Will the new migration figures force the Tories to go one step further on free movement?

Where do migrants to the UK come from the EU or non EU?

David Cameron's hopes of getting back on the front foot on migration have been dealt a blow this morning - ONS figures show that immigration is up, and specifically immigration from the EU is up as well.

These figures are important for two reasons, firstly the timing - these figures come ahead of a much anticipated speech David Cameron is about to deliver on the whole subject. Secondly, the numbers when compared to two targets, firstly the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto migration target of "tens of thousands a year not hundreds of thousands." Secondly, the comparison to migration flows under Labour. Here are some of the headline figures:

• Total net long-term migration estimated to be 260,000 in the year ending June 2014 up from 182,000 in the previous 12 months.
• Total gross immigration of 583,000 in the year ending June 2014, a statistically significant increase from 502,000 in the previous 12 months.
• EU immigration up 45,000 and non-EU up 30,000.
• 32,000 Romanians and Bulgarians came to the UK up 11,000 and EU15 migration also up 10,000.
• Estimated employment of EU nationals resident in the UK was 16% higher in July to September 2014 compared to the same quarter in 2013.

Interestingly, while immigration is also up from the new EU member states, the longer term trend driving EU migration is that from the EU15.

So how will all this play out? Well as you can see from the ONS graph below EU migration is not the largest component in total UK migration. That non-EU migration also went up for the first time in a while is politically significant.

However, EU migration is a large portion. The fact it is not showing any sign of decreasing will fuel trust issues over both the EU and migration.

Politically, perhaps the most significant aspect here is that net migration to the UK is now higher than when Labour left office (but lower than the peak during the Labour government). Ukip and some media are already jumping on this. Ahead of the speech, there’s one key question:

Has the Tory leadership already ‘priced in’ today’s figures, or has this made a cap of some sort more likely? 

The Farage Paradox part II: Support for EU membership at highest level since 1991

Back in May, we pointed out the so-called 'Farage Paradox' - even as the party came first in the European elections in the UK and Farage himself was widely seen as having bested Nick Clegg in their TV debates, support for leaving the EU had fallen to its lowest level for a long time according to Ipsos-MORI with 37% in favour of Brexit and 54% in support of staying in.

A few months later and UKIP is still riding high in the polls with a victory in the Clacton by-election under its belt and with the Tories on the run in Rochester and Strood - amid all kinds of noise around EU migration. However, on the wider EU question, support for membership has climbed even higher - today's Ipsos-MORI poll has support for membership at 56% - its highest since 1991!! - with support for leaving on 36%.

It's not entirely easy to nail down the drivers behind the trend - even the UK's public defeat over the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission President hasn't reversed it but one possibility could be that as the prospect of exit becomes more real, especially in the wake of the Scottish referendum, people are more likely to go with the 'better the devil you know' option. Another explanation is that Farage is good at stirring up support in concentrated parts of the country, but his divisive rhetoric turns others off. A feel-good factor over the economy (through as we've argued before, this can cut both ways) combined with increased uncertainty around the world - making the status quo look safer and club membership more attractive - could be other reasons.

Either way, it shows that even as UKIP find a way of tapping into disenchantment with the EU and mainstream UK politics, they are failing to convince  people that they have the right remedies and this risks derailing the broader 'out campaign, as the pro-Bexit Tory MP Michael Fabricant has warned:

"The out team will be very different, with no leader who commands popular support. Before you can even make the case for Britain becoming a mid-Atlantic economic hub, freed from the shackles of Brussels diktats, the Eurosceptics will be all over the place. No clear leader, and angry looking grey men who have been arguing the toss on Europe for years, will fail to impress. Yes, Nigel Farage is clearly the most charismatic Eurosceptic in years, but does anyone really imagine Farage being the Alex Salmond of the out campaign? Would he be persuasive enough to seduce a nation?"

However, it is worth bearing in mind that other polls have slightly different outcomes. Today's YouGov poll for the Times' red box showed lower levels of support for EU membership - support for membership is roughly the same under their 'major changes' scenario as under Ipsos-Mori's status quo scenario (YouGov's status quo option assumes renegotiation was attempted but failed to secure even modest changes, so can't be directly compared with the Ipsos-MORI one).

This shows that even if some polls suggest a majority of Brits would vote to stay in no matter what, EU reform and renegotiation remains by far the best option for any UK government. 

As has been noted before, that's why some Better Off Outers are now starting to fear that long sought after In/Out referendum - in itself an ironic development. 

