Heads begin to roll in aftermath of European election shock

As might be expected after some shocking showings in the European Parliament (EP) elections, the heads have begun to roll – and rightly so, some would say.

The most high profile resignation so far is that of the Spanish opposition Socialist leader Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba (pictured) who stepped down yesterday after his party’s vote share dropped to 23% from 39% in the previous EP election. His decision is not exactly a surprise as many have been scratching their heads over the opposition’s lack of penetration despite numerous opportunities including (but not limited to) the Spanish economic malaise, austerity and Partido Popular’s top level corruption scandal. Where the party goes from here remains to be seen but with the rise of regional (particularly Catalan) parties and the new Podemos movement (see our profile here) the party needs to reassert itself as the primary opposition.

Similarly, a poor showing by the Romanian opposition party saw its leader Crin Antonescu resign along with all the party’s executive bureau. Interestingly, the party has also voted to switch from the liberal ALDE grouping in the EP to the centre-right EPP.

Meanwhile, in Ireland, Labour leader Eamon Gilmore jumped before he was pushed after his party secured barely 7% of the vote – likely paying the price for being the junior coalition partner during a difficult period of government (similar to Lib Dems in the UK or PASOK in Greece). This paves the way for a cabinet reshuffle, but again his replacement is also still unclear.

Other scalps include Igor Lukšič, President of the Slovenian Social Democrats, who has bitten the bullet and stepped down, as well as the leader of the Hungarian Socialists, Tibor Szanyi, who offered his resignation (subsequently accepted) after his party was comfortably beaten by the neo-fascist Jobbik.

There could still be more to follow as the dust settles. But more importantly than those who have lost their heads is for those that just clung on to theirs to get the message and begin pushing for some serious reform across Europe and offering a clear alternative to those who still do not.

'Budget Deadline Day' in Europe

As you may have noticed, yesterday saw numerous governments across Europe unveiling their latest budgets for the coming year. Rather than just being a coincidence, this is down to the fact that yesterday was the deadline for eurozone governments to submit their budget plans to the European Commission – 'Budget Deadline Day', if you will.

As part of the ‘Six-pack’ set of rules, eurozone governments must have their budgets endorsed by the Commission, although the ability to actually force changes to the budget plans is limited for those countries which are not missing their targets already (except for significant peer pressure).

As with football’s transfer deadline day, there were some frantic negotiations, albeit without the minute to minute media coverage. Below, we take a look at the budgets of the Italian, Irish and Portuguese governments.

Italy
Italy yesterday unveiled its new ‘Stability Law’ – the budget guidelines for 2014-16. There’s some encouraging stuff in there, notably a package of tax cuts for businesses and workers worth €10.6bn over three years (of which €2.5bn to be cut in 2014). Nothing massive, but it's a start. The money to cover for these cuts is due to come from a number of public spending cuts. However, the draft budget will now have to be adopted by the Italian parliament, and some of the measures may change.

Prime Minister Enrico Letta has confirmed Italy aims to bring its deficit down to 2.5% of GDP by the end of next year. That said, the problem for Italy remains its weak growth – which in turn threatens its fiscal targets. Last week, for instance, the Italian government had to adopt a set of urgent measures to find a further €1.6bn and make sure the deficit stays below 3% of GDP this year. Unlike other countries, the budget may hold less importance for Italy’s economic future with the focus now on much needed political reform and improvement in the business environment.

Ireland
Debate over the Irish budget has been going on for some time, and the government managed to secure a lower level of headline cuts than expected ahead of time - €2.5bn compared to €3.1bn. However, the budget remains controversial with the Irish Independent running the front page headline, "Unkindest cuts", because they fall on pensions, healthcare and unemployment benefits for young people.

For the most part, although this budget was about tinkering around the edges rather than making the huge cuts we have seen before, the government focused on adjusting lesser known taxes to reap numerous small savings. Interestingly, the government also committed to reducing tax evasion and tackling the view of the country as a ‘corporate tax haven’. It will be key to see if this impacts the number of multinationals locating in Ireland and if it has any knock-on impact on economic growth.

Portugal
Of the three, this is probably the most concerning budget. Following a difficult summer for Portugal, politically at least, the government has once again been forced to find a further €3.2bn in cuts. However, the government has once again taken the same approach by heaping the cuts of public sector workers pay (up to 12% in parts) and on pensions. Action on these areas is needed. However, it has also been repeatedly struck down by the Constitutional Court. This might be setting the scene for another showdown.

This has evoked concerns from within the Commission, and it will be interesting to see whether a full endorsement is forthcoming. Portugal also confirmed it will miss this year’s deficit target and the continuing push to ease next year’s target suggests little confidence that it will meet that one either. The good news is that Portugal’s borrowing costs remain well below their peak, and some market access once it exits its bailout next year seems likely. That said, unless it can get a hold of the public sector reform needed, some additional aid still looks likely.

Overall then, a bit of a mixed bag. Few marquee measures, but some positive moves in terms of focusing cuts on spending rather than tax hikes.

Are the Irish more optimistic about an austerity cure for Europe than the Germans?

A new Gallup poll for Debating Europe has asked peple all over the EU, except Luxembourg for some reason, about their views on austerity.

Now, of course, 'austerity' is rather a nebulous concept, particularly as different member states have had different experiences, while deficit cutting and structural reform all fall under the same term. Nevertheless, there are some interesting results.

The table above (click to enlarge) shows that across Europe as a whole, 51% said austerity is not working, while 34% said it is working but will take time, and 5% were sure it is already working.

Clearly, there are differences across the member states. No surprises that Greeks (80%) and Cypriots (64%) are the most sceptical about the merits of austerity. Portugal and Spain are also towards the right hand, anti-austerity side of the scale.

But look at Ireland. According to this poll, more Irish respondents (53%) think that austerity is working than Germans (42%), Finns (40%), or Dutch (39%)  - whose governments are considered to be the eurozone's most hawkish.

It is also striking that people from the new member states in central and eastern Europe, albeit outside the eurozone, have the most trust in austerity policies. The Baltics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) in particular were subjected to significant austerity in the aftermath of the financial crisis yet many in these countries still support such an approach.

