then say 'yes' or 'no'. That will probably lead to fierce discussions between the Council and the Parliament, but we are not afraid of that.

Bring on the MEPs, then...

The Dutch Prime Minister used the same interview to reiterate how the next European Commission needs to get its priorities straight:

Why can't our architects still not work in Italy or France? [...] The [EU's] Services Directive is far from ideal [...] In the meantime, the EU is keeping itself busy with female quotas. Europe is even dealing with forest strategy and rules for websites. The EU shouldn't be touching this.

Making the case for an EU that focuses on facilitating trade and jobs, rather than meddling in all sorts of areas, in a concrete manner is key. Something we would like to hear more of, especially from UK Prime Minister David Cameron and British (and European) politicians.

Hört auf die Briten (und Open Europe)!

One of the constant frustrations at Open Europe is that the EU debate  is too often artificially framed between two camps: "in at any cost" and "out at any price."

That media likes a good shouting match is nothing new, but the biggest victim from framing the debate in such a way is substance. UK media and politics are inherently adversarial, following the logic of two politicians debating over the despatch box. It has its charm and benefits, but when translated to European politics it doesn't quite work, primarily because there are many positions on Europe, with the majority position still being staying in a heavily reformed Europe.

As we noted before, for their part, European media are often far too keen to simply copy the artificial two-camp narrative, leading to a conversation of the deaf.

This may now be changing slowly.  Earlier this year, Open Europe and the Fresh Start group of MPs brought together 400 of Europe's leading reformers at our EU Reform Conference to discuss the next steps. After all, saying reform is necessary without the policy to back it up is all talk and no trousers.

Which is why it's encouraging to see John F. Jungclaussen, the London correspondent for German weekly, Die Zeit, noting that:

There are not only shrill tones in the cacophony of the British Europe debate. In the lower frequencies, there are contributions which Europe should urgently listen to. They come from a group of parliamentarians from both Houses [of Parliament] and different parties that joined efforts because they want to engage constructively. Together with the think tank Open Europe, they develop concrete reform proposals which are just as pragmatic as they are meaningful.

Jungclaussen cites Open Europe’s report showing that further liberalising the EU’s services markets would produce a permanent increase to EU-wide GDP of up to 2.3% or €294bn, as a "particularly good example" of one such proposal.

Jungclaussen's piece shows that this more nuanced understanding of the debate carries traction, not only in the UK, but across Europe.

Rutte shows Clegg how its done on EU reform

It's good to hear a Dutch speaking liberal party leader forcefully expressing the case for EU reform. Sadly, as we noted earlier, it certainly wasn't Nick Clegg.  

In fact it was the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who once again today reaffirmed his credentials as a key proponent of EU reform with a speech to the FDP in Berlin.

As we have also noted before, the Netherlands (both the country and its government) is becoming a bit of a breeding and testing ground for ideas on EU reform. In his speech Rutte said:

"A lot of people in Europe are angry at the EU. Angry at those who sat at the controls in Brussels during recent years. Our common project of peace becomes, if we don't recognise this on time, a project of discontent."

"We won't restore the future and the belief in a functioning Europe with European elections or with European ‘spitzenkandidaten’. The ball is now in the court of national parliaments. Their legitimacy is greater than that of the European Parliament. So they should deal at an earlier stage and also more intensely with decision making in and from Brussels"

"European where necessary, national where possible. Tasks such as healthcare, education and taxation really are things which are for the Netherlands to decide, I think."

"That's why the European Commission should be given four core tasks: to strengthen the single market, to stimulate international trade, to more strictly apply agreements made and to only regulate in Brussels what really must be dealt with at the European level."

"All too often agreements regarding the budget or the democratic rule of law haven't been respected...Europe is more and more being associated with an anonymous, formal and impersonal layer of government where national sovereignty is being replaced by normative rules ‘from Brussels’".

Lots of overlap (at least in tone) with what Chancellor George Osborne and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble laid out in the FT last week.