Irony alert as Poles ride to UKIP's rescue in a classic Brussels stitch-up

We reported only a few days ago that UKIP's EFDD group in the European Parliament collapsed after a Latvian MEP resigned, meaning the group no longer met the criteria of having MEPs from at least seven different EU member states. The news drew a lot of media attention (not to mention schadenfreude) mainly due to the financial implications for UKIP - which, according to our estimates, stood to lose nearly €2 million a year in EU funding.

Today, it was announced that Robert Iwaszkiewicz, an MEP with Janusz Korwin-Mikke's KNP (pictured) has joined the group. Korwin-Mikke himself was deemed too toxic to join the UKIP group after the European elections given his controversial views on rape (women always "pretend to resist") and the Holocaust (no evidence Hitler knew about it), and that was before he provoked a full-blown race row. Iwaszkiewicz himself is hardly baggage free; during an interview about with Gazeta Wrocławska a couple of months ago, when asked about domestic violence, he said that:

"I'm convinced that many a wife would benefit from such a response in order to re-connect with reality."

When asked about his Korwin-Mikke's views as described above, he said that "these are taken out of context... when considered broadly, they make sense". In any event, this does not appear to be a principled defection - but rather a classic Brussels-style dirty deal. Polish daily Rzeczpospolita reports that Korwin-Mikke and Farage struck an agreement which would see Iwaszkiewicz's transfer mirrored by an MEP from the EFDD move to the 'far-right' bloc led by France's Marine Le Pen, which also includes Geert Wilders's PVV, the Austrian Freedom Party and Lega Nord, and fell one nationality short of forming an official group during the summer. The paper describes this a "binding transaction" and quotes Iwaszkiewicz as saying that:

"Negotiations are on-going. It was necessary to save them and I had to join urgently".

It remains unclear therefore whether an MEP from the EFDD will definitely join the Le Pen group - but that seems to be the implication. Because of the way the nationalities are represented over the two groups, it would either have to be one of UKIP's 24 MEPs or one of the two Sweden Democrats.

If the former, UKIP and Nigel Farage will face some uncomfortable questions given the extent to which they have tried to distance themselves from the Front National. Regardless, this incident just underscores the absurdity of these taxpayer subsides for European Parliament groups.

'Grillage People' no more: European Parliament group of Farage and Grillo collapses

Nigel Farage and Beppe Grillo (the 'Grillage People', as @Berlaymonster brilliantly renamed the duo) have just lost their group in the European Parliament.

Latvian MEP Iveta Grigule left #EFDD group today. #EFDD no longer has members from at least 7 countries, so declared dissolved today. #EP
— Jaume Duch (@jduch) October 16, 2014

The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group has collapsed following the departure of Latvian MEP Iveta Grigule, of the Latvian Farmers' Union. We don't know yet what pushed Grigule to leave. Sources from the EFDD group are already circulating their version of what happened:

EFDD sources say Latvian MEP was 'bribed' by @MartinSchulz and @EPPGroup to leave @Nigel_Farage group
— Bruno Waterfield (@BrunoBrussels) October 16, 2014

However, what we know is that Grigule's decision means UKIP, the Five-Star Movement and the other parties that had joined the group will lose a few millions of EU funding. According to our estimates, the EFDD group could have claimed around €3.8 million a year (see here for more details).

As we noted in our previous blog posts, it was not obvious that Farage's group would see through the whole five-year term in the European Parliament - not least because of the differences between UKIP and the Five-Star Movement, the two biggest factions in the group. Still, today's announcement has come a bit out of the blue.

In any case, given UKIP's growing momentum in domestic politics (victorious in the Clacton by-election and riding high in the latest opinion polls), we doubt Farage will be crying into his pint over losing his group in the European Parliament.

It's hard to predict what will happen next. For the moment, MEPs from the dissolved EFDD group will sit as non-attached members - the same status as Marine Le Pen's Front National, Lega Nord and Geert Wilders's Freedom Party, who failed to form their own group during the summer.

Will they all start discussing a possible cooperation? Will any of the (former) EFDD parties look to join forces with Le Pen, allowing her to form a new group? Or will Farage manage to quickly find a substitute for Grigule and re-establish the EFDD group? Time will tell.

Yesterday Scotland, tomorrow the EU? Are there lessons for the 'In' and 'Out' camps?

Staying or leaving?

If David Cameron wins the May election he has promised an In/Out EU referendum by 2017. Even if he does not it is still probable there will be one at some point. National referendums are rare in the UK so with the Scottish vote we have a rare glimpse of what the EU referendum campaigns could look like. What should the nascent In/Out camps take away from it?