It is not clear what exlpains Irish optimism about austerity. It is likely to be a mixture of the fact that, so far, the Irish economy has made relatively good progress (although fears about the banks and property market still remain) and a general cultural disposition - as we noted in a paper last year, of all the struggling eurozone countries Ireland has the economic and social setup and history most likely to fit with the austerity approach.

But taken as a whole, this poll highlights the political and social scale of the challenge the eurozone faces with its current policy approach, particularly among the populations of Southern Europe.

Ireland prepares to exit financial assistance…with further assistance…

Talk surrounding the Irish exit from its bailout programme has been picking up in recent days and weeks given that it is supposed to get off its current bailout programme at the end of this year (the final disbursement of funds is expected sometime in November).

The last few days in particular has seen increased interest with Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem telling the European Parliament yesterday that there would be “measures to support [Ireland’s] gradual exit” from its programme. Irish Finance Minister elaborated on this suggesting that Ireland will seek a €10bn credit line to help aid its transition back to fully funding itself.

All this means that it is looking increasingly likely that Ireland will request some form of ESM credit line towards the end of the year. This could take two forms:

Precautionary credit line (PCCL): open to eurozone states that have sound economic and financial situation including: sustainable public debt, access to capital markets, sustainable external position and solvent banking system (amongst others).

Enhanced credit line (ECCL): essentially for member states who do not meet the criteria for PCCL but do not require a full bailout programme. Conditions will involve improving shortcomings that prevent PCCL access.

Looking at the above criteria Ireland is likely only to be eligible for the ECCL, given the on-going banking sector issues and the questions over debt sustainability after the bank bailout. The procedure is pretty similar to any other bailout request and given Ireland's relative success in implementing reforms, approval seems likely. Importantly, “enhanced surveillance” (read strict conditions) will apply in either case, so Noonan’s hope that this can be done without further austerity and/or reforms seems unlikely to be fulfilled.

The key aim of such a loan is to gain access to the ECB’s OMT, its bond buying programme. Under a credit line Ireland would be eligible for the OMT as the programme applies the much needed conditionality. The combination of the loan (the size is not particularly important) and the OMT means it may not have to be tapped.

All that said and despite the many resounding endorsements for Ireland’s progress, many problems remain. In particular, toxic loans at Irish banks continue to increase while households struggle under the burden of such loans. The issue of how to deal with the public debt created by the previous round of bank bailouts remains unsettled and leaves a cloud hanging over the Irish economy.

Celebrating the end of the eurozone affair ignores the heart of the matter

In today's Telegraph, Mats Persson seeks to answer this simple - and yet brutally complex - question: is the eurozone crisis over?

'We are in the middle of the beginning of the end. The crisis has really hit its peak”, former French economy minister and current IMF chief Christine Lagarde told a broadcaster when asked about the eurozone crisis. The only problem: that was in July 2010. Time and again, EU leaders have declared the crisis over – and been proven wrong. So with markets remaining cautiously optimistic about the euro, is the worst finally behind us?

There are well-rehearsed reasons to be cheerful. Borrowing costs are down for all crisis-stricken countries, exports are picking up in some and EU leaders have actually agreed on a forward-looking measure by turning the ECB into a single supervisor for eurozone banks. Just as eurozone leaders have celebrated prematurely, Anglo-Saxon analysts have consistently tended to overstate the immediate risk of a eurozone break-up. Famously, one major US bank last year assigned an 80pc-90pc risk of Greece leaving the euro – an assessment that Open Europe cautioned strongly against. In Europe, the safest money is always on another fudge. Germany and the ECB were likely to take a political decision to keep Greece inside the eurozone for now, given the fragile situation elsewhere.

But the news last week that the eurozone economy shrunk by 0.6pc in the last quarter of 2012 illustrated what was always the bloc’s greatest challenge: reversing chronic economic malaise. Most fundamentally, reconciling a supranational currency with 17 national democracies remains a challenge. The eurozone’s basic austerity-for-cash prescription continues to fuel tension within individual countries and between the hawkish north and the austerity-fatigued south, testing voters’ patience. The forthcoming Italian elections are turning into a bit of a referendum on EU-mandated austerity, just like the Greek elections last year. Five of the seven main political parties – together polling at around 50pc – have vowed to end cuts. Two parties, Lega Nord and the Five Star Movement, the latter led by comedian-cum-politician Beppe Grillo, even want a referendum on whether the country should remain in the eurozone. The everlasting Silvio Berlusconi is making last-minute gains, in part thanks to a promise to kill what he calls “austerity imposed by Europe”. Against all known principles of common sense, the man still could win. Thankfully, a broadly pro-reform, centre-left coalition led by Pier Luigi Bersani is the most likely outcome, but even then the hope of sweeping economic reforms will be tempered, not least due to those parties’ strong links to the unions.

The Italian elections show how the north and Club Med in many ways are locked into a Catch-22: one wants cash (“solidarity”) first, supervision or discipline second, the other the exact opposite. That dynamic is again evident in the ongoing difficulties in agreeing a bail-out for Cyprus: Germany is unwilling to put in cash for fear of rewarding the bloated Cypriot financial sector. Cyprus resists far-reaching privatisations or significant write-downs of its banking or sovereign debt. This north-south stalemate could become further entrenched if French president Francois Hollande continues to slide towards the Mediterranean bloc, both in terms of political temperament and growth rates (France registered zero growth in 2012). This would weaken the Franco-German axis.

And beyond politics, has the eurozone’s triple crisis – fiscal, banking and competitiveness – really been addressed in any fundamental way? Many eurozone countries are on the path to running a primary surplus – meaning income exceeds outgoings, excluding the cost of servicing a country’s debt. But the eurozone’s overall debt still stands at 90pc of GDP, compared to 70pc in early 2010. Greece, Italy, Portugal and soon probably Cyprus, have debt levels exceeding 120pc of GDP – double what is meant to be allowed under eurozone rules.

The banking sector, too, remains fragile. Thankfully, ECB action helped avoid a massive bank funding crisis last year, but there is a price: eurozone banks have become alarmingly reliant on artificial life support. Liquidity from the ECB to banks now tops €1 trillion (£860bn) – up €140bn on 2009. Even though some banks have started to pay back the cash they owed the ECB early, the eurozone is a long way off a back-stop to allow for wind-downs of bust banks or disentangling of bank and government debt. Overnight interbank lending – a key indicator of banks confidence in the system – remains only half of what it was in 2009 and a third of its peak in 2007. If the crisis were solved, this would surely not be the case.