There was however one of Rutte's comments lacked credibility:

"Unemployment is the biggest problem of our time. I see it in my circle of friends.  You probably do too..."

Admittedly we’re not familiar with the Dutch Prime Minister's circle of friends but we find it hard to believe many of them are struggling for work...Nevertheless, Clegg could learn a thing or two.

Article 50: a trump card or joker?

We have today published the full report assessing the implications of our EU ‘wargame’ which simulated the negotiating dynamic under two scenarios: first, a UK-EU renegotiation from within and, second, under ‘Brexit’. As we’ve stressed before, the fact is that unless the UK wants to simply fall back on WTO trading rules and unilateral free trade, renegotiation and withdrawal will both require a negotiation with other EU states and the EU institutions.

The only formal way to the leave the EU is via the so-called “Article 50” exit clause of the EU Treaties, which stipulates a two-year timeframe within which to potentially conclude a continuity deal. In our simulation, after their initial hostility, all other member states recognised the need to strike a new trade deal with the UK with economic incentives trumping political rhetoric. Britain is unlikely to face the ‘worst case scenario’ of having to fall back on World Trade Organisation rules.

However, as our simulation showed, the initial new deal would likely fail to replicate the full access to the EU single market currently offered by full membership:

• A Norway-style deal – effectively single market membership but with no formal political influence – is likely to be rejected by EU partners and is in any case a bad deal for the UK as it amounts to “regulation without representation”.
• While a reciprocal trade agreement for goods, where the UK has a sizeable trade deficit of £56.2 billion (2012) with the EU, would be relatively easy to strike, access to the EU’s services market – where the UK has a trade surplus of £11.8 billion (2012) – will be far more difficult.
• Access for UK financial services would be a particular concern since a third of the UK’s trade surplus in financial and insurance services in 2012 came from trade with other EU member states – of the total £46.3 billion UK financial and insurance services trade surplus, £15.2 billion was with the EU and £14.5 billion with the US. Perhaps over time, further bilateral deals on market access could rectify this but the political resistance from France and some others could be high.

While Article 50 of the EU treaties has the benefit of definitely triggering negotiations – which isn’t guaranteed under Cameron’s renegotiation plan – it comes with several drawbacks:

• Article 50 is a one way street – once it is triggered, and even if the deal available at the end of the process proves unsatisfactory to the UK, there is no way back into the EU except with the unanimous consent of all other member states.
• It is likely to put the UK on the back foot in any negotiation. The remaining EU member states would be in charge of the timetable and the European Parliament would have a veto over any new agreement. Therefore, while having to fall back on WTO rules entirely is unlikely, it would remain a possibility.
• As the UK will not take part in the final qualified majority vote on whether to accept the new deal, protectionist-minded member states could have greater influence on the degree of market access the UK could secure post-exit – particularly on services (see graph below).

Compared to renegotiation from within, Article 50 therefore cedes more control than what is often thought.

Ultimately, though, while a high transaction cost is undeniable, the big question is if there is a point – and if so when – at which the high one-off cost of Brexit would be outweighed by the long-term benefits of more economic and political independence over areas such as financial regulation, agricultural policy or criminal justice, particularly if the eurozone comes to dominate the wider EU and the necessary reform proves unattainable.

The closest Cameron has got to setting out an EU "shopping list" yet few have noticed

What do David Cameron's seven EU 
reform commitments mean?

Writing in the Sunday Telegraph, David Cameron set out seven objectives - or eight if you read between the lines - for a Conservative EU reform agenda ahead of that potential 2017 EU referendum. Surprisingly, despite this being the most explicit that David Cameron has been in setting out a 'shopping list' (an unfortunate term), it has generated surprisingly little attention, in the UK and abroad.

To be fair, none of these objectives are completely new, one is not strictly to do with the EU, while in the case of some of the others it would be rather difficult to define success. Interestingly only the point about removing the commitment to “ever closer union” would definitely require treaty change.