In trying to understand the motivations of the Scottish voters Lord Ashcroft's poll, conducted after the vote, sheds some interesting light. Voters made up their minds late in the day - 52% of voters made their mind up this year with 18% in the last month. The main issues driving independence voters were disaffection from Westminster and concerns about the NHS. Uncertainties over the pound and pensions drove the No side. 70% of Yes voters said they agreed with "The principle that all decisions about Scotland should be taken in Scotland" while No voters also felt the risks of independence were to great and conflicted with their attachment to the UK.

So are these findings and the Yes/No campaign relevant to a UK referendum on EU membership? here are some key issues:

	Scottish Yes/No	EU In/Out
The need for a clearly thought out alternative to the status quo	The Scottish 'Yes' campaign came unstuck on some key elements of their proposition. Notably confusion over the £ and EU membership. The difficulty ‘Yes’ had with these key policies dogged their campaign	The nascent EU ‘Out’ campaign has a similar problem as there is no settled view. What relationship will the UK have with the EU after exit? Will it be the EEA, a new free trade agreement, what will access to the Single Market be etc and what are the political trade-offs.
Harnessing optimism	The 'Yes' campaign was good at harnessing the ‘future’ and ‘change’ as a campaign weapon. The ‘No’ side failed to put forward a comparable future vision for the UK focusing instead on the risks of independence leading them to be portrayed as ‘negative'.	It will be difficult for the ‘In’ campaign to portray an optimistic vision of an EU future, given the likelihood of ongoing problems in the Eurozone – it will probably stick to pointing out what it sees as the risks of leaving. It remains unclear whether the ‘Out’ campaign will be able to manage to transform itself from campaigning against the EU’s negative record to wholeheartedly putting forward its own positive vision.
Who leads the campaigns matters - can they claim to be the anti-establishment?	In Scotland the ‘Yes’ campaign was united, had message discipline and was led by the First Minister of Scotland. This gave it the credibility of office and the ability to set the scene while remaining an outsider/underdog in relation to Westminster at the same time. By contrast the ‘No’ campaign was cross-party, divided and although ‘backed’ by the UK government was simultaneously seen as 'the Establishment' while being in opposition in Scotland.	It is unclear who the ‘In’ and ‘Out campaigns will be led by. However, on the basis that David Cameron is content with his renegotiation, the ‘In’ will have the advantage of the head of government and all the main party leaders.This could leave the ‘Out’ campaign run by UKIP and a number of backbench MPs. Although the ‘Out’ side would have the advantage of being ‘anti-establishment’ there would be a large imbalance in credibility and official resources that could tell in the campaign.
Foreign interventions helpful / unhelpful?	The ‘Yes’ campaign had to endure a series of interventions against them from UK allies and others including the USA, Australia, Germany, Spain, NATO and the EU.	While foreign interventions in the EU referendum are inevitable some will be more effective than others. While UKIP will not lose any sleep over an admonition by Mr Juncker, Germany or France, they may suffer some damage if Commonwealth allies or the US express a desire for the UK to stay in the EU.
Business interventions - do they matter?	'Yes' had to put up with major Scottish and UK companies threatening to relocate out of Scotland in the event of independence. To counter it Yes managed to organise some pro-independence business voices but the overwhelming balance of the warnings weighed on the campaign.	‘Out’ like ‘Yes’ is likely to have to endure a slew of major companies questioning the case for exit, particularly larger businesses. This too will be countered by pro-exit business voices. Without the currency issue to worry about, the business question will be about what market access the UK would have to the single market (see alternative to the status quo section above).
Emotional appeal of staying / leaving?	While 'Yes' managed to mobilise significant emotional appeal for independence the residual emotional appeal of the United Kingdom was also considerable.	The emotional appeal of the EU institutions in the UK is close to zero. While it is clear that the emotional desire to leave the EU is felt strongly by confirmed 'Outists', it is less clear what role political identity will play among the undecideds.
Devo Max / EU Devo Max - key to the middle ground voter?	While the campaign started as a polarised Yes/No campaign it quickly switched in the last week into a No+Devo Max v. separation. This managed to win over some of the wavering middle ground to No. For that to work the credibility of the offer being delivered was key.	The In/Out campaign will start from the basis that ‘EU Devo-Max’ has either been achieved or has failed. This will have a huge repercussion on the campaign. If the negotiation is still on-going and is in the form of a last minute ‘EU Vow’ it is unlikely the credibility of those offering it will be enough to swing the result.
Turnout and the undecided voters - Age groups voting	The Yes/No campaign had a very high turnout and a high level of voters who made their mind up in the last month. Older people tended to support the UK and younger people independence. As turnout was universally high the normal higher turnout among older voters probably did not tell.	An In/Out referendum is likely to have a lower turnout and a higher level of undecideds, making the last month and weeks of the campaign key. Older voters are more likely to vote for 'Out' and younger for 'In'. However, with a lower turnout older voters are more likely to make their voice heard.
Wild card issues	The Yes/No campaign spent a lot of time discussing the supposed ‘privatisation’ of the NHS - a policy area already devolved to Edinburgh.	Immigration aside, the dry nature of EU policy could mean the In/Out campaign comes to focus on unpredictable issues.
Rogue polls - who might they help?	The close nature of the polls probably drove turnout and drove ‘shy unionists’ who may have taken the result for granted to vote.	Polling is also very likely to be a large driver of the 'In' / 'Out' campaigns but it is unclear who this might benefit.