Finally, by almost every indicator, the single currency is absolutely riddled with economic imbalances, but with no fiscal facility to compensate for them. Encouragingly, Spain, Portugal and in particular Ireland have cut unit labour costs relative to Germany – a key measure of competitiveness - but Italy and France are actually becoming less competitive in relative terms. And imbalances go far beyond labour cost. This year, Greece is expected to contract by over 4pc, Spain by 1.5pc and Cyprus by almost 2pc – while Germany, Finland and others are set for growth. Then there is unemployment. Shockingly, Greek unemployment hit 27pc towards the end of last year, with youth unemployment close to 62pc. Spain is not much better at 26pc and 55pc respectively – and all the scheduled reforms and cuts haven’t even been implemented yet. In Germany, meanwhile, unemployment is at record lows.

In a best-case scenario, the Mediterranean countries will follow the Irish example and continue to squeeze wages and cut costs at home. But in light of domestic political resistance, these imbalances could well continue to test the eurozone’s one-size-fits-all model for a very long time.

So, we have an election fought over EU austerity, political stalemate, a bail-out which no one wants to pay for, abysmal growth forecasts and massive unemployment. There may come a day when the eurozone bounces back and puts us all to shame. But to celebrate now the “end of the crisis” seems to be setting the bar exceptionally low.

Another positive step for Ireland?

Well we finally have a deal on one of the longest running sagas in the eurozone crisis – the Irish promissory notes deal.

See here for some good background on the whole issue.

Key points of the deal (from Irish PM Enda Kenny’s speech):

·         Last night the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC, formerly Anglo Irish bank) was liquidated. The loans it had taken from the ECB through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) were therefore terminated and the Irish Central Bank (ICB) took control of the €25bn in promissory notes and the €3.4bn for the most recent interest/principal payment.

·         The Irish government has agreed to swap these notes for 40 year Irish government bonds.

·         The principal repayments will take place between 2038 and 2053. The average interest rate will be 3% compared to 8% on the promissory note.

·         The Irish National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA, which owns NAMA and formerly IBRC) will see its borrowing requirement over the next decade fall by €20bn. The Irish government deficit will be reduced by approximately €1bn a year.

Essentially then, the IBRC was wound down, allowing/forcing the ICB to take control of the promissory notes which were used as collateral for the ELA which it had been providing, in turn allowing the IBRC to continue servicing its bondholders, depositors and any other obligations. It was then agreed to swap these notes for the longer dated lower interest ones.

It seems to be a fairly reasonable idea and a good work-around of a tricky situation. It certainly provides a reduction in the burden with a much lower interest payment and no principal payment for some time.

The main ECB concerns were: monetary financing if the collateral was allowed to be swapped for lower value (longer dated collateral), the further write-down of bondholders and setting a bad precedent for other eurozone members. Most of these have been addressed, although there are a few issues outstanding:

The first issue was mainly a concern while IRBC existed. That said, if the ICB took control of the bonds when the ELA was terminated as the IBRC was liquidated, why were they suddenly willing to exchange them for the new bonds? Surely, these longer dated lower interest bonds have a lower net present value than the previous promissory notes? This may be because the ICB and the Eurosystem tend to hold such assets at nominal value, but it’s hard to argue that the ICB hasn’t taken a loss in some terms.

The second seems to have been dodged as the remaining liabilities will be covered by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme (see FT Alphaville here for more details) and transferred to NAMA. That said, the role of NAMA now that the ELA has been terminated isn’t clear. Will it still finance these liabilities, if so, how? Surely, it would need to use the new bonds to borrow from the ECB to finance the remaining IBRC liabilities. This isn’t an issue as such, but needs clarification since it impacts: who is holding the new bonds, what interest is being paid and who it is paid to.

On the third issue, the ECB seems to accepted that this is a fairly special case and that setting a precedent is not much of a concern – or is at least less of a concern than the consequences of not giving Ireland a deal on the promissory notes.

A few remaining issues then, but nothing major and no deal breakers – although the monetary financing issue could potentially flare up in our view.

Ultimately, some deal was needed on this front both to reduce the impact of financing the Irish bank bailout on the Irish budget and to maintain political support for the extensive reform programme being undertaken in Ireland. Another positive step in the recovery of the Irish economy it seems. That said, the deal does not succeed in significantly reducing the overall cost of the Anglo Irish Bank bailout and the cost of the bank bailout will continue to weigh on Irish debt - i.e. plenty of challenges remain.

Who's afraid of the big bad bailout fund?

Update - 12:10: Eurozone finance ministers have already reached an agreement and put out a statement. It's pretty much exactly as we expected, with all assigned funds being rolled into the headline lending volume to give the €800bn.

The fact remains though that, even combined, the funds will not be able to introduce more than €500bn in fresh lending. This was the aim all along. In fact, all eurozone finance ministers have done is correct a previous mistake which would have limited the combined lending capacity to €300bn (as originally the treaty essentially specified that only €500bn in loans could be outstanding at any one time). There should be no illusions that this changes almost nothing (we expect not even the markets which have been reacting to every piece of news will be moved much by this). One thing is for certain though this is a clear win for Germany.

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Eurozone finance ministers are meeting today, in what looks to be the most chilled get-together of this group in recent time. They’re set to sign off on an agreement that will see the combination of the eurozone’s temporary and permanent bailout funds, the EFSF and ESM. On paper, the funds have the potential to produce a combined firewall of €940bn. Still far too little if Italy and Spain went, but an impressive sum nonetheless. That is, on paper. In reality they won’t even come close to this.

In an interview with Bild this morning, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble said he didn’t want to “unnerve markets with numbers”, but in a speech in Copenhagen he did just that, saying,

"We have 500 billion euros in fresh money available, together with the programs already agreed for Ireland, Portugal and the new program for Greece. It is about 800 billion (euros). I think it's enough."