In large parts, these are broad principles rather than specific policies - which is wholly appropriate given that it would be silly to set out a set of clear polices so far in advance (though some of these could easily get under way now). Here are the seven:

Commitment	What does it involve?	Treaty Change?
“Powers flowing away from Brussels, not always to it”	This is an overarching principle which would take a number of forms, including repatriating entire areas of EU powers, such as regional policy, to repealing specific regulations, to structural changes in the EU (incl. possible Treaty changes) that makes it easier to roll back the acquis such as a "green card" for national parliaments.	Depends. Reforms to regional policy and repealing individual rules, such as the Working Time Directive, would not require treaty change. Removing entire EU powers or structural changes might.
“National parliaments able to work together to block unwanted European legislation.”	At present a third or more of national parliaments can require the European Commission to reconsider proposals (a yellow card) - but it has only been used twice. There are various proposed ways of strengthening this mechanism to allow national parliaments collectively the power to strike down EU laws. This could give them a legal veto – the ‘red card’ or simply strengthen the existing mechanism.	If placed into EU law it would require treaty change. However, the Dutch Foreign Minister has suggested this could also be done through a "political agreement" between the Member States requiring the Commission to treat the yellow card as a de facto veto.
“Businesses liberated from red tape and benefiting from the strength of the EU’s own market – the biggest and wealthiest on the planet – to open up greater free trade with North America and Asia.”	De-regulation is very difficult to quantify. It could involve proposals to exempt small business from EU regulations. It could also involve imposing a repeal mechanism (a green card operated by national parliaments), sunset clauses, for EU laws as well as reviewing old EU regulations. This agenda also suggests further services liberalisation and the completion of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and further free trade agreements.	None of the "competitiveness agenda" requires Treaty Change. However, it is far from certain that TTIP will be agreed and then ratified while cutting EU red tape is always a challenge in the face of interest groups and the European Parliament - but far from impossible in the face of political will.
“Our police forces and justice systems able to protect British citizens, unencumbered by unnecessary interference from the European institutions, including the ECHR.”	This could involve withdrawal from the ECHR, successful reform of the ECHR or a UK Bill of Rights limiting its impact in the UK. The reference to “European Institutions” could imply removing the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) jurisdiction over EU crime and policing law.	Withdrawing from the ECHR would not require EU treaty change as it's not to do with the EU. Removing ECJ jurisdiction over EU crime and policing laws would.
“Free movement to take up work, not free benefits.”	This could involve a number of changes to EU rules around free movement including strengthening the link between economic contribution of EU migrants and access to benefits and ending "exportability" of child benefits.	Reforming the Free Movement Directive and the Social Security Regulation could be done without treaty change. Putting an outright cap on EU migration - which Cameron has NOT suggested - would require Treaty change.
"Support for the continued enlargement of the EU to new members but with new mechanisms in place to prevent vast migrations across the Continent.”	This would involve imposing tougher transitional controls on all future EU accessions, for example by extending the existing 7 year maximum transitional period or linking the right to free movement to population size and/or relative wealth levels.	EU enlargement requires a new Treaty with the accession state(s) over which all existing EU members would have a veto, so London could push this demand as the price for its agreement. However, enlargement does not alter the underlying EU Treaties themselves.
Dealing properly with the concept of “ever closer union”.	The EU treaties currently include a commitment to “ever closer union”. Removing these words would be largely symbolic but could have some political, and possible indirect judicial, impact.	Yes, given that the concept is itself enshrined in the treaty.

In addition, though he has not said so specifically, apart from a passing reference to need to achieve a union for both eurozone and non-eurozone countries, another priority for David Cameron will most definitely be to secure safeguards against eurozone caucasing.

A number of questions still remain of course, including the various reform ideas not touched on this article, including the EU budget, employment law or dealing with the ECJ (though they all could fit under the general principles he has laid out).

Lastly, David Cameron has said he will pursue this reform agenda followed by a referendum “if he is Prime Minister”. This is important as he appears to be setting down a red-line in any future negotiations with the Liberal Democrats to continue the Coalition.