Once the dust from Scotland's 'No' settles, what are the implications for the UK's EU renegotiation?

Act in haste - repent at leisure?

The big question over Scottish independence may have been settled but the campaign has thrown up a whole host of further questions concerning the UK's constitutional settlement that will need to be addressed in the near future. We look at some of these questions and at how they could impact on the UK's EU reform agenda. 

What’s the plan and schedule for devolution negotiations and implementation?

When it looked like a 'Yes' vote might be on the cards, the Tories, Labour and the Lib Dems pledged a new raft of powers for the Scottish parliament over areas like taxes, spending and welfare, with proposals due to be tabled in January. Speaking this morning, Cameron announced that discussions over a new settlement for the rest of the UK and England in particular - would take place "in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland".

Given that this will include - in Cameron's words - "a decisive answer" to the long-standing West Lothian question (ensuring "English votes on English laws"), it remains to be seen whether this timetable is realistic (some MPs are calling for a full constitutional convention). Labour have said they are committed to "looking at the issue" but the party is divided, with some senior figures including Gordon Brown and Douglas Alexander rejecting the option of Scottish MPs being excluded from votes only affecting English matters (which could deprive a potential Labour government of a majority on such votes). We simply do not know how far-reaching this shake-up will be and a quick and amicable cross-party consensus cannot be taken for granted.

Could this spill over into the general election campaign?

If the devolution question isn't on the way to being settled, it could conceivably play a large role in the general election campaign; the Tories and UKIP would take up the English cause, Labour and the Lib Dems would be stuck somewhere in the middle while the SNP would play the 'another broken promise by the Westminster establishment' card (unless the Scottish and English questions are considered separately). Not only would this displace debate about EU reform from the campaign, but growing English resentment at Scotland's privileged position within the UK could further boost the UKIP vote. Nigel Farage is already deftly positioning himself to take advantage. A strong UKIP vote would of course put pressure on any government (particularly a Conservative one) to take an even tougher line during the EU renegotiation.  

How will it impact the EU renegotiation/referendum timeline?

If the Tories end up back in government but still have to wrap up the constitutional questions it could prevent the government from hitting the ground running on EU reform and renegotiation. Given the scale of the challenge this is far from ideal. Furthermore, as we have warned before, we believe that Cameron is already behind the curve on finalising targeted reforms and road testing them with governments and business across Europe. In the end though, it is hard to see how Cameron could get away with shelving his planned 2017 EU referendum, given the pressure he would be under from his own party.

Headlines are all for AfD and UKIP, but the biggest shocker for traditional parties may come from Spain...

The surge of anti-EU, anti-euro and protest parties across Europe continues. Germany's anti-euro Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is making headlines after winning 9.7% of votes in yesterday's regional elections in Saxony and securing its first ever seats in one of the country's regional parliaments.

In the UK, a Survation poll for the Mail on Sunday found that, following the defection of Douglas Carswell from the Conservatives to UKIP last week, UKIP is set to win the ensuing Clacton by-election with 64% of the vote - which would grant Nigel Farage's party its first elected MP.

However, the biggest shocker for mainstream parties seems to be coming from Spain. According to a new Sigma Dos poll for El Mundo, the anti-establishment (but not anti-EU) party Podemos would finish third in a general election with 21.2% of votes - only 1.1% less than the opposition Socialist Party. Being neck-and-neck with one of Spain's two traditional parties is an absolutely extraordinary result for Podemos, given that it was founded in March. The poll puts Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy's centre-right Partido Popular in the lead on 30.1% - a 14.5% fall from the 44.6% the party scored at the November 2011 general election (click on the picture to enlarge).