Apparently, Schauble reached this number by adding €500bn from the ESM, €200bn from the EFSF, €56bn in bilateral loans to Greece and €60 billion from the third bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) – which is underwritten by all 27 member states via the EU budget. But much of this cash has already been spent, i.e. the EFSM only has €11bn left, and some of the other money can’t actually be lent out. In addition, the remaining €240bn in unused EFSF capacity will be held back for ‘exceptional circumstances’ until mid-2013.

As we’ve been reminded of time and again, the only thing that matters is effective lending capacity. The real amount of cash that is still available to back stop struggling states, should it come to that, is only around €500bn. Here’s the lending capacity math (courtesy of some excellent analysis by the WSJ):

• Mid-2012 – The ESM will be limited to €210bn (as it will only have €32bn in paid-in capital). Along with the €240bn in ‘exceptional’ funds, this gives a total potential lending of €450bn. (The money which is already out the door should be ignored)

• Mid-2013 – Following a second instalment of capital the ESM will be able to lend €420bn. The ‘exceptional’ funds will be wound down around this point.

• Mid-2014 – All ESM capital paid-in, reaches total lending capacity of €500bn.

(There is one caveat to these figures, in that the eurozone could decide to speed up the paying in of ESM capital if the funds were needed. However, this would likely face significant opposition from the likes of Germany and Finland, and is therefore most certainly a last resort).

So despite Schauble’s comment, euro finance ministers continue to throw various different numbers around, which bear few resemblances to reality. We also note that the French Finance Minister, François Baroin, yesterday floated an unfortunate analogy. He said,

"The bailout fund is a bit like the nuclear weapon in the military domain…It is not intended to be used but to act as a deterrent."

The problem here is that if it’s too big and terrible to ever be used, it’s likely that it won’t ever be used. Even jittery markets will be able to figure out that a large fund which would damage French and German credit ratings if ever extended will never be fully tapped. So clearly some circular logic at play. And let's not forget that it’s still far too small to save Italy and Spain should if worse come to worse.

But at least eurozone ministers can look forward to a quieter Friday than usual...

Markets vs. Democracy - Round 278

The Irish government has just announced that it will hold a referendum on the euro fiscal compact. The Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny said he had taken advice from the country’s Attorney General, and made the decision to call a public vote. He also said he would sign the fiscal compact treaty at the meeting of EU leaders on Friday, and the details and arrangements for the referendum will be sorted and announced in the coming weeks, with a vote to be held before the summer.

The Irish government had previously said that the chances (or risks if you ask the markets and EU elite) of a referendum were always 50-50, so this was far from a foregone conclusion. And, as Zerohedge put it, markets have reacted badly to the news of democracy, with the euro weakening significantly. But what is the precise significance of this announcement?

• The vote will essentially determine whether Ireland has access to future bailout funds or not. For a country to access the ESM, the eurozone's permanent bailout fund, it must have ratified and fully adhered to the treaty, according to the terms attached to the deal. The Irish government has already given indications that it will tie its approach closely in with the prospect of further bailout funding, with Deputy PM Eamon Gilmore pointing out the link between emergency funds and the fiscal pact approval. These scare tactics are likely to grow throughout the referendum campaign, with the flip-side of rejecting the treaty being seen as tantamount to a vote for eurozone exit. In other words, the Irish will vote with a gun to their head.

• It provides yet another illustration of the clash between different parliamentary/constitutional democracies (in this case the German vs the Irish constitutions) that time and again have served as an ‘obstacle’ to perceived crisis solutions.

• Irrespective of the outcome, the vote will not derail the euro fiscal compact as it only requires 12 member state ratifications before entering into force, though it could well limit the impact of the pact.

• Those that thought that the complicated political situation in Europe could be reduced to a simple 26 vs 1 narrative, following Cameron’s ‘veto’ to an EU27 Treaty back in December, have received another reminder as to why that isn't the case.

In sum, it would have been difficult to avoid this referendum and we're glad the Irish government did not engage in the legal gymnastics that have been going on elsewhere in the eurozone (*cough* Frankfurt). If further fiscal integration is ever going to succeed (leaving aside whether it's desirable), it will have to happen with a clear and strong mandate from the people. This is also a practical point which market players should ponder. Changes built on a clear mandate from the people (particularly when wrapped in pretty heavy austerity) have a far greater chance of standing the test of time.

But the likely approach of tying a Yes vote to access to more bailout funds and greater security and a No vote to a eurozone exit is already worryingly over-simplistic. Finally injecting some democracy into the eurozone crisis should not be watered down by pigeonholing it into tightly defined categories.

That said, as we've noted, the fiscal pact has already been watered down itself and signing up to it would not be the end of the world for Ireland - but only if that's what the people decide after a full discussion of the issue.

Fresh Trouble for the Fiscal Pact

One week after we published the third draft of the new European 'fiscal treaty' setting out tougher deficit and debt rules for eurozone countries, and with a fourth draft imminent, a quick update on where negotiations are at the moment.

The big news today comes from Prague. We reported last week that Czech Deputy Prime Minister Karel Schwarzenberg had threatened to pull his party out of the ruling coalition if the government decided to stay out of the 'fiscal treaty', but Czech President Vaclav Klaus had insisted that he would not sign the agreement "under any circumstances."

Well, the Czech government has now decided to put the issue to a referendum after several rounds of "very bloody negotiations", in the words of Radek John, the leader of Public Affairs - the smallest party of the coalition (pictured). The Czech Republic is not part of the euro, meaning that eurozone countries could still go ahead with the adoption of the fiscal treaty, without having to wait for the outcome of the referendum (non-euro countries can join at a later stage).

However, the announcement is extremely relevant for at least two reasons. First, there's now a concrete possibility of the Czechs staying out of the 'fiscal treaty', which would be the coup de grâce for the 26-versus-1 scenario depicted by a large portion of UK and European media in the wake of Cameron's veto at last month's EU summit (we had a go at showing why these reports were rushed, to say the least, see here and here).

Second, the news of a Czech referendum may trigger public and political pressure for a referendum in Ireland. This would not necessarily destroy the treaty because if a referendum were held on Irish ratification of the treaty, rather than simply the government's agreement to it, the treaty could still enter into force in theory. The last draft required 12 ratifications among euro states to enter into force but, certainly, it would throw a major spanner in the works and thoroughly undermine the credibility of the treaty if Ireland (the recipient of a bailout package) were not fully signed up at an early stage.