The big question is if these reforms were to fail, would he campaign to leave or stay in regardless?

French public opinion and Europe: Winds of change?

With the European Parliament elections approaching, the number of EU-related opinion polls is growing. Beyond the mere voting intentions, these surveys help get a clearer picture of how citizens see Europe in various countries.

Two separate opinion polls published in France over the past few days caught our attention. Just in case you don't read our press summary every day - France is a particularly interesting case, given that the anti-EU Front National may well win the most votes in the upcoming European Parliament elections.

The first poll, conducted by IFOP and published by French news site Atlantico over the weekend, found that 59% of French would be in favour of France "reconsidering the Schengen agreements [which created a passport-free travel zone in Europe] and restraining the conditions for the circulation and the establishment of European citizens on its territory."

A separate OpinionWay poll for Le Figaro and LCI found that, while a solid majority of French want to keep the euro, the number of those against a return to the franc dropped from 62% to 53% since April 2012. Also, the share of respondents who think EU membership is "a good thing" for France went down from 48% to 42% over the same period - again, still a relative majority.  

Interestingly, one of the questions in the poll was, "Which one of these feelings comes to mind when you think of the EU?" Well, 45% said 'disappointment', 18% 'hope' and 12% 'indifference'.

It would be exaggerated to claim that the French are turning their back on the EU, but the winds do seem to be changing somewhat, and the French electorate seems to be shifting towards a less idealistic approach to the 'Europe' issue. Looking at the bigger picture, this also highlights that, without sweeping reform of the EU, the risk is that voters will increasingly turn to anti-EU and anti-immigration parties - and potentially throw the baby out with the bathwater.

An increasing number of politicians across Europe have realised this, including in France. Rachida Dati, a French MEP from the centre-right UMP party, told our pan-European EU Reform Conference last month that the "disregard" of the EU elite for the citizens had to stop, adding that "it is the peoples that must impose their will to Brussels and not the other way around".

The Balance of Competence Review: some interesting stuff but this is becoming a painful process for Downing Street

With little fanfare, the Government has today published the second round of Balance of EU Competences reports – now making it 14 reports published in total. We won't accuse the Government of seeking to bury the latest batch of reports in the week of the worst UK floods for decades or a major announcement on an independent Scotland’s inability to use Sterling. Rather, it probably wanted to get them out before parliamentary recess.

However, the reports are a mixed bag with the most controversial one - free movement of workers - still missing. While the individual reports contain tales of dissatisfaction with the status quo and EU over interference within policy areas, the reports remain largely descriptive. None of the reports draws any deep conclusions on the broader balance of power between Westminster and Brussels, which they clearly didn't set out to do.

Some of the other reports are far better than others. The Trade and Investment report is genuinely interesting, for example. While some disagree with the report’s conclusion that membership of the customs union and the single market represents the best option on offer for UK trade, the report does at least engage with the alternatives and key debates, such as whether the EU is trade diverting or creating and the fact that the European Parliament can be a liability in trade talks.

We agree that on trade grounds the UK is at the moment better off inside (a reformed) EU.

The Transport report expresses concern about EU action that “fails to take account of the distinct circumstances of Member States with peripheral geographic locations, such as the UK.” The Environment and Climate Change report also contained some interesting factoids. The House Builders Federation for example noted that “in some areas 85% of Community Infrastructure Levy is required for mitigation of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, leaving little funding for schools and roads, commenting that this is disproportionate and unsustainable.” And that EU rules can add 18 months to the life cycle of a planning application.

These reports present a useful catalogue of the extent to which the EU now permeates almost all aspects of the UK economy and society, and the logical conclusions of the transport and environment papers is that we need to do more to maximise the EU's trade opportunities but also have some seriously effective mechanisms to fight over-regulation, such as "red" and "green" cards for national parliaments.