 
If you didn't read it at the time, here is a portrait of Podemos and its leader, Pablo Iglesias, that we published in the aftermath of the European Parliament elections in May - when Podemos came from nowhere to win five seats in Strasbourg. We noted:

Call it left-wing, anti-establishment, anti-austerity (but clearly not anti-EU), the rise of Podemos is significant because - similar to what the Five-Star Movement has done in Italy - it can give Spaniards a channel through which they can voice their dissatisfaction with the political establishment (and the current eurozone economic policies), something which has been lacking at the peak of the eurozone crisis.

Indeed, looking at the latest polls, Podemos seems to be following exactly the same trajectory as Beppe Grillo's Five-Star Movement in terms of rocketing (potential) electoral support. And exactly as in Italy, the rise of a strong anti-establishment party may well force the centre-right Partido Popular and the Socialists to consider an unusual (and uncomfortable) 'grand coalition' if none of the two big traditional parties wins a majority in the next general election - due in November 2015.

While the speed of the rise of Podemos is certainly surprising, there has undoubtedly been a huge gap in the market for a protest party in Spain over the past few years - as we noted on this blog at the end of May. Despite sky-high unemployment, a struggling economy, a few political scandals and regional discontent, no party or movement had so far managed to shake the solid support for the two mainstream parties. But since Podemos entered stage, things seems to have changed. With a Catalan independence referendum potentially coming up in November and thoughts turning towards next year's general election, these are certainly interesting times in Spanish politics.

Douglas Carswell defects to UKIP: A Clacton by election could change the general election result

Douglas Carswell was until this morning the Conservative MP for Clacton on the Essex coast. He has now resigned from the Conservative party, joined UKIP, and says he will resign his seat in order to contest it as a UKIP candidate in the resulting by-election.

His resignation is not a total surprise as it follows a long period as a critic of the Conservative Party's direction and of David Cameron in particular. Carswell's criticisms are not limited to the Conservatives and not limited to Europe - he has developed a critique of British politics generally -  but Europe is among his key complaints.

In his resignation speech Carswell questioned David Cameron's commitment to EU reform accusing him of aiming to do the bear minimum necessary in order to secure an 'in' vote, while Carswell's view of a satisfactory renegotiation seems more akin to associate membership. He says this is a classic example the political class not being straight with the electorate and his reason to quit. The Conservative leadership for their part will feel aggrieved that having set out a 2017 referendum on EU membership they are rewarded with Carswell's 'ingratitude' - recriminations will run and run.

Carswell prides himself on having a large following locally and Clacton itself, it has been argued, is  the "number one most demographically favourable seat in the country for UKIP" according to Goodwin and Ford's Revolt on the Right. He therefore has a fighting chance of winning the seat. So what could happen?

Firstly, it is unclear whether the Conservatives will allow the by election to go ahead - they have to approve the writ being moved and could argue that with an election already scheduled the people of Clacton can wait until May 2015. However, if it is called, the stakes could not be higher.

For the Conservatives to hope to win the 2015 general election they need to minimise the UKIP vote. The best way to do this is the classic 'squeeze'. In a first past the post election they will say there is no point voting for a third placed party - i.e UKIP. This will be very effective. However Carswell's by-election could change voter's calculations - and set a hugely important electoral precedent one way or another:

• If Carswell wins, UKIP can then tell voters everywhere that voting UKIP gives a genuine change of producing an MP. This could be catastrophic for the Conservatives and may deprive them of a number of seats, to other parties mostly, but conceivably to UKIP as well.
• If Carswell loses, the result will be equally disastrous for UKIP. The Conservatives can use it to show that even in one of UKIP's best constituencies with one of their biggest names they can not win a seat - so why waste your vote in May 2015 will be the refrain.

UKIP does not just take votes from the Conservatives, they also gain a lot of their support from Labour, non-voters and even the Lib Dems. However, Carswell by taking on his former party will polarise the debate again into Conservatives/UKIP, something perhaps both parties may wish to avoid. This could be a foretaste of 2015.

In any case, a Labour victory would most likely mean that the In/Out EU referendum Cameron has promised won't happen, as Ed Miliband looks determined to stick to his promise not to offer a straight vote. It would be a tremendous irony if Carswell's defection - Carswell, remember, having campaigned tirelessly for an EU referendum and more direct democracy - would in the end deny the UK public an EU referendum and more direct democracy.