But there could be another problem, and a quite surprising one. In fact, it looks like the Polish government is not happy with the latest draft, which (as the previous two) would exclude non-euro countries from attending meetings of eurozone leaders - a strong incentive for many of the non-euro countries to sign the treaty.

And sure enough, the Polish government is now suggesting that it might not join the 'fiscal treaty' unless its request is taken on board - Germany is thought to be rather keen on having the Poles signed up. This is what Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the press yesterday,

"Our efforts aim at a fiscal agreement the shape of which does not make the division of Europe into two clubs - the eurozone and countries outside the club - more lasting than is safe in our opinion."

Meanwhile, a fourth draft of the agreement is being finalised, and should be made available ahead of the next meeting of finance ministers on 23-24 January. The way ahead still looks quite rocky...

Note to EU: This is how austerity works

Ireland’s economic troubles are well documented, but at least the government has demonstrated its willingness to get to grips with its own budget deficit by taking some unpopular decisions, this time not with the electorate however, but with its own ministers. The Irish Independent reports that Taoiseach Enda Kenny vetoed his Justice Minister Alan Shatter’s request to use the government jet to fly to an informal EU justice and home affairs council meeting in Poland back in July.

It is reported that the trip would have cost around €20,000, but by flying with commercial airlines (SaS outbound, Ryanair for the return trip), Minister Shatter and his delegation notched up costs of around €3,000, thereby saving Irish (and European) taxpayers around €17,000. We appreciate that this might not seem like a lot in the context of the multi-billion euro bailouts, but it is arguably a lack of such prudence at all levels of government spending that precipitated the debt crisis that followed on the heels of the banking crisis in the first place.

Given that the EU is currently engaged in negotiating both next year’s EU budget and its Multiannual Financial Framework – long term budget – for the period 2014 – 2020, perhaps could serve as an unlikely but important precedent...

Will Ireland have a eurosceptic President?

Things are hotting up in the Irish presidential race. After the previous favourite, David Norris, and his ill-fated campaign came to an abrupt end following revelations about his private life - step into the ring namesakes Gay Mitchell and Gay Byrne (pictured) to slug it out.

The former - the Fine Gael party’s official nomination - is staunchly pro-EU and has been a serving MEP since 2004. During the 2008 referendum on the Lisbon Treaty he acted as Fine Gael’s director of elections. However, since David Norris ditched his campaign, Mitchell has been somewhat the frontrunner as other candidates ponder their chances.

But rumour is rife that Byrne will lead a charge for office as an independent candidate (he has never been linked to a political party). ‘Gaybo’ as the veteran broadcasting legend is famously referred to on the emerald isle, would be a highly popular candidate and is largely seen as Mitchell’s greatest contender. In fact, a poll in this morning puts him 20 points ahead Mitchell. He is though, judging by his latest remarks on the European Union, politically-speaking, the polar opposite of Mitchell. Responding yesterday to a question on how his eurosceptic sentiments might affect his presidential bid, he said:

“What we’re seeing now in Europe as far as I’m concerned, is a culmination of all my concerns about it down through the years. I never thought we would reach the disastrous stage we are at at the moment in Europe in my lifetime. I thought that it would eventually come in my grandchildren’s time but it’s come much much quicker than even I visualised and it’s happening even as we speak.”

He added that Ireland was “being run by mad people in Brussels” while arguing that the euro was a “crazy notion from the beginning. We crossed the Rubicon when we joined the single currency. I think there is no backing out now but it is a mad mad world.”

Strong words from the 77 year-old but perhaps not that surprising. He is not a man to shy away from incendiary remarks, especially those directed at the EU. He was vehemently opposed to the Lisbon Treaty during both referendums and called the Treaty “unintelligible bile.” For the minute, it’s unclear as to whether his country or even his most ardent of supporters agree with him on these matters.

But it’s striking to note that the strongly pro-EU main opposition party in Ireland, Fianna Fail, is considering standing aside and offering its support to Byrne, which says a lot about his appeal. FF TDs have said that Byrne's eurosceptic credentials may in fact be an asset with the public. TD Seán Fleming said, “He’s a man who’s always had his finger on the pulse in Ireland and he’s well on the pulse on this one.”

Very interesting.

Rewarded for being completely wrong

Emerging from his bureaucratic hole in Brussels, former Labour MEP Richard Corbett made an appearance on yesterday's Newsnight to discuss the ongoing eurozone crisis (joined by a Greek communist and Tory MP Douglas Carswell - the discussion wasn't exactly smooth). Corbett is one of those old EU federalists still hanging around and clinging on. Having lost his MEP seat in 2009, he now works for EU President Herman Van Rompuy. And last night Corbett did his best to keep up the appearance that he hadn't been completely found out by the eurozone crisis. You almost felt a bit of sympathy for him as he tried to explain "actually the euro as a whole is strong."

Corbett, you see, is a strong contender for the not so flattering prize of "the worst eurozone prediction ever" (and keep in mind that the competition is pretty tough). In 2009, Corbett kindly informed readers of the Bradford Telegraph that,

"The euro has been a rock of stability, as illustrated by the contrasting fortunes of Iceland and Ireland. Joining the single currency would be a major step."

Right Richard. Fast forward to 2011.
Iceland's borrowing costs (10yr bonds): 2.9%
Ireland's borrowing costs (10yr bonds): 12.3%

For his profound knowledge of economics and monetary policy, Corbett now holds a position in Van Rompuy's court, as an "adviser" to the Man himself.

Why does that make us feel even more nervous about the future of the euro?

Delaying tactics are only increasing the costs of the eurozone crisis

Over at the FT's newly established "A-list" blog, Martin Feldstein sets out the reasons why Greece will inevitably have to default, arguing that the key now is to delay it long enough for banks to get their act together. He argues:

Greece is not alone in its insolvency and a default by Athens could trigger defaults by Portugal, Ireland and possibly Spain. The resulting losses would destroy large amounts of the capital of banks and other creditors in Germany, France and other countries. There would be a drying up of credit available to businesses throughout Europe and there could be a collapse of major European banks.