Still, the desire for these reports not to reach any ‘controversial’ conclusions, whilst understandable on one level, has created another problem for David Cameron. European partners, media and his MPs may eventually ask ‘Why commission a review that seemingly contradicts your own policy?’ And why seek change when the "evidence" shows that everything is all well apart from some problems at the margins. We still think the basic idea behind the BoC is sound but there's a problem with what this exercise has turned into. It's not so much an attempt to assess the balance of powers but a descriptive public consultation. In its attempt to avoid drawing conclusions, it is doing precisely that, even when the wider criteria against which to measure EU involvement - which should be the point of this exercise - is absent.

Consider the Culture, Tourism and Sport report. In places, it reads like a European Commission advert for EU intervention. For example,

“…Over the last 20 years a Media Programme has supported some highly acclaimed British films including This is England (Shane Meadows, 2006), The King’s Speech (Tom Hooper, 2010) and The Iron Lady (Phyllida Lloyd, 2011). In 2010, UK companies received €8.7m to support the production, distribution and screening of films in the UK, and over €6.7m was invested to boost the European cinema releases of over 40 British films.”

That a report drafted by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport with evidence submitted by various organisations drawn from the culture sector should conclude that the EU’s culture competence is “an important source of funding for the sector, as a driver for new creative partnerships, and as a vehicle for promoting the UK’s ‘soft power’” is hardly a surprise.

Some spending on warm and fluffy initiatives such as films may seem like no big deal. But this is one of the fundamental problems with this entire exercise. Because there is no one weighing these micro aspects of EU membership against a wider set of principles it tells us little about the wider UK national interest. I.e. this funding is simply money the UK has already handed over to Brussels and that surely, if these projects should be publicly funded at all, this should be a decision made by people far more accountable to UK taxpayers than EU officials?

The Balance of Competence Review process was meant to provoke debate about the impact of the EU on the UK writ large. Unless he starts a process of putting these individual reports into the wider context of his vision for the EU, this could become a painful process for David Cameron.

Day 2 of the #EUReform conference: Powerful debate on all levels

Day two of the Open Europe / Fresh Start #EUReform conference saw a thriving exchange of reform ideas between panelists and conference delegates, viral Twitter action for #EUReform via the Twitter wall, as well as numerous media interviews. 

David Lidington, the UK's Europe Minister being greeted by OE Director, Mats Persson.

Eva Kjer Hansen, Chair of the EU Affairs Committee the Danish Parliament discussing the role of national parliaments in the EU.

Swedish columnist Katrine Kielos of Aftonbladet moderated the "Where does democractic authority lie" panel.

Susanna Koski , President of Youth Wing of the National Coalition Party (Finland) and Cecilia Ackerman of Citi in discussion.

German CDU MP  Klaus-Peter Willsch debating how to make the EU more accountable to its member states during a roundtable  discussion with Eva Kjer Hansen, Chair of of the European Affairs Committee (Liberal party) at the Danish Parliament, and Fresh Start MP Chris Heaton-Harris who is member of the European Scrutiny Committee

Several screens showed the lively #EUReform exchange on Twitter

Irish Minister for European Affairs Paschal Donohoe debating with conference delegates

Open Europe's Nina Schick with Fresh Start Project co-founder Andrea Leadsom MP (left) and Latvian MP Daina Kazaka (right)

Irish Minister for European Affairs Paschal Donohoe interviewed by Open Europe's Nina Schick.

Ebba Busch, Deputy Mayor of Uppsala and one of the top MEP candidate for Sweden's governing Christian Democrats on the Future of Europe Panel.

MPs from around Europe getting involved in the #EUreform agenda.

Open Europe's Nina Schick moderating the final panel of the Conference.

Rachida Dati, MEP and Deputy President of the French UMP Party, in an TV interview before her keynote speech in which she called for a "realist revolution" in Europe.

 Susanna Koski, President of the National Coalition Party's Youth Leage (Finland) adresses the Conference during the Future of Europe Panel.

Angel Martin Oro, Director of the Economic Trends Reporter (Spain) in conversation with a fellow delegate.

 

 Delegates attend the interactive round-table discussions.