Is Hammond the most eurosceptic Tory Foreign Secretary to date?

Hammond: Will he win back UKIP voters to the Conservatives?

Following the surprise resignation of William Hague as Foreign Secretary last night and the appointment this morning of Philip Hammond as his replacement, the Conservatives' Europe policy is once again in the spotlight. We now have a Foreign Secretary who has said that he would vote to leave the EU if it does not reform (he came out in support of Michael Gove who came out with similar comments). Last year, Hammond said:

"If the choice is between a European Union written exactly as it is today and not being a part of that then I have to say that I'm on the side of the argument that Michael Gove has put forward. I believe that we have to negotiate a better solution that works better for Britain if we are going to stay in."

He also told the BBC's Andrew Marr programme last year:

"I believe that we have to negotiate a better solution that works better for Britain if we are going to stay in and play a part in the European Union in the future, but let me be absolutely clear: I think it is defeatist to sort of say we want to leave the European Union."

"We should say no, this is a club that we are members of, and before we talk about leaving it, first of all we're going to try and change the rules and change the way it works and change the objectives that it has in order to make it something that works for Britain."

Is this a big deal? Well the logic of the Conservative position has always been that advocating an 'in' vote is dependant on achieving reform. Therefore stating the opposite - that no reform might lead to an 'out' is not that much of a revelation - Cameron himself has said a UK exit would be "imaginable". However, the key question is the threshold - how much needs to change for a Tory to vote Yes (In)? And Hammond definitely has a higher threshold than Hague.

Pointing out the obvious may have its advantages. If EU reform is to happen to the extent needed to persuade the British people to stay in the EU, other EU leaders need to understand that it cannot be tokenistic. In that sense, Hammond's appointment sends a clear message both at home and abroad - reform is not just desirable but fundamental to the UK's EU membership.

It will also have political benefits for the Conservatives. Hammond will now see the Conservative's EU policy through to the 2015 election and, assuming they win, attempt to force the actual reform agenda through before taking a leading role in the referendum. Having a figure who has said that reform must be substantial for him to back an 'in' will add credibility to their election campaign and help win back voters who have left to vote for UKIP.

But we think it's fair to say that Hammond is the most eurosceptic Tory Foreign Secretary since Viscount Halifax in 1939.

Farage wraps up his European Parliament group faster than Le Pen...thanks to a Front National defector

Nigel Farage has managed to form a new Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group in the European Parliament. The group comprises 48 MEPs from seven EU member states. The anti-immigration Sweden Democrats and the Latvian Farmers' Union both joined forces with UKIP. But the story of the day is that the seventh nationality Farage needed to wrap up his group has been provided by...a French MEP who defected from Marine Le Pen's Front National.

Joëlle Bergeron (see picture) was elected to the European Parliament with Front National last month. However, according to her, she came under pressure to give up her seat to another member of the party deemed as more 'orthodox' and closer to Le Pen. A couple of days before the European Parliament elections, Madame Bergeron had raised a few eyebrows in Front National's leadership by speaking out in favour of giving immigrants the right to vote in local elections in France. She eventually decided not to step down as an MEP, but she quit Front National and joined UKIP's group.   

How these parties will coexist remains uncertain. For example, UKIP wants to quit the EU, and Beppe Grillo’s Five-Star Movement is a rather unpredictable quantity that doesn’t want to leave the EU and supports a financial transaction tax. Indeed, the fact that parties will be allowed to vote independently on each specific issue could help make the alliance more sustainable.  

As we noted in a recent briefing, European Parliament rules mean the EFD group - as all the others - will be entitled to millions of subsidies every year. According to our estimates, based on 2012 figures, Farage's new alliance could claim in total around €5.6 million a year - €3.8 million for the group in the European Parliament, and €1.8 million for the affiliated pan-European political party and foundation. UKIP is not a member of the latter two, so it will only be entitled to a portion of the money specifically devoted to the European Parliament group.

So Nigel was faster than Marine, but Le Pen still has a good chance of forming her own group. She was in Brussels yesterday for a meeting with her new allies, and Polish MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke was sitting at the table (see picture) - most likely a sign that Poland's Congress of the New Right (KNP) is on board. This means Le Pen only needs one more national delegation to finish the job. Difficult, given that the deadline to register new groups expires next Tuesday, but definitely not impossible.