This inevitable contagion and its potential consequences for the European financial system is the reason the European Central Bank is determined to avoid a default at this time. The challenge, therefore, is to find a way to postpone the defaults long enough for the banks and other creditors to withstand the write-downs of bond values if Greece, Portugal and Ireland default simultaneously.

You can read the full article by following this link, but here is our response in full - we agree with Feldstein on many points, but argue it is better to face the inevitable sooner rather than later:

It now seems widely accepted that a Greek default is not a matter of if, but when. The most important question is therefore: when would such a default be most cost-effective? The answer to this extends beyond just the economic costs and into the political sphere.

While it is true that allowing creditors more time to buffer up against the write-downs resulting from sovereign defaults (in Greece and possibly Portugal and Ireland) could be beneficial, such delaying tactics come with three major drawbacks.

First, will the banks actually get their act together? The truth is that banks have had more than enough time to reduce their exposure to Greece. Even as late as February, Greek bonds were trading at 80 per cent of nominal value – a pretty decent recovery rate given the situation. Why have the banks not done so? There are a number of reasons for sure, ranging from greed to bad judgement. But one of the main ones, surely, is that they are continuing to expect that, given the enormous stakes, politicians and the ECB will continue to bail out Greece. The fact that Germany, for example, continues to resist stringent capital requirements for its banks is a sign that lessons simply aren’t be being learnt. This takes moral hazard to a whole new level and continues to fuel Europe’s debt bubble.

Secondly, the first round impact – and probably also the knock on effects – of a default will increase. We estimate that a 50 per cent haircut would be needed to get Greece down to a sustainable debt level, around 90 per cent of GDP. By 2014, following a second bailout, the necessary haircut would increase to 69 per cent.

Thirdly, and related to the prior two points, by our estimates the EU, IMF and ECB accounted for 26 per cent of Greek debt at the start of this year. By 2014, following a second Greek bailout, this will have risen to 64 per cent, meaning that roughly two-thirds of Greek debt will be taxpayer-owned by that date. Thus Europe is setting itself up for a massive political fall-out: taxpayers in creditor countries will utterly despise having to cough up cash (as loan-guarantees are turned into outright losses), as “bankers” are let off the hook. On the other side of the coin, the second bailout plan assumes that the Greek electorate is willing and able to swallow three more years of tough austerity measures. Even with some token private sector involvement, it looks as if taxpayers across Europe would judge a second €100bn-plus bailout of Greece a massive injustice. This is a major political gamble.

A second bailout is not the way forward. The EU needs to face up to reality and plan for an orderly debt restructuring as soon as possible, which could involve a limited cash injection. The current delaying tactic is only increasing the economic and political cost of the eurozone crisis.

Greece leaving the EMU: From taboo to fashionable?

First it was the idea of eurozone bail-outs, then it was restructuring, now another eurozone taboo has been completely smashed: Greece leaving the Single Currency. In fact, over the past few days, it appears as if arguing in favour of Greece leaving the eurozone has become almost fashionable.

The speculation really kicked off when Der Spiegel revealed that a "crisis meeting" had been called in Luxembourg, following rumours that the Greek government was considering leaving the eurozone (although the main topic on the agenda for that meeting was probably restructuring and another bail-out package).

Despite the usual round of denials ("there's no meeting", "Greece is just fine", "Elvis is alive" etc) people are now falling over themselves to be candid. Greece's EU Commissioner, Maria Damanaki, for example. Becoming the first EU official to speak the unspeakable, she said,

The scenario of Greece's exit from the euro is now on the table, as are ways to
do this. Either we agree with our creditors on a programme of tough sacrifices
and results...or we return to the drachma. Everything else is of secondary
importance.

Clearly an attempt to put pressure on her countrymen to get on with business, but a bold statement nonetheless. And the last few days have seen a slew of politicians and commentators following suit. Writing in De Telegraaf, former Dutch Finance Minister Willem Vermeend argued that "Greece should leave the euro", given that it will never be able to pay back its debt.

In an interview with Handelsblatt, German FDP MP Frank Schaeffler - the standard bearer of the German no-bail out movement - said,

As long as Greece hasn't privatised a single cent worth of assets, increasing
the aid would be absolutely the wrong signal. At the same time governments must
help with an orderly eurozone exit.

(Schaeffler has been arguing this for a while, it should be said, in April 2010 - before the Greek bail-out was even agreed - he said that Greece should be prepared to "voluntarily leave the eurozone").

An increasing number of academics and commentators are now also suggesting that Greece should take a hike - be it temporarily or permanently. Harvard Economics Professor Martin Feldstein, for example, who this week argued,

A temporary leave of absence from the eurozone would allow Greece to
achieve a price-level decline relative to other eurozone countries, and would
make it easier to adjust the relative price level if Greek wages cannot be
limited.

In the WSJ, Editor of German weekly Die Zeit Josef Joffe wrote that,

Greece faces default no matter what it does, but only abandoning the euro
would give it a chance at growth.

And in today's FT, columnist John Plender chimes in,

If a package is agreed in June, which seems probable, the challenge will be to bring Greece to a primary budget surplus where revenue exceeds costs before interest payments. At that point, it would be sensible for Greece to bow out of the monetary union and take advantage of currency devaluation. For that to work, though, European banks would need in the interim to have bolstered their capital. And the execution risks are phenomenal. This is policymaking on a wing and a prayer.

And you know where we stand - the eurozone, in its current shape and form, is simply unsustainable (see here, here, here and here for example).

Spring cleaning

The EU has today released its spring forecast, which updates last autumn’s economic forecasts for EU (and related) countries.

Despite our (relatively) chirpy title it’s far from happy reading.

The EU now expects Greek debt to reach 157.7% of GDP in 2011 and 166.1% in 2012. We can’t help but think that this backs up our (and many others') claim that the bailout has been a complete failure in Greece (combine this with talk of a second bailout only a year after the first and they’re almost making our point for us).

It’s not just Greece either. Irish debt is expected to reach 112% this year and 117.9% next. While Portugal’s debt is forecast to hit 101.7% by the end of the year and go on to 107.4% in 2012. Only a few months ago Portugal’s debt was expected to be around 82% this year, that’s a whopping 20% increase in only a few months!

All in all the figures and the report make fairly grim reading. Over the past year we have seen these sets of figures continuously revised upwards, yet the EU and the ECB continue to maintain that the adjustment programmes they’ve laid out for these countries are achievable and are having a substantial impact.

We think it’s about time the EU started accepting the reality of its own figures and added a debt restructuring to its tools for cleaning up the eurozone debt crisis this spring.

You call that austerity?

We imagine that will be the response by many in Athens and Dublin to the conditions which have been announced along with the €78bn bailout deal for Portugal. Jose Socrates, the caretaker Portuguese PM, was almost boasting on TV last night about how much more favourable the terms were for Portugal compared to Greece and Ireland. In the cold light of day though, most of the details we’ve seen so far focus on what won’t happen rather than what will, raising the question: Where are the necessary savings actually going to come from? That should be slightly concerning for taxpayers across the EU.

The point that has attracted most attention is the easing of the deficit cutting programme. But in actual fact the targeted cut is higher than before, given the change in the level of the deficit.

Previous 2010 estimate and 2011 target: 7.3% and 4.6% = change of 2.7%

New 2010 estimate and 2011 target: 9.1% and 5.9% = change of 3.2%

Most observers, including us, didn’t expect Portugal to be able to achieve its original level of cuts, let alone a higher level - especially when combined with lower growth prospects. That was before we even found out what was not going to be cut…

According to Socrates the conditions will not include cuts to: minimum wages, public sector pay, education spending and healthcare. In addition, there will be no additional public sector job cuts and the retirement age will not be increased. That is a huge list of things that will be left untouched, especially since savings of 3.2% of GDP are expected.

So, seriously, where is the money coming from?

Well, there are expected to be some, limited, cuts to higher scale state pensions as well as a decrease in the amount and duration of unemployment benefit. There is also a plan to raise VAT on electricity. In terms of increasing revenue, there was talk of privatising €5.3bn in public assets but not Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest credit institution, which was widely expected to be sold to raise funds. So all in all not exactly an earth-shattering plan for saving 3.2% of GDP.

To be fair, there are more details and plans to be announced but considering what has already been taken off the table we’re not overly optimistic.

Admittedly, too much austerity would definitely be bad for the economy and finding the right balance is a hard line to tread. But for those of us who already believe the bailouts to be a waste of money, since they won’t solve any of the long term problems, these kinds of conditions are almost just adding insult to injury.

Emerald Isle stress tests get a gold star (for now)

Yesterday afternoon Ireland announced the results of its recent round of banking stress tests. They showed that the banks need €24bn to recapitalise; that is undoubtedly a huge number for an economy the size of Ireland’s. So why are investors not running for the hills?

Well, from our perspective at least, the Irish stress tests seem to do something that none of the ones that have gone before have – make a genuine attempt to fully estimate the potential losses which banks could face.

This is a good start and the stress tests should be commended, but more important is how the banks and the government respond to the results. Unfortunately, that has been less commendable.

The government was expected to announce a series of measures to raise the necessary capital and set the banks on a sustainable course. However, there was only talk of ‘some’ capital being raised by investors and private lenders, with the main chunk expected to still come from the €35bn allotted to the banks by the original Irish bailout. There was also no mention of bondholders taking losses or of the widely reported new ECB medium term liquidity mechanism. So what we have is some more clarity of the state of Irish banks - which is good - but we're still missing a solid, revised plan to to address the mess.

The response of the banks was also slightly worrisome. Both AIB and Irish L&P suggested that their losses will not be as high as estimated due to the nature of the Irish mortgage market and real estate sector. This is essentially a reference to forbearance – when a lender allows a borrower extra time to repay a mortgage rather than foreclosing on the property. This allows the lenders to delay the realisation of losses, while giving the impression that the extra time given is designed to give a break to struggling taxpayers. Whatever the motivation, this is only a short term policy and, unless the Irish economy has a miraculous turnaround, most borrowers will be unable to repay these loans despite an extension in maturity.

Lastly there is the issue of the deleveraging – the sale of assets to bring the deposit-to-loan ratio back to a sustainable level – or as some people are terming it, the ‘fire sale’. Irish banks will need to shed €72bn of assets by 2013, which is a massive amount to dump into fragile financial markets. The losses on these assets will, in many cases, be substantial although the stress tests claimed to have accounted for this. Whether or not they were fully able to accurately predict the market value of some of these assets, especially since they will be sold over time, remains to be seen.

So a gold star for the stress tests (relatively at least) but they’re only a start. How the government and banks respond will deter whether Irish banks can recover quickly or whether markets will lose faith in them completely - meaning that an Irish restructering and/or another bail-out could be around the corner.

How to prevent bubbles

The new year sees the launch of the EU’s new financial supervisors: the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority. If you haven't already done so, have a look at our take on the new EU supervisors here.

Green MEP Sven Giegold (Germany), who took the lead on the issue in the European Parliament, seems to be their most ardent supporter. He told German TV channel ARD that the huge structural problems in Ireland's banking sector "could have been prevented by the new European banking supervisors, thanks to their new legal possibilities".

Hmmm, a bit of a simplistic explanation, no?

Giegold doesn't have to look very far to spot the reason why his reasoning is painfully incomplete. In fact, casting his eyes to Frankfurt and the ECB would do the trick.

As often repeated nowadays, low eurozone interest rates, essentially designed for a sluggish Germany, led to an abundance of cheap credit in Ireland, in turn fuelling a property bubble that burst with the financial crisis in 2008, while the Irish government turned a blind eye. The Irish banks became insolvent, and private debt became public debt through bank bail-outs.

Inappropriate interest rates weren't the only issue, but to ignore the problems they caused Ireland is just silly. Therefore, there are several problems with Giegold's view:

1. It's heroic to assume that the EU's financial supervisors - somehow by virtue of being ran at the EU level as opposed to the national level - would spot the credit dangers looming, and act accordingly. It's also not clear why EU supervisors would be less vulnerable to commercial or political "hijack" than their national counterparts.

2. Regulators often find it difficult to spot bubbles, not matter where they sit (in the Spectator, Johan Norberg does a good job of breaking down the flawed assumptions underpinning the thuinking ahead of the 2008 crash). Ireland, for example, had been experiencing sound growth since the beginning of the nineties, thanks to some brave economic reforms. Booming house prices could be seen as 'normal' in such economic circumstances. It's not at all clear that the new EU supervisors would possess the kind of competence needed to really dig into the markets, or know where to look (American regulators quite clearly didn't pre-Lehman).

Having said that, however, in a best case scenario, the European Banking Authority, alongside the European Systemic Risk Board, could in theory serve as important facilitators of information sharing to help regulators/supervisors keep up with new developments, such as the rise of the shadow banking system, and control leverage accordingly. The EBA could also coordinate cases where cross-border banks expose taxpayers and savers in different countries to risks, ideally leading to wind downs of insolvent banks at the minimum cost, rather than more taxpayer-backed bail-outs (solving nothing).

3. But, and here's the thing, even if the EU supervisors were to spot, say, a housing bubble and stop it (through taxes at the national level and regulating the housing market, for example), the problem of excessive cheap credit, fuelled by low interest rates, would not be addressed. There are other things to spend your cash on apart from houses. If money is cheap, risk-taking is easy. And the more risks the greater the scope for bubbles.

The only effective way to stamp out excessive cheap credit in a boom is to make money more expensive, through higher interest rates. But here the familiar dilemma appears yet again: in a currency union it's impossible to tailor the interest rates like this, meaning that the EU supervisors can scream "bubble" all they want.

This is of course a difficult conclusion to reach if you have an ideological commitment to centralised decision making and a single currency for everyone...

Will an Irish bailout actually solve anything?

Open Europe has today published a briefing asking the simple question: will an Irish bail-out actually solve anything?

A healthy Irish economy is quite clearly in the UK's interest, and to extend loans to a struggling neighbour (to use Osborne's rhetoric) is in itself nothing controversial. Sweden offered cash to Iceland after that country hit the rocks following a banking meltdown (not unlike that of Ireland) for example.

And Ireland is clearly in better shape than Greece, Portugal and Spain, and a rescue package could, at best, buy Ireland some time to get their house in order - courtesy of its open economy.

However, it's also true that euro membership alters the logic - and potential effectiveness - of a bailout. As we argue in the briefing, there are five reasons why a one-off bailout for Ireland will not solve the eurozone's problems:

1. Temporary loans or greater budget discipline across the eurozone will do very little to help countries such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal regain competitiveness, the main problem these countries face.

2. In essence, what was asked of Greece, and soon Ireland, is two-thirds of a traditional IMF package - cuts in expenditure and increased taxes. However, the third, vital ingredient - currency depreciation - isn't permitted within a single currency. Instead, currency devaluation has to be replaced by so-called "internal depreciation", meaning even more squeezes to jobs and wages which aren't politically or socially affordable.

3. The ECB is likely to continue to pursue a German-style monetary policy, leading to an undervalued currency for Germany (fuelling German export-led growth) but an equally overvalued currency for the weaker economies such as Portugal and Spain (although Ireland itself could be helped by a weaker euro). This, in turn, locks in a multi-speed eurozone, with the same type of tensions we've seen over the last year coming to the fore again in future.

4. The politics of a loan bailout and stronger supranational budget rules are unsustainable. The lending countries, most importantly Germany, can only sell a de facto debt union to their electorates if it comes with strict rules and terms. But such terms imposed from the outside seriously undermine the ability of the borrowing countries to democratically govern themselves.

5. The role currently being played by the ECB is untenable, both for political and economic reasons:

• Politically, the ECB's decision back in May to start buying 'junk' government bonds from the secondary market has compromised its independence - which the Germans were promised would never happen. A bailout using loan guarantees from other EU states may allow the ECB to withdraw its emergency funding for now, but without a long-term solution the ECB is likely to be called on again to prop up ailing states.

• Economically, the situation is unsustainable as well. The Eurosystem of eurozone central banks that underpins the ECB is leveraged 24 times, while the average hedge fund is only leveraged 3 to 4 times. A fall in assets of only a few percent would wipe out the ECB's reserves, which could lead to the ECB itself being in need of a "bail-out".

As we conclude,

There are no obvious long-term solutions that do not come with huge political and economic costs. The dilemma facing the eurozone remains whether it is to become a fully fledged United States-style fiscal and therefore political union with huge continuous transfers from the German-led bloc to those on the periphery - which would inflict serious damage on the German economy; or prepare for a messy divorce possibly in the form of a two-tier euro and even some countries exiting altogether.

"Europe is more than a nine year old currency"

Yesterday saw some interesting reactions from the German papers, in response to the increasingly likely Irish bail-out.

A leader in Die Zeit dismisses Herman Van Rompuy's “exaggerations” and “apocalyptic” comments (“if the Euro doesn’t survive, then the EU won’t survive”, he said earlier in the week), and so those of Chancellor Merkel who made a similarly dramatic statement only a few days ago. The leader asserts that “the European idea is more than an almost nine-year-old monetary community", arguing that the EU could function perfectly well without a single currency (hear, hear!).

It argues,

...you can thank the common market that anyone can, Europe-wide, sell their goods and services and be treated as if they were local there. And all of that would be the same without the Euro. A permanent change to a different currency would only make life a little bit more strenuous for your average citizen.

Dirk Heilmann in Handelsblatt captures many of the issues on the table in his piece’s titled: “Yet again we are saving Europe’s banks.” As the powerhouse of the euro zone, the Germans are expected to be picking up a reported third of the rescue package (!).

Now, with the rescue of Ireland, it has been clear from the beginning that it is essentially a bailout…The banking problems are so large that they overwhelm the land. So, again, we rescue banks: the Irish, their foreign creditors and the owners of Irish government bonds.

Yet Heilmann is sympathetic to the Irish plight:

The taxpayers should help Ireland’s credit institutions and their creditors, because Europe's banks are still ailing. Their compulsory rehabilitation is urgently needed.

He's also quick to dismiss Greek comparisons,

We are not talking about a country that has squandered these advantages like the Greeks and frittered away the Euro dividend...we are talking about a country, that, like Iceland, let its financial sector grow unattended for a long time, until the monster turned around and ate its master.